

EPICURUS

Museo Capitolino, Rome

EPICURUS

THE EXTANT REMAINS

WITH SHORT CRITICAL APPARATUS

TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

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PREFACE

AN interest in Lucretius took me back many years ago, as it has others, to the study of the remains of Epicurus, without which the true meaning of the Latin poet cannot be fully understood. The great work of Usener placed at one's disposal all that was then available for the knowledge of Epicurus, and with the exception of the Vatican Gnomologium nothing has since been added.¹ But the study of *Epicurea* brought me to the conclusion that something more than a mere text was needed: the work of Brieger, Giussani, Tohte, and others on certain portions of the Epicurean theory had at once shed light and raised new problems, and I was thus led to set about making my own text, translation, and commentary. Since I have been at work, there have appeared the German translation of Kochalsky, the Italian translation and brief commentary of Bignone, and quite recently the new Teubner text of von der Muehll. Each of these—and especially in my view the work of Bignone—have greatly advanced the study of Epicurus, but there is

¹ For certain fragments of the *Περὶ Φύσεως* see Commentary, p. 391.

still no complete¹ translation in English and no complete commentary in any language.

In the circumstances it seems worth while to publish the result of a good many years' work on the Epicurean text. But I do so with much hesitation. No one can be more fully aware than I am of the extreme difficulty of the writings of Epicurus, and the necessarily tentative character of any solution of their many *cruces*: I would repeat with fervour the words of Usener, 'nunc cum librum manibus emitto, sentio me hominem et inconstantem fuisse'. But I trust that I have shed some light on dark places and at least have made it clear where the problems lie and what are the data for their solution. I hope to follow up this work shortly with a volume of critical essays on the system of Epicurus, where it will be possible to deal with some of the problems at greater length.

My debt to many predecessors in Epicurean studies is great, and will become obvious in the commentary, but I think that after Usener I owe most to two great Italian scholars, Giussani and Bignone.

C. B.

OXFORD, *September*, 1924.

¹ Many of the important passages have been translated by Mr. R. D. Hicks in his *Stoic and Epicurean* (1910), but I do not always find myself in agreement with his versions. His translation of Diogenes Laertius in the Loeb series unfortunately appeared too late for me to use it. For the same reason I have been unable to use the translation of the Letters and the *Κύρια Δόξαι* by A. Ernout in his *Commentary on Lucretius I, II*.

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
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FRONTISPICE. Epicurus, from the bust in the *Museo Capitolino*, Rome.



INTRODUCTION

MSS. AND EDITIONS.

By far the greater part of the extant remains of Epicurus—the three letters, the *Κύρια Δόξαι*, and many of the surviving fragments—are embodied in the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius. The book purports to be a 'Life' of Epicurus and is compiled in haphazard fashion from many doxographical sources, the quotations occurring from time to time in the course of the narrative. Thus the problem of the text of Epicurus is for the most part that of the MS. sources for Diogenes. Six MSS. (BFGHPQ) were used by Usener in the preparation of his great edition (1887): for a full account of them his preface should be consulted. These six have recently been re-read, and Usener's report of the readings of the principal codices checked and occasionally corrected by P. von der Muehl (1922), who has added readings from five more MSS. (TDWCoZ) of which the last two are the most important. A brief account, based on the work of Usener and von der Muehl, will suffice for this edition in which I have been guided entirely by their reports.

The MSS. of Diogenes fall into two main classes, not, according to Usener, representing any ancient cleavage of tradition, but both derived during the Middle Ages from the same source, the one class representing a careful copying, the other more negligent work: this is shown by the occasional unexpected agreement of the chief representatives of the two classes, B and F.

1. The oldest representative of the first class is B, the Codex Borbonicus gr. iii. B. 29 (formerly 253), a parchment codex of the twelfth century, in the public library at Naples: it was corrected by a hand of the fourteenth century whose readings not infrequently agree with those of Co.

P Later than B, but almost more important, is P, the Codex Parisinus gr. 1759, a paper codex of the beginning of the fourteenth century. It is described by Usener as 'the twin' of B, but von der Muehll is inclined to regard it as representing another family of the same stock. P has unfortunately been much corrected and the corrections have often obscured or obliterated its original readings: von der Muehll distinguishes P² (Usener's P¹) who derived his readings from another copy of the same family and P³ (Usener's P²) who corrected the text later by the vulgate tradition.

We are, however, often able to recover the original reading of P from two other MSS. which appear to have been copied from P before it was corrected. For this purpose Usener relies Q mostly on the authority of Q, the Codex Parisinus gr. 1758, a paper codex made in the fourteenth century or at the beginning of the fifteenth. Von der Muehll prefers to quote a MS. which he has himself collated from photographs and Co which he refers to as Co, the Codex Constantinopolitanus Veteris Serail. ('The Old Seraglio'): this MS. was written in the fourteenth or fifteenth century (the last page being added later in the sixteenth). These two, or one or other of them, frequently confirm the original text of P, and in other places, where P's reading has been obscured, may be taken to preserve it.

H Belonging to the same class, though of lesser importance, are H, the Codex Laurentianus LXIX. 35 of the fourteenth century, also a copy of P, but later than Q and made after the W correction of P and therefore embodying a mixed text, and W, the Codex Vaticanus gr. 140 of the fourteenth century (one of von der Muehll's MSS.), which he believes, though with less certainty, to be also derived from P.

F II. The chief MS. of the second class, derived more carelessly from the same original tradition as the first class, is F, the Codex Laurentianus LXIX. 13, a large parchment MS., attributed by Usener to the twelfth and by von der Muehll to the thirteenth century. Usener is, however, of opinion that it is an

unscholarly copy and cannot be taken by itself to represent the tradition of the second class.

Z Von der Muehl finds the necessary support for F in Z, the Codex Lobcowicensis Raudnitzianus, which he has himself collated. This codex again has been much corrected and von der Muehl believes that after it had already received the additions of Z² and Z³ it was the source of the first printed edition of Diogenes.

f The *editio princeps* was published by Froben at Basle in 1523 and is said in the preface to be a transcript of the MS. of Matthew Aurigathus, professor at Wittenberg. The MS. would appear to have been a bad copy of the corrected Z. This printed text has therefore derivatively the authority of a MS. and is accordingly quoted by Usener in support of F. (I have not myself quoted it, except where readings rest on its sole authority.)

Von der Muehl points out the frequency with which we find in support of a reading the combination FP²Zf: this combination may be taken to represent the second class. Its best readings, however, are not infrequently due to conjecture rather than to tradition, and von der Muehl is of opinion that Usener is sometimes mistaken in attributing too great importance to them.

G The remaining MS. quoted by Usener is G, the Codex Laurentianus LXIX. 28, a paper MS., said to be of the fourteenth century. It appears to represent a mixed tradition of the two classes. Von der Muehl refers also occasionally to T, D the Codex Urbinas Vat. gr. 109, and to D, the Codex Borbonicus gr. iii. B. 28. He has also made some use of Φ, an epitome of Diogenes Laertius in Codex Vaticanus gr. 96, made, as he thinks, at the time of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, which is available when from time to time it quotes passages *in extenso*. A less valuable epitome of the same character is Ψ, found in the Codex Palatinus Vaticanus gr. 93 and dated 1338.

The MSS. of Diogenes were enriched by a considerable body of scholia, often references to other passages in Epicurus or

amplifications of or comments on the text: these have become interwoven into the text and are especially frequent in the letters to Herodotus and to Pythocles. Sometimes, where they are accompanied by references (e.g. to the *Περὶ Φύσεως*) it is easy to detect them, but in other places the task of disentangling text and gloss is extremely difficult and delicate. Most modern editors would agree that Usener was too ready to assume 'gloss, scholium, or *additamentum*', and that many phrases thus excluded by him can be restored to the text. Von der Muehl is of opinion that it is the intrusion of these additions in the letter to Pythocles which has caused its dislocated and incoherent appearance, and that it was in origin a genuine work of Epicurus' own hand. I am myself more inclined to hold the opinion of Usener that it is an Epicurean compilation.

With the earlier editions of Diogenes or of the tenth book Usener has dealt in his Introduction (pp. xv-xvii), and recent criticism has not altered his opinions. They fall naturally into two classes. The editors of the sixteenth century had access only to inferior MSS. and used them unscientifically. Of the *editio princeps* of Froben (1523) I have already spoken. Stephanus (1570) relied on G and another inferior MS. Marianus 393: Sambucus (1566) used the Venetus, Vaticanus, and Borbonicus, and made some corrections, but did not consult the MSS. constantly or with judgement. To the same class belong the editions of Aldobrandinus (1594) and Menagius (1664). Yet to each and all of these earlier editors are due certain conjectural restorations which still find a place in modern texts.

In the seventeenth century Gassendi revived the serious study of Epicureanism and may be said to have introduced the theory of atomism to the modern world. But though he too has contributed permanent emendations to the text, he was a poor Greek scholar, and in his edition of Book X (1649) showed no respect for tradition and practically re-wrote the text. Meibom (1692) in Usener's view did still greater damage to the text. Schneider (1813) was able to some extent to repair the harm done, but Huebner (1828) again returned to the tradition of

Meibom, and Cobet (1862), though he derived assistance from F and from his own scholarship, could not get free from it.

Hermann Usener's great work *Epicurea* appeared in 1887, and is the foundation of all modern study of Epicurus. By collecting together from the whole range of classical literature citations from Epicurus and allusions to his theories, he established a store-house of information on Epicureanism and in many cases parallels which serve to illustrate and often to explain the text of Epicurus himself. But almost more important were his services to the text. The way for a scientific study of the MS. tradition had been prepared by Wachsmuth who had collated the Italian MSS. and Bonner who had collated the two Paris MSS. (P and Q). Usener threw over the whole previous tradition of printed editions and made a fresh start from the scientific study of the MSS. and their relations to one another. His text is accordingly established on a far sounder basis and he has himself made important and valuable corrections. At the same time he is not what would now be called a conservative editor, and in dealing with passages which he could not understand he was too apt either to introduce violent emendations or to assume the intrusion of a gloss or scholium. But a glance at the critical apparatus in this edition or that of von der Muehl will show how often his corrections have been accepted, and any future work must take the form of a re-examination of the evidence on the lines which he laid down.

The work of Usener naturally gave an impetus to the study of Epicurus, and since his edition there has been published a considerable body of essays and articles, dealing for the most part with individual points in the Epicurean theory, but in many instances also making contributions to the elucidation of the text. Of these the most important are the works of Brieger and Glusani. Brieger, who already in 1882 had published a commentary on the letter to Herodotus, added a second pamphlet in 1893 *Epikurs Lehre von der Seele*, in which there is a further study of the text: he is too apt to indulge in wild emendation, but has made a few useful suggestions. More stimulating and

valuable are the essays of Giussani in his edition of Lucretius (1896-8): he showed wonderful penetration in the understanding and elucidation of Epicurean ideas, but again was too reckless in his dealings with the text to have left much of permanent value. Useful work has also been done by Arndt, Crönert, Diels, R. D. Hicks, P. Merbach, R. Philippon, and H. Weil.

Within the last ten years two translations of Epicurus have been published containing critical notes on the text. The German translation of A. Kochalsky (1914) introduces a considerable number of emendations, but they seem to me on the whole arbitrary and too often to take the form of re-writing. Of greater importance is the Italian translation of E. Bignone (1920): in brief foot-notes and some appendices he has made most penetrating comments on the text and in not a few places suggested corrections of his own which are of great value. I am, however, inclined to think that he is too prone to suppose that words have fallen out and to restore the text by additions. The Teubner text of von der Muehl (1922) came into my hands after I had practically completed my work. Its great value is the re-examination of the MSS. and the addition of readings from other MSS. not made by Usener. The editor also appears to me to use very sound judgement as between readings and conjectures and to have established a good text, with which I am happy to find myself in general agreement. I have endeavoured to introduce from his critical apparatus the necessary modifications of Usener's report of the readings of his MSS. together with the evidence gleaned from the additional MSS. The tendency of all these three recent critics is to a more conservative text than that of Usener, and with this tendency I am fully in accord. In the many difficult places which still remain I have used my judgement to the best of my ability in choosing between the alternatives available and in a few have introduced corrections of my own. But I doubt whether any editor could claim to have produced a fully satisfactory text.

For the fragments the text must necessarily depend on the MSS. of the authors from whom they are cited, except for the

Vatican Gnomologium. This is contained in Codex Vaticanus gr. 1950, a MS. of the fourteenth century. It was first published by C. Wotke, with some notes by Usener and Gomperz in *Wiener Studien*, vol. x (1888). Von der Muehl has collated the MS. again from photographs and in some cases has corrected the readings reported by Wotke. In the majority of these excerpts the text is fairly sound, but there are some in which it still remains very uncertain.

SIGLA

- I. B codex Borbonicus Neapolitanus gr. iii. B. 29 (saec. xii).
- P codex Parisinus gr. 1759 (saec. xiv).
- Q codex Parisinus gr. 1758 (saec. xiv vel xv init.).
- Co codex Constantinopolitanus Veteris Serail. (saec. xiv vel xv).
- H codex Laurentianus LXIX. 35 (saec. xiv).
- W codex Vaticanus gr. 140 (saec. xiv).
- II. F codex Laurentianus LXIX. 13 (saec. xii vel xiii).
- Z codex Lobcowicensis Raudnitzianus VI. fc. 38.
- f editio Frobeniana Basiliensis (anni MDxxxiii).
- G codex Laurentianus LXIX. 28 (saec. xiv).
- T codex Urbinas Vat. gr. 109 (saec. xv).
- D codex Borbonicus Neapolitanus gr. iii. B. 28.

23710

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vel xv).

EPICURUS

QUTR

B

ΕΠΙΚΟΤΡΟΣ ΗΡΟΔΟΤΩΙ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ

- 35 Τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὧς Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἑξακριβοῦν μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν ἐπιτομὴν τῆς ὅλης πραγμα-
 5 τείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὀλοσχερωτάτων γε δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύασα, ἵνα παρ' ἑκάστους τῶν καιρῶν ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς δύνωνται, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ φύσεως θεωρίας. καὶ τοὺς προβεβηκότας δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβλέψει τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας τὸν κατεστοιχειωμένον δεῖ
 10 μνημονεύειν. τῆς γὰρ ἀθρόας ἐπιβολῆς πυκνὸν δεόμεθα, τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὐχ ὁμοίως. | βαδιστέον μὲν οὖν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ τὸ τοσοῦτον ποιητέον, ἀφ' οὗ ἢ τε κυριωτάτῃ ἐπιβολῇ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἔσται καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκρίβωμα πᾶν ἐξευρήσεται, τῶν ὀλοσχερω-
 5 τάτων τύπων εὖ περιειλημμένων καὶ μνημονευομένων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ τετελεσιουργημένου τοῦτο κυριώτατον τοῦ παντὸς ἀκριβώματος γίνεται, τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὀξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι, καὶ (τοῦτο γίνοιτ' ἂν ἀπάντων) πρὸς ἀπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωνὰς συναγομένων. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ
 10 πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὄλων περιοδείας εἶναι μὴ δυνα-

35 3 βίβλους] βίβλους Usener: βίβλων Meibom 4 γε δοξῶν
 Usener in commentario: δὲ δοξῶν B: δεδοξῶν P¹QCo: δοξῶν
 FGHP² 5 αὐτοῖς] ἂν τις Usener: fortasse αὐτὸς Brieger παρε-
 σκεύασα ἵνα HP²Z: παρεσκεύασα... ἵνα cum litura F: παρεσκεύασαν ἃ
 QP¹Co¹: παρεσκεύασα ἃ BGCo² 6 αὐτοῖς Schneider: αὐτοῖς
 libri 7 καὶ] καὶ δὴ καὶ Giussani 8 προβεβηκότας Casaubon:
 προβεβληκότας libri 36 1 ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ Gassendi: καὶ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα
 libri 2 ἐν τῇ] ἐν τε Usener: ἐν δὲ Muehl 8 (τοῦτο γίνοιτ' ἂν
 ἀπάντων) supplevi: pro καὶ scripsit ἐκίστων Usener: (περὶ τῶν κατὰ

I

EPICURUS TO HERODOTUS

- 35 For those who are unable, Herodotus, to work in detail through all that I have written about nature, or to peruse the larger books which I have composed, I have already prepared at sufficient length an epitome of the whole system, that they may keep adequately in mind at least the most general principles in each department, in order that as occasion arises they may be able to assist themselves on the most important points, in so far as they undertake the study of nature. But those also who have made considerable progress in the survey of the main principles ought to bear in mind the scheme of the whole system set forth in its essentials. For we have frequent need of the general view, but not so often of the detailed
- 36 exposition. Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one's memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth. And in fact the accurate knowledge of details will be fully discovered, if the general principles in the various departments are thoroughly grasped and borne in mind ; for even in the case of one fully initiated the most essential feature in all accurate knowledge is the capacity to make a rapid use of observation and mental apprehension, and (this can be done if everything) is summed up in elementary principles and formulae. For it is not possible for any one to abbreviate the complete course through the whole system, if he cannot embrace in his own mind by means of short

Introduction :
need of this
epitome for
advanced
students.

μέρος καὶ περὶ τῶν ὅλων) supplevit Bignone 9 συναγομένων] συναγο-
μένοις Muehl: ἀναγιγνέων Usener 10 εἶναι] εἰδέναι Meibom δυνα-
μένου Thomas: δυνάμενον libri

- 37 μένου διὰ βραχεῶν φωνῶν ἅπαν ἐμπεριλαβεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν. | ὅθεν δὴ πᾶσι χρησίμης οὔσης τοῖς ῥηκνωμένοις φυσιολογία τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ, παρεγγυῶν τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογία καὶ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ βίῳ ἐποίησά σοι καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐπιτομήν
5 καὶ στοιχείωσιν τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν.

- Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὧς Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν (ἢ) εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ
38 κενοὺς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν. | ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἔξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ' ὃ ἀνάζομεν. ἔτι τε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
5 δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς (κατὰ) τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἶτε διανοίας εἴθ' οὗτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἀδήλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

- Ταῦτα δεῖ διαλαβόντας συννοῶν ἡδὴ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων·
10 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ' ἂν σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον. |
39 καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ οὐτις εἰς ἃ διελύετο. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν οἷον νῦν ἐστι, καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται. οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει. παρὰ γὰρ τὸ
5 πᾶν οὐθὲν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσαιο.

11 αὐτῷ Schneider: αὐτῷ libri 37 2 παρεγγυῶν τὸ QH²Co
Usener: παρεγγυῶντων FH¹P²Z: παρεγγυῶντ P¹: παμεγγυ... τὸ B:
παρεγγυῶ τὸ Gassendi 3 ἐνέργημα F Usener: ἐνέργημα BGH
PQCo τοιούτῳ Hirzel: τὸ τούτων libri: τοιούτος ὡν Bignone
4 ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ Usener: ἐγγαληνίζοντῳ P¹CoF²: ἐνταληνίζων τῷ B¹:
ἐγγαληνιζόντων F¹P²Z ἐποίησά σοι Usener: ποιήσασθαι libri
9 (ἢ) Roeper: (ἢ) Usener: ἢ G 38 4 ἔτι τε Arndt: εἶτε libri:
εἶτα Gassendi: ἐπειτα Usener, in commentario ἐπειτεν κατὰ
seclutit Bignone: καὶ Muehill 5 πάντα] πάντων Bignone: πάντως
Muehill (κατὰ) supplevit Gassendi 6 κατὰ Giussani: καὶ
libri: καὶ (κατὰ) Gassendi 9 δεῖ Cobet: δεῖ libri post
διαλαβόντας (δεῖ) Arndt 11 ἐγίνετ' ἐγένετ' P¹Co 39 2 ὄντων
F: ὄντων τῶν codd. cett. 4 εἰς δ] ὃ Brieger μεταβάλλει]
μεταβιλεῖ Usener 6 ποιήσαιο] ποιῆσαι Usener: ποιῆσαι (δύναι)το
Crönert

formulae all that might be set out with accuracy in detail.

- 87 Wherefore since the method I have described is valuable to all those who are accustomed to the investigation of nature, I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine.

First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or

1. *Methods of procedure.*

1. Words to be used in their first meaning.

- 88 use words devoid of meaning. For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgement, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense-perception and the unseen.

2. The standards of judgement.

Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses. First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds. And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.

II. *The Universe and its constituents.*

A. Imperceptible things.

1. Nothing is created out of nothing.

2. Nothing is destroyed into nothing.

3. The universe is ever the same.

Moreover, the universe is (bodies and space): for that bodies exist. sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning,

B. Bodies and space. The universe consists of bodies and space.

- 40 as I have already said. And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of
- 41 which compounds are formed. And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the non-existent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first-beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

There is no other independent existence.

Body exists in the form of indivisible particles.

Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be

C Infinity of the universe. The universe is infinite,

- 42 boundless and not bounded. Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

both in the number of atoms and in the extent of space.

Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of

D. Differences of shape in the atoms—but not infinite differences,

Nicholia

40 7 post καὶ τῶν legitur τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ φύσεως καὶ τῇ
10 καὶ ἱε καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ ἐπιτομῇ
καὶ ἱε BGHP¹Q: καὶ τῇ ἱε FP³

σώματα
ρεῖ, καθ'
ὥσπερ
ραν καὶ
ῖπου ἦν
παρὰ δὲ
ὥς οὔτε
ανόμενα
γόμενα.
, τὰ δ'
ομα καὶ
ήσεσθαι
κρίσεων,
θήσεται.
σεις.
ασμένον
στε οὐκ
υρον ἂν
δει τῶν
κενοῦ. |
οισμένα,
ἄπειρον
έλλοντα
οὐκ ἂν

στά, ἐξ

πρόσθεν]
BG: ὁν
κριλητι-
βανόμενα
7 καὶ
scripsi
ντά τινα
4 ὄντα
7 τὸ δὲ
μὴν τὸ
5 ἐνέστη

ομή φησι

ὦν καὶ αἱ συγκρίσεις γίνονται καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύονται, ἀπερίληπτά
 ἐστι ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν γενέσθαι
 τὰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιελημ-
 10 μένων. καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ σχηματίσιν ἀπλῶς ἄπειροί εἰσιν
 αἱ ὅμοιαι, ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄπειροι ἀλλὰ μόνον
 ἀπερίληπτοι. |

- 43 Κινουνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ ἄτομοι τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ αἱ μὲν . . .
 εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διστάμεναι, αἱ δὲ αὐτὸν παλμὸν
 ἰσχουσιν, ὅταν τύχωσι τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλιμέναι ἢ στεγαζό-
 44 μιναι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν. | ἥ τε γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ φύσις ἢ
 διορίζουσα ἐκάστην αὐτὴν τοῦτο παρασκευάζει, τὴν ὑπέρεισιν
 οὐχ ὅλα τε οὐσα ποιείσθαι· ἥ τε στερεότης ἢ ὑπάρχουσα
 αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν τὸν ἀποπαλμὸν ποιεῖ, ἐφ' ὅπου
 5 ἂν ἡ περιπλοκὴ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως διδῶ.
 ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, αἰτίων τῶν ἀτόμων οὐδὲν καὶ
 τοῦ κενοῦ. |

- 45 Ἡ τοσαύτη δὴ φωνὴ τούτων πάντων μνημονευομένων τὸν
 ἱκανὸν τύπον ὑποβάλλει τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίας.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κόσμοι ἄπειροι εἰσὶν οἱ θ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ
 καὶ οἱ ἀνόμοιοι. αἱ τε γὰρ ἄτομοι ἄπειροι οὐσαι, ὥς ἄρτι
 5 ἀπεδείχθη, φέρονται καὶ πορρωτάτω. οὐ γὰρ κατανήλυνται
 αἱ τοιαῦται ἄτομοι, ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο κόσμος ἢ ὑφ' ὧν ἂν
 ποιηθεῖν, οὐτ' εἰς ἓνα οὐτ' εἰς πεπερασμένους, οὐθ' ὅσοι
 τοιοῦτοι οὐθ' ὅσοι διάφοροι τούτοις. ὥστε οὐδὲν τὸ ἐμποδο-
 στατήσόν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων. |

9 αὐτῶν om. G 43 1 lacunam post καὶ αἱ μὲν indicavit
 Bignone, ante eadem verba Usener 2 uō Usener (in commen-
 tario): αὐτῶν libri: αὐτοῦ Brieger 3 ἰσχουσιν ἰσχουσαι Brieger
 τῇ περιπλοκῇ Usener: τὴν περιπλοκὴν libri 4 παρὰ G: περὶ
 BHPQ 44 2 αὐτὴν αὐτῶν G 6 αἰτῶν αἰτίων H. Weil
 45 1 ἢ BPO: δὲ G 2 (ταῖς περὶ) ante τῆς inseruit Usener
 ἐπινοίας Zf Bignone: ἐπινοίας libri. cett., Usener 3 οἱ θ' B²GH
 PQCo: εἰθ' B'FZ 4 καὶ οἱ GHPOCo: καὶ BFZ': εἰτ' f

Scholia

42 12 post ἀπερίληπτοι legitur οὐδὲ γὰρ φησιν ἐνδοτέρω εἰς ἄπειρον
 τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν, λέγει δέ, ἐπειδὴ αἱ ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται, εἰ
 μέλλει τις μὴ καὶ το.ε. μεγέθεσιν ἀπλῶς εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν
 λέγει C. F. Hermann: λήγει Usener εἰ μέλλει . . .
 ἐμβάλλειν in textu retinuit Muehlh μέλλει libri plerique:
 μέλλει BG

43 1 post αἱ ἄτομοι legitur φησι δὲ ἐνδοτέρω καὶ ἰσοταχῶς αὐτὰς
 κινεῖσθαι τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν εἶξιν ὁμοίαν παρεχομένου καὶ τῇ κουφοτάτῃ καὶ
 τῇ βαρυτάτῃ
 εἶξιν Kühn: ἴξιν B: ἴξιν libri. cett.

which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same (atomic) shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

- 43 And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them (falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions. And of the latter, some are borne on) separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them. For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.
- 44
- 45 These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

Furthermore, there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being infinite in number, as was proved already, are borne on far out into space. For those atoms, which are of such nature that a world could be created out of them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds which are alike, or on those which are different from these. So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the infinite number of the worlds.

Beholla

44. 7 post τοῦ κενοῦ legitur φησὶ δ' ἐνδοτέρω μηδὲ ποιότητά τινα περὶ τὰς αἰόμους εἶναι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ βίρους· τὸ δὲ χρώμα παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν αἰόμων ἀλλάττεσθαι ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα στοιχειώσεσσι φησι. πᾶν δὲ μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι περὶ αὐτάς· οὐδέποτε γοῦν ἄτομος ὥφθῃ αἰσθήσει

παρὰ libr. plerique: περὶ HQ δώδεκα libr. plerique: τῶ BPCo

E. Motion of the atoms.

F. Infinite number of worlds.

- 46^a Καὶ μὴν καὶ τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμενες τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσί, λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινομένων. οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστάσεις ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι γίνεσθαι τοιαῦται οὐτ' ἐπιτηδεύητες τῆς κατεργασίας τῶν κοιλωμάτων καὶ
5 λεπτοτήτων γίνεσθαι, οὔτε ἀπόρροιαί τὴν ἐξῆς θέσιν καὶ βάσιν διατηροῦσαι, ἣν περ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἶχον· τούτους δὲ τοὺς τύπους εἶδωλα προσαγορεύομεν. |
- 47^a Εἰθ' ὅτι τὰ εἶδωλα ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις κέχρηται, οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων· ὁθεν καὶ τάχῃ ἀνυπερβλητὰ ἔχει, πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς (τῷ) τῷ ἀπορρῷ αὐτῶν μηθὲν ἀντικόπτειν ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν, πολλαῖς
48 δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις εὐθύς ἀντικόπτειν τι. | πρὸς τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ γένεσις τῶν εἰδῶλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει. καὶ γὰρ βέδσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχῆς, οὐκ ἐπιδηλος τῇ μειώσει διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπλήρωσιν, σφύζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ
5 στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον, εἰ καὶ ἐνίστε συγχεομένη, καὶ συστάσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὀξεῖαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τρόποι τινὲς γεννητικοὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύσεών εἰσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται ταῖς αἰσθησέσιν,
10 ἂν βλέπῃ τις τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἐναργείας, τίνα καὶ τὰς συμπαθείας ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνοίσει. |
- 49 Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν, ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ ἔξω τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τοῦ τε χρώματος καὶ τῆς μορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ μεταξὺ ἡμῶν τε κἀκείνων, οὐδὲ
5 διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων ἢ οἷων δὴ ποτε βεναμάτων ἀφ' ἡμῶν πρὸς

46^a 3 ἀποστάσεις] συστάσεις Gassendi 4 τῆς scripsi: τοὺς
BP²QCo: τὰς FHP²: ταῖς GTD: πρὸς Usener 5 λεπτοτήτων]
λειοτήτων Usener γίνεσθαι del. Kühn 46 καὶ μὴν καὶ ...
47 κατασχέειν τὸ στοιχείον has duas sententias suadente Giussani ad
§§ 61, 62 transtuli 47^a 1 εἰθ' FPQ: εἰθ' B²GH 3 (τῷ) supplevit
Meibom: (τῷ) Tescari 4 ἀπορρῷ scripsi collato Lucr. iv. 205: ἀπείρω
libri: (μὴ) ἀπείρω Bignone: τὸ ἀπείρω Muehl: post ἀπείρω aliquid
intercidisse suspicabatur Tescari πολλοῖς] πολλοῖς Usener in com-
mentario 48 3 ἐπιπολῆς Z²f: ἐπὶ πολλῆς libr. cett. (ἐπιπολῆς
P²) συνεχῆς P² mg.: συνοχῆς libri 4 τῇ μειώσει Usener: σημειώσει
BGHPQ: ἡ μειώσει F 6 post συγχεομένη supplet ὑπάρχει H mg.
9 ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται H. Weil: ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ BGHPQCoZ: μαρτυρεῖ F
10 τις τίνα scripsi: τίς τίνα libri ἐναργείας Gassendi: ἐνεργείας libri
τίνα Usener: ἵνα libri 11 ἀνοίσει B: ἀνοίγη FHPQCoZ: ἀνεῖσι G

- 46^a Moreover, there are images like in shape to the solid bodies, far surpassing perceptible things in their subtlety of texture. For it is not impossible that such emanations should be formed in that which surrounds the objects, nor that there should be opportunities for the formation of such hollow and thin frames, nor that there should be effluences which preserve the respective position and order which they had before in the solid bodies: these images we call idols.
- 47^a Next, nothing among perceptible things contradicts the belief that the images have unsurpassable fineness of texture. And for this reason they have also unsurpassable speed of motion, since the movement of all their atoms is uniform, and besides nothing or very few things hinder their emission by collisions, whereas a body composed of many or infinite atoms is at once hindered by collisions.
- 48 Besides this (nothing contradicts the belief) that the creation of the idols takes place as quick as thought. For the flow of atoms from the surface of bodies is continuous, yet it cannot be detected by any lessening in the size of the object because of the constant filling up of what is lost. The flow of images preserves for a long time the position and order of the atoms in the solid body, though it is occasionally confused. Moreover compound idols are quickly formed in the air around, because it is not necessary for their substance to be filled in deep inside: and besides there are certain other methods in which existences of this sort are produced. For not one of these beliefs is contradicted by our sensations, if one looks to see in what way sensation will bring us the clear visions from external objects, and in what way again the corresponding sequence of qualities and movements.
- 49 Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes. For external objects could not make on us an impression of the nature of their own colour and shape by means of the air which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays or effluences of any

III. Sense-perception.
A. Sight.
1. The 'images'.

2. Their subtlety and speed.

3. Their immediate creation.

4. The method of sight and thought.

49 2 ἀν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο Cobet: ἂ μὲν (ἀν GZ²) ἀποσφραγίσαιτο
libri 5 τῶν] τινῶν Usener

- ἐκεῖνα παραγινομένων, οὕτως ὡς τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων
 ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμοχρόων τε καὶ ὁμοιομόρφων κατὰ
 τὸ ἐνάρμοττον μέγεθος εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡκέως
 50 ταῖς φοραῖς χρωμένων, | εἴτα διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ἐνὸς
 καὶ συνεχοῦς τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντων καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σφζόντων κατὰ τὸν ἐκείθεν σύμμετρον
 ἐπερισμὸν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ βάθος ἐν τῷ στερεμνίῳ τῶν ἀτόμων
 5 πάλσεως. καὶ ἦν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ
 διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων,
 μορφὴ ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινόμενη κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς
 πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου. τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ
 διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεὶ ἐστὶν (ἐπὶ τοῦ
 10 προσμένουτος) ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι,
 51 εἴτ' οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρομένου (ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρομένου) | ἢ τε γὰρ
 ὁμοιότης τῶν φαντασμῶν οἶον εἰ ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανομένων
 ἢ καθ' ὕπνου γινόμενων ἢ κατ' ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς
 διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς
 5 οὐσί τε καὶ ἀληθεσί προσαγορευομένοις, εἰ μὴ ἦν τινα καὶ
 τοιαῦτα προσβαλλόμενα· τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν,
 εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς
 συνημμένην μὲν (τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ), διάληψιν δὲ
 ἔχουσιν· κατὰ δὲ ταύτην, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντι-
 10 μαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται· εἰ μὲν δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ
 52 ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ἀληθές. | καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ
 τὴν δόξαν κατέχειν, ὥτα μήτε τὰ κριτήρια ἀναιρηῖται τὰ κατὰ
 τὰς ἐναργείας μήτε τὸ διημαρτημένον ὁμοίως βεβαιούμενον
 πάντα συνταράττη.

7 ὁμοχρόων Ross: ἀπὸ χρόων libri 9 φοραῖς H mg: μορ-
 φαῖς libri 50 2 ἀποδιδόντων... σφζόντων Usener: ἀποδίδοντος
 ... σφζόντος libri 5 πάλσεως TD Usener: πλάσεως FHPQCoZ:
 π..... BG ἂν λάβωμεν TD Gassendi: ἀναλάβωμεν libr. cett.
 8 ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ Z³f: ἐγκαταλείμματος FGZ¹: ἐγκαταλείματα B:
 ἐγκαταλήμματος HPQCo 9 (ἐπὶ τοῦ προσμένουτος) supplevit Usener
 11 (ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρομένου) supplevit Usener 51 α οἶον εἰ) οἶον ἢ
 Usener 6 τοιαῦτα Gassendi: ταῦτα libri προσβαλλόμενα
 Usener: πρὸς δ (δ F) βάλλομεν libri τὸ δέ) τὰ τε Usener
 8 (τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ) ex glossamata § 50 adscripto supplevit
 Usener 52 3 ἐναργείας Gassendi: ἐναργείας libri

Scholia

50 11 post ἐπιμαρτυρομένου legitur κατὰ τινα κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς
 συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσιν, καθ' ἣν τὸ

sort which pass from us to them—nearly so well as if models, similar in colour and shape, leave the objects and enter according to their respective size either into our
 50 sight or into our mind; moving along swiftly, and so by this means reproducing the image of a single continuous thing and preserving the corresponding sequence of qualities and movements from the original object as the result of their uniform contact with us, kept up by the vibration of the atoms deep in the interior of the concrete body.

And every image which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind or of the sense-organs, whether of shape or of properties, this image is the shape (or the properties) of the concrete object, and is produced by the constant repetition of the image or the impression it has left. Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to (what is waiting) to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed (or is contradicted).
 51 For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real, and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgement, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses. And error would not exist unless another kind of movement too were produced inside ourselves, closely linked to the apprehension of images, but differing from it; and it is owing to this, supposing it is not confirmed, or is contradicted, that falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it
 52 is true. Therefore we must do our best to keep this doctrine in mind, in order that on the one hand the standards of judgement dependent on the clear visions may not be undermined, and on the other error may not be as firmly established as truth and so throw all into confusion.

Scholia

ψεύδος γίνεται.

Scholion usque ab ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσθαι incipere credidit Muehl
 τινα κίνησιν Usener: τὴν ἀκίνητον libri: τὴν κίνησιν Menagius
 ἔχουσιν Gassendi: ἐχούση libri

51 9 post κατὰ δὲ ταύτην legitur τὴν συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ
 ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσιν

ἔχουσιν P³H: ἐχούσης BGP¹QCo: ἔχουσαι F

5. Truth and
 falsehood in
 vision.

- 5 Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν γίνεταί· ρεύματός τινος φερομένοι
 ἀπὸ τοῦ φωνοῦντος ἢ ἡχοῦντος ἢ ψοφούντος ἢ ὅπως δήποτε
 ἀκουστικὸν πάθος παρασκευάζοντος. τὸ δὲ ρεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς
 ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, ἅμα τινὰ διασφύζοντας συμ-
 10 πάθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐνότητα ἰδιότροπον διατείνουσιν
 πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαι, καὶ τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνου ὥς
 τὰ πολλὰ ποιοῦσαν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἐνδηλον
 53 παρασκευάζουσιν· | ἄνευ γὰρ ἀναφερομένης τινὸς ἐκείθεν συμ-
 παθείας οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἢ τοιαύτη ἐπαίσθησις. οὐκ αὐτὸν
 οὖν δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν ἀέρα ὑπὸ τῆς προιεμένης φωνῆς ἢ καὶ
 τῶν ὁμογενῶν σχηματίζεσθαι (πολλὴν γὰρ ἐνδειαν ἔξει τοῦτο
 5 πᾶσχειν ὑπ' ἐκείνης), ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τὴν γινωμένην πληγὴν ἐν
 ἡμῖν, ὅταν φωνὴν ἀφίωμεν, τοιαύτην ἐκθλιψῶν ὄγκων τινῶν
 ρεύματος πνευματώδους ἀποτελεστικῶν ποιεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ πάθος
 τὸ ἀκουστικὸν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει.

- Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν νομιστέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοήν,
 10 οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ ὄγκοι τινὲς ἦσαν
 ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποφερόμενοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τοῦτο
 τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν, οἱ μὲν τοῖσι τεταραγμένως καὶ ἁλλο-
 τρώως, οἱ δὲ τοῖσι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες. |

- 54 Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα
 τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεισθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους
 καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματι συμφυῆ ἔστι.
 ποιότης γὰρ πάντα μεταβάλλει· αἱ δὲ ἄτομοι οὐδὲν μεταβάλ-
 5 λουσιν, ἐπειδήπερ δεῖ τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν
 συγκρίσεων στερεῶν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον, ὃ τὰς μεταβολὰς οὐκ εἰς
 τὸ μὴ ὂν ποιήσεται οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετα-
 θέσεις (τινῶν), τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους. ὁθεν
 ἀναγκαῖον τὰ μὲν μετατιθέμενα ἄφθαρτα εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ
 10 μεταβάλλοντος φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα, ὄγκους δὲ καὶ σχημα-

5 ρεύματος Gassendi : πνεύματος libri 10 ὥς τὰ πολλὰ] ut glos-
 sema seclussit Usener 11 ποιοῦσαν... παρασκευάζουσιν] ποιούντας...
 παρισκευάζοντας Usener 53 5 πᾶσχειν Meibom : πᾶσχων
 B⁴GHPQ : πάσνον B¹F 6 ἐκθλιψῶν Brieger : ἐκλίθην B : ἐκλήθην
 P¹QH²Co : ἐκ FGHP²Z : ἔγκλισιν Usener ὄγκων τινῶν P¹QCo :
 τινῶν ὄγκων FGH¹P²Z : ὄγκων τινῶν B Usener 7 ἀποτελεστικῶν]
 ἀποτε' εστικῶν Usener 11 πρὸς τὸ FG : πρὸς BHPQ 54 3 σχή-
 ματι Kühn : σχήματος libri 4 οὐδὲν Zf : οὐδὲ cett. 5 δεῖ B¹ :
 δεῖ FGZ : δι' Co 8 (τινῶν) Bignone : ἐν πολλοῖς (sc. lemma) libri
 plerique : ἐκ πολλοῦ Z : μὲν πολλῶν Gassendi : ἐν πολλοῖς... ἀφό-
 δους ut variam lectionem seclussit Usener 9 μὲν Kochalsky :
 μὴ libri : δι' Usener

Moreover, hearing too results when a current is carried off from the object speaking or sounding or making a noise, or causing in any other way a sensation of hearing. Now this current is split up into particles, each like the whole, which at the same time preserve a correspondence of qualities with one another and a unity of character which stretches right back to the object which emitted the sound: this unity it is which in most cases produces comprehension in the recipient, or, if not, merely makes
 53 manifest the presence of the external object. For without the transference from the object of some correspondence of qualities, comprehension of this nature could not result. We must not then suppose that the actual air is moulded into shape by the voice which is emitted or by other similar sounds—for it will be very far from being so acted upon by it—but that the blow which takes place inside us, when we emit our voice, causes at once a squeezing out of certain particles, which produce a stream of breath, of such a character as to afford us the sensation of hearing.

B. Hearing.
 Hearing is due to an effluence from the object, which splits up into similar particles, which preserve the character of the original.

Furthermore, we must suppose that smell too, just like hearing, could never bring about any sensation, unless there were certain particles carried off from the object of suitable size to stir this sense-organ, some of them in a manner disorderly and alien to it, others in a regular manner and akin in nature.

C. Smell is
 similarly caused by effluences.

- 54 Moreover, we must suppose that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things, except shape, weight, and size, and all that necessarily goes with shape. For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be something which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, which can cause changes; not changes into the non-existent or from the non-existent, but changes effected by the shifting of position of some particles, and by the addition or departure of others. For this reason it is essential that the bodies which shift their position should be imperishable and should not possess the nature of what changes, but parts and configuration of their own. For thus much must needs remain constant.

IV. The Atoms.
 A. Their properties: shape, weight, and size.
 1. Other qualities change, but there must be something constant to prevent complete destruction.

55 τισμοὺς ἰδίους· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν | καὶ γὰρ
ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μετασχηματιζομένοις κατὰ τὴν περιάρεσιν
τὸ σχῆμα ἐνυπάρχον λαμβάνεται, αἱ δὲ ποιότητες οὐκ ἐνυπάρ-
χουσαι ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνο καταλείπεται, ἀλλ'
5 ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλύμεναι. ἱκανὰ οὖν τὰ ὑπολειπό-
μενα ταῦτα τὰς τῶν συγκρίσεων διαφορὰς ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ περ
ὑπολείπεσθαι γέ τινα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ (μὴ) εἰς τὸ μὴ δν
φθείρεσθαι.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δεῖ νομίζειν πᾶν μέγεθος ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις
10 ὑπάρχειν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀντιμαρτυρή· παραλλαγὰς
δέ τινας μεγεθῶν νομιστέον εἶναι. βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ τούτου
προσόντος τὰ κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις γινόμενα
56 ἀποδοθήσεται. | πᾶν δὲ μέγεθος ὑπάρχον οὔτε χρήσιμόν ἐστι
πρὸς τὰς τῶν ποιότητων διαφορὰς, ἀφίχθαι τε ἅμ' ἔδει καὶ
πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατὰς ἀτόμους· ὃ οὐ θεωρεῖται γινόμενον, οὐδ'
ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὁρατὴ ἀτομος ἐστιν ἐπωσῆσαι.

5 Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἐν τῷ ὀρισμένῳ σώματι
ἀπείρους ὄγκους εἶναι οὐδ' ὀηλίκοις οὖν. ὥστε οὐ μόνον
τὴν εἰς ἀπειρον τομὴν ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον ἀναιρετέον, ἵνα μὴ
πάντα ἀσθενῇ ποιῶμεν κἂν ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρώων
εἰς τὸ μὴ δν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν,
10 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν μὴ νομιστέον γενέσθαι ἐν τοῖς
57 ὀρισμένοις εἰς ἀπειρον μὴδ' (ἐπὶ) τοῦλαττον. | οὔτε γὰρ
ὅπως, ἐπειδὴν ἀπαξ τις εἶπη ὅτι ἀπειροὶ ὄγκοι ἐν τινι
ὑπάρχουσιν ἢ ὀηλικοί οὖν, ἐστι νοῆσαι, πῶς τ' ἂν ἔτι
τοῦτο πεπερασμένον εἴη τὸ μέγεθος; (πηλικοί γάρ τινες
5 δῆλον ὡς οἱ ἀπειροὶ εἰσιν ὄγκοι· καὶ οὔτοι ὀηλικοί ἂν
ποτε ᾧσιν, ἀπειρον ἂν ἦν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος·) ἄκρον τε ἔχοντος
τοῦ πεπερασμένου διαληπτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν,
οὐκ ἐστι μὴ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς τούτου τοιοῦτον νοεῖν καὶ οὕτω

II τοῦτο] ταῦτα Meibom ὑπομένειν] ὑποτιθέναι Usener
55 7 καὶ (μὴ) Aldobrandinus : καὶ libri : οὐκ Usener : καὶ μὴδὲν
Bignone 9 οὐδὲ δεῖ Gassendi : οὐδὲ δεῖ libri 56 I ὑπάρ-
χον] ὑπάρχειν Usener 2 ἅμ' ἔδει Usener : ἀμέλει (ἀμέλλει
H¹) libri : ἂν ἔδει Weil 3 οὐδ' Usener : οὐθ' libri 4 ὁρατὴ
ἀτομος ut glossema seclutit Usener 8 κἂν Usener : καὶ
libri ἀθρώων B : ἀτόμων F II μὴδ' (ἐπὶ) Gassendi : μὴδὲ
vel μὴ δὲ libri 57 2 ὅπως] om. F Giussani 3 ἢ] οἱ Usener
5 οἱ] om. FGHP^s post οὔτοι addunt ἐξ ὧν omnes libri excepto B
6 ἔχοντος Gassendi : ἔχοντες libri 7 θεωρητόν Co Usener :
θεωρητέον libr. cett. 8 μὴ οὐ B¹Q : μὴ cett. οὕτω PCoF²Z :
τοῦτο BF¹ : οὐ τῷ Giussani

55 For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not remain in the changing object, in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now these particles which are left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in compound bodies, since it is essential that some things should be left behind and not be destroyed into the non-existent.

Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our

a. The atoms have varieties of size, but not all sizes: for then some would become visible.

56 feelings and sensations. But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.

Besides this we must not suppose that in a limited body there can be infinite parts or parts of every degree of smallness. Therefore, we must not only do away with division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity, in order that we may not make all things weak, and so in the composition of aggregate bodies be compelled to crush and squander the things that exist into the non-existent, but we must not either suppose that in limited bodies there is a possibility of continuing to infinity in passing even to

B. The parts of the atoms. 1. The parts of a limited body cannot be infinite in number or infinitely small.

57 smaller and smaller parts. For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the body any longer be limited in size? (For it is obvious that these infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the body too would be infinite.) And again, since the limited body has an extreme point, which is distinguishable, even though not perceptible by itself, you cannot conceive that the succeeding point to it is not

For, if they are, (a) the body cannot be limited in size,

and (b) in the enumeration of extreme points it is not possible to continue to infinity.

- κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν βαδίζοντι εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον
 58 ὑπάρχειν κατὰ <τὸ> τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ. | τό τε
 ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει δεῖ κατανοεῖν ὅτι οὔτε τοιοῦτον
 ἔστω οἶον τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον οὔτε πάντῃ πάντως
 ἀνόμοιον, ἀλλ' ἔχον μὲν τινα κοινότητα τῶν μεταβατῶν,
 5 διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν οὐκ ἔχον· ἀλλ' ὅταν διὰ τὴν τῆς κοινότη-
 τος προσεμφέρειαν οἰηθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαι τι αὐτοῦ, τὸ μὲν
 ἐπιτάδῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα, τὸ ἴσον ἡμῖν δεῖ προσπίπτειν. ἐξῆς
 τε θεωροῦμεν ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καταρχόμενοι καὶ οὐκ
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν ἀπτόμενα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐν τῇ
 10 ἰδιότητι τῇ ἑαυτῶν τὰ μεγέθη καταμετροῦντα, τὰ πλείω πλείον
 καὶ τὰ ἐλάττω ἑλαττον. ταύτῃ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ νομιστέον καὶ τὸ
 59 ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον κεκρῆσθαι | μικρότητι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο δηλον
 ὥς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν θεωρουμένου, ἀναλογία
 δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται. ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἡ ἄτομος,
 κατὰ τὴν <τῶν> ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν κατηγορήσαμεν, μικρόν
 5 τι μόνον μακρὰν ἐκβάλλοντες. ἔτι τε τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ
 ἀμυγῇ πέρατα δεῖ νομίζειν, τῶν μικρῶν τὸ καταμέτρημα ἐξ
 αὐτῶν πρώτων τοῖς μείζοσι καὶ ἐλάττοσι παρασκευάζοντα,
 τῇ διὰ λόγου θεωρίᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων. ἡ γὰρ κοινότης ἢ
 ὑπάρχουσα αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ἀμετάβολα ἰκανὴ τὸ μέχρι τούτου
 10 συντελέσαι· συμφόρησιν δὲ ἐκ τούτων κίνησιν ἐχόντων οὐχ
 οἷον τε γενέσθαι. |

- 60 Καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὥς μὲν ἀνωτάτῳ ἢ κατωτάτῳ
 οὐ δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω· εἰς μέντοι τὸ ὑπὲρ
 κεφαλῆς, ὅθεν ἂν στῶμεν, εἰς ἄπειρον ἄγειν <ἐν>ὸν μηδέποτε
 φανεῖσθαι τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἢ τὸ ὑποκάτω τοῦ νοηθέντος εἰς

9 βαδίζοντι Usener: βαδίζοντα libri 10 κατὰ] καὶ τὸ Muehl
 (τὸ) supplevit Schneider 58 4 μεταβατῶν Schneider: μετα-
 βάτων libri 5 ἀλλ' ὅταν Cobet: ἀλλ' ὅτε (ἄλλοτε HPQ) libri
 59 3 κέχρηται Gassendi: κεκρῆσθαι libri 4 (τῶν) supplevit Usener
 5 μακρὰν Usener: μακρὸν libri ἐκβάλλοντες] ἐκβαλόντες Usener
 6 ἀμυγῇ] ἀμερῇ von Arnim μικρῶν BP¹Q: μικρῶν F: μακρῶν GHP²Z
 7 αὐτῶν Usener: αὐτῶν libri πρώτων HPQ: πρώτων BFGZ post
 παρασκευάζοντα hiatum indicavit Usener 9 ἀμετάβολα] ἀμετά-
 βата Usener: μεταβατά von Arnim 10 τούτων] τοῦ(των ὥς) τῶν
 Bignone ἐχόντων] (οὐκ) ἐχόντων Brieger 60 1 ἀνωτάτῳ
 Usener: ἀνωτάτῳ libri ἢ GHPCoZ: καὶ BFQ κατωτάτῳ Usener: εἰς
 κατωτάτῳ libri 2 post κατηγορεῖν hiatum indicavit Usener
 μέντοι H²P¹QCo: ἴσμεν τοι B: μέντοι FGH¹P²Z 3 στῶμεν
 BHPCoCo: τὸ μὲν FGZ ἄγειν <ἐν>ὸν scripsi: ἄγειν ὃν (ὃν FG) libri:
 τεῖνον Usener: ἄγειν <ἐξ>ὸν Giussani: ἄγειν (νοοῦσι, δηλ)ον Bignone

similar in character, or that if you go on in this way from one point to another, it should be possible for you to proceed to infinity marking such points in your mind.

- 58 We must notice also that the least thing in sensation is neither exactly like that which admits of progression from one part to another, nor again is it in every respect wholly unlike it, but it has a certain affinity with such bodies, yet cannot be divided into parts. But when on the analogy of this resemblance we think to divide off parts of it, one on the one side and another on the other, it must needs be that another point like the first meets our view. And we look at these points in succession starting from the first, not within the limits of the same point nor in contact part with part, but yet by means of their own proper characteristics measuring the size of bodies, more in a

2. The *minimum visible* has extension without parts.

and is the ultimate measure of size.

- 59 greater body and fewer in a smaller. Now we must suppose that the least part in the atom too bears the same relation to the whole; for though in smallness it is obvious that it exceeds that which is seen by sensation, yet it has the same relations. For indeed we have already declared on the ground of its relation to sensible bodies that the atom has size, only we placed it far below them in smallness. Further, we must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms, both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation of these unseen bodies by means of thought. For the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the homogeneous parts (of sensible things) is sufficient to justify our conclusion to this extent: but that they should ever come together as bodies with motion is quite impossible.

Similarly, there are least indivisible parts in the atom,

which are the units of measurement.

- 60 [Furthermore, in the infinite we must not speak of 'up' or 'down', as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest—and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us—nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the

[In what sense there is motion upward and downward in the infinite.]

5 ἄπειρον ἅμα ἄνω τε εἶναι καὶ κάτω πρὸς τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατον διανοηθῆναι. ὥστε ἕστι μίαν λαβεῖν φορὰν τὴν ἄνω νοουμένην εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ μίαν τὴν κάτω, ἃν καὶ μυριάκις πρὸς τοὺς πόδας τῶν ἐπάνω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν φερόμενον (ἐς) τοὺς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν τόπους ἀφικνῆται ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν
10 κεφαλὴν τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν κάτω φερόμενον· ἢ γὰρ ὅλη φορὰ οὐθὲν ἦττον ἑκατέρα ἑκατέρα ἀντικειμένη ἐπ' ἄπειρον νοεῖται. |

- 61 Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἱσοταχεῖς ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι, ὅταν διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ εἰσφέρωνται μηθενὸς ἀντικόπτουτος. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα θάττον οἰσθήσεται τῶν μικρῶν καὶ κούφω, ὅταν γε δὴ μηδὲν ἀπαντᾷ αὐτοῖς· οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ τῶν μεγάλων,
5 πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα, ὅταν μηθὲν μηδὲ ἐκείνους ἀντικόπτῃ· οὐθ' ἢ ἄνω οὐθ' ἢ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων φορὰ, οὐθ' ἢ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν. ἐφ' ὁπόσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχῃ ἑκατέρ(α αὐτ)ῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φορὰν σχήσει, ἕως (ἂν τι) ἀντικόψῃ, ἢ ἔξωθεν
10 ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν. |
46^b καὶ μὴν καὶ ἢ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ φορὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοφόντων γινομένη πᾶν μῆκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερι-
νοήτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ. βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους ἀντικοπῇ
62 καὶ οὐκ ἀντικοπῇ ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει. | ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κατὰ τὰς συγκρίσεις θάττων ἑτέρα ἑτέρας ῥηθήσεται τῶν ἀτόμων ἱσοταχῶν οὐσῶν, τῷ ἐφ' ἕνα τύπον φέρεσθαι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀθροίσμασιν ἀτόμους καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχή χρόνον,
5 εἰ μὴ ἐφ' ἕνα κατὰ τοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, ἀλλὰ

9 (ἐς) supplevit Usener 61 2 εἰσφέρωνται GH²P²: εἰσφέρωνται P¹Q: εἰσφέρονται FH¹: εἰσφέρουτε B: εἰς (ἕνα τύπον) φέρωνται Brieger 3 τὰ βαρέα] τὰ (μεγάλα καὶ) βυρέα Usener in commentario μικρῶν καὶ delevit Gassendi 4 ἀπαντᾷ Usener: ἀπαντᾷ BP¹Co: ἀπαντα F: ἀπαντᾶν libr. cett. post τὰ μικρὰ supplevit βραδύτερον Usener 5 ἔχοντα] ἐχόντων Giussani 8 ἑκατέρ(α αὐτ)ῶν scripsi: ἑκατέρων libri: ἑκότερον Usener 9 (ἂν τι) supplevit Usener 10 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν ut glossema seclussit Usener: πρὸς τὴν (ἐκ) τοῦ πλ. δύν. Bignone 46 1-4 καὶ μὴν καὶ . . . ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει hunc locum ex § 40 petitum huc inseri iussit Giussani 2 ἀντικοφόντων Usener: ἀντικοφάντων libri: ἀντικοπτόντων Giussani 3 βράδους BGH¹P¹Q: βραδύτης FH²P²Z 62 1 καὶ delevit Brieger 2 θάττων Z²f: θάττον codd. cett.: (οὐ) θάττων Usener ῥηθήσεται] οἰσθήσεται Kühn: φηρηθήσεται Brieger 3 τῷ] καὶ τὸ F unde κἰν τῷ vel καὶ (κατὰ) τὸ coniecit Bignone 4 καὶ delevit Usener τὸν ἐλάχιστον Meibom: τῶν ἐλαχίστων libri 5 εἰ

same time both up and down in reference to the same thing: for it is impossible to think this. So that it is possible to consider as one single motion that which is thought of as the upwards motion to infinity and as another the downward motion, even though that which passes from us into the regions above our heads arrives countless times at the feet of beings above and that which passes downwards from us at the head of beings below; for none the less the whole motions are thought of as opposed, the one to the other, to infinity.]

- 61 Moreover, the atoms must move with equal speed, when they are borne onwards through the void, nothing colliding with them. For neither will the heavy move more quickly than the small and light, when, that is, nothing meets them: nor again the small more quickly than the great, having their whole course uniform, when nothing collides with them either: nor is the motion upwards or sideways owing to blows (quicker), nor again that downwards owing to their own weight. For as long as either of the two motions prevails, so long will it have a course as quick as thought, until something checks it either from outside or from its own weight counteracting the force of that which
- 46^b dealt the blow. Moreover, their passage through the void, when it takes place without meeting any bodies which might collide, accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time. For it is collision and its absence which take the outward appearance of
- 62 slowness and quickness. Moreover, it will be said that in compound bodies too one atom is faster than another, though as a matter of fact all are equal in speed: this will be said because even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move towards one place, even though in moments of time perceptible only by thought they do not move towards one place but are constantly jostling one against another, until the continuity

C. The motions of the atoms. All move always at equal rate 'as quick as thought', neither weight nor direction making any difference.

Their speed is inconceivably great.

In compound bodies too all atoms really move at the same pace, though an inference from perception might deny this.

μῶ] ἢ μὴ Usener: εἴτα μὴ Giussani: εἰ (καὶ) μὴ Muehl κατὰ τοὺς
λόγους θεωρητοὺς χρόνους ut glossema seclisit Usener

οὐτο
ρὰν
καὶ
εὐον
τῇν
γὰρ
ἐπ'
θαν
οὔτε
φων,
λῶν,
ίνους
τῶν
ἐφ'
ᾄμα
ωθεν
ιιν. |
ησιω
περι-
κοπή
κατὰ
όμων
τοῖς
όνον,
ἀλλὰ
ρωντα
rieger
μικρῶν
παντα
sener
ατέρων
ος τῇν
'κ) τοῦ
hunc
κοψόν-
ράδους
rieger
ρηθῆ-
τὸ F
delevit
5 εἰ

- πυκνὸν ἀντικόπτουσιν, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ συνεχὲς
τῆς φορᾶς γίνηται. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξαζόμενον περὶ τοῦ
ἀοράτου, ὥς ἄρα καὶ οἱ διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ χρόνοι τὸ συνεχὲς
τῆς φορᾶς ἔξουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων·
- 10 ἔπει τὸ γε θεωρούμενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον
47^b τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστιν. | οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἅμα κατὰ τοὺς διὰ
λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὸ φερόμενον σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς
πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται (ἀδιανόητον γάρ, καὶ τοῦτο συνα-
φικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δῆποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου
5 οὐκ ἐξ οὗ ἂν περιλάβωμεν τὴν φορὰν τόπου ἔσται ἀφιστά-
μενον)· ἀντικοπῇ γὰρ ὁμοιον ἔσται, κἂν μέχρι τοσούτου τὸ
τάχος τῆς φορᾶς μὴ ἀντικοπτὸν καταλίπωμεν. χρήσιμον
δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχείον. |
- 63 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ συννορᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
καὶ τὰ πάθη (οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιωτάτη πίστις ἔσται), ὅτι ἡ
ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεια-
μένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν
5 ἔχοντι καὶ πῇ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῇ δὲ τούτῳ. ἔστι
δὲ τὸ μέρος πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ
καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ
ἄθροισματι· τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δῆλον
(ποιοῦσι) καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ εὐκυνήσῃαι καὶ αἱ διανοήσεις
10 καὶ ὧν στερόμενοι θυήσκειν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἔχει ἡ
ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν, δεῖ κατέχειν· |
- 64 οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἄθροισματος
ἔστεγάζετό πως. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα παρασκευάσαν
ἐκείνῃ τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετέβληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιούτου συμ-
πτώματος παρ' ἐκείνης, οὐ μέντοι πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκτηται·
5 διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν. οὐ

6 ἀντικόπτουσιν Gassendi : ἀντικόπτωσιν libri 47^b 1-8 οὐ μὴν
οὐδέ . . . τὸ στοιχείον hunc locum ex § 47 petitum huc transferri
iussit Giussani 1 οὐδ' ἅμα] οὐθ' ἅμα Usener : οὐδαμῇ Bignone
2 καὶ τὸ φερόμενον Usener : κατὰ τὸ φερόμενον libri : αὐτὸ τὸ φερόμενον
Muehl : καὶ τὰποφερόμενον Bignone 3 συναφικνούμενον] οὐτ'
ἀφικνούμενον Usener : οὔτε συναφικνούμενον Giussani 6 τοσούτου
libri plerique : τοῦτου BG 7 ἀντικοπτὸν scripsi : ἀντικόπτων
Usener : ἀντικοπέον B (sine accentu) GHP¹Q : ἀντικοπτὸν FP²Z
63 4 πνεύματι] σπέρματι F 5 ἔστι δὲ τὸ μέρος] ἔστι δὲ τι μέρος
Woltjer : ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους Usener : ἔστι δὲ τὸ γ' μέρος Diels
8 δῆλον (ποιοῦσι) Brieger : δῆλον libri : δηλοῦσι Gassendi : διῆγον
Usener

of their movement comes under the ken of sensation. For the addition of opinion with regard to the unseen, that the moments perceptible only by thought will also contain continuity of motion, is not true in such cases; for we must remember that it is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an apprehension that 47^b is true. Nor must it either be supposed that in moments perceptible only by thought the moving body too passes to the several places to which its component atoms move (for this too is unthinkable, and in that case, when it arrives all together in a sensible period of time from any point that may be in the infinite void, it would not be taking its departure from the place from which we apprehend its motion); for the motion of the whole body will be the outward expression of its internal collisions, even though up to the limits of perception we suppose the speed of its motion not to be retarded by collision. It is of advantage to grasp this first principle as well.

Nor of course does the whole body perform the trajects of all its component atoms.

63 Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings (for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief), you must consider that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure, and most resembling wind with a certain admixture of heat, and in some respects like to one of these and in some to the other. There is also the part which is many degrees more advanced even than these in fineness of composition, and for this reason is more capable of feeling in harmony with the rest of the structure as well. Now all this is made manifest by the activities of the soul and the feelings and the readiness of its movements and its processes of thought and by what we lose at the moment of death. Further, you must grasp that the soul possesses 64 the chief cause of sensation: yet it could not have acquired sensation, unless it were in some way enclosed by the rest of the structure. And this in its turn having afforded the soul this cause of sensation acquires itself too a share in this contingent capacity from the soul. Yet it does not acquire all the capacities which the soul possesses: and therefore when the soul is released from the body, the

v. *The soul.*
1. It is composed of fine atoms, like wind and heat, and of the third, more subtle, element.

2. The soul has sensation owing to its protection within the body, to which it then communicates sensation.

- γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρω
 ἅμα συγγεγεννημένῳ αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν, ὃ διὰ τῆς συντελε-
 σθείσης περὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν σύμπτωμα
 αἰσθητικὸν εὐθὺς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ ἀπεδίδου κατὰ τὴν ὁμοού-
 65 ρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ εἶπον. | διὸ δὴ
 καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγ-
 μένου ἀναισθητήσεται· ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ ταύτης ξυναπόληται τοῦ
 στεγάζοντος λυθέντος εἴθ' ὅλον εἶτε καὶ μέρους τινός, ἔαν
 5 περ διαμένῃ, ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα
 διαμένον καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν
 ἐκείνου ἀπηλλαγμένου, ὅσον ποτὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συντεῖναι τῶν
 ἀτόμων πλῆθος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν. καὶ μὴν καὶ
 διαλυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἀθροίσματος ἡ ψυχὴ διασπείρεται
 10 καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει τὰς αὐτὰς δυνάμεις οὐδὲ κινεῖται, ὥστε οὐδ'
 66 αἴσθησιν κέκτηται. | οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε νοεῖν αὐτὸ αἰσθανόμενον
 μὴ (δν) ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συστήματι καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσι ταύταις
 χρώμενον, ὅταν τὰ στεγάζοντα καὶ περιέχοντα μὴ τοιαῦτα ᾖ,
 67 ἐν οἷς νῦν οὐσα ἔχει ταύτας τὰς κινήσεις. | ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
 τότε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἀσώματον λέγεται κατὰ
 τὴν πλείστην ὁμολίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοη-
 θέντος ἄν. καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον
 5 πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ· τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν
 δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέ-

64 6 ἐτέρῳ . . . συγγεγεννημένῳ Brieger: ἐτέρῳ . . . συγγεγεννη-
 μένῳ libri: ἕτερον . . . συγγεγεννημένον Usener 8 αὐτὸ libri
 plerique: αὐτῷ B¹Z κίνησιν BP¹Q: δίνησιν FHP³: δύνῃσιν
 GZ. 65 3 ἀναισθητήσεται Kühn: ἀναισθήσεται B: ἀναισθησία libr.
 cett.: ἀναισθητεῖ Schneider ἀλλ' ἂν FP³: ἀλλὰ ἂν libr. cett.
 ταύτης Usener: ταύτη libri ξυναπόληται G: ξυναπόλλεται FHPQ:
 ξυναπόλλεται BC 5 ἔξει Usener: ὀξὺ libri: σῶζει Muehl
 6 καὶ κατὰ μέρος FG: κατὰ μέρος BHPQCo: καὶ μέρος Usener
 9 διαλυομένου F: δυομένου B: λυομένου libr. cett. 10 κινεῖται]
 κινήσεις Bignone: (τὰς αὐτὰς κινήσεις) supplendum censuit Brieger
 66 1 αὐτὸ] τὸ Usener 2 (δν) supplendum suspicatus est Usener
 4 οἷς] οἷοις coniecit Usener 67 2 δτι] ὅ τι Usener λέγεται
 Bignone: λέγει γὰρ libri: λέγομεν Muehl: verba λέγει γὰρ κατὰ τὴν
 πλείστην ὁμολίαν ut glossema seclisut Usener 3 καθ' ἑαυτὸ
 Stephanus: καθ' ἑαυτὸν libri 5 οὔτε] οὐδὲ coniecit Usener

Scholia

67 1 post καὶ τότε legitur λέγει ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν
 συγκρίσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρωγγυλωτάτων, πολλὰ τινι διαφορουσῶν τῶν
 τοῦ πυρός· καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι·
 τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς.

body no longer has sensation. For it never possessed this power in itself, but used to afford opportunity for it to another existence, brought into being at the same time with itself: and this existence, owing to the power now consummated within itself as a result of motion, used spontaneously to produce for itself the capacity of sensation and then to communicate it to the body as well, in virtue of its contact and correspondence of movement, as I have

- 65 already said. Therefore, so long as the soul remains in the body, even though some other part of the body be lost, it will never lose sensation; nay more, whatever portions of the soul may perish too, when that which enclosed it is removed either in whole or in part, if the soul continues to exist at all, it will retain sensation. On the other hand the rest of the structure, though it continues to exist either as a whole or in part, does not retain sensation, if it has once lost that sum of atoms, however small it be, which together goes to produce the nature of the soul. Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers nor performs its movements, so that it does not possess sensation either.

- 66 For it is impossible to imagine it with sensation, if it is not in this organism and cannot effect these movements, when what encloses and surrounds it is no longer the same as the surroundings in which it now exists and per-

- 67 forms these movements. Furthermore, we must clearly comprehend as well, that the incorporeal in the general acceptance of the term is applied to that which could be thought of as such as an independent existence. Now it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal as a separate existence, except the void: and the void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion

3. Even though parts of the body be lost, the soul still has sensation;

but if the soul be lost, the body ceases to feel;

and so does the soul, when the body is broken up.

4 The soul cannot be incorporeal, for if it were like the only incorporeal independent existence, the void, it could not act or be acted on.

Scholia

ὑπνον τε γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν τῶν παρ' ἄλλη τὴν σύγκρισιν παρεσπαρμένων ἐγκατεχομένων ἢ διαφορουμένων, ἵνα συμπιπτόντων τοῖς ἐπερεισμοῖς. τό τε σπέρμα ἀφ' ὧν τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι

μέν τι epit. vat. Cobet: μέντοι libri παρεσπάρθαι Schneider: παρεσπάρθῃ B²: παρσαρθρεῖ B¹FGHPQCo: παρσαθρεῖ Z θώρακι libri perique: σώματι GZ συμπιπτόντων] ἐμπιπτόντων F: unde ἐκπιπτόντων Giussani ἐπερεισμοῖς Usener: ποργμοῖς BHP¹Q: πορμοῖς F (sc. ἐπυρμοῖς): ἐσπαρμένοις GZ: πόροις Traversarius

χεται. ὥσθ' οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματίζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη· νῦν δ' ἐναργῶς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ συμπτώματα. | ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα (τὰ) περὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάγων τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, μνημονεύων τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥηθέντων, ἱκανῶς κατόψεται τοῖς τύποις ἐμπεριειλημμένα εἰς τὸ (καὶ τὰ) κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ 5 τούτων ἐξακριβοῦσθαι βεβαίως.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρη καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται σώματος ὥσανεὶ συμβεβηκότα ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτῶν γνωστοῖς, οὔθ' ὥς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο), | οὔτε ὅλως ὥς οὐκ εἰσίν, οὔθ' ὥς ἕτερ' ἅττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα, οὔθ' ὥς μόρια τούτου, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν (ἐκ) τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδιον, οὐχ οἶον δ' εἶναι (ἐκ) 5 συμπεφορημένων (ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄγκων μείζον ἄθροισμα συστήῃ ἥτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων), ἀλλὰ μόνον, ὥς λέγω, ἐκ τούτων ἀπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδιον. καὶ ἐπιβολὰς μὲν ἔχοντα ἰδίᾳς πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ διαλήψεις, συμπαρακολου- 10 θούντος δὲ τοῦ ἀθρόου καὶ οὐθαμῇ ἀποσχιζομένου, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀθρόαν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σώματος κατηγορίαν εἰληφότος. |

70 Καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῖς σώμασι συμπέπτει πολλάκις καὶ οὐκ αἰδιον παρακολουθεῖν * * * * οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις εἶναι οὔτε ἀσώματα.

9 διαλαμβάνεται scripsi: διαλαμβάνει libri: διαλαμβάνει Big- none: διαλαμβάνομεν Meibom: συμβαίνει Usener 68 2 (τὰ) supplevit Usener 4 (καὶ τὰ) supplevit Usener 7 βάρη Usener: βαρέα ἢ libri ὥσανεὶ συμβεβηκότα Galesius: ὥς ἂν εἰς αὐτὰ βεβηκότα libri: ὥς ἂν αἰεὶ συμβεβηκότα Bignone 9 αὐτῶν γνωστοῖς P³: αὐτοῖς γνώστοις libr. cett.: σώματος γνωστά Usener 69 2 οὔθ' ὥς Cassendi: ὥς οὔθ' (οὔθ' FQ) libri ἕτερ' ἅττα Usener: ἕτερα τὰ libri 3 (ἐκ) supplevit Meibom 4 (ἐκ) supplevi 5 συμπεφορημένων BQP¹Co: συμπεφορημένον F 6 μεγε- θῶν] μερῶν Schneider 7 τοῦδε τινος Usener: τοῦ δὲ τινος libri 8 ἑαυτοῦ] ἑαυτῶν HPQ 10 οὐθαμῇ Usener: οὐθαμῇ BP¹Q: οὐδαμῇ libr. cett. ἀποσχιζομένου] ἀποσχιζομένου B: ἀπο- σχιζόμενα Usener 11 εἰληφότος] εἰληφότα Usener 70 2 παρα- κολουθεῖν libr. plerique: παρακολουθεῖ B: παρακολουθεῖ α. γ' Bignone: post παρακολουθεῖν lacunam indicavit Usener εἶναι

through itself to bodies. So that those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking idly. For it would not be able to act or be acted on in any respect, if it were of this nature. But as it is, both these occurrences are clearly distinguished in respect of the soul. Now if one refers all these reasonings about the soul to the standards of feeling and sensation and remembers what was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in these general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the system as well.

These general principles will supply a basis for details.

Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that), nor that they absolutely do not exist, nor that they are some other kind of incorporeal existence accompanying body, nor that they are material parts of body: rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together to form it (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them. All these properties have their own peculiar means of being perceived and distinguished, provided always that the aggregate body goes along with them and is never wrested from them, but in virtue of its comprehension as an aggregate of qualities acquires the predicate of body.

VI. *Properties and Accidents.*

1. Properties are not independent corporeal existences or incorporeal existences or parts of body, but the inseparable physical constituents of body.

but body owes its essential nature to an aggregate of properties, always existing in it, not uniting to form it.

Furthermore, there often happen to bodies and yet do not permanently accompany them (accidents, of which we must suppose neither that they do not exist at all nor that they have the nature of a whole body), nor that they can be classed among unseen things nor as incorporeal. So

2. Accidents are not incorporeal existences, &c., but qualities and so on attached to body, but not permanently.

scripsi: καὶ libri: ἔσται Usener: καὶ ἀνασθῆναι δοξασιόων εἶναι Bignone

- ὥστε δὴ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φορὰν τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμενοι
 φανερά ποιοῦμεν τὰ συμπτώματα οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν
 5 ἔχειν, ὁ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα προσαγορεύομεν,
 οὔτε τὴν τῶν αἰδίων παρακολουθούτων, ὧν ἄνευ σῶμα οὐ
 δυνατόν νοεῖσθαι. κατ' ἐπιβολὰς δ' ἂν τις παρακολου-
 71 θούτος τοῦ ἀθρόου ἕκαστα προσαγορευθεῖη, | ἀλλ' ὅτε δήποτε
 ἕκαστα συμβαίνοντα θεωρεῖται, οὐκ αἰδίων τῶν συμπτωμάτων
 παρακολουθούτων. καὶ οὐκ ἐξελατέον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ταύτην
 τὴν ἐναργεῖαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ᾧ συμ-
 5 βαίνει οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν αἰδίων παρακολουθούτων, οὐδ' αὖ καθ'
 αὐτὰ νομιστέον (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο διανοητέον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τούτων
 οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰδίων συμβεβηκότων), ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται,
 συμπτώματα πάν(τα) κατὰ τὰ σώματα νομιστέον, καὶ οὐκ
 αἰδίων παρακολουθούντα οὐδ' αὖ φύσεως καθ' ἑαυτὰ τάγμα
 10 ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν ιδιότητα ποιεῖ
 θεωρεῖται. |
- 72 Καὶ μὴν καὶ τότε γε δεῖ προσκατανοῆσαι σφοδρῶς· τὸν
 γὰρ δὴ χρόνον οὐ ζητήτεον ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ὅσα ἐν
 ὑποκειμένῳ ζητοῦμεν ἀναγόντες ἐπὶ τὰς βλεπομένας παρ'
 ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς προλήψεις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνάργημα, καθ' ὃ τὸν
 5 πολλὸν ἢ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀναφωνοῦμεν, συγγενικῶς τοῦτο
 ἐπιφέροντας ἀναλογιστέον. καὶ οὔτε διαλέκτους ὡς βελτίους
 μεταληπτέον, ἀλλ' αὐταῖς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις κατ' αὐτοῦ
 χρηστέον· οὔτε ἄλλο τι κατ' αὐτοῦ κατηγορητέον ὡς τὴν
 αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔχον τῷ ἰδιώματι τούτῳ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι
 10 τινές), ἀλλὰ μόνον ᾧ συμπλέκομεν τὸ ἴδιον τοῦτο καὶ παρα-
 73 μετροῦμεν, μάλιστα ἐπιλογιστέον. | καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπο-
 δείξεως προσδίδεται ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ, ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ
 5 ὁ FGZ: ὃν HPQCo: ἦν B 6 αἰδίων BF: αἰδίων libr. cett.
 8 post προσαγορευθεῖη lacunam indicavit Usener 71 1 ὅτε]
 ὅτῳ Usener 2 αἰδίων Meibom: αἰδίων libri 4 ἐναργεῖαν] ἐνεργείαν GH 5 F¹GZ: ὁ B: ὁ HPQCoF² 5 αἰδίων PCo: αἰδίων BGFZ 6 διανοητέον] διανοητὸν Bernays 7 αἰδίων] αἰδίων BFGZ 8 πάν(τα) κατὰ τὰ σώματα Bignone: πάντα τὰ σώματα libri: πάντα σώματος Usener: πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα Muehl 10 ἀλλ' ὃν] ἄλλον P¹Q: ἀλλ' (ὃν) ὃν coniecit Bignone 11 θεωρεῖται] θεωρεῖσθαι vel θεωρητέον suspicatus est Usener 72 6 ἐπιφέροντας scripsi: περιφέροντες libri: ἐπιφέροντες Usener 7-8 κατ' αὐτοῦ ... κατ' αὐτοῦ Gassendi: καθ' αὐτοῦ... καθ' αὐτοῦ libri 9 ἔχον Usener: ἔχοντος libri (ἔχοντ H) 10 τοῦτο BHP¹Q: τούτῳ FGP²

Scholia

71 4 post συμβαίνει legitur ὁ δὴ καὶ σῶμα προσαγορεύομεν: in textu retinuit Muchll

- that when according to the most general usage we employ this name, we make it clear that accidents have neither the nature of the whole, which we comprehend in its aggregate and call body, nor that of the qualities which permanently accompany it, without which a given body cannot be conceived. But as the result of certain acts of apprehension, provided the aggregate body goes along with them, they might each be given this name, but only on occasions when each one of them is seen to occur, since accidents are not permanent accompaniments. And we must not banish this clear vision from the realm of existence, because it does not possess the nature of the whole to which it is joined nor that of the permanent accompaniments, nor must we suppose that such contingencies exist independently (for this is inconceivable both with regard to them and to the permanent properties), but, just as it appears in sensation, we must think of them all as accidents occurring to bodies, and that not as permanent accompaniments, or again as having in themselves a place in the ranks of material existence; rather they are seen to be just what our actual sensation shows their proper character to be.
- 72 Moreover, you must firmly grasp this point as well; we must not look for time, as we do for all other things which we look for in an object, by referring them to the general conceptions which we perceive in our own minds, but we must take the direct intuition, in accordance with which we speak of 'a long time' or 'a short time', and examine it, applying our intuition to time as we do to other things. Neither must we search for expressions as likely to be better, but employ just those which are in common use about it. Nor again must we predicate of time anything else as having the same essential nature as this special perception, as some people do, but we must turn our thoughts particularly to that only with which we associate this peculiar perception and by which we measure it. For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions
- Both their existence and their transitory character must be recognized.
3. Time is not recognizable by a concept, as are concrete things and qualities, but is a special kind of accident.

όμενοι
φύσω
ύομεν,
μα ού
κολου-
δήποτε
ομάτων
ταύτην
συμ-
καθ'
ούτων
ίνεται,
αὶ οὐκ
τάγμα
ποιεῖ

· τὸν
σα ἐν
παρ'
δ τὸν
τοῦτο
ελτίους
αὐτοῦ
ὡς τὴν
ποιοῦσι
παρα-
κ' ἀπο-
ις καὶ

or. cett.
[1 ὅτε]
[ἐνερ-
αὐδίων
[αὐδίων
σώματα
το ἄλλ'
ωρεῖται]
εροντας
τ' αὐτοῦ
9 ἔχον
FGP²

n textu

ταῖς νυξὶ συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν, ὡσαύτως
δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις, καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ
5 στάσσειν, ἰδιὸν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα πάλιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο
ἐννοοῦντες, καθ' ὃ χρόνον ὀνομάζομεν.

Ἐπὶ τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους δεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν
σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην τὸ ὁμοιοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις
πυκνῶς ἔχουσιν νομίζειν γεγενῆσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου, πάντων
10 τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων ἀποκεκριμένων καὶ μειζόνων καὶ
ἐλαττόνων· καὶ πάλιν διαλύεσθαι πάντα, τὰ μὲν θάττον,
τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ
74 τῶν τοιῶνδε πάσχοντα. | ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὔτε ἐξ
ἀνάγκης δεῖ νομίζειν ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας * * * * οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἂν ἀποδείξειεν οὐδεὶς, ὥς (ἐν) μὲν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ οὐκ
ἂν ἐμπεριελήφθη τὰ τοιαῦτα σπέρματα, ἐξ ὧν ζῷα τε καὶ φυτὰ
5 καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα (τὰ) θεωρούμενα συνίσταται, ἐν δὲ τῷ
τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη. |

75 Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα
ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι·
τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον
ἐξακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν ἐν μὲν τισὶ θάττον, ἐν δὲ
5 τισὶ βραδύτερον καὶ ἐν μὲν τισὶ περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις † ἀπὸ
τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου† * *, ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἐλάττους. ὅθεν καὶ
τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς τὰς

73 5 πᾶσιν] πάντα Usener 7 τοὺς κόσμους] τοὺς (τε) κόσμους
suspiciatus est Usener 8 ὁμοιοειδὲς FPQCo: ὁμοειδὲς BGHZ
13 πάσχοντα FGH¹P³Z: τοῦτο σχῶα BP¹Q: τοῦτο πάσχοντα H²
74 2 post ἔχοντας verba genuina scholio intruso expulsa esse indicavit
Usener 3 (ἐν) supplevit Gassendi 5 (τὰ) supplevit Schneider
75 2 αὐτῶν τῶν BHPQ: τῶν αὐτῶν F: τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν GCoZ
3 ὕστερον BP¹Q: καὶ ὕστερον codd. cett. 5 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἀπείρου ut glossema seclisut Usener ἀποτομήν pro ἀπὸ τῶν legendo:
retinuit Bignone qui (φόβων μείζους παρασκευάζεσθαι λύσεις) addere
voluit Lacunam indicavit Usener 6 καὶ Usener: κατ' libri

Scholia

73 6 post ὀνομάζομεν legitur φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ
φύσεως καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ ἐπιτομῇ

τῇ δευτέρᾳ libri plerique: τῇ β' FGZ

13 post πάσχοντα legitur ὅλον οὖν ὥς καὶ φθαρτοὺς φησι τοὺς
κόσμους μεταβαλλόντων τῶν μερῶν. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τὴν γῆν τῷ ἀέρι
ἐποχείσθαι.

ὅλον... καὶ in textu retinuit et post καὶ * * * (καὶ ἐν τῇ... Περὶ
φύσεως) adiecit Muehl φθαρτοὺς BPCo: φθάρτας F: ἀφθάρ-
τους GZ τοὺς κόσμους libri plerique: τὸν κόσμον F

74 2 post ἔχοντας legitur ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρους αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ιβ' Περὶ
φύσεως φησιν· οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ῥοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἄλλοιο-

that we associate it, and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connexion with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time.

And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

- 74 And further we must believe that these worlds were neither (created) all of necessity with one configuration (nor yet with every kind of shape. Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world;) for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

- 75 Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times (making great advances), and lesser again at others. And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men's natures according to their different nationalities had their own

VII. *Worlds, their creation, destruction, shapes, and contents.*

1. Worlds are created out of the void by means of separate aggregations of matter and are similarly dissolved.

2. Worlds are of various shapes.

3. In them all there are animals, &c., as in ours.

VIII. *The growth of civilization and the origin of language.*

1. The arts were taught by nature and developed by reason.

2. Language thus originated from

Scholia

σχήματος ἐτέρους· οὐ μέντοι πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν. οὐδὲ ζῶα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου

verbum ἀλλὰ in textu retinuit Muehl

περὶ αὐτοῦ BHP¹QCo: περὶ τούτου FGZ: περὶ (φύσεως) αὐτὸς

Usener ἔχειν libri plerique: ἔχεται β οὐ μέντοι... ἀπείρου

in textu retinere voluit Brieger

6 post ἐδυνήθη legitur ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐντραφήναι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρέπον καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς νομιστέον

τὸν αὐτὸν... νομιστέον in textu retinuit Muehl

ταύτως
σι καὶ
τοῦτο

πᾶσαν
μένους
άντων
ων καὶ
άπτον,
δὲ ὑπὸ
τέ ἐξ
* οὐδὲ
αὶ οὐκ
ἰ φυτὰ
δὲ τῷ

αντοία
θῆναι
στερον
ἐν δὲ
† ἀπὸ
εν καὶ
is τὰς

κόσμους
BGHZ
τα Η²
dicavit
neider
GCoZ
πὸ τοῦ
gendo:
addere
libri

α Περι

ι τοὺς

ῶ ἀέρι

... Περι

ἀφθάρ-

β Περι

ἀλλοιο-

φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας
 πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα
 10 ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ' ἑκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν
 φαντασμάτων, ὥς ἂν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν
 76 διαφορά εἴη· ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια
 τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἦττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι
 ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας· τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ
 συνωρώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς συνειδότας παρεγ-
 5 γῆσαι τινὰς φθόγγους τοὺς (μὲν) ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι,
 τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐλομένους κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν
 οὕτως ἐρμηνεύσαι.

Καὶ μὴν (καὶ τὴν) ἐν τοῖς μετέωροις φορὰν καὶ τροπὴν
 καὶ ἔκλειψιν καὶ ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις
 10 μῆτε λειτουργοῦντος τινὸς νομίζειν δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ διατά-
 τontos ἢ διατάξαντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος
 77 μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας | (οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεῖαι καὶ
 φροντίδες καὶ ὄργαι καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ
 καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται), μῆτε
 αὐτῷ πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα συνεστραμμένον τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα
 5 κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν· ἀλλὰ πᾶν
 τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενα ἐπὶ τὰς
 τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, ἵνα μὴδ' ὑπεναντίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν (γίνωνται)
 τῷ σεμνώματι δόξαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν
 ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῇ ἢ ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει. ὅθεν δὴ
 10 κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν τούτων
 ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει δεῖ δοξάζειν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην
 ταύτην καὶ περίοδον συντελεῖσθαι. |

78 Καὶ μὴν καὶ (τὸ) τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακρι-
 βῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸ μακάριον

12 εἴη] ἢ Usener 76 3 ἀλλήλους Meibom : ἀλλήλους F : ἀλλήλους
 libr. cett. 5 τοὺς (μὲν) Schneider : τοὺς libri : seclusit Usener 6 ἐλο-
 μένους] ἐπομένους Schneider αἰτίαν] φαντασίαν suspicatus est Usener
 8 (καὶ τὴν) supplevit Usener 11 διατάξαντος GHZ : διατάξοντος
 BFPQCo 77 2 ἀλλ' ἐν P¹QCo : ἀλλὰ ἐν B : ἀλλ' FGHP³Z
 4 αὐτῷ πῦρ ἅμα (ἅμα H) ὄντα P³GHZ : αὐτῷ πῦρ μόνον P¹Q : λυπυρα μα-
 οντα B¹ : λυπυρὰ ἅμα ὄντα B² : αὐτῷ πῦρ ὄντα F : αὐτῷ πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα
 M. Casaubon : αὐτῷ πῦρ ἀνάμματα Usener συνεστραμμένον] συνε-
 στραμμένου Usener 6 φερόμενα] φερόμενον Usener 7 ἵνα Usener :
 εἰς libri μὴδ' ὑπεναντίαι ... δόξαι] μὴδὲν ὑπεναντίον ... δόξη Meibom
 (γίνωνται) supplevit Gassendi 9 αὐτῇ ἢ HPQCo : αὐτὴν ἢ B : αὐτῇ

peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well. And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.

Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbours). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements. But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men's souls. Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.

Furthermore, we must believe that to discover accurately the cause of the most essential facts is the function of the science of nature, and that blessedness for us in the know-

natural sounds, caused by feelings and impressions,

and was subsequently developed deliberately. New names were introduced in both these ways.

X. *Celestial Phenomena.*

1. Their causes:

(a) The motions of the heavenly bodies are not controlled by any immortal blessed being,

(b) nor are they divine beings themselves.

We must not in either of these ways derogate from the majesty of the gods.

2. The knowledge of the nature of the heavenly

FGZ 10 κατὰ Meibom: καὶ libri
78 1 (τὸ) supplevit Usener

11 γένεσσι] συστάσει FGZ

ἐν τῇ περὶ μετεώρων γνώσει ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι καὶ ἐν τῇ
 τίνες φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτί, καὶ
 5 ὅσα συγγενῇ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοῦτο ἀκρίβειαν· ἔτι τε οὐ τὸ
 πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ
 ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ
 μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μῆθεν·
 79 καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς εἶναι. | τὸ δ'
 ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκὸς τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς
 καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῇ τοῖς μῆθεν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ
 μακάριον τῆς γνώσεως συντείνειν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους
 5 ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα κατιδόντας, τίνες δ' αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοούντας
 καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ προσήδειςαν ταῦτα·
 τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προσκατα-
 νοήσεως μὴ δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν
 κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν. διὸ δὴ κὰν πλείους αἰτίας εὐρίσκωμεν
 10 τροπῶν καὶ δύσεων καὶ ἀνατολῶν καὶ ἐκλείψεων καὶ τῶν
 τοιουτοτρόπων, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος γινόμενοις
 80 ἦν, | οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ
 ἀπειληφέναι, ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν
 συντείνει. ὥστε παραθεωροῦντας ποσαχῶς παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ
 ὅμοιον γίνεται, αἰτιολογητέον ὑπὲρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ
 5 παντὸς τοῦ ἀδήλου, καταφρονούντας τῶν οὔτε (τὸ) μοναχῶς
 ἔχον ἢ γινόμενον γνωρίζοντων οὔτε τὸ πλεοναχῶς συμβαῖνον
 (ἐπὶ τῶν) τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀποστημάτων φαντασίαν παραδιδόντων,
 ἔτι τε ἀγνοούντων καὶ ἐν ποίοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀταρακτῆσαι.
 ἂν οὖν οἴωμεθα καὶ ὧδί πως ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ
 10 ἐφ' οἷοις ὁμοίως ἔστιν ἀταρακτῆσαι, αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς
 γίνεται γνωρίζοντες, ὥσπερ κὰν ὅτι ὧδί πως γίνεται εἰδῶμεν,

3 ἐν τῇ . . . γνώσει seclisit Usener ἐνταῦθά (τε) suspicatus
 est Usener 4 τίνες Z^{ff}: τινὲς libri 5 συγγενῇ] συντείνει
 Usener: (τούτοις συντείνει) supplevit Kochalsky 6 ἐνδεχο-
 μένον Schneider: ἐνδεχομένα B: ἐνδεχομένως FHPQCo: ἐνδεχο-
 μένας GZ 79 4 τῆς γνώσεως] τὰς γνώσεις Usener 5 κατι-
 δόντας] κατειδόντας Usener 8 καὶ] κατὰ Gassendi 9 κὰν
 Usener: καὶ libri εὐρίσκωμεν Usener: εὐρίσκομεν libri 10 τῶν
 τοιουτοτρόπων Meibom: τῶν τοιούτων τρόπων (τροπῶν FGHP³Z)
 libri 12 ἦν Usener: ἦ H: ἦ libr. cett. 80 5 οὔτε (τὸ)
 Gassendi: οὐδὲ libri (οὐδὲν Co) 7 (ἐπὶ τῶν) supplevit Bignone:
 τὴν (τ') Usener παραδιδόντων] παριδόντων Usener 8 ἐν] ἐπὶ
 coniecit Schneider 9 καὶ ante ἐφ' οἷοις seclisit Usener 10 ἐφ'
 οἷοις FP³Z: ἐν ποίοις P¹QCo ἔστιν GH: om. libr. cett.

ledge of celestial phenomena lies in this and in the understanding of the nature of the existences seen in these celestial phenomena, and of all else that is akin to the exact knowledge requisite for our happiness: in knowing too that what occurs in several ways or is capable of being otherwise has no place here, but that nothing which suggests doubt or alarm can be included at all in that which is naturally immortal and blessed. Now this we can ascertain by our mind is absolutely the case. But what falls within the investigation of risings and settings and turnings and eclipses, and all that is akin to this, is no longer of any value for the happiness which knowledge brings, but persons who have perceived all this, but yet do not know what are the natures of these things and what are the essential causes, are still in fear, just as if they did not know these things at all: indeed, their fear may be even greater, since the wonder which arises out of the observation of these things cannot discover any solution or realize the regulation of the essentials. And for this very reason, even if we discover several causes for turnings and settings and risings and eclipses and the like, as has been the case already in our investigation of detail, we must not suppose that our inquiry into these things has not reached sufficient accuracy to contribute to our peace of mind and happiness. So we must carefully consider in how many ways a similar phenomenon is produced on earth, when we reason about the causes of celestial phenomena and all that is imperceptible to the senses; and we must despise those persons who do not recognize either what exists or comes into being in one way only, or that which may occur in several ways in the case of things which can only be seen by us from a distance, and further are not aware under what conditions it is impossible to have peace of mind. If, therefore, we think that a phenomenon probably occurs in some such particular way, and that in circumstances under which it is equally possible for us to be at peace, when we realize that it may occur in several ways, we shall be just as little disturbed as if we know that it occurs in some such particular way.

bodies, &c., is certain and essential for our happiness,

but not the knowledge of the detailed causes of their working.

We must therefore be content even if we find several causes for the same phenomenon.

We must reason about celestial phenomena on the analogy of things on earth, and not be disturbed, if we find several causes at work.

- 81 ἀταρακτῆσομεν. | ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ὅλως ἅπασιν ἐκείνο δεῖ
κατανοεῖν, ὅτι τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς
γίνεται ἐν τῷ ταῦτα μακάριά τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἀφθαρτα, καὶ
ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτοις βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ
5 αἰτίας, καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν αἰεὶ προσδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπτεῖν
κατὰ τοὺς μύθους εἶτε καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν
τῷ τεθνάναι φοβουμένους ὥσπερ οὖσαν κατ' αὐτούς, καὶ ἐν τῷ
μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀλλ' ἀλόγῳ γέ τιμι παραστάσει,
ὅθεν μὴ ὀρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν τὴν ἴσῃν ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην
82 ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν ὥς εἰ καὶ ἐδόξαζον ταῦτα. | ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία
τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελεύσθαι καὶ συνεχῇ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν
ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

Ὅθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παρούσι καὶ ταῖς
5 αἰσθήσεσι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ
ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις, καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρουσίᾳ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν
κριτηρίων ἐναργεῖα. ἂν γὰρ τούτοις προσέχωμεν, τὸ ὅθεν
ὁ τάραχος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγίνετο ἐξαιτιολογῶμεν ὀρθῶς καὶ
ἀπολύσομεν, ὑπὲρ τε μετεώρων αἰτιολογούντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
10 τῶν αἰεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων, ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐσχάτως.

- Ταῦτά σοι, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἐστι κεφαλαιωδέστατα ὑπὲρ τῆς
83 τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἐπιτεταμμένα, | ὥστε ἂν γένοιτο οὗτος ὁ
λόγος δυνατὸς κατασχεθῆ(ναι) μετ' ἀκριβείας· οἶμαι, ἐὰν
μὴ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα βαδίσῃ τις τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβομάτων,
ἀσύμβλητον αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀδρότητα
5 λήψεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ καθαρὰ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιήσῃ πολλὰ
τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐξακριβουμένων κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν
ἡμῶν, καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐν μνήμῃ τιθέμενα συνεχῶς βοηθήσει.
τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς (καὶ τὰ) κατὰ μέρος ἤδη

81 I ὅλως BHPCo: ὅλοις FQ: om. GZ 2 τάραχος (μέν)
suspiciatus est Usener 3 ταῦτα] ταῦτα Muehl doxazein
(eivai) Usener 4 τούτοις libr. plerique: ταύτας F: τούτῳ Usener
5 αἰεὶ Usener: καὶ libr: ἢ Muehl 6 εἶτε καὶ αὐτὴν Casaubon:
εἶτε κατὰ ταύτην libr 7 κατ' Casaubon: καὶ libr 8 ἀλλ' ἀλόγῳ
BGHP: ἀλλὰ λόγῳ FPQ 10 ὥς scripsi: τῷ BGZ: τὸ
FHPQCo: τῷ Usener εἰ καὶ ἐδόξα[ον] εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι Usener
82 2 τὸ] τῷ Usener 4 πάθεσι Bonnet: πᾶσι libr 11 fortasse
(τὰ) κεφαλαιωδέστατα 83 I ἂν γένοιτο] ἐὰν γένηται Usener
οὗτος ὁ λόγος δυνατὸς libr. plerique: δυνατὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος F
2 κατασχεθῆ(ναι) Bockemüller: κατασχέθη H: κατεσχέθη libr. cett.:
κατασχεθεῖς Gassendi 4 ἀσύμβλητον BHPQ: ἀσύγκριτον FGZ
5 καθαρὰ Gassendi: καθαρὰν libr 6 ἐξακριβουμένων Gassendi:

- 81 And besides all these matters in general we must grasp this point, that the principal disturbance in the minds of men arises because they think that these celestial bodies are blessed and immortal, and yet have wills and actions and motives inconsistent with these attributes; and because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends, or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves; and, again, because they are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentiment, and therefore, as they do not know the limits of pain, they suffer a disturbance equally great or even more extensive than if they had reached this belief by opinion.

3. *The causes of men's fears.*
The two chief causes of unrest of mind are (a) the belief that the heavenly bodies are divine, and (b) the fear of eternal punishment or of annihilation after death.

- 82 But peace of mind is being delivered from all this, and having a constant memory of the general and most essential principles.

Peace of mind is freedom from these fears.

Wherefore we must pay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations in general and in particular, according as the subject is general or particular, and to every immediate intuition in accordance with each of the standards of judgement. For if we pay attention to these, we shall rightly trace the causes whence arose our mental disturbance and fear, and, by learning the true causes of celestial phenomena and all other occurrences that come to pass from time to time, we shall free ourselves from all which produces the utmost fear in other men.

4. *Trust in the senses.*
To be quit of our fears, we must always attend to the direct evidence of feelings and sensations, and of the other criteria of judgement.

- Here, Herodotus, is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy. I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivalled strength compared with other men. For indeed he will clear up for himself many of the detailed points by reference to our general system, and these very principles, if he stores them in his mind, will constantly aid him. For such is their character that even those who are at present engaged in working out the

Conclusion.
This summary will be of value both to the advanced student and to the more general inquirer.

ἐξακριβούμενος BFHPQCo : ἐξακριβουμένοις GZ 8 (καὶ τὰ) sup-
plevit Usener : τὰ prius inseruerat Meibom

ἐξακριβοῦντας ἱκανῶς ἢ καὶ τελείως, εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀνα-
 λύνοντας ἐπιβολὰς τὰς πλείστας τῶν περιοδειῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης
 φύσεως ποιεῖσθαι· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀποτελου-
 μένων, ἐκ τούτων εἰσὶν οἱ κατὰ τὸν ἄνευ φθόγγων τρόπον τὴν
 ᾄσμα νοήματι περίοδον τῶν κυριωτάτων πρὸς γαληνισμὸν
 ποιοῦνται.

11 ὅσοι H : ὅσα libr. cett. 12 εἰσὶν οἱ scripsi : εἰσὶν ἢ libri :
 ἱκανῇ Usener : ὅση δὴ ἢ Bignone ἄνευ φθόγγων] ἀνεύφθογγον
 P²Q : ἄνευ φθόγῳ H

details to a considerable degree, or even completely, will be able to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis in reference to such a survey as this. And as for all who are not fully among those on the way to being perfected, some of them can from this summary obtain a hasty view of the most important matters without oral instruction so as to secure peace of mind.

ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ ΠΤΟΟΚΛΕΙ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ

- 84 *Ηνεγκέ μοι Κλέων ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σοῦ, ἐν ᾗ φιλοφρονού-
μενός τε περὶ ἡμᾶς διετέλεις ἀξίως τῆς ἡμετέρας περὶ σεαυτὸν
σπουδῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἀπιθάνως ἐπειρῶ μνημονεύειν τῶν εἰς
μακάριον βίον συντεινόντων διαλογισμῶν, ἐδέου τε σεαυτῷ
5 περὶ τῶν μετεώρων σύντομον καὶ εὐπερίγραφον διαλογισμὸν
ἀποστεῖλαι, ἵνα ῥαδίως μνημονεύης· τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν
γεγραμμένα δυσμνημόνευτα εἶναι, καίτοι, ὥς ἔφης, συνεχῶς
αὐτὰ βαστάξεις. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἡδέως τε σοῦ τὴν δέησιν ἀπεδεξά-
85 μεθα καὶ ἐλπίσω ἡδέαις συνεσχέθημεν. | γράψαντες οὖν τὰ
λοιπὰ πάντα συντελοῦμεν ἄπερ ἡξίωσας πολλοῖς καὶ ἄλλοις
ἐσόμενα χρήσιμα τὰ διαλογίσματα ταῦτα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς
νεωστὶ φυσιολογίας γνησίου γενομένοις καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἀσχολίας
5 βαθυτέρας τῶν ἐγκυκλίων τινὸς ἐμπεπλεγμένοις. καλῶς δὴ
αὐτὰ διάλαβε, καὶ διὰ μνήμης ἔχων ὀξέως αὐτὰ περιόδευε
μετὰ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἐν τῇ μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον
ἀπεστείλαμεν.

- Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων
10 γνώσεως εἶτε κατὰ συναφὴν λεγομένων εἶτε αὐτοτελῶς νομίζειν
εἶναι ἢ περ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
86 τῶν λοιπῶν. | μήτε τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι μήτε
ὁμοίαν κατὰ πάντα τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχειν ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις
ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων κάθαρσιν,
οἷον ὅτι τὸ πᾶν σώματα καὶ ἀναφῆς φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἄτομα
5 (τὰ) στοιχεῖα, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δὴ ὅσα μοναχὴν ἔχει

84 7 καίτοι] κἀδύνατον Crönert 8 βαστάξεις Casaubon : βαστά-
ζειν libri : βαστάζονται Usener 85 2 λοιπὰ πάντα] λείποντα con-
iecit Usener 9 ἐκ] εἰκὸς Kochalsky 10 post νομίζειν (δεῖ)
supplevit Gassendi 86 1 καὶ ante παραβιάζεσθαι om. FH¹P²Z :
ante μήτε transposuit Kochalsky : καὶ (ἄπρακτον) Bignone
4 σώματα Usener : σώμα libri 5 (τὰ) adiecit Schneider
τοιαῦτα δὴ ὅσα Bignone : τοιαῦτα ἢ ὅσα libri : τοιαῦτα ὅσα Schneider

II

EPICURUS TO PYTHOCLES

84 CLEON brought me a letter from you in which you continue to express a kindly feeling towards me, which is a just return for my interest in you, and you attempt with some success to recall the arguments which lead to a life of blessedness. You ask me to send you a brief argument about the phenomena of the sky in a short sketch, that you may easily recall it to mind. For you say that what I have written in my other works is hard to remember, even though, as you state, you constantly have them in your hands. I was glad to receive your request and felt constrained to answer it by pleasant expectations for the future. Therefore, as I have finished all my other writings I now intend to accomplish your request, feeling that these arguments will be of value to many other persons as well, and especially to those who have but recently tasted the genuine inquiry into nature, and also to those who are involved too deeply in the business of some regular occupation. Therefore lay good hold on it, keep it in mind, and go through it all keenly, together with the rest which I sent in the small epitome to Herodotus.

Introduction.
Pythocles' request.

Epicurus' consent :
general usefulness of the letter.

First of all then we must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena of the sky, whether they are dealt with in connexion with other doctrines or independently, than peace of mind and a sure confidence, just as in all other branches of study. We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that 'the universe consists of bodies and the intangible', or that 'the elements are indivisible', and all

Purpose of investigation :
the quiet life.

Its principles :
investigation of heavenly phenomena differs from that of ethics or physics:

τοῖς φαινομένοις συμφωνίαν· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων οὐχ
 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε πλεοναχὴν ἔχει καὶ τῆς γενέσεως
 αἰτίας καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι σύμφωνον κατηγορίαν.
 οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας φυσιολογητέον,
 87 ἀλλ' ὥς τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται· | οὐ γὰρ ἤδη ἀλογίας καὶ
 κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρεῖαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως
 ἡμᾶς ζῆν. πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσειστῶς κατὰ πάντων
 (τῶν) κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαυρομένων συμφώνως
 5 τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν
 δεόντως καταλήπῃ· ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολήπῃ, τὸ δ' ἐκβάλλῃ
 ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὃν τῷ φαινομένῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς
 ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. σημεία
 δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετέωροις συντελουμένων φέρειν τῶν παρ'
 10 ἡμῶν τινα φαινομένων, ἃ θεωρεῖται ἢ ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὐ τὰ
 ἐν μετέωροις φαινόμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται πλεοναχῶς
 88 γενέσθαι. | τὸ μέντοι φάντασμα ἐκάστου τηρητέον καὶ ἐπὶ
 τὰ συναπτόμενα τούτῳ διαιρετέον ἃ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται τοῖς
 παρ' ἡμῶν γινόμενοις πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι.

Κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχὴ τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ
 5 πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα, οὐ λυομένου πάντα τὰ ἐν
 αὐτῷ σύγχυσις λήψεται, ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου
 καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ καὶ ἢ ἐν
 περιανομένῳ ἢ ἐν στάσει ἔχοντι καὶ στρογγύλῃν ἢ τρίγωνον
 ἢ ὅλαν δὴ ποτε (ἔχουσα) περιγραφὴν. πανταχῶς γὰρ ἐνδέ-
 10 χεται· τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ (ἐν) τῷδε
 89 τῷ κόσμῳ, ἐν ᾧ λήγον οὐκ ἔστι καταλαβεῖν. | ὅτι δὲ καὶ
 τοιοῦτοι κόσμοι εἰσὶν ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος, ἔστι καταλαβεῖν,
 καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος δύναται κόσμος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ

7 ὑπάρχει Gassendi: ὑπάρχειν libri 87 1 ἤδη ἀλογίας FHP²Z:
 ἰδιολογίας BP¹QCo unde ἰδιολογίας Stephanus 3' κατὰ] καὶ
 Usener: om. Crönert πάντων (τῶν) Bignone: πᾶν τῶν HP¹Q:
 πάντων libr. cett. 9 δ' ἐπὶ Usener: δέ τι BP¹QCo: δέ τινα FHP²Z:
 δέ πιθανὰ Bignone φέρειν] φέρει Kühn 10 ἢ Woltjer:
 ἢ libri οὐ] οὕτως F unde οὐχ ὥς Crönert 88 1 ἐκάστου]
 ἐκάστον coniecit Usener ἐπὶ] ἐτι Usener 5 οὐ λυομένου . . .
 λήψεται huc transtuli, post πυκνῷ καὶ habent libri, ut additamen-
 tum seclussit Usener 7 καὶ καταλήγουσα . . . πυκνῷ ut addita-
 mentum seclussit Usener ante ἢ ἐν περιανομένῳ addunt καὶ
 λήγουσαν libri (καὶ λήγουσα Gassendi) scilicet e καὶ καταλήγουσα
 repetitum: de his tribus versibus vid. commentarium nostrum
 8 ἐν στάσει Gassendi: ἐνστασιν libri 9 (ἔχουσα) addidi παν-
 ταχῶς] πανταχοῦ H²Q 10 (ἐν) τῷδε Usener: τῷδε libri (τόδε F)

such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations. For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles,

for more than one cause may produce the same effect.

87 but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble. Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes just as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth. Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass, though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in 88 several ways. Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth.

Such plurality of causes is not a disturbing element, if we do not make arbitrary decisions.

Things on earth may help us to explain heavenly phenomena.

A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion: it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three-cornered, or any kind of shape. For all such conditions are possible, seeing that no phenomenon is evidence against this in our world, in which it is not possible to perceive an ending.

I. *Worlds.*
Definition of a world: its boundary and shape.

89 And that such worlds are infinite in number we can be sure, and also that such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we

Worlds infinite in number.
Place of formation.

καὶ (ἐν) μετακοσμῷ, ὃ λέγομεν μεταξὺ κόσμων διάστημα, ἐν
 5 πολυκένῳ τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ,
 καθάπερ τινὲς φασίν, ἐπιτηδεῖων τιῶν σπερμάτων ῥυέντων
 ἀφ' ἐνὸς κόσμου ἢ μετακοσμίου ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ πλείονων κατὰ
 μικρὸν προσθέσεις τε καὶ διαρθρώσεις καὶ μεταστάσεις ποιούν-
 των ἐπ' ἄλλον τόπον, ἐὰν οὕτω τύχη, καὶ ἐπαρδεύσεις ἐκ τῶν
 10 ἐχόντων ἐπιτηδεύς ἕως τελειώσεως καὶ διαμονῆς ἐφ' ὅσον
 τὰ ὑποβληθέντα θεμέλια τὴν προσδοχὴν δύναται ποιεῖσθαι. |
 90 οὐ γὰρ ἀθροισμὸν δεῖ μόνον γενέσθαι οὐδὲ δῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐνδέχεται
 κόσμον γίνεσθαι κενῷ κατὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης,
 αὔξεσθαι τε, ἕως ἂν ἐτέρῳ προσκρούσῃ, καθάπερ τῶν φυσικῶν
 καλουμένων φησί τις. τοῦτο γὰρ μαχόμενόν ἐστι τοῖς φαινο-
 5 μένοις.

Ἡλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα (οὐ) καθ' ἑαυτὰ
 γενόμενα ὕστερον ἐμπεριελαμβάνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, ἀλλ'
 εὐθὺς διεπλάττετο καὶ αὔξησιν ἐλάμβανεν κατὰ προσκρίσεις
 καὶ διωήσεις λεπτομερῶν τιῶν φύσεων, ἥτοι πνευματικῶν
 10 ἢ πυροειδῶν ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα οὕτως ἢ
 91 αἰσθησις ὑποβάλλει. | τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἡλίου τε (καὶ σελήνης)
 καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρον κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τηλικούτον
 ἐστὶν ἡλίκον φαίνεται· κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἥτοι μείζον
 τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ μικρῷ ἔλαττον ἢ τηλικούτον. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ
 5 τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρὰ ἐξ ἀποστήματος θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν
 αἰσθησιν θεωρεῖται. καὶ πᾶν δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐνστημα
 ῥαδίως διαλυθήσεται, ἐὰν τις τοῖς ἐναργήμασι προσέχη, ὅπερ
 92 ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως βιβλίοις δείκνυμεν. | ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις
 ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρον καὶ κατὰ ἀναψιν

89 4 καὶ (ἐν) scripsi: καὶ libri: κὰν coniecit Usener 5 εἰλικρινεῖ
 καὶ] καὶ εἰλικρινεῖ Zeller 6 τινὲς Casaubon: τινα libri 7 ἢ καὶ
 FHP³Z: ἢ BP¹QCo 10 διαμονῆς] διαμονῇ Usener 91 1 δῖνον P²QCo: δεινόν
 FP³: ἐφόσον B: ἐφ' ὃ H(P¹)QCo 90 1 δῖνον P²QCo: δεινόν
 HP¹: δεινόν BFZ 6 (οὐ) adiecit Aldobrandinus 91 1 (καὶ
 σελήνης) adiecit Usener 2 μὲν τὸ Schneider: μέντοι libri
 3 καθ' αὐτὸ Usener: καθ' αὐτὸν P¹: καθ' αὐτὴν Q: κατ' αὐτὸ FHP³Z:
 κατ' αὐτὸν BH² 4 post τηλικούτον libri οὐχ ἅμα habent, quod ut
 glossema seclusi: emendaverunt τυχόν Lachmann, τυγχάνει Usener
 8 βιβλίοις] βυβλίοι: Usener 92 2 post ἀναψιν Usener (τε) adiecit

Scholia

90 7 post τοῦ κόσμου verba καὶ ὅσα γε δὴ σώζει habent HPQ, 8 post
 ἐλάμβανεν codd. eidem ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γῇ καὶ θάλαττα: eadem verba

mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void, and not in a large empty space quite void, as some say: this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in from a single world or interworld, or from several: little by little they make junctions and articulations, and cause changes of position to another place, as it may happen, and produce irrigations of the appropriate matter until the period of completion and stability, which lasts as long as the underlying foundations are capable of

Manner of formation

and endurance.

90 receiving additions. For it is not merely necessary for a gathering of atoms to take place, nor indeed for a whirl and nothing more to be set in motion, as is supposed, by necessity, in an empty space in which it is possible for a world to come into being, nor can the world go on increasing until it collides with another world, as one of the so-called physical philosophers says. For this is a contradiction of phenomena.

False idea of formation and destruction of worlds.

Sun and moon and the other stars were not created by themselves and subsequently taken in by the world, but were fashioned in it from the first and gradually grew in size by the aggregations and whirlings of bodies of minute parts, either windy or fiery or both; for this is what our sensation suggests. The size of sun (and moon) and the other stars is for us what it appears to be; and in reality it is either (slightly) greater than what we see or slightly less or the same size: for so too fires on earth when looked at from a distance seem to the senses. And every objection at this point will easily be dissipated, if we pay attention to the clear vision, as I show in my books about nature. The risings and settings of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies may be due to kindling and extinc-

II. The heavenly bodies.

(a) Creation, in the world.

(b) Constitution.

(c) Size: nearly what we see it.

(d) Their rising and setting.

Beholia

alias alii disponunt codices

καὶ ὅσα . . . σώζει in textu retinuit Muehl

σώζει] fortasse

συζη Userer

91 3 post φαίνεται legitur τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ ια Περὶ φύσεως "εἰ γάρ", φησί, "τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀπεβεβλήκει, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χράαν". ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρότερον διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι

ἀπεβεβλήκει Userer: ἀποβεβλήκει libri

ἀλλ' οὐ Userer: ἄλλο

(ἄλλω B) libri, Muehl, qui verba ἄλλο γὰρ . . . οὐθέν ἐστι in textu retinuit

συμμετρότερον libri plerique: συμμετρώτερον

B'Z: συμμετρούμενον Lachmann

- γενέσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ κατὰ σβέσειν, τοιαύτης οὐσης περι-
στάσεως καὶ καθ' ἑκατέρους τοὺς τόπους ὥστε τὰ προειρημένα
5 ἀποτελείσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φαινομένων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ. (καὶ)
κατ' ἐκφάνειαν τε ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ πάλιν ἐπιπροσθήσιν τὰ
προειρημένον δύναιτ' ἂν συντελείσθαι· οὐδὲ γάρ τι τῶν φαινο-
μένων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ. τὰς τε κινήσεις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδύνατον
μὲν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θλου οὐρανοῦ δίνην, ἢ τούτου μὲν
10 στάσιω, αὐτῶν δὲ δίνην κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει
93 τοῦ κόσμου ἀνάγκην ἀπογεννηθεῖσαν ἐπ' ἀνατολῇ· | * * * *
τάτῃ θερμασίᾳ κατὰ τινα ἐπιπέμῃσιν τοῦ πυρὸς αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς
ἐξῆς τόπους ἰόντος. τροπὰς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἐνδέχεται
μὲν γίνεσθαι κατὰ λόξωσιν οὐρανοῦ οὕτω τοῖς χρόνοις κατη-
5 ναγκασμένον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ ἀέρος ἀντέξωσιν ἢ καὶ
ὑλῆς αἰεὶ ἐπιτηδεῖας ἐχομένως ἐμπιπραμένης, τῆς δ' ἐκλειπούσης·
ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιαύτην δίνην κατεκληθήναι τοῖς ἄστροις
τούτοις, ὥσθ' οἷόν τιν' ἔλικά κωεῖσθαι. πάντα γὰρ τὰ
τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῇ οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐναργημάτων
10 διαφωνεῖ, ἔάν τις ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων μερῶν ἐχόμενος τοῦ
δυνατοῦ εἰς τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις ἔκαστον τούτων
δύνηται ἀνάγειν, μὴ φοβούμενος τὰς ἀνδραποδῶδεις ἀστρο-
λόγων τεχνιτείας. |
- 94 Κενώσεις τε σελήνης καὶ πάλιν πληρώσεις καὶ κατὰ
στροφὴν τοῦ σώματος τούτου δύναιντ' ἂν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ
σχηματισμοὺς ἀέρος ὁμοίως, ἔτι τε καὶ κατὰ προσθετήσεις
καὶ κατὰ πάντας τρόπους, καθ' οὓς καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν φαινό-
5 μενα ἐκκαλεῖται εἰς τὰς τούτου τοῦ εἵδους ἀποδόσεις, ἔάν
μή τις τὸν μοναχῇ τρόπον κατηγαπηκῶς τοὺς ἄλλους κενῶς
ἀποδοκιμάζῃ, οὐ τεθεωρηκῶς τί δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρήσαι

3 δύνασθαι] δυνατόν Usener κατὰ] seclisut Usener 4 καὶ
καθ' ἑκατέρους τοὺς τόπους] τρόπους Meibom: ut additamentum
seclisut Usener 5 (καὶ) addidit Usener 6 ἐπιπροσθήσιν] ἐπι-
πρόσθησιν Cobet 93 I post ἀνατολῇ lacunam indicavit Usener
collato Lucr. v. 519-525 . . . τάτῃ edd.: τὰ (τα B) τῇ BP¹: εἰ
τατῇ Q: εἴτα τῇ FZ: εἴτα τῇ libr. cett.: σφροδοτάτῃ coniecit
Usener: ἐπιτηδειοτάτῃ Bignone 6 ἐχομένως Usener: ἐχομένοις
BP¹QCo: ἐχομένης FHP⁵Z 8 ἐκλειπούσης Usener: δὲ καταλιπούσης libri: δὲ κατα-
λειπομένης Muehl 8 οἷόν τιν' Usener: οἷον τε libri 9 οὐθενὶ
Usener: οὐδὲν BPQ: οὐδὲν FH 12 ἀνάγειν Schneider: ἐπάγειν
B: ἀπάγειν libr. cett.: ἐπανάγειν Muehl 13 τεχνιτείας F:
τεχνιτίας B: τεχνητείας HPQ 94 I κενώσεις . . . πληρώσεις]

tion, the composition of the surrounding matter at the places of rising and setting being such as to lead to these results: for nothing in phenomena is against it. Or again, the effect in question might be produced by their appearance over the top of the earth, and again the interposition of the earth in front of them: for once more nothing in phenomena is against it. Their motions may ^(e) Their motions. not impossibly be due to the revolution of the whole heaven, or else it may remain stationary, and they may revolve owing to the natural impulse towards the east, which was produced at the beginning of the world by an excessive heat owing to a spreading of the fire which is always moving on to the regions nearest in succession. The tropics of sun and moon may be caused ^(f) The tropics. owing to an obliquity of the whole heaven, which is constrained into this position in the successive seasons; or equally well by an outward impulsion of a current of air, or because the appropriate material successively catches fire, as the former fails; or again, from the beginning this particular form of revolution may have been assigned to these stars, so that they move in a kind of spiral. For all these and kindred explanations are not at variance with any clear-seen facts, if one always clings in such departments of inquiry to the possible and can refer each point to what is in agreement with phenomena without fearing the slavish artifices of the astronomers.

94 The wanings of the moon and its subsequent waxings ^(g) The Moon. might be due to the revolution of its own body, or equally ⁽¹⁾ its phases; well to successive conformations of the atmosphere, or again to the interposition of other bodies; they may be accounted for in all the ways in which phenomena on earth invite us to such explanations of these phases; provided only one does not become enamoured of the method of the single cause and groundlessly put the others out of court, without having considered what it is possible

κένωσις . . . πλήρωσις Userer κατὰ στροφὴν Gassendi: καταστροφὴν
libri 2 δύναται Meibom: δύναται libri 3 κατὰ προσθετήσεις]
κατ' ἐπιπροσθήσεις Cobet 6 κενῶς] κενούς F: ὡς κενούς Cobet
7 οὐ τεθεωρηκῶς Cobet: οὔτε θεωρητικῶς (θεωρητικῶς B¹) libri τι
Userer: τι libri (bis)

- καὶ τί ἀδύνατον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατα θεωρεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν.
 95 ἔτι τε ἐνδέχεται τὴν σελήνην ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἔχειν τὸ φῶς,
 ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. | καὶ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται
 πολλὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα, πολλὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἐτέρων. καὶ
 οὐθὲν ἐμποδοστατεῖ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινομένων, ἕαν
 5 τις τοῦ πλεοναχοῦ τρόπου ἀεὶ μνήμην ἔχῃ καὶ τὰς ἀκολουθοῦσας
 αὐτοῖς ὑποθέσεις ἅμα καὶ αἰτίας συνθεωρῇ καὶ μὴ ἀναβλέπων
 εἰς τὰ ἀνακόλουθα ταῦτ' ὀγκοῖ ματαίως καὶ καταρρέπῃ ἄλλοτε
 ἄλλως ἐπὶ τὸν μοναχὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ ἔμφασις τοῦ προσώπου
 ἐν αὐτῇ δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ παραλλαγὴν μερῶν
 καὶ κατ' ἐπιπροσθέτησιν, καὶ ὅσοι ποτ' ἂν τρόποι θεωροῦντο
 96 τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις κεκτημένοι. | ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ
 τῶν μετεώρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἰχνεύειν οὐ προετέον. ἦν γάρ
 τις ἢ μαχόμενος τοῖς ἐναργήμασιν, οὐδέποτε μὴ δυνήσεται
 ἀταραξίας γνησίου μεταλαβεῖν.
- 5 "Ἐκλειψις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ
 κατὰ σβέσιν, καθάπερ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο θεωρεῖται γινώ-
 μενον· καὶ ἤδη κατ' ἐπιπροσθέτησιν ἄλλων τινῶν, ἢ γῆς ἢ
 ἀοράτου τινὸς ἢ ἐτέρου τοιούτου. καὶ ὧδε τοὺς οἰκείους
 ἀλλήλοις τρόπους συνθεωρητέον, καὶ τὰς ἅμα συγκυρήσεις
 97 τινῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι. | ἔτι τε τάξις περιόδου,
 καθάπερ ἔνια καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν τῶν τυχόντων γίνεται, λαμ-
 βανέσθω· καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῇ προσαγέσθω,
 ἀλλ' ἀλειτούργητος διατηρεῖσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι.
 5 ὥς εἰ τοῦτο μὴ πραχθήσεται, ἅπαντα ἢ τῶν μετεώρων αἰτιο-
 λογία ματαία ἔσται, καθάπερ τισὶν ἤδη ἐγένετο οὐ δυνατοῦ
- 8 ἀδύνατα P¹: ἀ δυνατὰ Q: τὰ δυνατὰ P² 9 ἐνδέχεται (μὲν)
 Usener in commentario 95 5 αὐτοῖς] αὐτῆς H¹: αὐτῶ Gassendi
 6 ταῦτ' ὀγκοῖ ματαίως B: ταυτὸν κυματαίως PQ: ταυτὸν κυματέον H
 9 ἐπιπροσθέτησιν] ἐπιπρόσθησιν Cobet ποτ' Usener: πάντα libri
 96 2 ἰχνεύειν] ἰχνεύειν Usener προετέον BPQ: προσθετέον FHZ
 3 τις ἢ Usener: τίσιν P¹Q: τίσι P²: τίσι B: τίσι cett. μαχό-
 μενος Gassendi: μαχομένοις BP¹QCo: βαλλομένοις FH¹Z 7 ἤδη]
 ἔτι Meibom: δὴ καὶ Cobet ἐπιπροσθέτησιν FP²Z: ἐπιπρόσθησιν
 BP¹Co: ἐπιπρόσθησιν Cobet 8 ἀοράτου coniecit Usener (in
 praefatione): οὐρανοῦ libri: σελήνης Woltjer: fortasse (σελήνης ἢ)
 ἀοράτου τινὸς ἢ scripsi: ἢ τινος libri: ἢ omittendum censuit
 Usener vel in ἡμῖν vertendum 9 συγκυρήσεις BP²H²QCo:
 συγκυρήσεις libr. cett. 97 5 ἢ BF: ἢ περὶ PCo: περὶ Z αἰτιο-
 λογία? F¹: ἀντιολογία libr. cett.

Scholia

96 10 post γίνεσθαι legitur ἐν δὲ τῇ ιβ' Περὶ φύσεως ταῦτα λέγει καὶ

- for a man to observe and what is not, and desiring therefore to observe what is impossible. Next the moon may ⁽²⁾ its light; 95 have her light from herself or from the sun. For on earth too we see many things shining with their own, and many with reflected light. Nor is any celestial phenomenon against these explanations, if one always remembers the method of manifold causes and investigates hypotheses and explanations consistent with them, and does not look to inconsistent notions and emphasize them without cause and so fall back in different ways on different occasions on the method of the single cause. The impression of a face ⁽³⁾ the face in the moon may be due to the variation of its parts or to interposition or to any one of many causes which might be 96 observed, all in harmony with phenomena. For in the case of all celestial phenomena this process of investigation must never be abandoned: for if one is in opposition to clear-seen facts, he can never have his part in true peace of mind.

- The eclipse of sun and moon may take place both owing ⁽⁴⁾ Eclipses. to their extinction, as we see this effect is produced on earth, or again by the interposition of some other bodies, either the earth or some unseen body or something else of this sort. And in this way we must consider together the causes that suit with one another and realize that it is not impossible that some should coincide at the same time. 97 Next the regularity of the periods of the heavenly bodies ⁽⁵⁾ Periods. must be understood in the same way as such regularity is seen in some of the events that happen on earth. And do not let the divine nature be introduced at any point into these considerations, but let it be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness. For if this principle is not observed, the whole discussion of causes in celestial phenomena is in vain, as it has already been for certain persons who have not clung to the

Epholia

πρὸς, ἥλιον ἐκλείπειν σελήνης ἐπισκοτούσης, σελήνην δὲ τοῦ τῆς γῆς σκιάματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἀναχώρησιν. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἰπικούρειος ἐν τῇ ᾱ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων
ταῦτα Usener: ταῦτα (ταύτην H) libri πρὸς BHPQ: τὸν
πρὸς FZ¹: τὸν Z³f

τρόπον ἐφασμένους, εἰς δὲ τὸ μάταιον ἐκπεσοῦσι τὸ καθ' ἓνα τρόπον μόνον οἶεσθαι γίνεσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τοὺς κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἐκβάλλειν εἰς τε τὸ ἀδιανόητον
 10 φερομένους καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἃ δεῖ σημεῖα ἀποδέχεσθαι, μὴ δυναμένους συνθεωρεῖν. |

98 Μῆκη νυκτῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν παραλλάττοντα καὶ παρὰ τὸ ταχείας ἡλίου κινήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν βραδείας ὑπὲρ γῆς, παρὰ τὸ μῆκη τόπων παραλλάττοντα (διέναι), καὶ (παρὰ τὸ) τόπους τινὰς περαιοῦν τάχιον ἢ βραδύτερον, ὥς καὶ παρ' 5 ἡμῖν τινα θεωρεῖται, οἷς συμφώνως δεῖ λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐν λαμβάνοντες τοῖς τε φαινόμενοις μάχονται καὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρησάι διαπεπτώ-
 10 κασιν.

Ἐπισημασίαι δύνανται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ συγκυρήσεις
 10 καιρῶν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμφανέσι παρ' ἡμῖν ζῆναι, καὶ παρ' ἑτεροιώσεως ἀέρος καὶ μεταβολάς· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα οὐ
 99 μάχεται τοῖς φαινόμενοις· | ἐπὶ δὲ ποίοις παρὰ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦτο τὸ αἴτιον γίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι συνιδεῖν.

Νέφη δύνανται γίνεσθαι καὶ συνίστασθαι καὶ παρὰ πλήρεις ἀέρος (κατὰ) πνευμάτων συνώσεις καὶ παρὰ περιπλοκάς ἀλλή-
 5 λούχων ἀτόμων καὶ ἐπιτηδείων εἰς τὸ τοῦτο τελέσαι καὶ κατὰ ρευμάτων συλλογὴν ἀπὸ τε γῆς καὶ ὑδάτων· καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείους αἱ τῶν τοιούτων συστάσεις οὐκ ἀδυνατοῦσι συντελεῖσθαι. ἤδη δ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μὲν θλιβομένων, ἢ δὲ
 100 * μεταβαλλόντων ὕδατα δύνανται συντελεῖσθαι, | ἔτι τε πνευμάτων καταφορὰ ἀπὸ ἐπιτηδείων τόπων καὶ δι' ἀέρος κινουμένων, βιαιοτέρας ἐπαρδεύσεως γνωμένης ἀπὸ τινων ἀθροισμάτων ἐπιτηδείων εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιπέμψεις.

7 τὸ καθ'] τῷ καθ' Z Usener 10 ἃ δεῖ BP : ἃ δεῖ (ἢ sscr.) H : ἃ δὲ Q :
 δὴ FZ 11 συνθεωρεῖν Meibom : σύν θεῷ χαίρειν libri 98 3 παρὰ
 τὸ . . . ἢ βραδύτερον ut glossema seclussit Usener παραλλάττοντα]
 παραλλάττειν Gassendi : post παραλλάττοντα plura verba intercidisse
 suspicatus est Bignone (διέναι) adieci exempli causa (παρὰ
 τὸ) adieci 4 περαιοῦν Usener : περαιούντα libri ἢ βραδύτερον
 post ἡμῖν habent libri ; huc transtulit Gassendi post βραδύτερον
 vereor ne clausula tota intercidere. De toto hoc loco vid. commen-
 tarium 7 εἰ] ἢ Usener 9 γίνεσθαι BP' Q : γενέσθαι FHP' Z
 11 ἑτεροιώσεις Usener : ἑτέροις ὥσεῖ libri μεταβολὰς Kühn : μετα-
 βολῆς libri 99 1 ἐπὶ Usener : ἔτι FH' P' Z : ἤδη BP' Q Co
 4 (κατὰ) adieci : (διὰ) Bignone πνευμάτων συνώσεις (συνώσεως libri)]
 ut glossema seclussit Usener, qui in praefatione πνευμάτων συνώσεῖ
 coniecerat : (ἢ) πν. συν. Meibom : (καὶ) πν. συν. Kühn 8 ἀπ'

method of possible explanations, but have fallen back on the useless course of thinking that things could only happen in one way, and of rejecting all other ways in harmony with what is possible, being driven thus to what is inconceivable and being unable to compare earthly phenomena, which we must accept as indications.

The successive changes in the length of nights and days may be due to the fact that the sun's movements above the earth become fast and then slow again because he passes across regions of unequal length or because he traverses some regions more quickly or more slowly, (or again to the quicker or slower gathering of the fires that make the sun), as we observe occurs with some things on earth, with which we must be in harmony in speaking of celestial phenomena. But those who assume one cause fight against the evidence of phenomena and fail to ask whether it is possible for men to make such observations. ^{(j) Length of nights and days.}

Signs of the weather may occur owing to the coincidence of occasions, as happens with animals we can all see on earth, and also through alterations and changes in the atmosphere. For both these are in accordance with phenomena. But under what circumstances the cause is produced by this or that, we cannot perceive. ^{(k) Weather-signs.}

Clouds may be produced and formed both by the condensation of the atmosphere owing to compression by winds and by the interlacing of atoms clinging to one another and suitable for producing this result, and again by the gathering of streams from earth and the waters: and there are several other ways in which the formation of such things may not impossibly be brought about. And from them again rain may be produced if they are squeezed in one part or changed in another, or again by a downward current of wind moving through the atmosphere from appropriate places, a more violent shower being produced from certain conglomerations of atoms suited to create such downfalls. ^{III. Meteorology. (a) Clouds. (b) Rain.}

Kühn: ἐπ' libri 100 1 πνευμάτων καταφορὰ Usener: πνεύματα
κατὰ ἀποφορὰν libri: πνευμάτων κατὰ ἀποφορὰν Bignone 2 καὶ δι'
λέρος] δι' ἀέρος P⁸Z

- 5 Βροντὰς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ πνεύματος ἐν τοῖς
κοιλώμασι τῶν νεφῶν ἀνελήσιν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις
ἀγγείοις, καὶ παρὰ πυρὸς πεπνευματωμένου βόμβον ἐν αὐτοῖς,
καὶ κατὰ ῥήξεις δὲ νεφῶν καὶ διαστάσεις καὶ κατὰ παρατρίψεις
νεφῶν καὶ κατὰξεις πῆξιν εἰληφότων κρυσταλλοειδῇ· καὶ
10 τὸ ὅλον καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος πλεοναχῶς γίνεσθαι λέγειν
ἐκκαλεῖται τὰ φαινόμενα. |
- 101 Καὶ ἀστραπαὶ δ' ὡσαύτως γίνονται κατὰ πλείους τρόπους·
καὶ γὰρ κατὰ παράτριψιν καὶ σύγκρουσιν νεφῶν ὁ πυρὸς
ἀποτελεσματικὸς σχηματισμὸς ἐξολισθάνων ἀστραπὴν γεννᾷ·
καὶ κατ' ἐκκρισμὸν ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν ὑπὸ πνευμάτων τῶν
5 τοιούτων σωμάτων ἃ τὴν λαμπρότητα ταύτην παρασκευάζει,
καὶ κατ' ἐκπιασμόν, θλίψεως τῶν νεφῶν γινομένης εἴθ' ὑπ'
ἀλλήλων εἴθ' ὑπὸ πνευμάτων· καὶ κατ' ἐμπερίληψιν δὲ τοῦ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστρων κατεσπαρμένου φωτός, εἴτα συναλυνομένου
ὑπὸ τῆς κινήσεως νεφῶν τε καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ διεκπίπτοντος
10 διὰ τῶν νεφῶν· ἢ κατὰ διήθησιν (διὰ) τῶν νεφῶν τοῦ
λεπτομερεστάτου φωτός, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς νέφη συνεφλέχθαι
καὶ τὰς βροντὰς ἀποτελεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τούτου κίνησιν· καὶ
κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκπύρωσιν τὴν γινομένην διὰ τε
102 συντονίαν φορᾶς καὶ διὰ σφοδρὰν κατείλησιν· | καὶ κατὰ ῥήξεις
δὲ νεφῶν ὑπὸ πνευμάτων ἐκπτωσίν τε πυρὸς ἀποτελεσματικῶν
ἀτόμων καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀστραπῆς φάντασμα ἀποτελουσῶν· καὶ
κατ' ἄλλους δὲ πλείους τρόπους ῥαδίως ἔσται καθορᾶν ἐχό-
5 μενον αἰεὶ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ τὸ τούτοις ὅμοιον δυνάμενον
συνθεωρεῖν. προτερεῖ δὲ ἀστραπὴ βροντῆς ἐν τοιαύτῃ τι
περιστάσει νεφῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἅμα τῷ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐμπίπτειν
ἐξωθεῖσθαι τὸν ἀστραπῆς ἀποτελεσματικὸν σχηματισμόν, ὕστερον
δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα ἀνελιούμενον τὸν βόμβον ἀποτελεῖν τοῦτον·
10 καὶ κατ' ἐκπτωσιν δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα, τῷ τάχει συντονωτέρῳ
κεχρησθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀστραπὴν, ὕστερεῖν δὲ τὴν βροντὴν, |
103 καθάπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἐξ ἀποστήματος θεωρουμένων καὶ πληγὰς
τινας ποιομένων.

8 διαστάσεις] διαπάσεις Usener 9 κατάξεις Froben: τάξεις
BHPQCo: διαστάσεις F: τάσεις Usener 101 2 καὶ ante σύγ-
κρουσιν] ἢ coniecit Usener 8 κατεσπαρμένου Schneider: κατε-
σπειραμένου libri 10 (διὰ) adiecit Schneider 11 ἢ Bignone:
ἢ libri ἢ ἀπὸ ... 12 ἀποτελεῖσθαι ut additamentum seclausit Usener
συνεφλέχθαι Usener: συνειλέχθαι libri 12 κατὰ Bignone: καὶ κατὰ

Thunder may be produced by the rushing about of wind (c) Thunder in the hollows of the clouds, as happens in vessels on earth, or by the reverberation of fire filled with wind inside them, or by the rending and tearing of clouds, or by the friction and bursting of clouds when they have been congealed into a form like ice: phenomena demand that we should say that this department of celestial events, just like them all, may be caused in several ways.

101 And lightnings are produced in several ways: for (d) Lightning both owing to the friction and collision of clouds a conformation of atoms which produces fire slips out and gives birth to the lightning, and owing to wind bodies which give rise to this flash are dashed from the clouds: or compression may be the cause, when clouds are squeezed either by one another or by the wind. Or again it may be that the light scattered abroad from the heavenly bodies is taken in by the clouds, and then is driven together by the movement of the clouds and wind, and falls out through the clouds; or else light composed of most subtle particles may filter through the clouds, whereby the clouds may be set on fire by the flame and thunder produced by the movement of the fire.

102 Or the wind may be fired owing to the strain of motion and its violent rotation: or clouds may be rent by wind and atoms fall out which produce fire and cause the appearance of lightning. And several other methods may easily be observed, if one clings always to phenomena and can compare what is akin to these things. Lightning precedes (e) Why thunder in such a conformation of the clouds, either because lightning precedes thunder. at the moment when the wind dashes in, the formation of atoms which gives rise to lightning is driven out, but afterwards the wind whirls about and produces the reverberation; or because they both dash out at the same moment, but lightning moves at a higher speed towards us, and thunder comes after, as in the case of some things

103 seen at a distance and producing blows.

libri: καὶ Usener: καὶ κατὰ τὴν σίξιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦτου κίνησιν sup-
plendum censuit Bignone 102 2 ἔκπτωσιν τε Usener: ἔκπτωσιν
τῶν libri 5 αἰ Usener: καὶ libri 10 κατ' ἔκπτωσιν scripsi:
κατέμπτωσιν B (unde κατ' ἔμπτωσιν edd.): κατέμπτωσιν P¹: κατ'
ἔμπτωσιν P²CoF

- Κεραυνὸς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ πλείονας πνευμάτων
 συλλογὰς καὶ κατείλησιν ἰσχυράν τε ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ κατάρρηξιν
 5 μέρους καὶ ἐκπτώσιν ἰσχυροτέραν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς κάτω τόπους,
 τῆς ῥήξεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐξῆς τόπους πυκνότερους
 εἶναι διὰ πίλησιν νεφῶν· καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς
 ἐκπτώσιν ἀνελινομένου, καθὰ καὶ βροντὴν ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι,
 πλείονος γενομένου καὶ πνευματωθέντος ἰσχυρότερον καὶ
 10 ῥήξαντος τὸ νέφος διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ὑποχωρεῖν εἰς τὰ
 104 ἐξῆς, τῷ πίλησιν γίνεσθαι αἰετὸς πρὸς ἄλλα. | καὶ κατ' ἄλλους
 δὲ τρόπους πλείονας ἐνδέχεται κεραυνὸς ἀποτελεῖσθαι· μόνον
 ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω· ἀπέσται δέ, ἔάν τις καλῶς τοῖς φαινόμενοις
 ἀκολουθῶν περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν σημειῶται.
- 5 Πρηστήρας ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ κάθεσιν νέφους
 εἰς τοὺς κάτω τόπους στυλοειδῶς ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἀθρόου
 ὠσθέντος καὶ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος πολλοῦ φερομένου, ἅμα καὶ
 τὸ νέφος εἰς τὸ πλάγιον ὠθοῦντος τοῦ ἐκτὸς πνεύματος·
 καὶ κατὰ περίσταςιν δὲ πνεύματος εἰς κύκλον, ἀέρος τινὸς
 10 ἐπισυνωθουμένου ἄνωθεν· καὶ ῥύσεως πολλῆς πνευμάτων
 γενομένης καὶ οὐ δυναμένης εἰς τὰ πλάγια διαρρηθῆναι διὰ
 105 τὴν πέριξ τοῦ ἀέρος πίλησιν. | καὶ ἕως μὲν γῆς τοῦ πρηστήρος
 καθιεμένου στρόβιλοι γίνονται, ὥς ἂν καὶ ἡ ἀπογέννησις
 κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ πνεύματος γίνηται· ἕως δὲ θαλάττης
 δύνει ἀποτελοῦνται.
- 5 Σεισμὸς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ πνεύματος ἐν τῇ
 γῇ ἀπόληψιν καὶ παρὰ μικροὺς ὄγκους αὐτῆς παράθεσιν καὶ
 συνεχῇ κίνησιν, ὃ τὴν κράδανσιν τῇ γῇ παρασκευάζει. καὶ τὸ
 πνεῦμα τοῦτο ἡ ἕξωθεν ἐμπεριλαμβάνει (ἡ) ἐκ τοῦ πίπτειν
 εἴσω ἐδάφη εἰς ἀντροειδεῖς τόπους τῆς γῆς ἐκπνευματοῦντα
 10 τὸν ἐπειλημμένον ἕρα. (καὶ) κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διάδοσιν

103 4 κατάρρηξιν FH: κατὰ ῥῆξιν BP¹QCo 7 διὰ πίλησιν
 P²Q: διὰ πείλησιν B: διαπείλησιν F: δι' ἀπείλησιν (P¹)H νεφῶν
 BP¹Q: τῶν νεφῶν cett. κατ' αὐτὴν Usener: κατὰ ταύτην libri
 104 5 κατὰ κάθεσιν BP¹F²Co: κατάθεσιν F¹: κατὰ θέσιν ZP³ mg.f.
 6 στυλοειδῶς Usener: ἄλλοειδῶς libri 7 πολλοῦ] κύκλῳ Usener
 8 πλάγιον Usener: πλησίον libri 105 2 ὥς ἂν ... γίνηται ut glos-
 sema seclussit Usener (qui ὥς ἀναγκαίως ... δίνῃσιν ... γίνεται scripsit)
 6 ἀπόληψιν] ἐναπόληψιν suspicatus est Usener 7 ὃ τὴν Usener:
 ὅταν libri κράδανσιν B² mg.: κράδαστον B: κραδαστὸν cett.: τὸν
 κραδασμὸν Casaubon παρασκευάζει F: παρασκευάζῃ cett. 8 (ἡ)
 adiecit Meibom 9 εἴσω Diels (vid. Usener, praefat. xx): εἰς libri
 ἐκπνευματοῦντα Usener: ἐκ πνευμάτων libri 10 ἐπειλημμένον

Thunderbolts may occur because there are frequent gatherings of wind, which whirls about and is fanned into a fierce flame, and then a portion of it breaks off and rushes violently on the places beneath, the breaking taking place because the regions approached are successively denser owing to the condensation of clouds: or as the result of the actual outburst of the whirling fire, in the same way that thunder may be produced, when the fire becomes too great and is too violently fanned by wind and so breaks through the cloud, because it cannot retreat to the next regions owing to the constant condensation of clouds one on the other. And thunderbolts may be produced in other ways too. Only superstition must be excluded, as it will, if one successfully follows the lead of seen phenomena to gain indications about the invisible. ^{(f) Thunderbolts.}

Cyclones may be produced either by the driving down of a cloud into the regions below in the form of a pillar, because it is pushed by the wind gathered inside it and is driven on by the violence of the wind, while at the same time the wind outside impels it sideways; or by wind forming into circular motion, while mist is simultaneously thrust down from above; or when a great rush of wind takes place and cannot pass through sideways owing to the surrounding condensation of the atmosphere. And when the spout is let down on to the land, whirlwinds are produced in all the various ways in which their creation may occur owing to the movement of the wind, but if it reaches the sea it produces waterspouts. ^{VI. Atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena. (a) Cyclones.}

Earthquakes may be brought about both because wind is caught up in the earth, so that the earth is dislocated in small masses and is continually shaken, and that causes it to sway. This wind it either takes into itself from outside, or else because masses of ground fall in into cavernous places in the earth and fan into wind the air that is imprisoned in them. And again, earthquakes may be brought ^{(b) Earthquakes.}

P¹Q mg. Co: ἐπιλημμένον B: περιλημμένον FHP³Z (καὶ) κατ' αὐτήν
Uscner: κατὰ ταύτην libri

Icholia

103 11 post γίνεσθαι legitur τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς ὅρος τι ὑψηλόν, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα κεραυνοὶ πίπτουσιν

106 τῆς κινήσεως ἐκ τῶν πτώσεων ἐδαφῶν πολλῶν καὶ πάλιν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ὅταν πυκνώμασι σφοδροτέροις τῆς γῆς ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐνδέχεται σεισμοὺς ἀποτελεῖσθαι, | καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ πλείους τρόπους τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας τῆς γῆς γίνεσθαι.

* * * * *

Τὰ δὲ πνεύματα συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι κατὰ χρόνον ἄλλοφυλλας τιῶς ἀεὶ κατὰ μικρὸν παρεισδνομένης, καὶ καθ' ὕδατος ἀφθόνου συλλογῇ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πνεύματα γίνονται καὶ ὀλίγων πεσόντων εἰς τὰ πολλὰ κοιλώματα, διαδόσεως τούτων γινομένης.

Χάλαζα συντελείται καὶ κατὰ πῆξιν ἰσχυροτέρα, πάντοθεν δὲ πνευματωδῶν περιστάσιν τιῶν καὶ καταμέρισιν· καὶ (κατὰ) 10 πῆξιν μετριωτέραν ὕδατοειδῶν τιῶν (καὶ) ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν, ἅμα τὴν τε σύνωσιν αὐτῶν ποιουμένην καὶ τὴν διάρρηξιν πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρη συνίστασθαι πηγνύμενα καὶ κατὰ ἀθροότητα. | 107 ἡ δὲ περιφέρεια οὐκ ἀδυνάτως μὲν ἔχει γίνεσθαι πάντοθεν τῶν ἄκρων ἀποτηκομένων καὶ ἐν τῇ συστάσει πάντοθεν, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ μέρη ὁμαλῶς περιϋσταμένων εἴτε ὕδατοειδῶν τιῶν εἴτε πνευματωδῶν.

5 Χιώνα δὲ ἐνδέχεται συντελεῖσθαι καὶ ὕδατος λεπτοῦ ἐκχεομένου ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν διὰ πόρων συμμετρίας καὶ θλίψεως ἐπιτηδεῖων νεφῶν ἀεὶ ὑπὸ πνευμάτων σφοδράς, εἴτα τούτου πῆξιν ἐν τῇ φορᾷ λαμβάνοντος διὰ τινα ἰσχυρὰν ἐν τοῖς κατωτέρω τόποις τῶν νεφῶν ψυχρασίας περιστάσιν· καὶ κατὰ 10 πῆξιν δ' ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν ὁμαλῇ ἀραιότητα ἔχουσιν τοιαύτη πρόεσις ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν γίνοιτο ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα θλιβομένων ὕδατοειδῶν καὶ συμπαρακειμένων· ἃ οἶονεὶ σύνωσιν ποιούμενα 108 χάλαζαν ἀποτελεῖ, ὃ μάλιστα γίνεται ἐν τῷ ἀέρι. | καὶ κατὰ

12 ἀνταπόδοσιν Gassendi: ἀνταποδίδωσιν libri 106 3 post πνεύματα addendum (ταῦτα) suspicatus est Usener 5 τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν Bignone 6 ὀλίγων F: ὀλίγων cett.: corruptum suspicatus est Usener 9 καὶ καταμέρισιν scripsi: καὶ κατὰ μέρος libri (καταμέρισιν F): κατὰ μέρος Usener (κατὰ) adiecit Meibom 10 πῆξιν H: τῆξιν BFPQCo (καὶ) adieci: (πνευματωδῶν δὲ τιῶν) Usener ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν] ὁμοιότησιν Usener 12 ἀθροότητα Gassendi: ἀθρότητα libri 107 2 ἀποτηκομένων Sambucus: ἀποτικομένων B: ἀποπικομένων HPQCo: ἀποπικνουμένων F³ 3 κατὰ Aldobrandinus: καὶ τὰ libri ὕδατοειδῶν] ὕδατοποιῶν F 6 διὰ πόρων Kühn: διαφόρων BP¹Co: διαφορῶν FP³QZ: διαφόρων H θλίψις Usener: θλίψεως libri 7 ἀεὶ Bignone: καὶ libri: om. Usener ὑπὸ πνευμάτων Gassendi: ὑπομνήματος libri σφοδράς

106

about by the actual spreading of the movement which results from the fall of many such masses of ground and the return shock, when the first motion comes into collision with more densely packed bodies of earth. There are also many other ways in which these motions of the earth may be caused.

* * * * *

The winds may be produced when from time to time ^(c) some alien matter is continual and gradually forcing its way in, or owing to the gathering of a vast quantity of water. The other winds arise when a few (currents of air) fall into many hollow spaces, and cause a spreading of wind. ^{(c) (? Volcanoes).}

107

Hail is produced both by a powerful congelation, when ^(d) certain windy bodies form together from all sides and split up: also by a more moderate congelation of watery bodies and their simultaneous division, which causes at one and the same time their coagulation and separation, so that they cling together as they freeze in their separate parts as well as in their whole masses. Their circular shape may possibly arise because the corners melt off all round or because at their conformation bodies, whether watery or windy, come together evenly from all directions part by part, as is alleged.

108

Snow may be produced when fine particles of rain are ^(e) poured out of the clouds owing to the existence of pores of suitable shape and the strong and constant compression by winds of clouds of the right kind; and then the water is congealed in its descent owing to some conformation of excessive coldness in the clouds in the lower regions. Or else owing to congelation in clouds of uniform thinness an exudation of this kind might arise from watery clouds lying side by side and rubbing against one another: for they produce hail by causing coagulation, a process most frequent in the atmosphere. Or else, owing to the friction of

Usener: σπορὰς libri 9 κατωτέρω Cobet: κατώτερον BHPQ:
κατωτάτοις FZ 10 δμαλῇ BP¹Q: δμαλὴν cett. ἔχουσιν Meibom:
ἔχουσαν BP¹QCo: ἔχουσα cett. τοιαύτη Z: τοιαύτην cett.
11 post θλιβομένων (τῶν) inseruit Usener 13 ἀέρι] ἔαρι Usener

τρίψιν δὲ νεφῶν πῆξιν εἰληφότων ἀπόπαλσιν ἂν λαμβάνοι
τὸ τῆς χιόνος τοῦτο ἄθροισμα. καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους
ἐνδέχεται χιόνα συντελεῖσθαι.

- 5 Δρόσος συντελεῖται καὶ κατὰ σύνοδον πρὸς ἄλλα ἐκ τοῦ
ἀέρος τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ τῆς τοιαύτης ὑγρασίας ἀποτελεστικὰ
γίνεται· καὶ κατὰ φοράν δὲ ἢ ἀπὸ νοτερῶν τόπων ἢ ὕδατα
κεκτημένων, ἐν οἷς τόποις μάλιστα δρόσος συντελεῖται,
εἴτα σύνοδον τούτων εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ λαβόντων καὶ ἀποτελέσιν
10 ὑγρασίας καὶ πάλιν φοράν ἐπὶ τοὺς κάτω τόπους, καθάπερ
ὁμοίως καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπὶ πλεόνων τοιαῦτά τινα (θεωρεῖται.
109 καὶ πάχνη δὲ μεταβαλλομένων) συντελεῖται τῶν δρόσων,
τοιούτων τινῶν πῆξιν τινα λαβόντων διὰ περιστάσιν τινα
ἀέρος ψυχροῦ.

Κρύσταλλος συντελεῖται καὶ κατ' ἐκθλιψιν μὲν τοῦ περι-
5 φεροῦς σχηματισμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος, σύνωσιν δὲ τῶν σκαληνῶν
καὶ ὀξυγωνίων τῶν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὑπαρχόντων· καὶ κατὰ ἔξωθεν
δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πρόσκρισιν, ἃ συνελαθέντα πῆξιν τῷ ὕδατι
παρεσκεύασε, ποσὰ τῶν περιφερῶν ἐκθλίψαντα.

- Ἴρις γίνεται κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸς ἀέρα
10 ὕδατοειδῆ· ἢ κατὰ πρόσκρισιν ἰδίαν τοῦ τε φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ
ἀέρος, ἢ τὰ τῶν χρωμάτων τούτων ἰδιώματα ποιήσει εἴτε
πάντα εἴτε μονοειδῶς· ἀφ' οὗ πάλιν ἀπολάμποντος τὰ ὁμο-
ροῦντα τοῦ ἀέρος χρώσιν τοιαύτην λήψεται, οἷαν θεωροῦμεν,
110 κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν πρὸς τὰ μέρη. | τὸ δὲ τῆς περιφερείας
τοῦτο φάντασμα γίνεται διὰ τὸ τὸ διάστημα πάντοθεν ἴσον
ὑπὸ τῆς ὀψεως θεωρεῖσθαι, ἢ σύνωσιν τοιαύτην λαμβανουσῶν
τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἀτόμων ἢ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
5 ἀέρος ἀποφερομένων περιφέρειάν τινα καθίεσθαι τὴν σύγκρισιν
ταύτην.

108 2 ἂν λαμβάνοι τὸ Schneider: ἀναλαμβάνοιτο B^P1Q: ἀναλαμβάνοι
τὸ cett. 7 κατὰ φοράν] κατ' ἀναφοράν Bignone: κατὰ (ἀπο)φοράν
Muehl 8 οἷς Usener: τοῖς libri: οἷς Meibom 9 post
ἀποτελέσιν Bignone παχυτέρας supplevit 11 post τοιαῦτά τινα
lacunam suspicatus est Gassendi: (θεωρεῖται. καὶ πάχνη δὲ μεταβαλ-
λομένων) supplevi, (συντελούμενα θεωρεῖται. καὶ πάχνη δὲ οὐ διαφέρόν-
τως) Usener 109 2 τοιούτων τινῶν Usener: τούτων τινὰ B
τούτων cum litura P: τούτων cett. 6 κατὰ] κατὰ (τὴν) Schneider,
fortasse recte 7 συνελαθέντα Gassendi: συνελασθέντα BHPQ:
συντελεσθέντα F 9 ἀπὸ τοῦ scripsi: ὑπὸ τοῦ BHPQ: τοῦ F
10 κατὰ πρόσκρισιν scripsi: κατ' (κατὰ H) ἀέρος φύσιν libri: κατὰ κράσιν

congealed clouds, these nuclei of snow may find occasion to break off. And there are many other ways in which snow may be produced.

Dew may be produced both when such particles as are ^(f) Dew and Frost. productive of this kind of moisture issue from the atmosphere and meet one another, and also when particles rise from moist regions or regions containing water, in which dew is most naturally produced, and then meet together and cause moisture to be produced, and afterwards fall back on the ground below, as ^(is) frequently ^(seen) to be the case in phenomena on earth as well. ^(And frost is produced by a change) in the dew-particles, when such particles as we have described undergo a definite kind of congelation owing to the neighbourhood of a cold atmosphere.

Ice is caused both by the squeezing out from the water ^(g) Ice. of particles of round formation and the driving together of the triangular and acute-angled particles which exist already in the water, and again by the addition from without of particles of this kind, which when driven together produce a congelation in the water, by squeezing out a certain number of the round particles.

The rainbow is caused by light shining from the sun on ^(h) The rainbow. to watery atmosphere: or else by a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately; from it as it reflects back again the neighbouring regions of the air can take the tint which we see, by means of the shining of the light on to its various parts. The appearance of its round ^{Its shape.} shape is caused because it is perceived by our sight at equal distance from all its points, or else because the atoms in the air or those in the clouds which are derived from the same air, are pressed together in this manner, and so the combination spreads out in a round shape.

Usener: κατὰ σύμφυσιν Bignone 13 τοιαύτην Usener: ταῦτα
 FZ: ταύτην cett. 110 I τὸ Gassendi: τὰ libri 4 ἀτόμων
 Meibom: τομῶν libri αὐτοῦ ἀέρος] ἡλίου Usener 5 post ἀέρος
 libri προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην habent (e versu 8) 4 post
 ὑποφερομένων libri ἀτόμων habent, sc. lectionem emendatam verbi
 τομῶν (v. 4) καθίσθαι Meibom: καθίσθαι libri

“ Ἄλως περὶ τὴν σελήνην γίνεται καὶ παντοθεν ἀέρος
 προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην ἢ τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ρεύματα
 ἀποφερόμενα ὁμαλῶς ἀναστέλλοντος ἐπὶ τοσούτου ἐφ’ ὅσον
 10 κύκλῳ περιστῆσαι εἰς τὸ νεφοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ μὴ τὸ παράπαν
 διακρίναι, ἢ καὶ τὸν πέριξ αὐτῆς ἀέρα ἀναστέλλοντος συμ-
 μέτρως παντοθεν εἰς τὸ περιφερὲς τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ παχυμερὲς
 III περιστῆσαι. | ὃ γίνεται κατὰ μέρη τιὰ ἥτοι ἔξωθεν βιασαμένου
 τινὸς ρεύματος ἢ τῆς θερμασίας ἐπιτηδείως πόρων ἐπιλαμ-
 βανομένης εἰς τὸ τοῦτο ἀπεργάσασθαι.

Κομήται ἀστέρες γίνονται ἥτοι πυρὸς ἐν τόποις τισὶ διὰ
 5 χρόνων τινῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις συντρεφομένου περιστάσεως
 γινομένης, ἢ ἰδίαν τιὰ κίνησιν διὰ χρόνων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
 ἰσχυontos ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ὥστε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄστρα ἀναφανῆναι ἢ
 αὐτὰ ἐν χρόνοις τισὶν ὀρμῆσαι διὰ τινα περίστασιν καὶ εἰς
 τοὺς καθ’ ἡμᾶς τόπους ἔλθεῖν καὶ ἐκφανῆ γενέσθαι. τὴν
 10 τε ἀφάνισιν τούτων γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας ταύτας
 αἰτίας. |

II2 Τιὰ ἄστρα στρέφεται αὐτοῦ δ συμβαίνει οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸ
 μέρος τοῦτο τοῦ κόσμου ἐστάναι, περὶ δ τὸ λοιπὸν στρέφεται,
 καθάπερ τινὲς φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ δίνῃν ἀέρος ἔγκυκλον
 αὐτῷ περιεστάναι, ἢ κωλυτικὴ γίνεται τοῦ περιπολεῖν ὥς
 5 καὶ τὰ ἄλλα· ἢ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐξῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ὕλην ἐπιτηδείαν
 μὴ εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἐν ᾧ κείμενα θεωρεῖται. | καὶ
 κατ’ ἄλλους δὲ πλείονας τρόπους τοῦτο δυνατὸν συντελεῖσθαι,
 ἕαν τις δύνῃται τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις συλλογίζεσθαι.

II3 Τιὰ τῶν ἄστρων πλανᾶσθαι, εἰ οὕτω ταῖς κινήσεσι χρώ-
 μενα συμβαίνει, | τιὰ δὲ μὴ (οὕτω) κινεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται μὲν
 καὶ παρὰ τὸ κύκλῳ κινούμενα ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω κατηναγκάσθαι,
 ὥστε τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δίνην φέρεσθαι ὁμαλῇν οὖσαν,
 τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄμα τισὶν ἀνωμαλῆς χρωμένην· ἐνδέχεται

7 καὶ Usener: καὶ κατὰ libri 9 ἀναστέλλοντος Meibom: ἀνα-
 στέλλοντα libri 10 περιστῆσαι εἰς Usener: περὶ τῆς εἰς libri:
 περιστῆσιν Meibom 11 διακρίναι Usener: διακρίνη libri αὐτῆς
 ἀέρα B: ἀέρα αὐτῆς cett. III 2 ἐπιτηδείως scripsi: ἐπιτη-
 δείων libri 7 ἢ αὐτὰ . . . II αἰτίας tanquam si repetantur priora
 seclutit Usener II2 I ἄστρα στρέφεται scripsi: ἀναστρέφεται
 libri: ἄστρα στρέφεσθαι Usener δ] om. Usener 2 τὸ λοιπὸν]
 τὰ λοιπὰ Schneider 4 αὐτῷ] αὐτοῖς Gassendi 10 συμβαίνει
 FP²(? H¹): συμβαίνειν cett. II3 I (οὕτω) adieci: δ’ ὁμαλῶς Usener
 pro δὲ μὴ: κινεῖσθαι seclutit Bignone 3 ὁμαλῇ] ὁμαλῇ Usener

A halo round the moon is caused either when air is carried towards the moon from all sides, or when the air checks the effluences carried from the moon so equably that it forms them into this cloudy ring all round without any gaps or differences, or else when it checks the air round the moon uniformly on all sides so as to make that which encircles it round and thick in texture. This comes to pass in different parts either because some current outside forces the air or because heat blocks the passages in such a way as to produce this effect.

Comets occur either when fire is collected together in certain regions at certain intervals of time in the upper air because some gathering of matter takes place, or when at certain intervals the heaven above us has some peculiar movement, so that stars of this nature are revealed, or when they themselves at certain seasons start to move on account of some gathering of matter and come into the regions within our ken and appear visible. And their disappearance occurs owing to the opposite causes to these.

Some stars 'revolve in their place' (as Homer says), which comes to pass not only because this part of the world is stationary and round it the rest revolves, as some say, but also because a whirl of air is formed in a ring round it, which prevents their moving about as do the other stars: or else it is because there is not a succession of appropriate fuel for them, but only in this place in which they are seen fixed. And there are many other ways in which this may be brought about, if one is able to infer what is in agreement with phenomena.

That some of the stars should wander in their course, if indeed it is the case that their movements are such, while others do not move in this manner, may be due to the reason that from the first as they moved in their circles they were so constrained by necessity that some of them move along the same regular orbit, and others along one which is associated with certain irregularities: or it may

4 κατὰ τὴν ἄμα τισὶν] κατὰ τινα δίνησιν Usener: κατὰ τιν' ἄλλην τισὶν Bignone

(f) The moon's halo.

v. Further celestial phenomena.
(a) Comets.

(b) Fixed stars.

(c) Planets and regular stars.

5 δὲ καὶ καθ' οὗς τόπους φέρεται οὗ μὲν παρεκτάσεις ἀέρος
εἶναι ὁμαλὰς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνωθούσας κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς ὁμαλῶς
τε ἐκκαούσας, οὗ δὲ ἀνωμαλεῖς ὥστε τὰς θεωρουμένας παραλ-
λαγὰς συντελεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ μίαν αἰτίαν τούτων ἀποδιδόναι,
πλεοναχῶς τῶν φαινομένων ἐκκαλουμένων, μανικὸν καὶ οὐ
10 καθηκόντως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ματαίαν ἀστρολογίαν
ἐξηλωκότων καὶ εἰς τὸ κενὸν αἰτίας τινῶν ἀποδιδόντων, ὅταν
τὴν θέλαν φύσιν μηθαμῇ λειτουργιῶν ἀπολύωσι. |

II4 Τινὰ ἄστρα ὑπολειπόμενα γινῶν θεωρεῖσθαι συμβαίνει
καὶ παρὰ τὸ βραδύτερον συμπεριφέρεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν κύκλον
περιόντα, καὶ παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἐναντίαν κωεῖσθαι ἀντισπώμενα
ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δίνης· καὶ παρὰ τὸ περιφέρεσθαι τὰ μὲν διὰ
5 πλείονος τόπου, τὰ δὲ δι' ἐλάττονος, τὴν αὐτὴν δίνην περι-
κυκλοῦντα. τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τούτων καθήκόν
ἐστι τοῖς τερατεύεσθαι τι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς βουλομένοις.

Οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀστέρες ἐκπίπτειν καὶ παρὰ μέρος κατὰ
παράτριψιν ἑαυτῶν δύνανται συντελεῖσθαι καὶ παρὰ ἔκπτωσιν
10 οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐκπνευμάτωσις γένηται, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀστραπῶν
II5 ἐλέγομεν· | καὶ κατὰ σύνοδον δὲ ἀτόμων πυρὸς ἀποτελεστικῶν,
συμφυλίας γενομένης εἰς τὸ τοῦτο τελέσαι, καὶ κίνησιν οὗ
ἂν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον γένηται· καὶ κατὰ
πνεύματος δὲ συλλογὴν ἐν πυκνώμασί τισιν ὀμιχλοειδέσι
5 καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν τούτου διὰ τὴν κατείλησιν, εἴτ' ἐπέκρηξιν
τῶν περιέχοντων, καὶ ἐφ' ὃν ἂν τόπον ἡ ὁρμὴ γένηται
τῆς φορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτον φερομένου. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τρόποι εἰς
τὸ τοῦτο τελέσαι ἀμήθητοί εἰσιν.

Αἱ δ' ἐπισημασίαι αἱ γινόμεναι ἐπὶ τισι ζῷοις κατὰ συγκύ-
10 ρημα γίνονται τοῦ καιροῦ. οὗ γὰρ τὰ ζῷα ἀνάγκην τινὰ

5 οὗ μὲν B: οὗ μὲν P¹QH²: οὗ FH¹P³Z 6 ὁμαλὰς FHP³Z:
ὁμαλεῖς BP¹Q 7 οὗ δὲ BF: οὐδὲ cett. ἀνωμαλεῖς FPQ: ἀνομα-
λεῖς B: ἀνωμαλῶς H 11 τινῶν] ἀστρων Usener: πάντων Bignone
II4 3 περιόντα Froben: περιόντα libri 4 τῆς αὐτῆς] τοιαύτης
Usener 8 κατὰ παράτριψιν Usener: καὶ παρὰ τρίψιν libri
9 ἑαυτῶν] νεφῶν Usener: ἀστρων Bignone, fortasse recte παρὰ]
πυρὸς Usener 10 ἀστραπῶν] ἀστέρων F¹ II5 2 συμφυλίας H²PQ:
συμφυλίας FH¹Z: σ(νμ)φυλίας B καὶ Usener: καὶ κατὰ libri
οὗ] οἱ coniecit Usener 4 πνεύματος] πνευμάτων... τούτων (5)...
φερομένων (7) Muehl 5 καὶ Usener: κατὰ libri τούτου
Usener: τούτων libri ἐπέκρηξιν FHP: ἐπ' ἔκριξιν B: ἐπεκρήψιν
Q: ἔκρηξιν conl. Usener: ἔκρηξιν (ἐκ) Muehl 7 φερομένου

be that among the regions to which they are carried in some places there are regular tracts of air which urge them on successively in the same direction and provide flame for them regularly, while in other places the tracts are irregular, so that the aberrations which we observe result. But to assign a single cause for these occurrences, when phenomena demand several explanations, is madness, and is quite wrongly practised by persons who are partisans of the foolish notions of astrology, by which they give futile explanations of the causes of certain occurrences, and all the time do not by any means free the divine nature from the burden of responsibilities.

114 That some stars should be seen to be left behind by others is caused because though they move round in the same orbit they are carried along more slowly, and also because they really move in the opposite direction though they are dragged back by the same revolution: also because some are carried round through a greater space and some through a lesser, though all perform the same revolution. But to give a single explanation of these occurrences is only suitable to those who wish to make a show to the many.

(d) Difference of speed in orbits of stars.

115 What are called falling stars may be produced in part by the rubbing of star against star, and by the falling out of the fragments wherever an outburst of wind occurs, as we explained in the case of lightning-flashes: or else by the meeting of atoms productive of fire, when a gathering of kindred material occurs to cause this, and a movement in the direction of the impulse which results from the original meeting; or else by a gathering of wind in certain dense and misty formations, and its ignition as it whirls round, and then its bursting out of what encloses it and its rush towards the spot to which the impulse of its flight tends. And there are other ways in which this result may be brought about, quite free from superstition.

(e) Falling stars.

The signs of the weather which are given by certain animals result from mere coincidence of occasion. For the animals do not exert any compulsion for winter to

(f) Weather-signs from animals.

Usener: *φερομένης libri 8 ἀμύθητοι] ἀνύσιμοι Usener: ἄμβουι Lortzing*

116

προσφέρεται τοῦ ἀποτελεσθῆναι χειμῶνα, οὐδὲ κάθηται τις
 θέλα φύσις παρατηροῦσα τὰς τῶν ζῶων τούτων ἐξόδους
 κάπειτα τὰς ἐπισημασίας ταύτας ἐπιτελεῖ. | οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾠν
 εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ζῶον κἂν εἰ μικρὸν χαριέστερον εἴη, τοιαύτη
 μωρία ἐμπέσοι, μὴ ὅτι εἰς παντελῇ εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτημένον.

Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα, Πυθόκλεις, μνημόνευσον· κατὰ πολὺ τε
 5 γὰρ τοῦ μύθου ἐκβήσῃ καὶ τὰ ὁμογενῇ τούτοις συννοῶν
 δυνήσῃ. μάλιστα δὲ σεαυτὸν ἀπόδος εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν
 καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις θεωρίαν, ἔτι δὲ
 κριτηρίων καὶ παθῶν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκεν ταῦτα ἐκλογιζόμεθα.
 ταῦτα γὰρ μάλιστα συνθεωρούμενα ῥαδίως τὰς περὶ τῶν
 10 κατὰ μέρος αἰτίας συννοῶν ποιήσῃ. οἱ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ κατα-
 γαπήσαντες ἢ μάλιστα οὐτ' ᾠν αὐτὰ ταῦτα καλῶς συνθεω-
 ρήσαιεν οὔτε οὗ ἕνεκεν δεῖ θεωρεῖν ταῦτα περιποιήσαντο.

116 1 ᾠν supplevit Cobet 2 εἰ adiecit Usener μικρὸν
 F : μικρῶ cett. 3 ἐμπέσοι Usener : ἐκπέσῃ libri : ἐκπέσοι Cobet
 6 ἀπόδος εἰς BP²QCo : ἀποδώσεις P¹?FZ 9 ῥαδίως BF : ῥαδίας
 HP¹Q 11 ἢ Kühn : ἢ libri οὐτ' ᾠν Usener : οὔτε BHPQ :
 ἢ F

116

116

come to an end, nor is there some divine nature which sits and watches the outgoings of these animals and then fulfils the signs they give. For not even the lowest animal, although 'a small thing gives the greater pleasure', would be seized by such foolishness, much less one who was possessed of perfect happiness.

All these things, Pythocles, you must bear in mind ; for *Conclusion.* thus you will escape in most things from superstition and will be enabled to understand what is akin to them. And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things. For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details. But those who have not thoroughly taken these things to heart could not rightly study them in themselves, nor have they made their own the reason for observing them.

III

ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ ΜΕΝΟΙΚΕΙ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ

- 122 Μήτε νέος τις ὦν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων
 ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστίν
 οὔτε πάρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. ὁ δὲ λέγων
 ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν
 5 ὁμοίως ἐστὶ τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρῆναι
 τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτ' εἶναι. ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ
 γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν
 χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, τῷ δὲ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς
 ἢ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων. μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ
 10 ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἰ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα
 ἔχομεν, ἀπουσίας δὲ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν. |
- 123 Ἄ δέ σοι συνεχῶς παρήγγελον, ταῦτα καὶ πράττε καὶ
 μελέτα, στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ταῦτ' εἶναι διαλαμβάνων.
 πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῶν ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων,
 ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μηθὲν μήτε τῆς
 5 ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοικεῖον αὐτῷ
 προσάπτε· πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ
 ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτὸν δόξαζε. θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ
 εἰσὶν· ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. οἴους δ' αὐτοὺς
 (οἱ) πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν
 10 αὐτοὺς οἴους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβῆς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν
 θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσά-

122 3 ὑγιαῖνον libr. plerique: ὑγιαίων B: ὑγιαίνειν cit. Clemens
 4 ἢ ante μήπω] εἰ B: om. Q post ὑπάρχειν habent ὥραν libri: om.
 Usener: (τὴν) ὥραν Cobet 5 μήπω Clemens: μὴ libri 6 μηκέτ'
 Clemens: μηκέτι libri (μὴ F) 8 χάριν] χάριν Ritter 123 8 γὰρ]
 μὲν γὰρ P¹Z 9 (οἱ) supplevit Gassendi νομίζουσιν] νοοῦσιν
 Usener

III

EPICURUS TO MENOECEUS

122 LET no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.

Introduction.
Both young
and old must
study philo-
sophy.

123 The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men's minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness : but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be : for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the

*First princi-
ples.*
1. The nature
of the gods.
The gods
exist, im-
mortal and
blessed,

but their
nature is not
such as is
popularly
supposed.

124 πτων. | οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ' ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις, ἐνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι τε τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι (τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς). ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς 5 τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.

Συνέθιξε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον· ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει· στέρησις δέ ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος. ὅθεν γνώσις ὀρθή τοῦ μηθὲν 10 εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένην πόθον. | οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινὸν τῷ κατελιφότει γνησίως τὸ μηθὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν. ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρῶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων. ὁ γὰρ 5 παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ. τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὤμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δ' ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τότε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδήπερ περὶ 10 οὗς μὲν οὐκ ἐστιν, οἱ δ' οὐκέτ' εἰσίν.

Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν θάνατον ὅτε μὲν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν φεύγουσιν, ὅτε δὲ ὡς ἀνάπανσιν τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν (κακῶν 126 ποθοῦσιν. | ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ (ζῆν) οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται τὸ ζῆν οὔτε δοξάζεται κακὸν εἶναι τι τὸ μὴ ζῆν. ὥσπερ δὲ σιτίον οὐ τὸ πλεῖον πάντως ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον αἰρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ χρόνον οὐ τὸν 5 μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται.

Ὁ δὲ παραγγέλλων τὸν μὲν νέον καλῶς ζῆν, τὸν δὲ γέροντα καλῶς καταστρέφειν εὐήθης ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι μελέτην

124 3 βλάβαι τε Usener: βλάβαι αἵται libri: fortasse βλάβαι τοῖς αἰτίοις (τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς) supplevit Gassendi 6 νομίζοντες] ut falsum suspicatus est Usener: ἀποδοκιμάζοντες Kochalsky 11 ἄπειρον Aldobrandinus: ἄπορον libri post ἀλλὰ τὸν (ἄπορον) supplevit Bignone 125 5 παρὸν HP²Q: παρῶν BFP¹Z 10 οὐκέτ' Usener in commentario: οὐκέτι libri 12 τῷ] τῷ ex τὸ correctum B (κακῶν... τὸ ζῆν) supplevit Usener (excepto quod ποθοῦσιν scripsit Casaubon, αἰροῦνται Usener) 126 2 δοξάζεται] δοξάζει Richards 3 δὲ Usener: δὲ τὸ libri 4 ἥδιστον] ἥδιον Usener

124 gods the beliefs of the many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.

Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it comes, is but an empty pain in anticipation. So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.

2. Death.
Death is
nothing to us.

This makes
life pleasant
and death no
terror.

Nor is its
anticipation
painful:

It is nothing
to living or
dead.

But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life. (But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

We should
not shun life
or fear death:

we want a
pleasant life,
not a long
one.

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the

To live well
is to learn to
die well.

- τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν. πολλὸν δὲ χείρων
 10 καὶ ὁ λέγων καλὸν μὲν μὴ φῦναι,
 φύντα δ' ὅπως ὄκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι. |
 127 Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πεποιθὼς τοῦτό φησι, πῶς οὐκ ἀπέρχεται ἐκ
 τοῦ ζῆν; ἐν ἐτοίμῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴ περ ἦν
 βεβουλευμένον αὐτῷ βεβαίως· εἰ δὲ μωκώμενος, μάταιος
 ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις.
 5 Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως
 οὐχ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον
 μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον.
 Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί,
 αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ
 10 μόνον· τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν
 ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσχησίαν, αἱ δὲ
 128 πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. | τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν
 αἴρεσιν καὶ φύγῃ ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος
 ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ
 μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν,
 5 ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἀπαξ τοῦτο
 περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χεიმῶν, οὐκ
 ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῶντος βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν
 ἕτερον ὃ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμ-
 πληρῶσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρεῖαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ
 10 μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· (ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν),
 οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν
 129 καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. | ταύτην γὰρ
 ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης
 καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην
 κατανατῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντας.
 5 Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο
 καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἰρούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὅτε πολλὰς

9 χείρων libr. plerique: χείρον B¹HZ 127 1 ἐκ τοῦ] τοῦ Usener
 5 οὔτε ἡμέτερον P² in margine: om. libri: οὔτε πάντως ἡμέτερον
 epitome Vaticana 128 2 ἐπανάγειν BP¹Q: ἐπαναγαγεῖν libr. cett.
 3 (τῆς ψυχῆς) supplevit B²: om. B¹: τοῦ σώματος FHPQZCo
 4 πάντα BHP¹: ἅπαντα FP²QZ 8 τὸ ante τοῦ] om. BF συμπλη-
 ρώσεται ep. Vat. Usener: συμπληρώσ(η)ται cum litura B²: συμπλη-
 ρώσεται HP¹QCo: συμπληρωθήσεται FZ 10 (ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν)
 supplevit Gassendi: μηδὲν pro μὴ Usener: μηκέτι coniecit Muehl
 129 6 καὶ οὐ BP²Z: καὶ FP¹QCo

same training which teaches to live well and to die well.
Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to
be born, but

It is foolish
to say it is
good to die
at once.

'once born make haste to pass the gates of Death'.

127 For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass
away out of life? For it is open to him to do so; if he
had firmly made up his mind to this. But if he speaks in
jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive
them.

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither
ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether
expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it
will certainly not come.

The future is
neither ours
nor not ours.

We must consider that of desires some are natural,
others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and
others merely natural; and of the necessary some are
necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body,
and others for very life. The right understanding of these

The moral
theory.
1. Division of
desires.

128 facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the
health of the body and (the soul's) freedom from disturb-
ance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For
it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid
pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all
the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living
creature has not to wander as though in search of some-
thing that is missing, and to look for some other thing by
which he can fulfil the good of the soul and the good of
the body. For it is then that we have need of pleasure,
when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but
when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure.

Health of
body and
repose of
soul the
motive of
action.

129 And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end
of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first
good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act
of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again,
using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every
good.

Hence
pleasure the
standard of
the good.

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us,
for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but
sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater

2. Pleasure
is in itself
always good,
but not all

- ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλείον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων
ἐπεται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν,
ἐπειδὴ μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθεῖ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπο-
10 μείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσει
ἔχειν οἰκεῖαν ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἰρετή· καθάπερ καὶ
ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ αἰεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα. |
130 τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων
βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει. χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν
ἀγαθῷ κατὰ τινας χρόνους ὥς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τοῦμπαλιν
ὥς ἀγαθῷ.
- 5 Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα
πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔαν μὴ ἔχωμεν
τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι
ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι,
καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κεῖν
10 δυσπόριστον. οἱ τε λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ διαίτη τὴν
ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν, ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἐνδειαν
131 ἐξαιρεθῇ· | καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδιδῶσιν
ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. τὸ συνεθίζειν
οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἀπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυτελεσί διαίταις καὶ ὑγείας
ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις
5 ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῖς πολυτελεσίς ἐκ διαλειμ-
μάτων προσερχομένους κρείττον ἡμᾶς διατίθῃσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν
τύχην ἀφόβους παρασκευάζει.
- Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν
ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κεκίμενας λέγομεν, ὥς
10 τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι
νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταραττεσθαι
κατὰ ψυχὴν· | οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ' ἀπο-
132 λαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
ὅσα φέρει πολυτελεὲς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ
νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἰρέσεως

11 μέντοι] μέντοι (γ') Usener 130 2 βλέπει] ἐπιβλέπει coniect
Usener 3 τοῦμπαλιν HP²QCo: τὸ ἔμπαλιν FZ: ὅτ' ἂν πάλιν B
unde τᾶμπαλιν Usener 7 χρώμεθα] ἀρκώμεθα Cobet 10 οἱ τε]
οἱ γὰρ Usener: ὅτι τε Muehl πολυτελεῖ P²H²QCoZ³: πολυτέλ(ει)
F: πολυτέλειαν B²H¹P¹Z¹ 11 ἡδονήν] ἀηδῖαν Usener ἅπαν] ἅπαξ
Usener 131 6 προσερχομένους GZ: προσερχομένοι BFHPQCo

discomfort accrues to us as the result of them : and pleasures are similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since to be chosen, a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains because of for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural accompanying pain. kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen : even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgement on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

130

We must judge by comparison.

And again independence of desire we think a great good—not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed ; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips. To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune.

131

3. We must be content with a little,

and so shall enjoy luxury more, if it comes.

Simple diet secures health and alertness.

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere

132

4. Pleasure then does not mean sensual enjoyment,

but health of body and the exercise of the mind on philosophy.

9 καὶ τὰς Rossi: καὶ τὰς τῶν libri
λανσις Usener.

132 1 ἀπολαύσεις] ἀπό-

5 καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλείστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.

Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
 10 ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως (οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως) ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. συμ-
 133 πεφύκασιν γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον. ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρεῖττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας ὡς ἔστιν εὐσυμπληρωτόν
 5 τε καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὡς ἡ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τινων δεσπότην εἰσαγομένην πάντων ἐγγελῶντος (εἰμαρμένην; * * * * * ὧν ἂ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται) ἂ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἂ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην
 10 ἄστατον ὄραν, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτόν
 134 καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν | (ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μῦθος κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη δουλεύειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπὶδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην)· τὴν δὲ
 5 τύχην οὔτε θεόν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, ὑπολαμβάνων (οὐθεν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται) οὔτε (πάντων) ἀβέβαιοι αἰτίαν ((οὐκ) οἶεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι, ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων
 135 ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι), | κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζει εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν (βέλτιον

5 ἐξ ὧν B: ἀφ' οὗ Z: om. libr. cett. 9 διδάσκουσα Usener: διδάσκουσαι (διδασκουσ[αι] H) libri: διδασκούσης Rossi 10 (οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως) supplevit Stephanus 133 3 ἐπι-
 λελογισμένου codd. plerique: ἐπιλελογισμένου FP³Z 7 ἐγγε-
 λῶντος scripsi: ἀγγέλωντος P¹Q¹: ἀγγελῶντος P²Q²: ἀγγέλλον-
 τος BFHZ: ἀνελόντος Kühn: διαγγέλωντος Usener (εἰμαρμένην)
 supplevit Usener nonnulla intercidisse manifestum est: extre-
 mam lacunam ὧν ἂ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται (γίνονται scripsit) supplevit
 Bignone: καὶ μᾶλλον ἂ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι λέγοντος post εἰμαρ-
 μένην Usener 134 4 post ἀνάγκην graviter interpunxi, levius
 Usener 5 ὑπολαμβάνων] ὑπολαμβάνοντος Usener 6 (πάντων)
 supplevi: μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν post αἰτίαν Bignone ἀβέβαιοι]

opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.

- Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice) without living pleasantly. For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain: he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. (He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.
- For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god's acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things): for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it. He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason.

5. The greatest thing is prudence,

which teaches all other virtues,

and they secure a pleasant life.

The prudent man is superior to all others.

He knows the limits of good and evil,

and is not the slave of necessity,

which is worse than belief in popular religion.

He regards chance, too, as an opportunity for good,

but prefers prudence with misfortune to prosperity with folly.

βέλαιον Lewy 7 (οὐκ) supplevit Usener 8 μὴ ante διδοῦσθαι
inseruit Gassendi 135 2 νομίζει scripsi : νομίζειν F : νομίζων
BHPQ : νομίζοντος Usener βέλτιον] βέλτιστον Usener

γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ καλῶς κριθέν (σφαλῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κακῶς κριθέν) ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην).

- 5 Ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις συγγενῇ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πρὸς (τε) τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐθ' ὕπαρ οὐτ' ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῶν ζῶν ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.

3 γὰρ] δ' αὖ Bignone (σφαλῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κακῶς κριθέν) inserui :
 (μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι ἢ τὸ μὴ καλῶς κριθέν) Madvig 5 σεαυτὸν Gassendi :
 ἐαυτὸν libri 6 (τε) inseruit Usener 8 ζῶν Z⁸f : ζῶ[ν] B³ : ζῶον
 HPQCoZ¹ : ζῶον δ F

For it is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance.

Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself, and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like to a mortal being.

Peroration.
The practice of these precepts will make you a god among men.

IV

ΚΤΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ

139 I. Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

II. Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναι-
5 σθητέ· τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

III. Ὁρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλ-
γοῦντος ὑπεξαιρέσεις. ὅπου δ' ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ' ὃν
ἂν χρόνον ῇ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ
συναμφότερον. |

140 IV. Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ
τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον
ὑπερτείνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμ-
βαίνει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι
5 τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἢ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

V. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ
δικαίως (οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως) ἄνευ τοῦ
ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐ ζῆ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς
καὶ δικαίως, (καὶ ὅτῳ ἐκείνο μὴ) ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον
10 ἡδέως ζῆν.

VI. Ἐνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν
ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ποτε τοῦτο οἶός τ' ἢ παρασκευάζεσθαι. |

139 3 ἀσθενεί] ἀσθενεία Sent. Vat. I 8 τὸ λυπούμενον] om.
τὸ BP¹QCo 140 3 συμβαίνει] συμμένει Bywater 7 (οὐδὲ
φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως) supplevit Gassendi, cf. Diog. Oen.
54 8 δὲ τοῦτο] δ' ἐν τούτων Usener οὐ ζῆ... 9 ὑπάρχει om.
Sent. Vat. V οὐ] οἶον Usener: ἐξ οὐ Bignone ζῆ scripsi: ζῇ
libri: ζῆν Gassendi 9 (καὶ ὅτῳ ἐκείνο μὴ) supplevi 11 ἦν
Usener: ἢ libri 12 ἀγαθόν] fortasse ἀγαθὰ Usener: num adden-
dum (ταῦτα ζητεῖν)? τοῦτο] τοῦτό τις Meibom

Scholia

139 3 post τὸ τοιοῦτον legitur ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ
θεωρητοὺς, οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστώτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδεῖαν ἐκ τῆς

IV

PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES

139 I. The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble The divine
itself nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never nature.
constrained by anger or favour. For all such things exist
only in the weak.

II. Death is nothing to us: for that which is dissolved Death.
is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is
nothing to us.

III. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of The limit of
all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long pleasure.
as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor
of both at once.

140 IV. Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the Bodily pain :
acute pain is there for a very short time, and even that its strength
which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not and length.
continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses
permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.

V. It is not possible to live pleasantly without living Connexion of
prudently and honourably and justly, [nor again to live pleasure and
a life of prudence, honour, and justice] without living virtue.
pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the
pleasant life, is not living prudently and honourably and
justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous
life], cannot possibly live pleasantly.

VI. To secure protection from men anything is a Protection.
natural good, by which you may be able to attain this
end.

Scholias

*συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένων,
ἀνθρωποιδεῖς*

*οὗς μὲν . . . οὗς δὲ] οὐ μὲν . . . ὥς δὲ Gassendi ὁμοειδεῖαν
HP²QCo: ὁμοειδίαν BZ: ὁμοιοειδίαν F ἀποτελεσμένων libri
plerique: τετελεσμένων F: ἀποτελεσμένους Kühn*

140 11 post κατὰ φύσιν legitur ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας: retinuit Muehl

- 141 VII. Ἐνδοξοὶ καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλῆς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλῆς, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐ
5 ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.

VIII. Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν. |

- 142 IX. Εἰ κατεπυκνούτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἂν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.

X. Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυνε 5 τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν (καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων) ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἶχομεν ὃ τι μεμφαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐθαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ
10 κακόν.

XI. Εἰ μὴτὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαί ἡνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μὴ ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἦ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας. |

- 143 XII. Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἢ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ' ὑποπτευόμενον τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.

5 XIII. Οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

XIV. Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι

141 6 ἑαυτὸ BHP¹QCo: ἑαυτὴν FP⁸Z κακόν BHPQ: κακή FP⁸Z
142 1 post ἡδονή, (καὶ μνήμη) supplevit Bignone: (καὶ τόνῳ)
Crönert καὶ χρόνῳ FP⁸Z: τῷ . . . χρόνῳ B¹: τῷ καὶ χρόνῳ
B²P¹Co: τῷ χρόνῳ Arndt περὶ ὅλον Rossi: περὶ ὅδον FP⁸Z:
περίοδον BHP¹QCo 4 ἀσώτους] ἀσωμάτων FZ: εὐσωμάτων
P⁴ 6 (καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων) ex Diog. Oen. fr. 45 supplevit
Bignone, cf. XI 7 μεμφαίμεθα] μεμφάμεθα B: ἐμεμφάμεθα
Usener 8 ἐκπληρουμένοις Diog. Oen. Usener: εἰσπληρουμένοις
libri 12 τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν Lachelier: τετόλμηκα νοεῖν libri

141 VII. Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature. Fame and position are no protection.

VIII. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself: but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures. Impure pleasures.

142 IX. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. Difference of pleasures.

X. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life. Failure of sensual pleasure.

XI. If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science. Need of science for pleasure.

143 XII. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that without natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed. Science saves us from myth.

XIII. There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above and things beneath the earth and indeed all in the boundless universe remain matters of suspicion. Protection from men valueless without science.

XIV. The most unalloyed source of protection from Retirement best secures protection.

143 2 ὑποπτευόμενον] ὑποπτεύονται Sent. Vat. XLIX: ὑποπτεύονται
Usener in commentario

τινὸς δυνάμει τῷ ἐξοριστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτῃ
 10 γίνεται ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν
 ἀσφάλεια. |

144 XV. Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥριςται καὶ εὐπόριστός
 ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

XVI. Βραχεία σοφῶ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ
 κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διώκει καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον
 5 τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικῆσει.

XVII. Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ' ἄδικος πλείστης
 παραχῆς γέμων.

XVIII. Οὐκ ἐπαύζεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ἐπειδὰν ἀπαξ
 τὸ κατ' ἐνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται·
 10 τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέραν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγύνησεν
 ἢ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα
 τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ. |

145 XIX. Ὁ ἀπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ
 πεπερασμένος, ἐὰν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ
 λογισμῷ.

XX. Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀπειρά,
 5 καὶ ἀπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια, τοῦ
 τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν,
 καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον
 παρεσκεύασεν, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδέ-
 θημεν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐθ' ἠνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγήν
 10 ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὥς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ
 ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν. |

146 XXI. Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὥς εὐπόριστόν
 ἐστὶ τὸ (τὸ) ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἐνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον
 βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων
 ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

9 τινὶ Usener: τε libri, Bignone ἐξοριστικῇ Meibom: ἐξε-
 ριστικῇ P²Z: ἐξεριστικῇ F: ἐξαιρετικῇ BP¹Q: ἐξεριστικῇ H, unde
 ἐξεριστικῇ Usener: ἐξεριστικῇ Bignone: ἐξέρεσις ἢ conl. Usener
 εὐπορία εἰλικρινεστάτῃ] εὐπορία εἰλικρινεστάτῃ f: εὐπορία εἰλικρι-
 νεστέρα Muehl: εἰλικρινεστ(άτῃ, ἐπεξεργαστικῷ)τάτῃ Bignone
 10 ἐκχωρήσεως HZ³: ἐγχωρήσεως BFPQCo²Z¹ 12 ἀσφάλεια] ἀδεια
 coniecerat Usener 144 3 βραχεία BFP¹: βραχεία HP²Q τύχη]
 τύχη Cobet 4 διώκει Stobaeus: διώκει (διώκει Z) libri: διώκησε
 Usener καὶ] om. Usener 5 τοῦ βίου] om. FCo²Z διοικεῖ
 καὶ διοικῆσει ut glossema seclisut Usener 6 ὁ δίκαιος] βίος add.
 Diodorus Sent. Vat. XII 11 ἐκλόγισις BPQ: ἐκλόγησις FCo²Z
 145 5 καὶ] κὰν Diels ἀπειρος] ἀπειρ(ον οὐκ ἀπειρ)ος Bignone παρε-

men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life and the retirement from the world.

144 XV. The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity. Nature's wealth.

XVI. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters reason has ordained and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain. Chance and reason in life.

XVII. The just man is most free from trouble, the unjust most full of trouble. Justice and injustice.

XVIII. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind. Limits of bodily and mental pleasure.

145 XIX. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure. Infinite time does not increase pleasure.

XX. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as un- limited and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life. The flesh, reason, and pleasure.

146 XXI. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition. Pleasure without competition.

σκεύασεν] ἀρέσκοι ἂν Usener 7 τὸν παντελῆ] fortasse παντελῆ τὸν
cf. XXI 8 χρόνου BP¹Q: βίου FHCo²Z προσεδέθημεν FHCo²Z:
προσεδέθημεν PQ: προσεδέθη' (οὐ) μὴν Usener 9 οὐδ' H: οὐδέ
B: οὐδ' F II κατέστρεψεν] κατέστρεψεν Bywater 146 2 (τὸ)
supplevit Casaubon

5 XXII. Τὸ ὑφεισθηκὸς δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν
τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐφ' ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μετὰ.

XXIII. Εἰ μάχῃ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις σὺδ'
ὡς ἂν φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεύεσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν
10 κρῖνῃς.

147 XXIV. Εἴ τιν' ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθησῶ καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις
τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ
τὴν αἰσθησῶ καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν
τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ
5 δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις
καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ
τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν, οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον,
ὡς τετηρηκὸς ἔσει πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν
τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

148 XXV. Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν
πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις
εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δλώξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλό τι, οὐκ ἔσονται
σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

5 XXVI. Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν,
ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρωθῶσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλ' εὐδιάχτων
τὴν ὀρεξίν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δυσπόριστον ἢ (ῆ) βλάβης ἀπεργα-
στικά δόξωσιν εἶναι.

XXVII. Ὡς ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου
10 βίον μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτήσις.

XXVIII. Ἡ αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ
μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεῶν μὴδὲ πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν
αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατέειδε
συντελουμένην.

149 XXIX. Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι·

5 τέλος secludebat Schneider

λεῖς H¹: ἐκβάλλεις codd. cett.

Usener

5 ἐκβαλεῖς Z²f: ἐκβάλλεις codd. cett.

Bonnet

8 ὡς τετηρηκὸς] ὥστ' ἀνηρηκὸς

ὥστε τετηρηκὸς Merbach

καὶ (ἀνηρηκὸς) Giussani

7 δυσπόριστον BP¹: δυσπόριστοι F

cett. 13 φιλίας] φιλείας Usener:

κατέειδε Madvig: κατεῖναι libri

147 1 ἐκβαλεῖς Cobet: ἐκβά-

2 κατὰ codd. plerique: καὶ FCo²Z

HPQ: ματαία FCo²Z

7 ἐκλείψεις] ἐκλείψει

κατὰ Bignone: καὶ codd. Usener:

148 6 εὐδιάχτων] ἀδιάχτων HQ

ἢ (ῆ) Usener: ἢ B: ἢ codd.

149 1 φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι

XXII. We must consider both the real purpose and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion. The tests of moral action.

XXIII. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false. Rejection of all sensations.

147 XXIV. If you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgement. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgement between what is right and what is wrong. Rejection of a single sensation and failure to distinguish sensation and opinion.

148 XXV. If on each occasion instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other nearer standard when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles. Necessity of reference to the ultimate standard.

XXVI. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm. Unnecessary desires.

XXVII. Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship. Value of friendship.

XXVIII. The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life. Friendship and the duration of evils.

149 XXIX. Among desires some are natural (and necessary, Classification of desires.

αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μὲν) οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι (δέ) supplevit Bignone ex Sent. Vat. XX: φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι libri: φυσικαὶ καὶ (ἀναγκαῖαι: αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ) καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι Stephanus

αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μὲν) οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι (δέ). αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.

XXX. Ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγοῦν 5 δὲ ἐπαυγουσῶν, ἔαν μὴ συντελεσθῶσι, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ συντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὐταὶ γίνονται, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν. |

150 XXXI. Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον ἐστὶ σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

XXXII. Ὅσα τῶν ζῶων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς 5 ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἀδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

XXXIII. Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ' ὀηλικούς δὴ ποτε αἰεὶ τόπους 10 συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι. |

151 XXXIV. Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.

XXXV. Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο 5 πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεῦειν ὅτι λήσει, κὰν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ. μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἀδελον εἰ καὶ λήσει.

XXXVI. Κατὰ μὲν (τὸ) κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ 10 δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δὴ ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. |

152 XXXVII. Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς

4 post φυσικῶν fortasse μὲν Usener 150 4 ἄλληλα Gassendi :
ἀλλὰ BFOH²Z : ἀλλὰ . . P : ἀλλ' ἂν H¹ : ἄλλα Usener 5 ἦν
Usener : ἢ BHP¹Q : ἢ οὐδὲ P² : ἐστὶν οὐδὲ FCo²Z 151 4 ποιούν-
τα] κινούντα Madvig 6 ἐπὶ Sent. Vat. VI Menagius : ἀπὸ
BQ¹P¹ : ὑπὸ FP²Co²Z 8 (τὸ) supplavit Gassendi

Scholia

149 3 post γινόμεναι legitur φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαῖας ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀληθινὰς ἀπολυτοῦσας, ὡς πατὸν ἐπὶ δίφους· φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαυρουμένας δὲ τὸ ἀλγῆμα, ὡς πολυτελὴ σιτία· οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτε ἀναγκαῖας, ὡς

some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

XXX. Wherever in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination, and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.

Imagination and unnecessary desires.

150 XXXI. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.

Nature of justice.

XXXII. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise too for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

No justice without compact.

XXXIII. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another in any place whatever and at any time it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

Justice not an independent existence.

151 XXXIV. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

Injustice.

XXXV. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed, to be confident that he will escape detection, even if at present he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

The fear of detection.

XXXVI. In its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another: but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

Variability of justice.

152 XXXVII. Among actions which are sanctioned as just

Test of just

Scholia

στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις
ἀλγυθόνης Weil: ἀλγυθόνας libri

δε post οὐκ ἀναγκαίως om. FCo²Z

χρεῖαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι
δικαίων, ἔχει τὸ τοῦ δικαίου ἐνέχυρον, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι
γένηται, ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆται τις, μὴ
5 ἀποβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας,
οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. κὰν μεταπίπτῃ
τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν
πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκείνου τὸν χρόνον ἢ
δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ'
10 εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν. |

153 XXXVIII. Ἐνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιστώτων
πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἐναρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ
νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια.
ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε
5 τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαι', ὅτε
συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτενο-
μένων· ὕστερον δ' οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν. |

154 XXXIX. Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξωθεν ἄριστα
συστησάμενος οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκενάσαστο·
τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο
δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμικτος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξωρίσαστο ὅσα τοῦτ'
5 ἔλυσιτέλει πράττειν.

XL. Ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα
ἐκ τῶν ὁμορουντων παρασκευάσασθαι, οὗτοι καὶ ἐβίωσαν
μετ' ἀλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιοτάτον πίστωμα ἔχοντες, καὶ
πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ ᾤδύραντο ὥς πρὸς
10 ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφὴν,

152 2 τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων seclisit Usener additamentum
suspiciens capiti sententiae destinatum 3 τὸ τοῦ F: τὸν τοῦ HPQ
Usener ἐνέχυρον scripsi: εἶναι HP¹Q: χώραν εἶναι BF: τὸ ἐν τοῦ
δικαίου χώρα Muehl: alii alia 4 νόμον Usener: μόνον libri
9 ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ Usener: ἀλλὰ πλείστα libri: ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς εἰς τὰ Kochalsky
153 1 καινῶν Aldobrandinus: κενῶν libri: κοινῶν Z^f 2 ἐναρ-
μόττοντα Usener (cf. XXXVII. 8): ἀρμόττοντα libri 4 καινῶν
Gassendi: καὶ τῶν B: κενῶν HPQ 5 δὲ BHPQ: δὴ F
154 1 τὸ μὴ] τὸ μὲν Usener (in commentario) 2 συστησάμενος]
συστειλάμενος Usener (in commentario) 3 ὅσα δὲ Usener: ὅσα
γε HPQ: ὅσα FCoZ 4 ἐξωρίσαστο Stephanus: ἐξορίσαστο H: ἐξη-
ρίσαστο BFPQ: ἐξηρέσαστο Usener: ἐξηρείσαστο Muehl τοῦτ' HPQ:
τούτω B: τοῦ F: τούτων Usener: τοῦτο Stephanus 5 ἔλυσιτέλει

by law, that which is proved on examination to be of advantage in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is none the less just for that period in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds but look to the actual facts.

action under
all circum-
stances.

153

XXXVIII. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just, have been shown not to accord with the general concept in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, there they were just at the time when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another; but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

The same
action some-
times just,
sometimes
unjust.

154

XXXIX. The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself and the rest at least not alien: but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

The ordering
of the wise
man's life.

XL. As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

The
Epicurean
community.

HPQ: λυσιτελής B: λυσιτελής F Usener 6 τοῦ τὸ Meibom: τοῦ τε
BP: του FCoZ 7 οὗτοι F: οὕτω codd. cett. Usener 8 ἡδίστα
τὸ Usener: ἡδίστον τὸν B: ἡδίστον. P: ἡδίστον καὶ Q: ἡδίστον
FHCoz 9 πρὸς ἑλεον B: πρὸς σὶ δέον HP¹Q: ἑλεον F²Co²Z

V

FRAGMENTA EPICUREA

A.

SENTENTIAE VATICANAE

Ἐπικούρου Προσφώνησις

I. = Κύριαι Δόξαι I.

II. = Κύριαι Δόξαι II.

III. = Κύριαι Δόξαι IV.

*IV. Πᾶσα ἀλγηδὼν εὐκαταφρόνητος· ἡ γὰρ σύντονον
ἔχουσα τὸ πονοῦν σύντομον ἔχει τὸν χρόνον, ἡ δὲ χρονί-
ζουσα περὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀβληχρὸν ἔχει τὸν πόνον.

V. = Κύριαι Δόξαι V.

VI. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XXXV.

VII. Ἀδικοῦντα λαθεῖν μὲν δύσκολον, πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν
ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον.

VIII. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XV.

IX. Κακὸν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ζῆν μετὰ ἀνάγκης.

[X. Metrodorus. Μέμνησο ὅτι θνητὸς ὢν τῇ φύσει καὶ
λαβὼν χρόνον ὀρισμένον ἀνέβης τοῖς περὶ φύσεως διαλο-
γισμοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ κατεῖδες
τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.]

*XI. Τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσύχαζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ
δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

XII. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XVII.

XIII. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XXVII.

XIV. Γεγόναμεν ἀπαξ, δις δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι· δεῖ δὲ
τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτ' εἶναι· σὺ δὲ οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὔριον (κύριος)

Sigla : V = Cod. Vaticanus Graecus 1950

IV 1 σύντονον Usener : σύντομον V IX 1 ἀνάγκη] (ζῆν ἐν ἀνάγκῃ
Hartel X 1 ὅτι] Μενέστρατε δίοτι Clem. Alex. ὢν τῇ φύσει]
φύς C. A. 2 λαβὼν] λαχὼν Gomperz χρόνον] βίον C. A. τοῖς

V

FRAGMENTS

A.

VATICAN COLLECTION

'Epicurus' Exhortation'

IV. All bodily suffering is negligible: for that which causes acute pain has short duration, and that which endures long in the flesh causes but mild pain.

VII. It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to obtain security for escaping is impossible.

IX. Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.

[X. Remember that you are of mortal nature and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity and have seen 'things that are now and are to come and have been'.]

XI. For most men rest is stagnation and activity madness.

XIV. We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not (master) of to-morrow, postpone your happiness: life is

... κατείδες]· τῇ ψυχῇ ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων
κατείδες καὶ C. A. 4 τὰ τ' ἔόντα om. C. A. XIV 2 κύριος om.
V : supplendum ex Stobaeo

ἀναβάλλῃ τὸ χαῖρον· ὁ δὲ βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται καὶ εἰς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἀσχολούμενος ἀποθνήσκει.

*XV. Ἦθη ὥσπερ τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἴδια τιμῶμεν, ἂν τε χρηστὰ ἔχωμεν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλώμεθα, ἂν τε μὴ· οὕτω χρὴ (τὰ) τῶν πέλας, ἂν ἐπιεικέις ὦσιν.

*XVI. Οὐδεὶς βλέπων τὸ κακὸν αἰρεῖται αὐτό, ἀλλὰ δελεασθεὶς ὡς ἀγαθῷ πρὸς τὸ μείζον αὐτοῦ κακὸν ἐθηρεύθη.

*XVII. Οὐ νέος μακαριστὸς ἀλλὰ γέρων βεβιωκὼς καλῶς· ὁ γὰρ νέος (ἐν) ἀκμῇ πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροφρονῶν πλάζεται· ὁ δὲ γέρων καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι τῷ γῆρα καθώρμικεν τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατα-
5 κλείσας χάριτι.

*XVIII. Ἀφαιρουμένης προσόψεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ συνανα-
στροφῆς ἐκλύεται τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος.

*XIX. Τοῦ γεγονότος ἀμνήμων ἀγαθοῦ γέρων τήμερον γεγένηται.

XX. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XXIX.

*XXI. Οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πεισόμεθα δὲ τὰς (τ') ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες τὰς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβεράς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.

XXII. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XIX.

*XXIII. Πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή· ἀρχὴν δ' εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

*XXIV. Ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπτωσιν εἰδῶλων.

*XXV. Ἡ πενία μετρομένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὀριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.

*XXVI. Δεῖ διαλαβεῖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ πολὺς λόγος καὶ ὁ βραχὺς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνει τέλος.

*XXVII. Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων μόλις τελεω-

3 τὸ χαῖρον] τὸν καιρὸν Stobaeus 4 εἰς] διὰ τοῦτο Stobaeus
XV 1 τιμῶμεν] τιμώμενα Wotke 2 ζηλώμεθα Wilamowitz: ζηλού-
μεθα V: ζηλούμενα Weil post ἂν τε μὴ lacunam suspicatus est
Wotke. 3 χρῆ] χρῆσις Usener (τὰ) supplevit Weil ἂν
ἐπιεικέις Usener: ἀνεπιεικῶς V XVI 1 βλέπων Wotke: βλέπων
V 2 ἀγαθῷ V: ἀγαθὸν Usener πρὸς τὸ προσὸν Usener:
πρὸς τι Crönert αὐτοῦ] ἂν τοῦ Usener XVII 2 νέος (ἐν) ἀκμῇ
scripsi: νέος ἀκμῇ V: νέος ἀκμῇ Crönert: ἔντος ἀκμῆς Usener
πολύς] πολλὰ Hartel 5 χάριτι] χάρακι Hartel XIX 1 ἀμνήμων]
ἀμνημονῶν Wilamowitz ἀγαθοῦ Hartel: ἀγαθὸς V τήμερον]
αὐθημερὸν coniecit Usener: τὴν φρόνησιν Gomperz XXI 1 πεισό-

wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure.

XV. We value our characters as something peculiar to ourselves, whether they are good and we are esteemed by men, or not; so ought we to value the characters of others, if they are well-disposed to us.

XVI. No one when he sees evil deliberately chooses it, but is enticed by it as being good in comparison with a greater evil and so pursues it.

XVII. It is not the young man who should be thought happy, but an old man who has lived a good life. For the young man at the height of his powers is unstable and is carried this way and that by fortune, like a headlong stream. But the old man has come to anchor in old age as though in port, and the good things for which before he hardly hoped he has brought into safe harbourage in his grateful recollections.

XVIII. Remove sight, association and contact, and the passion of love is at an end.

XIX. Forgetting the good that has been he has become old this very day.

XXI. We must not violate nature, but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfil the necessary desires and also the physical, if they bring no harm to us, but sternly reject the harmful.

XXIII. All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help.

XXIV. Dreams have no divine character nor any prophetic force, but they originate from the influx of images.

XXV. Poverty, when measured by the natural purpose of life, is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty.

XXVI. You must understand that whether the discourse be long or short it tends to the same end.

XXVII. In all other occupations the fruit comes pain-

μεθα scripsi: πείσομεν V 2 τὰς (τ') Usener: τὰς V XXIII 1 αἰ-
περή Usener: ἀπερή V XXV 2 ἐστὶ ἐνὶ V XXVI 2 συντρέχει
Hartel: συντρέχει V

θείσιν ὁ καρπὸς ἔρχεται, ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερπνόν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν ἀπόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μάθησις καὶ ἀπόλαυσις.

*XXVIII. Οὐτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς δοκιμαστέον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ παρακινεῖσθαι χάριν φιλίας.

*XXIX. Παρρησίᾳ γὰρ ἔγωγε χρώμενος φυσιολογῶν χρησμοδεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἢ βουλομένην κἂν μηδεὶς μέλλῃ συνήσσει, ἣ συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς δόξαις καρποῦσθαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον.

[XXX. Metrodorus. Ἐτοιμάζονται τινες διὰ βίου τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον, οὐ συνωρῶντες ὥς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν θανάσιμον ἐγκέχεται τὸ τῆς γενέσεως φάρμακον.]

XXXI. Πρὸς μὲν τᾶλλα δυνατὸν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι, χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἀνθρώποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οἰκοῦμεν.

*XXXII. Ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῶν σεβομένων ἐστί.

XXXIII. Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ριγοῦν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν κἂν (Διὶ) ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιο.

*XXXIV. Οὐχ οὕτως χρεῖαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας παρὰ τῶν φίλων ὥς τῆς πλίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς χρείας.

*XXXV. Οὐ δεῖ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων ἐπιθυμῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων ἦν.

[XXXVI. Ὁ Ἐπικούρου βίος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων συγκρινόμενος ἔνεκεν ἡμερότητος καὶ αὐταρκείας μῦθος ἂν νομισθεῖ.]

*XXXVII. Ἀσθενὴς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ κακόν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἡδοναῖς μὲν γὰρ σῶζεται, ἀλγηδόσι δὲ διαλύεται.

*XXXVIII. Μικρὸς παντάπασιν, ὅ πολλοὶ αἰτίαι εὐλογοῖ εἰς ἐξαγωγήν βίου.

*XXXIX. Οὐθ' ὁ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος οὐθ' ὁ μηδέποτε συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατηλεῦει τῇ χάριτι

XXVII 3 μάθησιν Wotke : μάθησις V ἅμα Wotke : μετὰ V
XXVIII 2 χάριν ἡμῖν bis V XXIX 1 φυσιολογῶν χρησμοδεῖν
Usener : φυσιολογῶ χρησμῶ. Δεῖ V : φυσιολόγῳ χρησμοδεῖν Crönert
XXXII 1 σεβασμὸς Usener : σεβαστὸς V : σεβαστὸς (λόγος) Bignone
ἀγαθὸν μέγα Usener : ἀγαθὸν μετὰ V τῶν σεβομένων] τῷ σεβομένῳ
Usener XXXIII 2 κἂν (Διὶ) Hartel : καὶ V XXXVIII 1 μι-
κρὸς] οἰκτρὸς Usener

fully after completion, but in philosophy pleasure goes hand in hand with knowledge; for enjoyment does not follow comprehension, but comprehension and enjoyment are simultaneous.

XXVIII. We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship's sake we must even run risks.

XXIX. In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob.

[XXX. Some men throughout their lives gather together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.]

XXXI. Against all else it is possible to provide security, but as against death all of us mortals alike dwell in an unfortified city.

XXXII. The veneration of the wise man is a great blessing to those who venerate him.

XXXIII. The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst and cold. For if a man possess this safety and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in happiness.

XXXIV. It is not so much our friends' help that helps us as the confidence of their help.

XXXV. We should not spoil what we have by desiring what we have not, but remember that what we have too was the gift of fortune.

[XXXVI. Epicurus' life when compared to other men's in respect of gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend.]

XXXVII. Nature is weak towards evil, not towards good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

XXXVIII. He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life.

XXXIX. He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship.

τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ὃ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπίστίαν.

*XL. Ὁ λέγων πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχει τῷ λέγοντι μὴ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό φησι κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι.

*XLI. Γέλῶν ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφίεντας.

*XLII. Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολαύσεως.

*XLIII. Φιλαργυρεῖν ἄδικα μὲν ἀσεβές, δίκαια δὲ αἰσχρόν· ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ ῥυπαρῶς φεῖδεσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου.

*XLIV. Ὁ σοφὸς εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα συγκαθεῖς μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται μεταδιδόναι ἢ μεταλαμβάνειν· τηλικούτου αὐταρκείας εὖρε θησαυρόν.

*XLV. Οὐ κόμπου οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικούς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδείαν ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει, ἀλλὰ σοβαροὺς καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονούντας.

*XLVI. Τὰς φαύλας συνηθείας ὥσπερ ἄνδρας πονηροὺς πολὺν χρόνον μέγα βλάψαντας τελείως ἐκδιώκωμεν.

[XLVII. Metrodorus. Προκατελήμμαι σε, ὦ τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν σὴν παρελθούσῃ ἐνέφραξα. καὶ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε ἀλλῇ οὐδεμίᾳ περιστάσει δώσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδότους· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡμᾶς τὸ χρεὼν ἐξάγῃ, μέγα προσπτύσαντες τῷ ζῆν καὶ τοῖς 5 αὐτῷ κενῶς περιπλαττομένοις ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς εὖ ἡμῖν βεβίωται.]

*XLVIII. Πειρᾶσθαι τὴν ὑτέραν τῆς προτέρας κρείττω ποιεῖν, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὁδῷ ὤμεν· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπὶ πέρας ἔλθωμεν, ὁμαλῶς εὐφραίνεσθαι.

XL 3 post γίνεσθαι γέλων ex γελῶν ad initium sententiae. sequentis addidit Usener XLI 1 γελῶν om. Usener : μελετᾶν Crönert δεῖν Wotke : δεῖν V : δεῖ Leopold 2 λήγειν Usener : λέγειν V 3 ὀρθῆς Hartel : ὀργῆς V XLII 2 ἀπολαύσεως Usener : ἀπολύσεως V XLIII 2 φεῖδεσθαι Wotke : φεῖδε . . . V XLIV 1 συγκαθεῖς Usener : συγκριθεῖς V : συγκλεισθεῖς Gomperz ἐπίσταται Usener : παρίσταται V XLV 1 φωνῆς] (κενῆς) φωνῆς Usener 3 σοβαροῦς] ἀφόβους Usener : ἀθουρύβους Gomperz : ἀσοβάρους Leopold XLVI 2 μέγα βλάψαντας Hartel : μεταβλάψαντας V : μεγάλα βλάψαντας Usener XLVII 2 σὴν] (τὴν) σὴν coniecit Usener 5 περιπλαττομένοις] περιπλεκομένοις Usener 6 παιῶνος Usener : πλείονος V

For the former barterers kindly feeling for a practical return and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.

XL. The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.

XLI. We must laugh and philosophize at the same time and do our household duties and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

XLII. The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment.

XLIII. The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly, shameful; for it is unseemly to be merely parsimonious even with justice on one's side.

XLIV. The wise man when he has accommodated himself to straits knows better how to give than to receive: so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency which he has discovered.

XLV. The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances.

XLVI. Our bad habits, like evil men who have long done us great harm, let us utterly drive from us.

XLVII. I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

XLVIII. We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content.

XLVIII 1 ὑστέραν . . . προτέρας] ὑστεραίαν . . . προτεραιάς Usener
2 ἐν ὁδῷ Wotke: ἐν ὁ δῶ V: ἐν προόδῳ Bignone: ἐν εὐδῶ Crönert

XLIX. = Κύριαι Δόξαι XII.

L. = Κύριαι Δόξαι VIII.

*LI. Πυνθάνομαι σου τὴν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονώτερον διακείσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐντενξιν. σὺ δὲ ὅταν μῆτε τοὺς νόμους καταλύῃς μῆτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθη κείμενα κινήῃς μῆτε τῶν πλησίων τιτὰ λυπῇς μῆτε τὴν σάρκα καταξάλῃς μῆτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκῃς, χρῶ ὡς βούλει τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει. ἀμήχανον μέντοι γὰρ τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἐνί γέ τιτι τούτων συνέχεσθαι· ἀφροδίσια γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἐβλαψεν.

*LII. Ἡ φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν οἰκουμένην κηρύττονσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν.

*LIII. Οὐδενὶ φθονητέον· ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιοι φθόνου, πονηροὶ δὲ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον εὐτυχῶσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς λυμαίνονται.

LIV. Οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν· οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν.

*LV. Θεραπευτέον τὰς συμφορὰς τῇ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων χάριτι καὶ τῷ γνωσκειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπρακτον ποιῆσαι τὸ γεγονός.

*LVI-LVII. Ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος (αὐτὸς ἢ ὁρῶν στρεβλούμενον) τὸν φίλον . . . ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς δι' ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ ἀνακεχαιστισμένος ἔσται.

*LVIII. Ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου.

*LIX. Ἀπληστον οὐ γαστήρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ δόξα ψευδὴς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γαστροῦ ἀορίστου πληρώματος.

LX. Πᾶς ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὸς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται.

*LXI. Καλλίστη καὶ ἡ τῶν πλησίων ὄψις, τῆς πρώτης συγγενείας ὁμοιοσύνης, ἡ πολλὴν εἰς τοῦτο ποιουμένη σπουδήν.

LI 1 ἀφθονώτερον Usener: ἀφθονό^{TV} V 2 ἀφροδισίων Usener: ἀφροδισίων V ὅταν Usener: ὅτε V 3 καταλύῃς Wotke: καταλύεις V ἔθῃ Hartel: ἔθει V 4 πλησίων Wotke: πλησίων V 5 καταναλίσκῃς Wotke: καταναλίσκει V²: καταγιγνώσκει V¹ 6 τὸ Usener: τὴ V LII 1 ἡ φιλία] ἡ φιλοσοφία Hartel: Ἡλίου σφαῖρα coniecit Usener 2 μακαρισμόν] μακάριον βίον Weil LIII 2 εὐτυχῶσι Wotke: ἐντυχῶσι V αὐτοῖς Wotke: αὐτοῖς V LV 3 γεγονός Usener: γένος V LVI-LVII ut unam sententiam lacunosam habet V: separavit Wotke 1 στρεβλούμενος τὸν φίλον] αὐτὸς ἢ ὁρῶν στρεβλούμενον supplavit Usener: στρεβλουμένου

L I. You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbours or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers: for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.

L II. Friendship goes dancing round the world proclaiming to us all to awake to the praises of a happy life.

L III. We must envy no one: for the good do not deserve envy and the bad, the more they prosper, the more they injure themselves.

L IV. We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality: for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health.

L V. We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by the recognition that it is impossible to make undone what has been done.

L VI-L VII. The wise man is not more pained when being tortured (himself, than when seeing) his friend (tortured): (but if his friend does him wrong), his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

L VIII. We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics.

L IX. It is not the stomach that is insatiable, as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach needs an unlimited amount to fill it.

L X. Every man passes out of life as though he had just been born.

L XI. Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is a great incitement to this end.

τοῦ φίλου (ex cod. pal. gr. Heid. 129) (καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνῆσκει· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται τὸν φίλον Bignone: post τὸν φίλον fortasse supplementum εἰ δὲ ἀδικήσει αὐτὸν ὁ φίλος LVIII 2 δεσποτηρίου Usener: δεσποτήρια V LIX 2 (τῆς) γαστρὸς supplevit Usener LXI 1 πλησίον Wotke: πλησίον V ὅψις] συναψις coniecit Usener 2 ἡ scripsi: ἡ εἰς vel εἰ V: ἡ Weil: καὶ Hartel: κεί (ἀεὶ) Bignone ποιουμένη] ποιουμένης Usener

*LXII. Εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δέον ὄργαι γίνονται τοῖς γεννήσασιν πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα, μάταιον δῆπουθέν ἐστι τὸ ἀντιτείνεω καὶ μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι συγγνώμης τυχεῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ δέον ἀλλὰ ἀλογώτερον, γελοῖον πάνν τὸ προσεκκαίειν τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμο-
5 κατοχοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν μεταθεῖναι κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους εὐγνωμονοῦντα.

*LXIII. Ἔστι καὶ ἐν λιτότητι μεθόριος, ἧς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιτος παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι' ὁριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι.

*LXIV. Ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔπαινον αὐτόματον, ἡμᾶς δὲ γενέσθαι περὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἰατρείαν.

*LXV. Μάταιόν ἐστι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖσθαι ἅ τις ἐαυτῷ χορηγῆσαι ἱκανός ἐστι.

*LXVI. Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.

*LXVII. Ἐλεύθερος βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα (μὴ) ῥᾶδιον εἶναι χωρὶς θητείας ὄχλων ἢ δυναστῶν, ἀλλὰ (σὺν) συνεχεῖ δαψιλείᾳ πάντα κέκτηται· ἂν δέ που καὶ τύχη χρημάτων πολλῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ῥαδίως ἂν εἰς
5 τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὐνοίαν διαμετρήσαι.

*LXVIII. Οὐδὲν ἱκανὸν ὧ ὀλίγον τὸ ἱκανόν.

*LXIX. Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῶον εἰς ἀπειρον τῶν ἐν διαίτῃ ποικιλμάτων.

LXX. Μηδὲν σοι ἐν βίῳ πραχθεῖν ὃ φόβον παρέξει σοι, εἰ γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον.

*LXXI. Πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώ-
τημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυ-
μίαν ἐπιζητούμενον, καὶ τί ἔαν μὴ τελεσθῇ;

LXXII. = Κύρια Δόξαι XIII.

*LXXIII. Καὶ τὸ γεγενῆσθαι τινας ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν.

*LXXIV. Ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσῃ πλείον ἤνυσεν ὁ ἥττηθείς, καθ' ὃ προσέμαθεν.

LXII 2 ἔκγονα Wotke: ἔγγονα V 4 πάνν Weil: πᾶν V: πάντως Muehl: σιγᾶν Usener προσεκκαίειν Weil: πρὸς ἐκκλήσιν V: πρὸς ἐκκλίσιν Usener: πρὸς ἔκκαυσιν Gomperz post ἀλογίαν Usener ἄγον inseruit θυμοκατοχοῦντα Crönert: θυμωκατοχοῦντα V: θυμῷ κατασχόντα Usener: θυμῷ κατέχοντα Weil 6 εὐγνωμονοῦντα Crönert: εὐγνωμονοῦντας V LXIII 1 λιτότητι μεθόριος Usener: λεπτότητι καθάριος V: λεπτότητι καθαριότης Muehl LXVII 1 ἐλεύθερος] ἐλευθέριος coniecit Usener κτήσασθαι χρήματα Hartel: χρήσα-

LXII. Now if parents are justly angry with their children, it is certainly useless to fight against it and not to ask for pardon; but if their anger is unjust and irrational, it is quite ridiculous to add fuel to their irrational passion by nursing one's own indignation, and not to attempt to turn aside their wrath in other ways by gentleness.

LXIII. Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is in like case with him who errs through excess.

LXIV. Praise from others must come unasked: we must concern ourselves with the healing of our own lives.

LXV. It is vain to ask of the gods what a man is capable of supplying for himself.

LXVI. Let us show our feeling for our lost friends not by lamentation but by meditation.

LXVII. A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbours.

LXVIII. Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little.

LXIX. The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties of dainty food.

LXX. Let nothing be done in your life, which will cause you fear if it becomes known to your neighbour.

LXXI. Every desire must be confronted with this question: what will happen to me, if the object of my desire is accomplished and what if it is not?

LXXII. The occurrence of certain bodily pains assists us in guarding against others like them.

LXXIII. In a philosophical discussion he who is worsted gains more in proportion as he learns more.

σθαι κτήματα V 2 (μή) supplevit Usener Θηλείας Hartel: θηλείας
V 3 (σύν) supplevit Usener: (δν) Hartel πάντα] πάν(τα τὰ
συμφέρον)τα coniecit Bignone 5 διαμετρήσαι Wotke: διαμετρήσαι
V 1. LXVIII 1 τὸ] num οὐχ? LXIX 1 λίχρον V²: λέχρον V²
LXX 1 βίω] (τῷ) βίω coniecit Usener LXXIII 1 γεγενῆσθαι
Wotke: γενέσθαι (sic) V

*LXXV. Εἰς τὰ παρῳκηχότα ἀγαθὰ ἀχάριστος φωνὴ ἡ λέγουσα “Τέλος ὄρα μακροῦ βίου”.

*LXXVI. Τοιοῦτος εἴ γηράσκων ὁποῖον ἐγὼ παραινῶ, καὶ διέγνωκας ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἑαυτῷ φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ οἶον τὸ τῇ Ἑλλάδι· συγχάριω σοι.

*LXXVII. Τῆς αὐταρκείας καρπὸς μέγιστος ἐλευθερία.

*LXXVIII. Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται· ὦν τὸ μὲν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον.

*LXXIX. Ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐτέρῳ ἀόχλητος.

*LXXX. Ἔστιν πρώτη σωτηρίας μοῖρα τῆς ἡλικίας τήρησις καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς οἰστρώδεις.

*LXXXI. Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾶ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὔθ' ἢ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περιβλεψίς οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας.

LXXVI 1 τοιοῦτος] (ὅτι) τοιοῦτος Usener παραινῶ Wotke;
 πέραινῶ V 2 διέγνωκας Usener: διήγνωκας V τὸ post οἶον Hartel:
 τῷ V LXXVIII 2 θνητὸν Hartel: νοητὸν V LXXX 1 ἔστιν
 πρώτη Hartel: γενναίῳ Muehl: P(vel T)...ω V LXXXI 1 οὐδὲ
 τὴν] οὐδέ τιν' Usener 4 ἀδιορίστους Usener: ἀζυρί σίτους V

LXXV. Ungrateful towards the blessings of the past is the saying, 'Wait till the end of a long life'.

LXXVI. You are in your old age just such as I urge you to be, and you have seen the difference between studying philosophy for oneself and proclaiming it to Greece at large: I rejoice with you.

LXXVII. The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.

LXXVIII. The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship: of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.

LXXIX. The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another.

LXXX. The first measure of security is to watch over one's youth and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of pestering desires.

LXXXI. The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honour and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with causes of unlimited desire.

B.

CERTORUM LIBRORUM RELIQUIAE.

I. Περὶ Αἰρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν.

1. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπουσία καταστηματαίκαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί· ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεῖα βλέπονται.

II. Διαπορίαι.

2. Πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφὸς ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει; οὐκ εὖοδον τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ κατηγόρημα.

III. Μικρὰ Ἐπιτομή.

3. Μαντικὴ οὐσα ἀνύπαρκτος, εἰ καὶ ὑπαρκτή, οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἡγητέα τὰ γνωόμενα.

IV. Πρὸς Θεόφραστον.

4. Ἄλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τούτου τοῦ μέρους οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν σκότει ταῦτα ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα ἔχειν.

V. Συμπόσιον.

5. Polyaeus. Οὗ φησὶ εἶναι, ὃ Ἐπίκουρε, τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου διαθερμασίας; (ὑπέλαβέ τις) οὐ τὸ καθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι. (καὶ μετὰ σμικρόν) φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου οὐκ εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ὁ οἶνος. τοῦδε δὲ 5 τινος ὁ τοσοῦτος εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ἂν ῥηθῇ.

6. Διὸ δὴ καθόλου μὲν οὐ ῥητέον τὸν οἶνον εἶναι θερμαντικόν, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως καὶ τῆς οὕτω διακειμένης θερμαντικὸν τὸν τοσοῦτον, ἢ τῆσδε τὸν τοσοῦτον εἶναι ψυκτικόν. ξένισι

1 Diog. Laert. x, § 136 1 post καὶ Usener ἢ inseruit 2 ἐνεργεῖα] ἐναργεῖα H. Ritter 2 Plut. adv. Col. 34, p. 1127 a 3 Diog. Laert. x, § 135 1 παρ' ἡμᾶς] πρὸς ἡμᾶς Meibom: παρ' (ἂ τὸ παρ') ἡμᾶς Bignone 4 Plut. adv. Col. 7, p. 1110 c 5 Plut. adv. Col. 6,

B.

REMAINS ASSIGNED TO CERTAIN BOOKS.

I. *Concerning Choice and Avoidance.*

1. Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion.

II. *Problems.*

2. Will the wise man do things that the laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find.

III. *The Shorter Summary.*

3. Prophecy does not exist, and even if it did exist, things that come to pass must be counted nothing to us.

IV. *Against Theophrastus.*

4. But even apart from this argument I do not know how one should say that things in the dark have colour.

V. *Symposium.*

5. Polyaeus: Do you, Epicurus, deny the existence of the warmth produced by wine? (Some one interrupted :) It does not appear that wine is unconditionally productive of heat.

(And a little later :) It seems that wine is not unconditionally productive of heat, but wine of a certain quantity might be said to produce heat in a certain body.

6. Therefore we must not speak of wine as unconditionally productive of heat, but rather say that a certain quantity of wine will produce heat in a certain body which is in a certain disposition, or that a different quantity

p. 1109e 2 ὑπελαβέ τις] ὑπέλαβε "tis . . Usener 3 ἀποφαί-
νεσθαι] ἀποφαίνεται Usener

γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἀθροίσματι φύσεις, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ψυχρὸν
5 συσταίῃ, εἰ, δέον γε, ἑτέrais παραφυγεῖσαι ψυχρασίας φύσιν
ἀποτελέσειαν· ὁθεν ἐξαπατῶμενοι οἱ μὲν ψυκτικὸν τὸ καθόλου
φασὶν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον, οἱ δὲ θερμαντικόν.

7. Πολλάκις οὐδ' ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα θερμαντικὴν ἐπιφέρειν
ἢ ψυκτικὴν δύναμιν ὁ οἶνος, ἀλλὰ κινήεντος τοῦ ὄγκου καὶ
γενομένης τῶν σωμάτων μεταστάσεως αἱ ποιοῦσαι τὸ θερμὸν
ἄτομοι νῦν μὲν συνῆλθον εἰς ταῦτ' καὶ παρέσχον ὑπὸ πλήθους
5 θερμότητα καὶ πύρωσιν τῷ σώματι, νῦν δ' ἐκπεσοῦσαι
κατέψυξαν.

8. Συνουσίῃ ὤνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἀγαπητὸν δ' εἰ μὴ
ἐβλαψε.

9. Θαυμαστὸν δὴ, εἰ σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξείργον διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν,
ὥς αὐτὸς ἂν φήσας, τῶν κατὰ σεαυτὸν ἀπάντων νέος ὢν
πρεσβυτῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐνδόξων πολλῶν ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει
ὑπερέχειν . . . θαυμαστὸν δὴ φημι, εἰ σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξείργον
5 διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει προέχειν, ὃ δοκεῖ
τριβῆς εἶναι καὶ συνηθείας πολλῆς, τοῦ δὲ θεωρήσαι τὰ πράγ-
ματα, ὥς ἔχει, διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔστιν ἐξείργεσθαι, οὐ μᾶλλον
ἂν δόξαι ἐπιστήμη αἰτία εἶναι ἢ περ τριβῆ καὶ συνηθείας.

VI. Περὶ Τέλους.

10. Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τὰ γαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς
διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίω, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ
τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ' ὅψιν
ἡδέας κινήσεις.

11. Τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατὰστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης
πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει
τοῖς ἐπιλογίσεσθαι δυναμένοις.

12. Τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ τοιοντότροπα,
ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, χαίρειν
ἐατέον.

5 εἰ, δέον γε,] sic interpunxi : εἰς δέον τε Wyttēbach : εἰ (eis) δέον
γε Bignone : ἢ αἶ γε Usener 7 Plut. *adv. Col.* 6, p. 1110 a
8 Diog. Laert. x, § 118 q.v. 9 Philodem. *περὶ ῥητορ. ὑπομν.* ii, col. x
(Sudhaus *Voll. Rhet.* i. 102) 1 δὴ om. pap. 2 ὥς Sudhaus : τε
pap. : ὅτε Gomperz 7 οὐ Sudhaus : οὐ pap. 10 Athen. xii.
546 e (cf. Diog. Laert. x, § 6) 1 ἔχω τί νοήσω Diog. Laert. : δύναμαι
νοῆσαι Athen. 3 κατ' ὅψιν ἡδέας κινήσεις om. Diog. Laert.
11 Plut. *contr. Ep. beat.* 4, p. 1089 d 12 Athen. xii. 546 f

will produce cold in a different body. For in the compound body of wine there are certain particles out of which cold might be produced, if, as need arises, united with different particles they could form a structure which would cause cold. So that those are deceived who say that wine is unconditionally heating or cooling.

7. Wine often enters the body without exerting any power either of heating or of cooling, but when the structure is disturbed and an atomic re-arrangement takes place, the atoms which create heat at one time come together and by their number give heat and inflammation to the body, at another they retire and so cool it.

8. Sexual intercourse has never done a man good, and he is lucky if it has not harmed him.

9. It is strange indeed that you were not at all impeded by your youth, as you would say yourself, from attaining, young as you were, a distinction in the art of rhetoric far above all your contemporaries, even the experienced and famous. It is strange indeed, I say, that you were not at all impeded by your youth from winning distinction in the art of rhetoric, which seems to require much practice and habituation, whereas youth can be an impediment to the understanding of the true nature of the world, towards which knowledge might seem to contribute more than practice and habituation.

VI. *On the end of Life.*

10. I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, and withdraw the pleasures of love, and withdraw the pleasures of hearing, and withdraw the pleasurable emotions caused to sight by beautiful form.

11. The stable condition of well-being in the body and the sure hope of its continuance holds the fullest and surest joy for those who can rightly calculate it.

12. Beauty and virtue and the like are to be honoured, if they give pleasure; but if they do not give pleasure, we must bid them farewell.

VII. Περὶ Φύσεως.

Lib. I.

13. Ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ κενόν.
14. Ἡ τῶν ὄντων φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ τόπος.

Lib. XI.

15. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀπεβεβλήκει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χροάν· ἄλλο γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρώτερον διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι.

INCERTORUM LIBRORUM FRAGMENTA.

16. Ἀτομόν ἐστι σῶμα στερεόν ἀμέτοχον κενοῦ παρεμ-
πλοκῆς· κενόν ἐστι φύσις ἀναφῆς.
17. Ἄλλ' ἴωσαν· εἶχε γὰρ ἐκείνος ὠδίνων τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
στόματος καύχησιν τὴν σοφιστικὴν, καθάπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ
τῶν ἀνδραπόδων.

C.

EPISTOLARUM FRAGMENTA.

18. Ὁ [ἐ]ὰν δ[ιανοῶν]ται, περι[γ]ίγνεται τῶ[ν] κατὰ τὴν
[ἐ]νδεῖαν κα[ὶ] πε[ν]ία κακῶν.
19. Κὰν πόλ[ε]μος ἦι, δεινὸν οὐκ ἂ[ν] θέσθαι θεῶν εἴλε[ων]
ὄντων. καθαρὰν τ[ὴν] ζῶην διηχέειν κα[ὶ] διά[ξ]ειν σὺν αὐτ[ῶ]ι
Μάτρωι θε[ῶν] εἴλεων ὄντων.
20. Λέγε δή μοι, Πολύαι', οἷσθ' ἅπερ ἡμῖν μεγάλη χαρὰ
γεγένηται;

EPISTULAE AD PLURES DATAE.

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους.

21. Ταῦτα ἡγάγεω αὐτὸν εἰς ἔκστασιν τοιαύτην, ὥστε μοι
λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποκαλεῖν διδάσκαλον.

13 Sext. Emp. *adv. Dogm.* iii. 333 14 Plut. *adv. Col.* II, p. 1112 e
15 Schol. *ad Ep. ad Pyth.* (Diog. Laert. x, § 91) 1 ἀπεβεβλήκει edd.:
ἀποβεβλήκει libri 2 ἄλλο (ἄλλω B)] ἀλλ' οὐ Usener 16 Schol.
ad Dionys. Thr. p. 660, 25 Bekk. 17 Diog. Laert. x, § 7
1 ἀλλ' ἴωσαν Usener: ἀλλ' εἴπως ἀλλ' BP¹Q: alii libri alia: ἀλλ' εἴ
τις ἄλλος Stephanus εἶχε γὰρ ἐκείνος Usener: εἶχε γὰρ κείνος libri:
εἶχε κακείνος Stephanus 18 Philodem. *de Divitiis*, VH² iii. 85:
restituit Gomperz 2 κακῶν Gomperz: καιδε. v apogr. 19 Philo-
dem. *περὶ εὐσ.* VH² ii. 107: restituit Gomperz 1 ἂν θέσθαι Usener:

VII. *On Nature.*

Book I.

13. The nature of the universe consists of bodies and void.

14. The nature of all existing things is bodies and space.

Book XI.

15. For if it (*sc.* the sun) had lost its size through the distance, much more would it have lost its colour: for there is no other distance better adapted for such loss than that of the sun.

FROM UNCERTAIN WORKS.

16. The atom is a hard body free from any admixture of void; the void is intangible existence.

17. Away with them all: for he (Nausiphanes), like many another slave, was in travail with that wordy brag-gart, sophistic.

C.

REMAINS OF LETTERS.

18. If they have this in mind, they are victorious over the evils of want and poverty.

19. Even if war comes, he would not count it terrible, if the gods are propitious. He has led and will lead a pure life in Matro's company, by favour of the gods.

20. Tell me, Polyaeus, do you know what has been a great joy to us?

LETTERS TO SEVERAL PERSONS.

To the philosophers in Mytilene.

21. This drove him to such a state of fury that he abused me and ironically called me master.

ἀθεσθαι apogr.: ἔσεσθαι Gomperz 20 Theo *Progygmi.* 2, t. 1, p. 169 Walz. οἷσθ' ἅπερ ἡμῖν Crönert: συναπέρμεν libri: ἔστιν ἂ πρὶν μὲν Usener 2 γεγένηται Crönert: γένηται libri 21 Diog. Laert. x, § 8 2 διδάσκαλον] δύσκολον proposuit Usener: (μου ταυτὸν) adiecit Kochalsky

22. Οἶμαι δ' ἔγωγε τοὺς βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητὴν με δόξειν τοῦ πλεύμονος εἶναι, μετὰ μεираκίων τινῶν κραιπαλόντων ἀκούσαντα.

Καὶ γὰρ ποιηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκὸς τοιαῦτα ἐξ
5 ὧν οὐ δυνατὸν εἰς σοφίαν ἐλθεῖν.

EPISTULAE AD SINGULOS DATAE.

Πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον.

23. Ἐγὼ δ' ἐφ' ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρετὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ παραχῶδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐλπίδας.

Πρὸς Ἀπελλήν.

24. Μακαρίζω σε, ὦ Ἀπελλῇ, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης αἰκίας ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὤρμησας.

Πρὸς Θέμισταν.

25. Οἷός τέ εἰμι, ἐὰν μὴ ὑμεῖς πρὸς με ἀφίκησθε, αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος, ὅπου ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ Θέμιστα παρακαλῇτε, ὠθεῖσθαι.

Πρὸς Ἰδομενέα.

26. Πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν ὑπὲρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκνων· οὕτω γάρ μοι λέγειν ἐπέρχεται.

27. Ὡ πάντα τὰμὰ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέον.

28. Εἰ βοῦλει πλούσιον Πυθοκλέα ποιῆσαι, μὴ χρημάτων προστίθει, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφαίρει.

29. Ἐξηλώσαμεν τὴν αὐτάρκειαν οὐχ ὅπως τοῖς εὐτελέσι καὶ λιτοῖς πάντως χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως θαρρῶμεν πρὸς αὐτά.

30. Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευτῶντες ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί· στραγγουρικά τε παρηκολούθει καὶ δυσσεντερικά πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν

22 Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* i. 3 4 ἄνθρωπος Usener: ἄνθρωπος
edd. 23 Plut. *adv. Col.* 17, p. 1117 a 24 Athen. xiii, p. 588 a
(cf. Plut. *contr. Ep. beat.* 12, p. 1094 d) 1 ὦ Ἀπελλῇ ex Plut. sup-
plevit Usener: ὦ οὗτος libri αἰκίας Bignone: αἰτίας libri: παιδείας
Wachsmuth 25 Diog. Laert. x, § 5 2 ὅπου] ὅποι Cobet

22. I suppose that those grumblers will believe me to be a disciple of The Mollusc and to have listened to his teaching in company with a few bibulous youths. For indeed the fellow was a bad man and his habits such as could never lead to wisdom.

LETTERS TO INDIVIDUALS.

To Anaxarchus.

23. But I summon you to continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but disturbing hopes of results.

To Apelles.

24. I congratulate you, Apelles, in that you have approached philosophy free from all contamination.

To Themista.

25. If you two don't come to me, I am capable of arriving with a hop, skip, and jump, wherever you and Themista summon me.

To Idomeneus.

26. Send us therefore offerings for the sustenance of our holy body on behalf of yourself and your children: this is how it occurs to me to put it.

27. O thou who hast from thy youth regarded all my promptings as sweet.

28. If you wish to make Pythocles rich, do not give him more money, but diminish his desire.

29. We think highly of frugality not that we may always keep to a cheap and simple diet, but that we may be free from desire regarding it.

30. On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the

26 Plut. *adv. Col.* 18, p. 1117 d 27 Theo *Progymn.* 2, t. 1, p. 169 Walz. 28 Stobaeus *Floril.* xvii. 24 1 χρημάτων VAB¹: χρήματα B²: χρήμασι Meineke 29 Stob. *Floril.* xvii. 14 2 πάντως B: πάντων AV 30 Diog. Laert. x, § 22 1 τελευτώντες] τελευταίαν Davis ex Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 30. 96 2 παρηκολούθει Stephanus: παρηκολούθηκει libri

ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ
 5 ψυχὴν χαίρου· ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῶν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη-
 σὺ δὲ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ
 φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παιδῶν Μητροδώρου.

Πρὸς Κωλώτην.

31. Ὡς σεβομένῳ γάρ σοι τὰ τότε ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα
 προσέπεσεν ἐπιθύμημα ἀφυσιολόγητον τοῦ περιπλακῆναι ἡμῶν
 γονάτων ξφαπτόμενον καὶ πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως
 γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς σεβάσεις τινῶν καὶ λιτάς· ἐπολείς οὖν καὶ
 5 ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι.

* Ἀφθαρτός μοι περιπάτει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους διανοοῦ.

Πρὸς Λεόντιον.

32. Παιὼν ἄναξ, φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἴου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς
 ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον.

Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα.

33. Παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε τὰκάτιον ἀράμενος.

34. Καθεδοῦμαι προσδοκῶν τὴν ἡμερτὴν καὶ ἰσόθεόν σου
 εἴσοδον.

EPISTULAE AD INCERTOS DATAE.

Ad puerum aut puellam.

35. Ἀ]φείγμεθα εἰς Λάμψακον ὑγιαίνοντες ἐγὼ καὶ Πυθοκλῆς
 κα[ι Ἑρμ]αρχος καὶ Κ[τῆ]σιππος, καὶ ἐκεῖ κατελήφαμεν ὑγ[ι]αί-
 νοντας Θεμισταν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς [φί]λο[υ]ς. εὖ δὲ ποιε[ί]ς
 καὶ σὺ εἰ ὑγιαίνεις καὶ ἡ μ[ά]μμη [σ]ου, καὶ πάπαι καὶ
 5 Μάτρω[υ] πάντα πε[ρ]ί[θ]η[ι], ὥσπ[ε]ρ καὶ ἔ[μ]προσθεν. εὖ γὰρ
 ἴσθι, ἡ αἰτία, ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ[ι] λοιποὶ πάντες σε μέγα
 φιλοῦμεν, ὅτι τούτοις πείθῃ πάντα.

7 φιλοσοφίαν f: φιλοσοφίας libri 31 Plut. adv. Col. 17, p. 1117b
 2 τοῦ Usener: τὸ libri 4 τινῶν Usener: τιμῶν libri: θεῶν Wytten-
 bach 32 Diog. Laert. x, § 5 2 ἐνέπλησας Suidas: ἐνέπλησεν
 (ἐνέπλησε B) libri 33 Diog. Laert. x, § 6 1 φεῦγε τὰκάτιον ἀρά-
 μενος Gassendi: φεύγετε κατιδιαραμεν B: φεύγετε τε καὶ δι'/. ἐραμεν

joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you. Do you, as I might expect from your devotion from boyhood to me and to philosophy, take good care of the children of Metrodorus.

To Colotes.

31. In your feeling of reverence for what I was then saying you were seized with an unaccountable desire to embrace me and clasp my knees and show me all the signs of homage paid by men in prayers and supplications to others; so you made me return all these proofs of veneration and respect to you.

Go on thy way as an immortal and think of us too as immortal.

To Leontion.

32. Lord and Saviour, my dearest Leontion, what a hurrahing you drew from us, when we read aloud your dear letter.

To Pythocles.

33. Blest youth, set sail in your bark and flee from every form of culture.

34. I will sit down and wait for your lovely and godlike appearance.

LETTERS TO UNCERTAIN PERSONS.

To a boy or girl.

35. We have arrived at Lampsacus safe and sound, Pythocles and Hermarchus and Ctesippus and I, and there we found Themista and our other friends all well. I hope you too are well and your mamma, and that you are always obedient to pappa and Matro, as you used to be. Let me tell you that the reason that I and all the rest of us love you is that you are always obedient to them.

(in mg. ./. α.) P: φεύγετε κατὰ διέραμεν QH 34 Diog. Laert.
x, § 5 35 Vol. Herc. 176, col. 18: restituit Gomperz 4 σου
Usener: καὶ τῇ Gomperz 6 αἰρία Gomperz: ΝΑΪΙΑ pap.

Epistula supremorum dierum.

36. Ἐβδόμη γὰρ ἡμέρα ὅτε ταῦτ' ἔγραφον, οὐχ[ὶ ἀπο]-
κεχ[ώρη]κ[ε]ν [δὴ] [κ]ατ[ὰ τὴν] οὐρησιν [ἐ]μοὶ οὐθέν καὶ ἀλγη-
δόνες ἐνήσαν τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν ἡμέραν ἀγουσῶν. σὺ
οὖν, ἂν τι γένηται, τὰ παιδία τὰ Μητροδώρου διοίκησον τέτταρα
5 ἢ πέντ' ἔτη μηθὲν πλείον δαπανῶν ἢ περ νῦν εἰς ἐμὲ δαπανᾷς
κατ' ἐνιαυτόν.

Incertarum epistularum fragmenta.

37. Βρυάζω τῷ κατὰ τὸ σωμάτιον ἡδεῖ, ὕδατι καὶ ἄρτῳ
χρώμενος, καὶ προσπύω ταῖς ἐκ πολυτελείας ἡδοναῖς οὐ
δι' αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξακολουθοῦντα αὐταῖς δυσχερῆ.

38. Ἐπιμελοῦ γάρ, καθάπερ σοι καὶ ἀπαλλαττομένῳ ἔλεγον,
καὶ Ἀπολλοδώρου [τοῦ] ἀ[δελ]φοῦ. σὺ γὰρ κακὸς ὢν παρ[έχ]ει
μο[ι] φρονίδα, εἴ τι πράττει, ὧν οὐ βούλεται.

39. Πέμψον μοι τυροῦ κυθριδίου, ὥς ὅταν βοῦλωμαι πολυτε-
λεύσασθαι δύνωμαι.

40. Δαιμονίως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ
περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδὴν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεία ἐνδέδειχθε
τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας.

41. [Τὴν σύνταξιν ἣν . . . συνε]τάξατο ἐμαντῶ[ι κ]αὶ ἐν
Ἵπερβ[ορ]είοις ὦσιν ἀποστε[λε]ῖν, ταύτην καὶ μόνην ἐπιτάττω.
[ἐ]κατὸν γὰρ κα[ὶ] ἐ[κ]κοσι [δ]ο[ραχ]μᾶ[ς μόν]ας κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν
βούλομα[ι] παρ' ἑκατέρου λαμβάνειν.

5 Ἡνεγκέ μοι Κτήσιππος τὴν κα[τ'] ἐ[ν]ιαυτὸν σύνταξ[ι]ν ἣν
ἀπέστειλας ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ σεαυτοῦ.

42. Τιμίαν μὲν ἕξει ἀντίδοσιν τὴν [ὕπ'] ἐ[μ]οῦ δοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ
πα[ιδιάν].

43. Οὐδέποτε ὠρέχθην τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ
ἐκείνοις ἤρεσκεν, οὐκ ἔμαθον· ἃ δ' ἤδειν ἐγώ, μακρὰν ἦν τῆς
ἐκείνων αἰσθήσεως.

44. Ἀφυσιολόγητον μηδὲν ἡγοῦ βώσεως τῆς σαρκὸς βοᾶν
τὴν ψυχῇ. σαρκὸς δὲ φωνή· μὴ πεινῆν, μὴ διψῆν, μὴ

36 Philodem. πραγματ. VH² i. 128: restituerunt Spengel Gomperz
37 Stob. Floril. xvii. 34 38 Pap. Herc. 176, col. 8 39 Diog.
Laert. x, § 11 I κυθριδίου κυθριδίων f: Κυθνίου Menagius 40 Plut.
contr. Ep. beat. 15, p. 1097 e I δαιμονίως Usener: δαίως libri: δαψι-
λῶς Cobet. 41 Philodem. πραγματ. VH² i. 127 42 Philo-
dem. πραγματ. VH² i. 118 I ἀντίδοσιν scripsi: αἰνούσαν pap.

Letter written in his last days.

36. Seven days before writing this the stoppage became complete and I suffered pains such as bring men to their last day. If anything happens to me, do you look after the children of Metrodorus for four or five years, but do not spend any more on them than you now spend each year on me.

Letters to unknown recipients.

37. I am thrilled with pleasure in the body, when I live on bread and water, and I spit upon luxurious pleasures not for their own sake, but because of the inconveniences that follow them.

38. As I said to you when you were going away, take care also of his brother Apollodorus. He is not a bad boy, but causes me anxiety, when he does what he does not mean to do.

39. Send me some preserved cheese, that when I like I may have a feast.

40. You have looked after me wonderfully generously in sending me food, and have given proofs heaven-high of your good will to me.

41. The only contribution I require is that which . . . ordered the disciples to send me, even if they are among the Hyperboreans. I wish to receive from each of you two a hundred and twenty drachmae a year and no more.

Ctesippus has brought me the annual contribution which you sent for your father and yourself.

42. He will have a valuable return in the instruction which I have given him.

43. I was never anxious to please the mob. For what pleased them, I did not know, and what I did know, was far removed from their comprehension.

44. Think it not unnatural that when the flesh cries aloud, the soul cries too. The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. It is hard for the soul to

43 Gnomolog. cod. Par. 1168, f. 115r 3 αὐθιγῶς edd.:
διυθιγῶς Par. 44 Porph. *ad Marc.* 30, p. 209, 7 Nauck

ρίγουν. καὶ ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ χαλεπὸν μὲν κωλύσαι, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ παρακοῦσαι τῆς παραγγειλάσης φύσεως αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς προσ-
5 φνουὺς αὐτῇ αὐταρκειᾶς καθ' ἡμέραν.

45. Ὁ οὖν τῇ φύσει παρακολουθῶν καὶ μὴ ταῖς κεναῖς δόξαις ἐν πάσιν αὐτάρκης· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἄρκοῦν πάντα κτήσις ἐστι πλοῦτος, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀορίστους δόξεις καὶ ὁ μέγιστος πλοῦτός ἐστιν (οὐ πλοῦτος ἀλλὰ πενία).

46. Ἐφ' ὅσον δ' ἂν ἀμυχανῆς, λήθῃ τῆς φύσεως ἀμυχανεῖς· σταντῶ γὰρ ἀορίστους φόβους καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προσβάλλεις.

47. = Sent. Vat. XIV.

48. Κρεῖττον δέ σοι θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ στιβάδος κατακειμένη ἢ ταραττεσθαι χρυσὴν ἐχούσῃ κλίνην καὶ πολυτελῇ τράπεζαν.

49. . . . φέρων τὴν ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σο[ῦ] καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν ὃν ἐπεπόησο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι μῆτε τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν[α ἐ]ν τοῖς ἀοράτοις οἴ[ν]σα[ν] ἡδύναιτο συνιδεῖν μῆτε τὴν συμφωνίαν τὴν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν
5 ὑπάρχουσιν πρὸς τὰ ἀοράτα καὶ πάλ[λ]ιν ἀντιμαρτύρ[η]σιν . . .

50. Ἢδὼν ἢ φίλου μνήμῃ τεθηκότος.

51. Μὴ φεῦγε μικρὰ χαρίζεσθαι· δόξεις γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

52. Ἐχθροῦ δεηθέντος μὴ ἀποστραφῆς τὴν ἀξίωσιν· πλὴν ἀσφαλίζον σεαυτὸν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κυνὸς διαφέρει.

D.

INCERTAE SEDIS FRAGMENTA.

De Sapientia et Sapiente.

53. = Sent. Vat. LIV.

54. Κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὅφ' οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἱατρικῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσης, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος.

3 τῇ ψυχῇ Nauck: τὴν ψυχὴν cod. 45 Porph. *ad Marc.* 27, p. 207, 31 Nauck 4 ἐστίν] οὐ πλοῦτος ἀλλὰ πενία adiecit Bignone: ἐστὶ πενία Usener 46 Porph. *ad Marc.* 29, p. 209, 1 2 σταντῶ edd.: αὐτὸν cod. 47 Stob. *Floril.* xvi. 28 48 Porph. *ad Marc.* 29, p. 209, 3 1 κατακειμένη . . . ἐχούσῃ] κατακειμένῃ . . . ἔχοντι Usener 49 Philodem. *πραγματ. VH*² i. 126 secundum lectionem Crönert 50 Plut. *contr. Ep. beat.* 28, p. 1105 d 51 Maximus

repress these cries, and dangerous for it to disregard nature's appeal to her because of her own wonted independence day by day.

45. The man who follows nature and not vain opinions is independent in all things. For in reference to what is enough for nature every possession is riches, but in reference to unlimited desires even the greatest wealth is (not riches but poverty).

46. In so far as you are in difficulties, it is because you forget nature; for you create for yourself unlimited fears and desires.

48. It is better for you to be free of fear lying upon a pallet, than to have a golden couch and a rich table and be full of trouble.

49. . . . remembering your letter and your discussion about the men who are not able to see the analogy between phenomena and the unseen nor the harmony which exists between sensations and the unseen and again the contradiction . . .

50. Sweet is the memory of a dead friend.

51. Do not avoid conferring small favours: for then you will seem to be of like character towards great things.

52. If your enemy makes a request to you, do not turn from his petition: but be on your guard; for he is like a dog.

D.

FRAGMENTS FROM UNCERTAIN SOURCES.

On philosophy.

54. Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either, if it does not expel the suffering of the mind.

Gnomol. c. 8 52 *Maximus Gnomol.* c. 66 54 *Porph. ad Marc.* 31, p. 209, 23 Nauck (cf. *Stob. Floril.* lxxxii. 6) 3 ἐκβαλ-
 λούσης *Stob.*: θεραπεύειν cod. 4 πάθος] κακόν *Stob.*

Physica.

55. Οὐδὲν ξένον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀποτελεῖται παρὰ τὸν ἥδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.

56. Οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον εὐδαίμονας καὶ ἀδιαλύτους νοήσομεν μὴ φωνούντας [μηδ'] [ἀλ]λήλοις διαλεγομένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς νεοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁμοίους.

57. Ἡμεῖς γοῦν θύωμεν [ὁσί]ως καὶ καλῶς οὐ [καθ]ήκει, κα[ὶ κ]αλῶ[ς] πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺς νόμους μ[η]θ[ε]ν[] ταῖς δόξαις αὐ[τ]οῦς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων κ[αί] σεμνοτάτων διαταράττοντες. [ἔτι] δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι] ὦμεν ἀφ' ἧς
5 ἔλεγον δόξης· οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν]δέχεται φυσικῶς] ζῆν . . .

58. Εἰ ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐχαῖς ὁ θεὸς κατηκολούθει, θάττον (ἀν) ἀπώλλυντο πάντες ἀνθρώποι, συνεχῶς πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατ' ἀλλήλων εὐχόμενοι.

Ethica.

59. Ἀρχὴ καὶ ρίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή· καὶ τὰ σοφὰ καὶ τὰ περιττὰ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν.

60. Τότε χρεῖαν ἔχομεν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρῆναι αὐτὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πάσχωμεν ἐν αἰσθήσει καθεστῶτες, τότε οὐδεμία χρεῖα τῆς ἡδονῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡδονὴ τὴν ἀδικίαν ποιεῖ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὰς
5 κενὰς δόξας ὀρεξίς.

61. Τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ †παρ' αὐτὸ† πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἂν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ, ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ θρυλῶν.

62. Ἀμεινόν ἐστιν ὑπομεῖναι τοῦσδε τινὰς τοὺς πόνοους, ὅπως ἡσθῶμεν ἡδονὰς μείζους· συμφέρει τῶνδὲ τινων ἀπέχσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῶμεν ἀλγηδόνας χαλεπωτέρας.

63. Μηδὲ αἰτιώμεθα τὴν σάρκα ὥς τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίαν μὴδ' εἰς τὰ πράγματα τρέπωμεν τὰς δυσφορίας.

55 Plut. *Strom.* fr. 8 56 Philodem. *de Vict. deor.* VH¹ vi. 13
57 Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβ. VH² ii. 108, 9 restituit Gomperz I καὶ
καλῶς scripsi : κα . . . αλω charta : καὶ τᾶλλα Gomperz 5 ζῆν
Gomperz : τὴν charta 58 Gnomolog. cod. Par. 1168, f. 115 r
2 ἂν om. Par. ἀπώλλυντο edd. : ἀπώλλουντο Par. 59 Athen. xii,
p. 546 f. 60 Stob. *Floril.* xvii. 35 4 ἡδονῇ] ἐνδεῖα Usener :
φωνῇ Crönert : ῥοπή Bignone 61 Plut. *contr. Ep. beat.* 7, p. 1091 a

Physics.

55. Nothing new happens in the universe, if you consider the infinite time past.

56. We shall not be considering them any happier or less destructible, if we think of them as not speaking nor conversing with one another, but resembling dumb men.

57. Let us at least sacrifice piously and rightly where it is customary, and let us do all things rightly according to the laws not troubling ourselves with common beliefs in what concerns the noblest and holiest of beings. Further let us be free of any charge in regard to their opinion. For thus can one live in conformity with nature . . .

58. If God listened to the prayers of men, all men would quickly have perished: for they are for ever praying for evil against one another.

Ethics.

59. The beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must be referred to this.

60. We have need of pleasure when we are in pain from its absence: but when we are not feeling such pain, though we are in a condition of sensation, we have no need of pleasure. For the pleasure which arises from nature does not produce wickedness, but rather the longing connected with vain fancies.

61. That which creates joy insuperable is the complete removal of a great evil. And this is the nature of good, if one can once grasp it rightly, and then hold by it, and not walk about babbling idly about the good.

62. It is better to endure these particular pains so that we may enjoy greater joys. It is well to abstain from these particular pleasures in order that we may not suffer more severe pains.

63. Let us not blame the flesh as the cause of great evils, nor blame circumstances for our distresses.

1 παρ' αὐτὸ] παρ' αὐτοῦ Reiske: πάντα Usener: κατ' αὐτὸ Bignone
 3 ἐπιβάλλη Usener: ἐπιβάλλη libri 62 Aristocles apud Euseb.
Praep. evang. xiv. 21, 3, p. 769 a 63 Porph. *ad Marc.* 29,
 p. 208, 25 Nauck

64. Οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

65. Ὁ γὰρ πόνος ὁ ὑπερβάλλων συνάψει θανάτῳ.

66. Ἐρωτι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς πᾶσα ταραχώδης καὶ ἐπί-
πονος ἐπιθυμία ἐκλύεται.

67. Χάρις τῇ μακαρίᾳ Φύσει ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἐποίησεν
εὐπόριστα, τὰ δὲ δυσπόριστα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα.

68. Οὐ σπάνιον γε εὐρεῖν ἄνθρωπον (πένητα) πρὸς τὸ τῆς
φύσεως τέλος καὶ πλούσιον πρὸς τὰς κενὰς δόξας. οὐδεὶς
γὰρ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἷς ἔχει ἀρκεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ οἷς οὐκ ἔχει
ὀδυῖται. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ πυρέττοντες διὰ κακοήθειαν τῆς
5 (νόσου) αἰεὶ διψῶσι καὶ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὕτω
καὶ οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς ἔχοντες διακειμένην πένονται πάν-
των αἰεὶ καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαίμαργίας ἐμ-
πίπτουσιν.

69. Ὡς ὀλίγον οὐχ ἱκανόν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν ἱκανόν.

70. Πλουσιώτατον αὐτάρκεια πάντων.

71. Φοβούμενος ὁ πολὺς τὸ λιτὸν τῆς διαίτης διὰ τὸν
φόβον ἐπὶ πράξει πορεύεται τὰς μάλιστ' ἂν τοῦτου παρα-
σκευαζούσας.

72. Πολλοὶ τοῦ πλούτου τυχόντες οὐ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν
κακῶν εὖρον ἀλλὰ μεταβολὴν μειζόνων.

73. Ἐξ ἐργασίας θηριώδους οὐσίας μὲν πλήθος σωρεύεται,
βίος δὲ ταλαίπωρος συνίσταται.

74. Ἡ γὰρ διὰ φόβον τις κακοδαμονεῖ ἢ δι' ἀόριστον καὶ
κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν· ἃ τις χαλινῶν δύναται τὸν μακάριον ἐαυτῷ
περιποιῆσαι λογισμόν.

75. Οὐκ ἀπορεῖν τούτων πόνος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φέρει μᾶλλον
τὸν ἀνόνητον ἐκ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πόνον.

76. Ἡ ταπεινὴ ψυχὴ τοῖς μὲν εὐημερήμασιν ἐχανυνώθη, ταῖς
δὲ συμφοραῖς καθηρέθη.

77. Καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης μικρότερα (ἢ φύσις) διδάσκει

- 64 Plut. *de Poet. aud.* 14, p. 36 b 65 Plut. *contr. Ep. beat.* 23,
p. 1103 d 66 Porph. *ad Marc.* 31, p. 209, 21 67 Stob. *Floril.*
xvii. 23 68 Porph. *ad Marc.* 27, p. 208, 2 Nauck 1 οὐ] om.
Usener πένητα supplevit Usener: om. cod. 5 νόσου supplevit
Mai: om. cod. 69 Aelian *Var. hist.* iv. 13 70 Clem. Alex.
Strom. vi. 2, p. 266, 38 71 Porph. *ad Marc.* 28, p. 208, 15 Nauck
72 Porph. *ad Marc.* 28, p. 208, 23 Nauck 1 τὴν] τῶν Usener
73 Porph. *ad Marc.* 28, p. 209, 5 Nauck 1 θηριώδους Nauck:

64. Great pains quickly put an end to life ; long-enduring pains are not severe.

65. Excessive pain will bring you to death.

66. Through love of true philosophy every disturbing and troublesome desire is ended.

67. Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary.

68. It is common to find a man who is (poor) in respect of the natural end of life and rich in empty fancies. For of the fools none is satisfied with what he has, but is grieved for what he has not. Just as men with fever through the malignance of their (disease) are always thirsty and desire the most injurious things, so too those whose mind is in an evil state are always poor in everything and in their greed are plunged into ever-changing desires.

69. Nothing satisfies the man who is not satisfied with a little.

70. Self-sufficiency is the greatest of all riches.

71. Most men fear frugality and through their fear are led to actions most likely to produce fear.

72. Many men when they have acquired riches have not found the escape from their ills but only a change to greater ills.

73. By means of occupations worthy of a beast abundance of riches is heaped up, but a miserable life results.

74. Unhappiness comes either through fear or through vain and unbridled desire : but if a man curbs these, he can win for himself the blessedness of understanding.

75. It is not deprivation of these things which is pain, but rather the bearing of the useless pain that arises from vain fancies.

76. The mean soul is puffed up by prosperity and cast down by misfortune.

77. (Nature) teaches us to pay little heed to what fortune

θρηνηώδους cod. 74 Porph. *ad Marc.* 29, p. 208, 30 Nauck
 75 Porph. *ad Marc.* 31, p. 209, 19 Nauck 1 πόνος] κακόν coniecit
 Usener 76 Gnomolog. cod. Par. 1168, f. 115, &c. 77 Porph.
ad Marc. 30, p. 209, 12 Nauck 1 παρὰ τῆς τύχης Usener : περὶ τῆς
 ψυχῆς cod.

νομίζεω, καὶ εὐτυχοῦντας μὲν γινώσκειν ἀτυχεῖν, δυστυχοῦντας δὲ μὴ παρὰ μέγα τίθεσθαι ὅν τὸ εὐτυχεῖν, καὶ δέχεσθαι μὲν ἀθорύβως τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθὰ, παρατετάχθαι δὲ πρὸς τὰ 5 παρ' αὐτῆς δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά· ὥς ἐφήμερον μὲν πάν τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ κακόν, σοφία δὲ οὐδαμῶς τύχῃ κοινωνεῖ.

78. Ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος ἥδιστα πρόσσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον.

79. Προσπτόω τῷ καλῷ καὶ τοῖς κενῶς αὐτὸ θαυμάζουσιν, ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ποιῇ.

80. Δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.

81. Οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κείνται, οὐχ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶσιν ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται.

82. Κὰν λαθεῖν δύνωνται, πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν· ὅθεν ὁ (περὶ) τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀεὶ φόβος ἐγκεκλιμένος οὐκ ἐᾷ χαίρειν οὐδὲ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι.

83. Οὐ παρόντος οὐδενὸς ὁ κεκτημένος [τὸ τοῦ] γένους τ[ε]λ[ος] [πα]ρ[α]πλησίω]ς ἐστὶν ἀγαθ[ός].

84. Οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄφοβον εἶναι φοβερόν φαινόμενον.

85. Τὸ εὐδαιμον καὶ μακάριον οὐ χρημάτων πλήθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδ' ἀρχαῖ τιμες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διαθέσεις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὀρίζουσα.

86. Λάθε βιώσας.

87. Λέγειν δεῖ πῶς ἄριστα τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος συντηρήσει, καὶ πῶς τις ἐκὼν εἶναι μὴ πρόσσεισιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πληθῶν ἀρχάς.

3 παρὰ Usener: περὶ cod. ὅν Usener: ὦν cod. 5 ante ὥς cod. καὶ habet: delevit Nauck 6 καὶ κακόν ex Gnomol. Byz. supplevit Usener: om. cod. post δὲ cod. καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ habet: om. Usener τύχῃ Usener: τύχης cod. 78 Plut. *de Tranq. anim.* 16, p. 474 c 79 Athen. xii, p. 547 a 80 Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vi. 2, p. 266, 39 81 Stob. *Floril.* 43, 139 82 Plut. *contr. Ep. deat.* 6, p. 1090 c 83 Script. Epic. Incert. *VH*² vii. 21, col. xxviii 84 Gnomol. cod. Par. 1168, f. 115 u, etc. 85 Plut. *de Poet. aud.* c. 14, p. 37 a 86 Plut. εἰ καλῶς εἴρηται τὸ λάθε βιώσας, p. 1128 sq. 87 Plut. *adv. Col.* 31, p. 1125 c

brings, and when we are prosperous to understand that we are unfortunate, and when we are unfortunate not to regard prosperity highly, and to receive unmoved the good things which come from fortune and to range ourselves boldly against the seeming evils which it brings: for all that the many regard as good or evil is fleeting, and wisdom has nothing in common with fortune.

78. He who least needs to-morrow, will most gladly go to meet to-morrow.

79. I spit upon the beautiful and those who vainly admire it, when it does not produce any pleasure.

80. The greatest fruit of justice is serenity.

81. The laws exist for the sake of the wise, not that they may not do wrong, but that they may not suffer it.

82. Even if they are able to escape punishment, it is impossible to win security for escaping: and so the fear of the future which always presses upon them does not suffer them to be happy or to be free from anxiety in the present.

83. The man who has attained the natural end of the human race will be equally good, even though no one is present.

84. A man who causes fear cannot be free from fear.

85. The happy and blessed state belongs not to abundance of riches or dignity of position or any office or power, but to freedom from pain and moderation in feelings and an attitude of mind which imposes the limits ordained by nature.

86. Live unknown.

87. We must say how best a man will maintain the natural end of life, and how no one will willingly at first aim at public office.

VI

VITA EPICURI

- 1 Ἐπίκουρος Νεοκλέους καὶ Χαιρεστράτης, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν
 δῆμων Γαργήτιος, γένους τοῦ τῶν Φιλαῖδων, ὥς φησι
 Μητροδῶρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ εὐγενείας. τοῦτον φασὶν ἄλλοι τε
 καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ἐν τῇ Σωτίωνος ἐπιτομῇ κληρουχισάντων
 5 Ἀθηναίων τὴν Σάμον ἐκείθι τραφῆναι· ὁκτωκαιδεκῆτῃ δ' ἔλθειν
 εἰς Ἀθήνας, Ξενοκράτους μὲν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ, Ἀριστοτέλους δ'
 ἐν Χαλκίδι διατρίβοντος. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ
 Μακεδόνος καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκπεσόντων ὑπὸ Περδίκκου
 2 μετελθεῖν εἰς Κολοφῶνα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. | χρόνον δέ τινα
 διατρίψαντα αὐτόθι καὶ μαθητὰς ἀθροίσαντα πάλιν ἐπανελθεῖν
 εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτους· καὶ μέχρι μὲν τινὸς κατ'
 ἐπιμίσθιον τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσοφεῖν, ἔπειτα ἰδίᾳ ἀπο(φαί-
 5 νεσθαι) τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσαν αἵρεσιν συστήσαντα.
 ἐφάψασθαι δὲ φιλοσοφίας αὐτὸς φησιν ἔτη γεγωνὸς τετταρεσ-
 καίδεκα. Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
 περὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου βίου φησὶν ἔλθειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ
 καταγνόντα τῶν γραμματιστῶν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθησαν ἐρμη-
 10 νεῦσαι αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ χάους. φησὶ δ'
 Ἑρμιππος γραμματοδιδάσκαλον αὐτὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ἔπειτα
 μέντοι περιτυχόντα τοῖς Δημοκρίτου βιβλίοις, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ
 3 ᾗξαι· | διὸ καὶ τὸν Τίμωνα φάσκειν περὶ αὐτοῦ
 ὕστατος αὖ φυσικῶν καὶ κύντατος, ἐκ Σάμον ἐλθὼν
 γραμμαδιδασκαλίδης, ἀναγωγότατος ζώντων.
 συνεφιλοσόφουν δ' αὐτῷ προτρεψαμένῳ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τρεῖς
 5 ὄντες, Νεοκλῆς, Χαιρέδημος, Ἀριστόβουλος, καθὰ φησι
 Φιλόδημος ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων

I 6 Ἀκαδημία Usener: ἀκαδημία libri 2 4 ἀπο(φαίνεσθαι)
 τὴν Usener: ἀπο... τὴν B: ἀποστὴν Q: πῶς τὴν F: ... τὴν P²H:
 ἀποστατεῖν τὴν Kochalsky 6 δὲ Usener: τε libri τετταρεσκαί-
 δεκα B²QH: ἰδ F 13 ᾗξαι Hübner: ᾗξαι B: αἵξαι F²QH

VI

LIFE OF EPICURUS .

- 1 EPICURUS, son of Neocles and Chaerestrata, was an Athenian of the deme of Gargettus, and the family of the Philaidæ, as Metrodorus says in his work on *Nobility of Birth*. Heraclides in his epitome of Sotion and others say that the Athenians having colonized Samos, Epicurus was brought up there. In his eighteenth year, as they say, he came to Athens, when Xenocrates was at the Academy and Aristotle was living in Chalcis. After the death of Alexander of Macedon, when the Athenians were driven out of Samos by Perdiccas, he went to join his father in
- 2 Colophon. Having stayed there some time and gathered disciples he returned again to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates. For a while he joined with others in the study of philosophy, but later taught independently, when he had founded the school called after him. He tells us himself that he first made acquaintance with philosophy at the age of fourteen. Apollodorus the Epicurean in the first book of his *Life of Epicurus* says that he took to philosophy because he despised the teachers of literature, since they were not able to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod. Hermippus says that Epicurus was at one time a schoolmaster and then after he met with the writings of Democritus, he took eagerly to philosophy.
- 3 And this is why Timon says about him :

‘Last and most shameless of the scientists, infant school teacher from Samos, the most stubborn of all living beings’.

His three brothers, Neocles, Chaeredemus, and Aristobulus joined him in studying philosophy at his suggestion, according to Philodemus the Epicurean in the tenth book

συντάξεως. ἀλλὰ καὶ δοῦλος Μῦς ὄνομα, καθά φησι Μυρωνιανὸς ἐν Ὀμοίοις ιστορικοῖς κεφαλαίοις.

- Διότιμος δ' ὁ Στωικὸς δυσμενῶς ἔχων πρὸς αὐτὸν πικρότατα
 10 αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν, ἐπιστολὰς φέρων πεντήκοντα ἄσελγείς
 ὡς Ἐπικούρου· καὶ ὁ τὰ εἰς Χρῦσιππον ἀναφερόμενα ἐπιστόλια
 4 ὡς Ἐπικούρου συντάξας. | ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ περὶ Ποσειδώνιον τὸν
 Στωικὸν καὶ Νικόλαος καὶ Σωτίων ἐν τοῖς δώδεκα τῶν ἐπι-
 γραφομένων Διοκλείων ἐλέγχων, ἃ ἔστι περὶ τῆς εἰκάδος, καὶ
 Διονύσιος ὁ Ἀλικαρνασσεύς. καὶ γὰρ σὺν τῇ μητρὶ περιούντα
 5 αὐτὸν εἰς τὰ οἰκίδια καθαρμὸν ἀναγινώσκειν, καὶ σὺν τῷ πατρὶ
 γράμματα διδάσκειν λυπρὸν τιμω μισθαρίου. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
 ἀδελφῶν ἕνα προαγωγέειν, καὶ Λεοντίῳ συνεῖναι τῇ ἐταίρᾳ·
 τὰ δὲ Δημοκρίτου περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ Ἀριστίππου περὶ τῆς
 ἡδονῆς ὡς ἴδια λέγειν. μὴ εἶναι τε γνησίως ἀστὸν, ὡς
 10 Τιμοκράτης φησὶ καὶ Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ἐπικούρου
 ἐφηβείας. Μιθρῇν τε αἰσχροῦς κολακεύειν τὸν Λυσιμάχου
 διοικητήν, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Παιᾶνα καὶ ἄνακτα καλοῦντα. |
 5 ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Ἡρόδοτον καὶ Τιμοκράτην τοὺς ἔκπυστα
 αὐτοῦ τὰ κρύφια ποιήσαντας ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ κολακεύειν αὐτὸ
 τοῦτο. ἐν τε ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πρὸς μὲν Λεόντιον “Παιᾶν ἄναξ,
 φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἴου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγ-
 5 νόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον.” πρὸς δὲ Θεμισταν τὴν Λεοντέως
 γυναῖκα “Οἷός τε, φησὶν, εἰμί, ἐὰν μὴ ὑμεῖς πρὸς με ἀφίκησθε,
 αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος, ὅπου ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ Θεμιστα παρακαλῇτε,
 ὠθεῖσθαι.” πρὸς δὲ Πυθοκλέα ὥραϊον ὄντα “Καθεδοῦμαι,
 φησὶ, προσδοκῶν τὴν ἡμερτήν καὶ ἰσόθεόν σου εἴσοδον.” καὶ
 10 πάλιν πρὸς Θεμισταν γράφων † νομίζει αὐτῇ παραινεῖν †,
 καθά φησι Θεόδωρος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν πρὸς Ἐπικούρου. |
 6 καὶ ἄλλαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἐταίραις γράφειν, καὶ μάλιστα Λεοντίῳ,
 ἧς καὶ Μητροδωρον ἐρασθῆναι. ἐν τε τῷ Περὶ τέλους γράφειν
 οὕτως. Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τάγαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν

3 8 ἐν Ὀμοίοις Hübner: ἐν νόμοις libri 4 2 τοῖς δώδεκα FPQH: τοῖς δωδεκάτῳ B, unde τῷ δωδεκάτῳ Gassendi 3 τῆς Froben: τοῖς BFPQH εἰκάδος Hübner: κδ libri 9 ἀστὸν BPH: αὐτὸν FQ 5 4 ἐνέπλησας Suidas: ἐνέπλησεν (ἐνέπλησε B) libri 5 Λεοντέως Gassendi: Λεόντος libri 7 ὅπου] ὅποι Cobet 10 νομίζει αὐτῇ παραινεῖν libri: νομίζει αὐτὴν περαινεῖν Froben, unde νομίζει αὐτὴν περαινεῖν Bignone: ὀνομάζει αὐτὴν ἐταίραν (vel Ἀριάγνην) Usener: νομίζει αὐτὴν παρενεῖναι Kochalsky: locus nondum sanatus

of his *Comparison of Philosophies*. Also a slave called Mys, as Muronianus says in his chapters on historical coincidences.

Diotimus the Stoic, who is ill-disposed to Epicurus, has calumniated him most bitterly by producing fifty lewd letters as Epicurus' work; so has the writer who has assigned to Epicurus the collection of 'billets-doux' which
 4 were attributed to Chrysippus, and also Posidonius the Stoic and his followers, as well as Nicolaus and Sotion in the twelve books of the 'Arguments of Diocles' which are named after the Epicurean celebration of The Twentieth; also Dionysius of Halicarnassus. For they say that he used to go round from house to house with his mother reading out the purification prayers, and assisted his father in elementary teaching for a miserable pittance. They add that one of his brothers prostituted himself and kept company with Leontion, the hetaera. Also that he took Democritus' atomic theory and Aristippus' theory of pleasure and taught them as his own. Further, that he was not an Athenian born, as Timocrates says, and Herodotus too in his book *The Youth of Epicurus*. He is also said to have used degrading flattery towards Mithres, the steward of Lysimachus, calling him in his letters both 'Saviour' and
 5 'My lord'. Idomeneus too and Herodotus and Timocrates, who divulged his secrets, he is said to have praised and flattered all the same. And in his letters he wrote to Leontion, 'Lord and Saviour, my dearest Leontion, what a hurrahing you drew from us, as we read aloud your dear letter', and to Themista, Leonteus' wife, 'If you two don't come to me, I am capable of arriving with a hop, skip and jump, wherever you and Themista summon me'. And to Pythocles who was young and beautiful he writes, 'I will sit down and wait for your lovely and godlike appearance'. And again in writing to Themista he calls her (by a most flattering name), as Theodorus says in the fourth book of
 6 his attack on Epicurus. They say that he wrote to many other women of pleasure and particularly to Leontion, with whom Metrodorus was also in love; and that in the treatise *On the End of Life* he wrote, 'I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of

- τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς
 5 δι' ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς. ἐν τε τῇ πρὸς Πυθοκλέα
 ἐπιστολῇ γράφειν Παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε τὰκάτιον
 ἀράμενος. Ἐπικτήτος τε κωαϊδολόγον αὐτὸν καλεῖ καὶ τὰ
 μάλιστα λουδορεῖ. καὶ μὴν καὶ Τιμοκράτης ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγραφο-
 μένοις Εὐφραντοῖς ὁ Μητροδώρου μὲν ἀδελφός, μαθητῆς δὲ
 10 αὐτοῦ τῆς σχολῆς ἐκφοιτήσας φησὶ δις αὐτὸν τῆς ἡμέρας
 ἐμῆν ἀπὸ τρυφῆς, ἑαυτὸν δὲ διηγεῖται μόγις ἐκφυγεῖν ἰσχυῖσαι
 τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐκείνας φιλοσοφίας καὶ τὴν μυστικὴν ἐκείνην
 7 συνδιαγωγὴν. | τὸν τε Ἐπίκουρον πολλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον
 ἡγνοῦν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸν βίον, τό τε σῶμα
 ἐλεεωδῶς διακείσθαι, ὥς πολλῶν ἐτῶν μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ
 φορέλου διαναστῆναι· μὴν τε ἀναλίσκειν ἡμερησίαν εἰς τὴν
 5 τράπεζαν, ὥς αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Λεόντιον ἐπιστολῇ γράφει καὶ
 ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους. συνείναι τε
 αὐτῷ τε καὶ Μητροδώρῳ ἑταίρας καὶ ἄλλας, Μαμμάριον καὶ
 Ἡδεῖαν καὶ Ἐρώτιον καὶ Νικίδιον. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἑπτὰ καὶ
 τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς Περὶ φύσεως τὰ πλείστα ταῦτά λέγειν
 10 καὶ ἀντιγράφειν ἐν αὐταῖς ἄλλοις τε καὶ Νανσιφάνει τὰ
 πλείστα, καὶ αὐτῇ λέξει φάσκειν οὕτως, Ἄλλ' ἴτωσαν· εἶχε
 γὰρ ἐκείνος ὠδίνων τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος καύχησιν τὴν
 σοφιστικὴν, καθάπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων. |
 8 καὶ αὐτὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς περὶ Νανσιφάνους
 λέγειν Ταῦτα ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν εἰς ἔκστασιν τοιαύτην, ὥστε μοι
 λουδορεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποκαλεῖν διδάσκαλον. πλεύμονά τε αὐτὸν
 ἐκάλει καὶ ἀγραμμάτων καὶ ἀπατεῶνα καὶ πόρνην· τοὺς τε περὶ
 5 Πλάτωνα Διουνοσκολάκας καὶ αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα χρυσοῦν καὶ
 Ἀριστοτέλῃ ἄσωτον, (ὄν) καταφαγόντα τὴν πατρίαν οὐσίαν
 στρατεύεσθαι καὶ φαρμακοπωλεῖν· φορμοφόρον τε Πρωταγόραν
 καὶ γραφέα Δημοκρίτου καὶ ἐν ταῖς κώμας γράμματα διδά-

6 4 δὲ τὰς] δὲ καὶ τὰς Meibom 5 μορφῆς Athenaeus: μορφᾶς
 PB¹ (ex μορφᾶς corr.): μορφᾶς QH: μορφῶν F 6 φεύγε τὰκάτιον
 ἀράμενος Gassendi: φεύγετε κατιδιարαμεν B: φεύγε τε κατι δι' /, ἐ
 ραμεν (in mg. / ai) P: φεύγετε κατι διέραμεν QH 13 συνδιαγωγὴν
 PQ: συναγωγὴν BF: διαγωγὴν H 7 6 ταῖς] τῇ Menagius
 7 Μαμμάριον Spengel ex Philodemo: μαρμάριον BPQH: μαρμάρ
 ριον F 9 ταῦτά Kühn: ταῦτα libri: post ταῦτά Usener (τε)
 inseruit 10 ἄλλοις f: ἄλλαις BFPQH τὰ πλείστα uncinis
 inclusit Usener 11 ἄλλ' ἴτωσαν Usener: ἄλλ' εἴτως ἄλλ'
 B: alii libri alia: ἄλλ' εἴ τις ἄλλος Stephanus εἶχε
 γὰρ ἐκείνος Usener: εἶχε γὰρ κείνος libri: εἶχε κἀκείνος Stephanus

taste and withdraw the pleasures of love and those of hearing and sight'. Again in the letter to Pythocles they say he wrote 'Blest youth, set sail in your bark and flee from every form of culture'. Epictetus moreover calls him a filthy talker and abuses him roundly. And even Timocrates, who was the brother of Metrodorus and a disciple of Epicurus, after he had abandoned the school, wrote in a book with the title *Pleasant Things* that Epicurus used to vomit twice a day owing to his luxurious living, and that he himself was scarcely able to escape from his philosophical disquisitions during the night and from the
 7 community of the initiates. He adds that Epicurus was profoundly ignorant of philosophy and still more so of practical life, that his body was miserably weak, so that for many years he was unable to rise from his portable couch: further, that he spent no less than a mina a day on his food, as Epicurus writes himself in the letter to Leontion and in the letters to the philosophers in Mytilene: moreover, there were other women who lived with him and Metrodorus, named Mammarrion and Hedeia and Erotion and Nicidion. He adds that in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* he repeats himself for the most part and attacks many other philosophers in them but Nausiphanes most of all, saying in his own words, 'Away with them all: for Nausiphanes, like many another slave, was in travail
 8 with that wordy braggart, sophistic'. He says that Epicurus himself in his letters about Nausiphanes said, 'This drove him to such a state of fury that he abused me and ironically called me "Master"'. He used to call Nausiphanes 'The mollusc', 'The illiterate', 'The cheat', 'The harlot'. The followers of Plato he called 'Flatterers of Dionysus' and Plato himself 'The golden man', and Aristotle 'The debauchee', saying that he devoured his inheritance and then enlisted and sold drugs. Protagoras he called 'Porter' or 'Copier of Democritus', saying that he taught in the village schools. Heraclitus he called

8 3 διδάσκαλον] δύσκολον coniecit Usener: (μου ἐαυτὸν) adiecit Kochalsky 6 (δν) supplevit C. F. Hermann 7 στρατεύεσθαι coniecit Usener

σκεῖν· Ἡράκλειτόν τε κυκητήν· καὶ Δημόκριτον Ληρόκριτον·
 10 καὶ Ἀντίδωρον Σαννίδωρον· τοὺς τε Κυνικοὺς ἐχθροὺς τῆς
 Ἑλλάδος· καὶ τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς πολυφθόρους· Πύρρωνα δὲ
 ἀμαθὴ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. |

- 9 Μεμῆνασι δ' οὗτοι. τῷ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ μάρτυρες ἱκανοὶ τῆς
 ἀνυπερβλήτου πρὸς πάντας εὐγνωμοσύνης ἢ τε πατρὸς χαλ-
 καῖς εἰκόσι τιμῆσασα, οἳ τε φίλοι τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥς
 μὴδ' ἂν πόλεσιν ὄλαις μετρεῖσθαι δύνασθαι, οἳ τε γνώριμοι
 5 πάντες ταῖς δογματικαῖς αὐτοῦ σειρήσι προσκατασχεθέντες,
 πλὴν Μητροδώρου τοῦ Στρατονικέως πρὸς Καρνεάδην ἀποχωρή-
 σαντος, τάχα βαρυνθέντος ταῖς ἀνυπερβλήτοις αὐτοῦ χρηστό-
 τησιν· ἢ τε διαδοχῇ, πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλιπουσῶν τῶν ἄλλων,
 ἐς αἰὲ διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους ἀρχὰς ἀπολύνουσα ἄλλην ἐξ
 10 ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων· | ἢ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία, καὶ
 ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς εὐποιία, πρὸς τε τοὺς οἰκέτας ἡμερότης,
 ὥς δῆλον καὶ τῶν διαθηκῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοὶ συνεφιλο-
 σόφουν αὐτῷ, ὧν ἦν ἐνδοξότατος ὁ προειρημένος Μῦς· καθόλου
 5 τε ἢ πρὸς πάντας· αὐτοῦ φιλανθρωπία. τῆς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς
 θεοὺς ὁσιότητος καὶ πρὸς πατρίδα φιλίας ἄλεκτος ἢ διάθεσις.
 ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ ἐπιεικείας οὐδὲ πολιτείας ἦψατο. καὶ χαλεπω-
 τάτων δὲ καιρῶν κατασχόντων τηνικάδε τὴν Ἑλλάδα αὐτόθι
 καταβιώναι, δις ἢ τρίς εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν τόπους πρὸς
 10 τοὺς φίλους διαδραμόντα· οἳ καὶ πανταχόθεν πρὸς αὐτὸν
 ἀφικνούντο, καὶ συνεβίουν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ κήπῳ καθά φησι καὶ
 Ἀπολλόδωρος, [ὃν καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα μνῶν πρίασθαι· Διοκλῆς
 δὲ ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῆς ἐπιδρομῆς φησιν] εὐτελέστατα καὶ λιτότατα
 11 δαισιώμενοι· | κοτύλῃ γοῦν, φησὶν, οἰνιδίῳ ἤρκοοντο· τὸ δὲ
 πᾶν ὕδωρ ἦν αὐτοῖς ποτόν. τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς
 τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν
 κοινὰ τὰ φίλων λέγοντα· ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον·
 5 εἰ δ' ἀπίστων, οὐδὲ φίλων. αὐτὸς τε φησὶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστο-
 λαῖς ὕδατι μόνον ἀρκεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρτῳ λιτῷ. καὶ Πέμφον μοι

10 Κυνικοὺς Reinesius: κυζηνικοὺς libri: Κυρηναϊκοὺς Gassendi

11 πολυφθόρους Bake: πολυφθονεοὺς BQ: πολὺ φθονεοὺς FPH

9 I τῷ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ Gassendi: τῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν libri 9 νηρίθμους
 BF¹PQ²H¹: ἀννρίθμους F²H² 10 9 εἰς τοὺς BPQFH: εἰς om.
 f Usener 11 4 τὰ] τὰ τῶν Meibom

'The Muddler', Democritus Lerocritus ('Judge of nonsense'), Antidorus Sannidorus ('Maniac'), the Cynics 'Enemies of Hellas', the Logicians 'The destroyers', and Pyrrho 'The uneducated fool'.

- 9 But these calumniators are all mad. For Epicurus has witnesses enough and to spare to his unsurpassed kindness to all men. There is his country which honoured him with bronze statues, his friends so numerous that they could not even be reckoned by entire cities, and his disciples who all remained bound for ever by the charm of his teaching, except Metrodorus, son of Stratoniceus, who went over to Carneades, overweighted perhaps by Epicurus' excessive goodness. There is also the permanent continuance of the school after almost all the others had come to an end, and that though it had a countless succession of heads from among the disciples. There is again his grateful devotion to his parents, his generosity to his brothers, and his gentleness towards his servants, of whom the most notable was Mys already mentioned, as is proved by his will and the part they took in his philosophical discussions. In short there is his benevolence to all. Of his reverence towards the gods and his love of his country it would be impossible to speak adequately. But from excess of modesty he would not take any part in politics. Yet although Greece was at that time in great straits he continued to live there, and only once or twice made a voyage to Ionia and the neighbourhood to see his friends. But they came to him from all quarters, and took up their abode with him in the garden, as Apollodorus says [who adds that he bought it for eighty minae: Diocles in the third book of his *Course in Philosophy* confirms this], living
- 10 a most frugal and simple life. Indeed, he says, they were satisfied with half a pint of wine, and for the most part drank water. He adds that Epicurus did not recommend them to put their belongings into a common stock, as did Pythagoras, who said that 'Friends have all in common'. For to do so implied distrust: and distrust could not go with friendship. Epicurus himself says in his letters that he was content with nothing but water and a bit of bread.

τυροῦ, φησί, κυθριδίου, ἵν' ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεύσασθαι
δύνωμαι. τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τέλος δογματίζων.
ὃν καὶ Ἀθήναιος δι' ἐπιγράμματος οὕτως ὑμνεῖ |

- 12 ἄνθρωποι μοχθεῖτε τὰ χεῖρονα, καὶ διὰ κέρδος
ἄπληστοι νεικέων ἄρχετε καὶ πολέμων·
τὰς φύσις δ' ὁ πλοῦτος ὄρον τινὰ βαιὸν ἐπίσχει·
αἱ δὲ κεναὶ κρίσιες τὰν ἀπέραντον ὁδόν.

- 5 τοῦτο Νεοκλῆος πυνυτὸν τέκος ἢ παρὰ Μουσέων
ἔκλυεν ἢ Πυθούς ἐξ ἱερῶν τριπόδων.

εἰσόμεθα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον προϊόντες ἐκ τε τῶν δογμάτων ἐκ τε
τῶν ῥητῶν αὐτοῦ.

- Μάλιστα δ' ἀπεδέχετο, φησὶ Διοκλῆς, τῶν ἀρχαίων
10 Ἀναξαγόραν, καίτοι ἐν τισιν ἀντειρηκῶς αὐτῷ, καὶ Ἀρχέλαον
τὸν Σωκράτους διδάσκαλον. ἐγύμναζε δέ, φησί, τοὺς γνωρί-
13 μους καὶ διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμματα. | Τοῦτον
Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς Ναυσιφάνους ἀκοῦσαί φησι καὶ
Πραξιφάνους· αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ φησιν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐν τῇ πρὸς
Εὐρύλοχον ἐπιστολῇ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Λεύκιππὸν τινα γεγενῆσθαι
5 φησι φιλόσοφον, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὔτε Ἑρμαρχος, ὃν ἐνιοί φασιν
καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἐπικούρειος διδάσκαλον Δημοκρίτου
γεγενῆσθαι. Δημήτριος δὲ φησιν ὁ Μάγνης καὶ Ξενοκράτους
αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι.

- Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρία κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἦν ὅτι
10 ἰδιωτάτῃ ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς αἰτιάται. σαφὴς
δ' ἦν οὕτως, ὥς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο
ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν. | καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ
14 Χαίρειν Εὐδὲ πρᾶττειν καὶ Σπουδαίως ζῆν.

- Ἀρίστων δὲ φησιν ἐν τῷ Ἐπικούρου βίῳ τὸν Κανόνα
γράψαι αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ναυσιφάνους Τρίποδος, οὗ καὶ ἀκοῦσαι
5 φησιν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Παμφίλου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ.
ἄρξασθαι τε φιλοσοφεῖν ἐτῶν ὑπάρχοντα δυοκαίδεκα, ἀφηγή-
σασθαι δὲ τῆς σχολῆς ἐτῶν ὄντα δύο πρὸς τοῖς τριάκοντα.

7 κυθριδίου] κυθριδίου f: Κυθνίου Menagius 12 2 ἄπληστοι
Usener: ἄπλειστον F: ἄπληστον lib. cett. 8 ῥητῶν BP¹Q: ῥημά-
των FP²H 13 4 Εὐρύλοχον Menagius ex § 28: εὐρόλοκον P¹Q:
εὐρύδοκον BFP²H 10 ἰδιωτάτῃ] ἰδιωτικωτάτῃ Menagius: ἰδιω-
τική Bake 12 ἀπαιτεῖν] ἀσκέιν Cobet: ἀπαιτῶν coniecit Usener
14 2 post Χαίρειν Usener γράφει inserere voluit 3 Ἀρίστων
Cobet: ἄριστον oi libri: Ἀρίστων ὁ π(ερι)πατητικὸς) Bignone:
Ἀντίγονος Usener φησιν Cobet: φασιν libri

'Send me,' he says, 'some preserved cheese, that when I like I may have a feast.' Such was the man who taught that the end is pleasure. Athenaeus sings his praise in an epigram:

- 12 Men toil at mean pursuits, for love of gain
 Insatiate they welcome war and strife;
 Their idle fancies lead on endless paths,
 But nature's wealth is set in narrow bounds.
 This truth the prudent son of Neocles
 Learnt from the Muses or Apollo's shrine.

The truth of this we shall know better as we go on from his own words and teaching.

- Diocles says that of the earlier philosophers he showed most sympathy with Anaxagoras, though on certain points he opposed him, and with Archelaus, the master of Socrates. And, he adds, he used to practise his disciples in getting
 13 his writings by heart. Apollodorus in his *Chronicles* asserts that he listened to the teaching of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes. Epicurus himself denies this in his letter to Eurylochus and says he was his own teacher. And indeed both Epicurus and Hermarchus deny that there ever was such a philosopher as Leucippus, whom Apollodorus the Epicurean and others say was the master of Democritus. Demetrius of Magnesia says that he was also a follower of Xenocrates.

- He uses current diction to expound his theory, but Aristophanes the grammarian censures it as being too peculiar. But he was clear in expression, just as in his
 14 book on *Rhetoric* he insists on clearness above everything. In his letters he used to say 'Prosper' or 'Live well', instead of the conventional introduction 'Be happy'.

Ariston in his *Life of Epicurus* says that he borrowed *The Canon* from the *Tripod* of Nausiphanes, whose pupil he says he was, as well as being a disciple of Pamphilus the Platonist in Samos. He states that Epicurus began philosophy at the age of twelve, and was at the head of his School at thirty-two.

Ἐγεννήθη δέ, φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, κατὰ τὸ
 τρίτον ἔτος τῆς ἐνάτης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐπὶ
 10 Σωσιγένους ἄρχοντος μηνὸς γαμηλιῶνος ἑβδόμῃ, ἔτεσιν
 15 ὕστερον τῆς Πλάτωνος τελευτῆς ἑπτὰ. | ὑπάρχοντα δ' αὐτὸν
 ἔτῳ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πρώτῳ ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ καὶ Λαμψάκῃ
 συστήσασθαι σχολὴν ἐπὶ ἔτη πέντε· ἔπειθ' οὕτως εἰς Ἀθήνας
 μετελθεῖν, καὶ τελευτῆσαι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ἔτος τῆς ἑβδόμης
 5 καὶ εἰκοστῆς καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐπὶ Πυθαράτου ἔτη
 βιώσαντα δύο πρὸς τοῖς ἑβδομήκοντα· τὴν τε σχολὴν δια-
 δέξασθαι Ἑρμαρχὸν Ἀγεμόρτου Μυτιληναῖον. τελευτῆσαι δ'
 αὐτὸν λίθῳ τῶν οὖρων ἐπισχεθέντων, ὥς φησι καὶ Ἑρμαρχος
 ἐν ἐπιστολαῖς, ἡμέρας νοσήσαντα τετταρεσκαίδεκα. ὅτε καὶ
 10 φησιν Ἑρμιππος ἐμβάντα αὐτὸν εἰς πύelon χαλκῇν κεκρα-
 16 μένην ὑδατι θερμῷ καὶ αἰτήσαντα ἄκρατον ροφήσαι· | τοῖς τε
 φίλοις παραγγέλλαντα τῶν δογμάτων μεμνησθαι, οὕτω τελευ-
 τῆσαι. καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸν οὕτω·

Χαίρετε καὶ μέμνησθε τὰ δόγματα. τοῦτ' Ἐπίκουρος
 5 ὕστατον εἶπε φίλοις τοῦτος ἀποφθίμενος.
 θερμὴν ἐς πύelon γὰρ ἐληλύθειεν καὶ ἄκρατον
 ἔσπασεν, εἴτ' Ἀἰδὴν ψυχρὸν ἐπεσπάσατο.
 οὗτος μὲν ὁ βίος τάνδρός, ἦδε (δὲ) ἡ τελευτή.

Καὶ διέθετο ὧδε·

(ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ)

10 Κατὰ τὰδε δίδωμι τὰ ἐμᾶντοῦ πάντα Ἀμννομάχῳ Φιλο-
 κράτῳ Βατῆθην καὶ Τιμοκράτῃ Δημητρίῳ Ποταμίῳ κατὰ
 17 τὴν ἐν τῷ Μητροφῷ ἀναγεγραμμένην ἑκατέρῳ δόσω, | ἐφ' ᾧ τε
 τὸν μὲν κῆπον καὶ τὰ προσόντα αὐτῷ παρέξουσιν Ἑρμάρχῳ
 Ἀγεμόρτου Μυτιληναῖῳ καὶ τοῖς συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν αὐτῷ καὶ
 οἷς ἂν Ἑρμαρχὸς καταλίπῃ διαδόχοις τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐνδια-
 5 τρίβειν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. καὶ αἰεὶ δὲ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀπὸ
 ἡμῶν, ὅπως ἂν συνδιασώσωσιν Ἀμννομάχῳ καὶ Τιμοκράτῃ

10 ἑβδόμῃ Usener: ἑβδόμῃ B²: ἑβδόμης FPQH: om. B¹
 15 9 τετταρεσκαίδεκα B: τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα Q: τετταρακαίδεκα FP²:
 τετταρασκαίδεκα H 16 4-7 in *Anthol. Pal.* vii. 106 inclusum
 5 τοῦτος Usener: πρώτος BFH: πρώτων PQ: οἷσιν f *Anthol.*
 6 ἐληλύθειεν Usener: ἐλύθηεν ex ἐσλύθηεν corr. B: ἐσήλυθεν PQH
Anthol. καὶ BPQH *Anthol.*: καὶ τὸν Ff 8 (δὲ) supplēvit
 Stephanus 17 3 Ἀγεμόρτου Usener ex § 24: ἀγεμάρχου libri

He was born, says Apollodorus in the *Chronicles*, in the third year of the 109th Olympiad in the archonship of Sosigenes on the seventh day of the month Gamelion, 15 seven years after the death of Plato. When he was thirty-two he started his school first for five years at Mitylene and Lampsacus and then he migrated to Athens. There he died in the second year of the 127th Olympiad in the archonship of Pytharatus, at the age of seventy-two. Hermarchus of Mitylene, son of Agemortus, succeeded to the headship of the school. Epicurus died of a stone in the bladder, as Hermarchus also says in his letters, after an illness of fourteen days. 16 Hermippus tells us that as he was dying he got into a bronze bath filled with hot water, and asked for a cup of unmixed wine, which he gulped down. Then having adjured his friends to remember his teaching he expired. I have composed the following epigram on him :

'Farewell, remember my sayings.' Thus spake at his death Epicurus,

These the last words as he died spake he aloud to his friends.

Then in a hot bath he laid him, a goblet of wine he demanded,
Quaffed it, and soon the cold air quaffed he of Hades below.
Such was Epicurus' life and such his death.

His will was as follows :

EPICURUS' WILL.

I hereby leave all my possessions to Amynomachus, son of Philocrates, of the deme of Bate, and Timocrates, son of Demetrius, of the deme of Potamos, according to the 17 form of gift to each registered in the Metroum, on condition that they make over the garden and all that goes with it to Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, of Mitylene, and to those who study philosophy with him and to those whom Hermarchus may leave as his successors in the school, for them to live there in the pursuit of philosophy. And to those who hereafter follow my philosophy I assign the right to live in the garden, that they may assist Amyno-

κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, τὴν ἐν τῷ κήπῳ διατριβὴν παρακατατίθεμαι τοῖς τ' αὐτῶν κληρονόμοις, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποτε τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατον ᾖ, ὅπως ἂν κακέωνοι διατηρῶσιν τὸν κήπον, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ
 10 οἷς ἂν οἱ ἀπὸ ἡμῶν φιλοσοφούντες παραδίδωσιν.

Τὴν δ' οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Μελίτῃ παρεχέτωσαν Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης ἐνοικεῖν Ἑρμάρχῳ καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφούσιν, ἕως ἂν Ἑρμαρχος ζῇ. |

18 Ἐκ δὲ τῶν γινομένων προσόδων τῶν δεδομένων ἀφ' ἡμῶν Ἀμυνομάχῳ καὶ Τιμοκράτῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν μερίζεσθωσαν μεθ' Ἑρμάρχου σκοπούμενοι εἰς τε τὰ ἐναγίσματα τῷ τε πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν εἰθισμένην
 5 ἀγεσθαι γενέθλιον ἡμέραν ἐκάστου ἔτους τῇ προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ γαμηλιῶνος, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰς τὴν γινομένην σύνοδον ἐκάστου μηνὸς ταῖς εἰκάσι τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ἡμῶν τε καὶ Μητροδώρου (μνήμην) κατατεταγμένην· συντελείτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμέραν τοῦ ποσειδεῶνος· συντελεί-
 10 τωσαν δὲ καὶ τὴν Πολυαῖνου τοῦ μεταγεινιῶνος, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς. |

19 Ἐπιμελείσθωσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Μητροδώρου Ἐπικούρου καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Πολυαῖνου, φιλοσοφούντων αὐτῶν καὶ συζώντων μεθ' Ἑρμάρχου. ὥσαύτως δὲ τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς Μητροδώρου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιείσθωσαν,
 5 καὶ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἐλθοῦσαν ἐκδότησαν ᾧ ἂν Ἑρμαρχος ἔληται τῶν φιλοσοφούντων μετ' αὐτοῦ, οὔσης αὐτῆς εὐτάκτου καὶ πειθαρχούσης Ἑρμάρχῳ. διδότησαν δὲ Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἡμῖν προσόδων εἰς τροφὴν τούτοις, ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι δοκῇ σκοπου-
 10 μένοις μεθ' Ἑρμάρχου. |

20 Ποιείσθωσαν δὲ μεθ' αὐτῶν καὶ Ἑρμαρχὸν κύριον τῶν προσόδων, ἵνα μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγρακτότος ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ καταλελειμμένου ἡγεμόνος τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν ἕκαστα γίνηται. τὴν δὲ προῖκα τῷ θήλει παιδίῳ, ἐπειδὴν
 5 εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθῃ, μερισάτωσαν Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης,

8 ἂν ποτε τρόπῳ Usener: ἂν ἀποτρέπω libri 9 διατηρῶσιν
 Usener: διατηρεῖεν F: διατηροῖεν libr. cett. 10 παραδίδωσιν
 BP¹Q: παραδίδωσι GHP²: παραδίδωσι F: παραδίδωσιν Usener
 18 i ἀφ' ὑφ' Kochalsky 6 ὥσπερ Usener: ὥστε libri: ἔτι δὲ
 Casaubon 8 (μνήμην) supplevit Aldobrandinus collato Cic. de Fin.
 ii. 31. 101 κατατεταγμένην] κατὰ (τὰ) τεταγμένα Usener 10 μετα-

machus and Timocrates to maintain it to the best of their power, and to their heirs, in whatever way may give the securest possession, that they too may preserve the garden, and after them those to whom the disciples of my school may hand it on.

The house in Melite Amynomachus and Timocrates shall assign for a dwelling to Hermarchus and to those who study philosophy with him, as long as Hermarchus shall live.

18 The income of the property left by me to Amynomachus and Timocrates shall be divided by them as far as possible, with the advice of Hermarchus, for the offerings in honour of my father and mother and brothers, and for the customary celebration of my birthday every year on the tenth of Gamelion, and likewise for the assembly of my disciples which takes place on the twentieth of each month, having been established in recollection of myself and Metrodorus. Let them also keep the day of my brothers in Poseideon and the day of Polyaeus in Metageitnion, as I have done myself.

19 Amynomachus and Timocrates shall take care of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of the son of Polyaeus, provided they devote themselves to philosophy and live with Hermarchus. Likewise they shall take care of Metrodorus' daughter, and when she comes of age shall give her in marriage to one of his disciples whom Hermarchus shall choose, provided she is well-behaved and obedient to Hermarchus. Amynomachus and Timocrates shall set aside for the maintenance of these children such sum out of the revenues of my estate as shall seem good to them each year in consultation with Hermarchus.

20 They shall give Hermarchus authority with themselves over the income, in order that everything may be done in consultation with the man who has grown old with me in the study of philosophy and has been left by me head of the school. The dowry for the girl, when she comes of age, shall be apportioned by Amynomachus and Timocrates,

γείτνῳ FP¹: μεταγείτνῳ B: μεταγείτνῳ P²GH · 20 2 μετὰ τοῦ BP¹QG: μετ' αὐτοῦ FP²H: fortasse μετ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ

δοῦναι ἂν ἐπιδέχεται ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀφαιροῦντες μετὰ τῆς Ἑρμάρχου γνώμης. ἐπιμελείσθωσαν δὲ καὶ Νικάνορος, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἵν' ὅσοι τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν χρεῖαν ἔν τοῖς ἰδίῳις παρεσχημένοι καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν οἰκειότητα ἐνδε-
 10 δειγμένοι συγκαταγῇσκουν μεθ' ἡμῶν προείλοντο ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, μηδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεεῖς καθεστήκωσιν παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δύναμιν. |

21 Δοῦναι δὲ τὰ βιβλία τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡμῖν πάντα Ἑρμάρχῳ. ἔαν δέ τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων περὶ Ἑρμαρχον γένηται πρὸ τοῦ τὰ Μητροδώρου παιδία εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθῃν, δοῦναι Ἀμυνόμαχον καὶ Τιμοκράτη, ὅπως ἂν εὐτακτούντων αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γίνηται
 5 τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀπὸ τῶν καταλελειμμένων ὑφ' ἡμῶν προσόδων. καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπάντων ὧν συντετάχαμεν ἐπιμελείσθωσαν, ὅπως ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἕκαστα γίγνηται. ἀφίημι δὲ τῶν παίδων ἐλεύθερον Μῖν, Νικίαν, Λύκωνα. ἀφίημι δὲ καὶ Φαίδριον ἐλευθέραν. |

22 Ἡδὴ δὲ τελευτῶν γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα τήνδε ἐπιστολήν. Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευτῶντες ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί· στραγγουρικὰ τε παρηκολούθει καὶ
 5 δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δὲ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου. καὶ διέθετο μὲν ὧδε.

10 Μαθητὰς δὲ ἔσχε πολλοὺς μὲν, σφόδρα δὲ ἐλλογίμους Μητροδώρον Ἀθηναῖον ἢ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Σάνδης Λαμψακηνόν· ὃς ἀφ' οὗ τὸν ἄνδρα ἔγνω, οὐκ ἀπέστη ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλὴν
 23 ἐξ μὴνῶν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἔπειτα ἐπανῆλθε. | γέγονε δὲ ἀγαθὸς πάντα, καθὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς μαρτυρεῖ

11 παρὰ Usener: ἐπὶ libri 21 2 γένηται F: γίνηται libr. cett.
 6 ὧν FPOH: ὡς BG 7 ἂν Usener: δὴ libri 9 ἐλευθέραν P²GH:
 ἐλευθέρα F¹: ἐλευθερίαν BF²P¹Q: ἐλευθερίᾳ Usener 22 2 τελευ-
 τῶντες] τελευταίαν Davis ex Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 30. 96 3 παρηκολούθει
 Stephanus: παρηκολουθήκει libri 7 φιλοσοφίαν f: φιλοσοφίας libri
 8 διέθετο Stephanus: ἔθετο libri 11 Ἀθηναῖον Duening: ἀθηναῖον
 libri ἢ] καὶ f Τιμοκράτους Duening: Τιμοκρατ' FPO: τιμο-

who shall take a suitable sum from the capital with the approval of Hermarchus. They shall also take care of Nicanor, as I have done, to show that those who have studied with me and have met my needs from their own resources and shown me every mark of friendship and elected to grow old with me in the study of philosophy, may not lack for anything that is necessary, as far as lies in my power.

- ²¹ They are to give all the books that belong to me to Hermarchus. And if any mortal chance befall Hermarchus before Metrodorus' children come of age, Amynomachus and Timocrates shall as far as possible provide all that is necessary from the income of my estate, if the children are well-behaved. They shall carefully carry out all my other arrangements, so that each may be fulfilled as far as possible. Of my slaves I set free Mys, Nicias and Lycon, and I also set Phaedrium free.

- ²² When he was on the point of death he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: 'On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you. Do you, as I might expect from your devotion from boyhood to me and to philosophy, take good care of the children of Metrodorus.' Such then was his will.

He had many disciples, but among the most distinguished was first Metrodorus, son of Athenaeus (or Timocrates) and Sande, of Lampsacus. From the time when he first came to know Epicurus he never left him, except when he went to his native city for six months, and then he came back.

- ²³ He was a good man in all respects, as Epicurus too bears witness in prologues to his writings and in the third book

κράτην BHf Σάνδης Usener: Σάνδην libri: Κασσάνδρας coniecit
Gomperz 13 οἰκίαν Cobet: οἰκίαν libri 23 2 πάντα BFP¹Q:
κατὰ πάντα P²H γραφαῖς Usener: γράφει libri

σχολὰς συγγράφας· καὶ Ὠρίων, καὶ ἄλλοι οὓς οἱ γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.

Ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἐπικούροισι τρεῖς· ὃ τε Λεοντέως υἱὸς καὶ Θεμιστάς· ἕτερος Μάγνης· τέταρτος ὄπλομάχος.

Γέγονε δὲ πολυγραφώτατος ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, πάντας ὑπερβαλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων. κύλιδροι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους εἰσὶ. γέγραπται δὲ μαρτύριον ἔξωθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ εἰσιν Ἐπικούρου φωναί. ἐξήλου δὲ αὐτὸν Χρύσιππος ἐν πολυγραφίᾳ, καθά φησι Καρνεάδης παράσιτον αὐτοῦ τῶν βιβλίων ἀποκαλῶν. “εἰ γὰρ τι γράφαι ὁ 27 Ἐπίκουρος, φιλονεικεῖ τοσοῦτον γράφαι ὁ Χρύσιππος· | καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πολλάκις ταῦτα γέγραφε καὶ τὸ ἐπελθόν, καὶ ἀδιόρθωτα εἶακε τῷ ἐπείγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὥς ἐκείνων μόνων γέμειν τὰ βιβλία, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ 5 Ζήνωνι ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει”. καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα μὲν Ἐπικούρου τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα. ὧν τὰ βέλτιστα ἐστί τάδε· Περὶ φύσεως λζ. Περὶ ἀτόμων καὶ κενοῦ. Περὶ ἔρωτος. Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικούς. Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. Διαπορίαι. Κύριαί δόξαι. Περὶ 10 αἰρέσεων καὶ φυγῶν. Περὶ τέλους. Περὶ κριτηρίου ἢ Κανόν. Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ θεῶν. Περὶ οὐσιότητος. Ἠγυσίανναξ. Περὶ βίων τέσσαρα. | Περὶ δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς πρὸς Θεμισταν. Συμπόσιον. Εὐρύλοχος πρὸς Μητρόδωρον. Περὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ γωνίας. Περὶ ἀφῆς. Περὶ εἰμαρμένης. Περὶ παθῶν δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. 5 Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός. Περὶ εἰδῶλων. Περὶ φαντασίας. Ἀριστόβουλος. Περὶ μουσικῆς. Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. Περὶ δώρων καὶ χάριτος. Πολυμήδης. Τιμοκράτης α β γ. Μητρόδωρος α β γ δ ε. Ἀντίδωρος α β. Περὶ νόσων δόξαι πρὸς Μιθρήν. Καλλιστόλας. 10 Περὶ βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης. Ἐπιστολαί.

Ἄ δὲ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐκθέσθαι πειράσομαι τρεῖς ἐπιστολὰς αὐτοῦ παραθέμενος, ἐν αἷς πᾶσαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ

26 5 τέταρτος] τρίτος Cobet
12 φιλονεικεῖ] ἐφιλονεικεῖ Casaubon
10 φυγῶν Gassendi: φύτων libri
libri 11 δ Usener: μίαν libri
B²: αὐτῶν libr. cett.

9 αὐτοῦ Cobet: αὐταὶ libri
27 3 εἶακε Cobet: εἶλε libri
28 9 νόσων Gassendi: νότων
αὐτῷ Usener: αὐτῶ B¹: αὐτῷ[ν]

Orion, and others whom the genuine Epicureans call Sophists.

There were three other Epicuruses, the son of Leonteus and Themista, another, who was a Magnesian, while the fourth was a drill-sergeant.

Epicurus was a very prolific writer and exceeded all others in the bulk of his works, of which there are more than three hundred rolls. There is not in them one single citation from another author: it is all Epicurus' own words. Chrysippus tried to rival him in the amount of his writings, as Carneades tells us, calling him the parasite who fed on Epicurus' books. 'Whenever Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus felt bound in rivalry to write the
27 equivalent; and this is why he often repeats himself and says whatever occurs to him, and has left a great deal uncorrected in his hurry; moreover, he has so many quotations that his books are filled with them and nothing else, a characteristic which one may observe also in the writings of Zeno and Aristotle.' Such are the numerous and important works of Epicurus, of which the best are the following: 1. *On Nature*, thirty-seven books, 2. *On atoms and void*, 3. *On Love*, 4. Epitome of the books *Against the Physicists*, 5. *Against the Megarians*, 6. *Problems*, 7. *Principal Doctrines*, 8. *On Choice and Avoidance*, 9. *On the End*, 10. *On the Criterion*, or *The Canon*, 11. *Chaeredemus*,
28 12. *On the Gods*, 13. *On Religion*, 14. *Hegesianax*, 15. *On Lives*, four books, 16. *On Just Action*, 17. *Neocles*, addressed to Themista, 18. *Symposium*, 19. *Eurylochus*, addressed to Metrodorus, 20. *On Vision*, 21. *On the corner in the atom*, 22. *On Touch*, 23. *On Fate*, 24. *On internal sensations*, maxims addressed to Timocrates, 25. *Prognostic*, 26. *The Protreplic*, 27. *On images*, 28. *On perception*, 29. *Aristobulus*, 30. *On Music*, 31. *On Justice and the other Virtues*, 32. *On gifts and gratitude*, 33. *Polymedes*, 34. *Timocrates*, three books, 35. *Metrodorus*, five books, 36. *Antidorus*, two books, 37. *On disease*, maxims addressed to Mithras, 38. *Callistolas*, 39. *On royal power*, 40. *Anaximenes*, 41. *Letters*.

I will now endeavour to expound the doctrines which he sets forth in these works and will put before you three

- 29 φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτέμνεται. | θήσομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς Κυρίας αὐτοῦ
δόξας καὶ εἴ τι ἔδοξεν ἐκλογῆς ἀξίως ἀνεφθέγγχθαι, ὥστε σὲ
πανταχόθεν καταμαθεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ κρίνειν εἰδέναι. τὴν
μὲν οὖν πρώτην ἐπιστολὴν γράφει πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον (ἥ τις ἐστὶ
5 περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· τὴν δὲ δευτέραν πρὸς Πυθοκλέα) ἥ τις
ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων· τὴν τρίτην πρὸς Μενουκέα, ἔστι δ'
ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ βίων. ἀρκτέον δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης, ὀλίγα
προειπόντα περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν φιλοσοφίας. |
- 30 Διαιρεῖται τοίνυν εἰς τρία, τό τε κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ
ἠθικόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν
ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Κανόνι. τὸ δὲ
φυσικὸν τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς
5 Περὶ Φύσεως βίβλοις λζ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς κατὰ στοιχείον.
τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὰ περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς· ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς
Περὶ βίων βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ Περὶ τέλους.
εἰώθασι μέντοι τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ τάττειν.
καλοῦσι δ' αὐτὸ περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς, καὶ στοιχειωτικόν·
10 τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ φύσεως·
τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν περὶ αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, καὶ περὶ βίων καὶ
τέλους. |
- 31 Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὥς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν. ἀρκεῖν
γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγ-
γους. ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος
κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις
5 καὶ τὰ πάθη· οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς
τῆς διανοίας. λέγει δὲ καὶ (αὐτὸς) ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον
ἐπιτομῇ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Κυρίαις δόξαις. πᾶσα γάρ, φησὶν,
αἰσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτικὴ· οὔτε γὰρ
ὑφ' αὐτῆς κινεῖται, οὔτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα δύναται τι
10 προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν. οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διε-
λέγξαι· | οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογενὴς αἰσθησις τὴν ὁμογενῆ διὰ τὴν
32 ἰσοσθένειαν· οὔθ' ἡ ἀνομογένεια τὴν ἀνομογένειαν, οὐ γὰρ

29 3 καὶ Usener: κάμει libri 4 ἥ τις... 5 Πυθοκλέα adiecit
Usener 30 5 κατὰ στοιχείον] κατεστοιχειωμένον coniecit Usener
7 καὶ τῷ Usener: καὶ τῷ Ff: καὶ τὸ BQOH: καὶ ἐν τῷ Meibom
31 4 καὶ προλήψεις] καὶ τὰς προλήψεις Gassendi, fortasse recte
6 (αὐτὸς) coniecit Usener: om. libri 9 ὑφ' αὐτῆς F: ὑπ' αὐτῆς
P²: ἀπ' αὐτῆς B¹QH δύναται Gassendi: ἀδυνατεῖ libri
32 1 ὁμογενὴς scripsi: ὁμογένεια libri ὁμογενῇ B¹P¹Q: ὁμο-
γένειαν P²H

of his letters, in which he has abridged his whole philosophy. I will also give you the *Principal Doctrines*, and a selection from his sayings which seem most worthy of mention. You will thus be able to understand Epicurus from every point of view and could form a judgement on him. The first letter he writes to Herodotus (and it deals with Physics; the second is to Pythocles), and it deals with Celestial Phenomena; the third is to Menoeceus, and contains the moral teaching. We must begin with the first letter, but I will first speak briefly about the divisions of his philosophy.

It is divided into three parts, the Canonicon (or Procedure), the Physics and the Ethics. The Canonicon gives the method of approach to the system, and is contained in the work called *The Canon*. The Physics contains all the investigation into nature, and is contained in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* and in an abridged form in the letters. The Ethics deals with choice and avoidance, and is contained in the books *On Lives* and the letters and the book on *The End*. The Epicureans usually group the Canonicon with the Physics and state that it deals with the criterion of truth and the fundamental principles and contains the elements of the system. The Physics deals with creation and dissolution and with nature; the Ethics with things to be chosen or avoided, with the conduct of life and its purpose.

Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in *The Canon* Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the *Principal Doctrines*. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it. Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity;

τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικά· οὔτε μὴν λόγος, πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ
 τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡρτῆται· οὐθ' ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν, πάσαις
 5 γὰρ προσέχουмен. καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ' ὑφέσταναι
 πιστοῦται τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν. ὑφέστηκε δὲ τό τε
 ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν. ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρῆσθαι σημειοῦσθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ
 ἐπίνοιαί πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασιν κατὰ τε
 10 περίπτωσιν καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν,
 συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. τά τε τῶν μαινομένων
 φαντάσματα καὶ (τὰ) κατ' ὄναρ ἀληθῆ, κινεῖ γάρ· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν
 οὐ κινεῖ. |

33 Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἰοῦναι κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν
 ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην
 τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον τὸ Τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρω-
 5 πος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν
 καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων.
 παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι. καὶ
 οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνωκεί-
 10 μεν αὐτό· οἷον τὸ πόρρω ἐστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς· δεῖ γὰρ
 κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸς μορφήν. οὐδ'
 ἂν ὠνομάσαμεν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν
 τύπον μαθόντες. ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσω αἱ προλήψεις.

Καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἡρτῆται, ἐφ'
 34 δ' ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν· οἷον Πόθεν ἴσμεν εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν
 ἄνθρωπος; | τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν, ἀληθῆ τέ
 φασιν καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμαρτύρηται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτύ-
 ρηται, ἀληθῆ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιμαρτύρηται ἢ ἀντιμαρτύρηται,
 5 ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅθεν (τὸ) προσμένον εἰσῆχθη· οἷον τὸ
 προσμεῖναι καὶ ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι τῷ πύργῳ καὶ μαθεῖν ὁποῖος
 ἐγγὺς φαίνεται.

3 εἰσι κριτικά FP²H: εἰς κριτικὸν P¹Q: εἰς κριτικῶν B 4 ἡρτῆται
 Aldobrandinus: εἴρηται libri 5 ἐπαισθήματα B(P¹)Q: ἀνεπαί-
 σθητα FP²H 12 (τὰ) supplevit Casaubon 33 6 ὑποτεταγ-
 μένον Gassendi: ἐπιτεταγμένον libri 34 4 (τὸ) addidit Gassendi

nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.

30 The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance 'Such and such a thing is a man': for the moment the word 'man' is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance we ask 'Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?': to do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence.

Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, How do we know
34 whether this is a man? Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view.

Πάθῃ δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο, ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, ἰστάμενα
περὶ πάντων ζῶντων, καὶ τὴν μὲν οἰκείον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον· δι' ὧν
κρίνεσθαι τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς. τῶν τε ζητήσεων εἶναι τὰς
10 μὲν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰς δὲ περὶ ψιλῆν τὴν φωνήν. καὶ
ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τῆς διαίρεσεως καὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου στοιχειωδῶς.
'Ανιτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολήν.

Sequitur epistola ad Herodotum.

83 Καὶ ἥδε μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἐπιστολὴ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· περὶ
δὲ τῶν μετεώρων ἥδε.

Sequitur epistola ad Pythoclem.

116

117

Ταῦτα αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων δοκεῖ | περὶ δὲ τῶν
βιωτικῶν, καὶ ὅπως χρὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐκφεύ-
γεω, οὕτως γράφει. Πρώτερον δὲ διέλθωμεν ἃ τε αὐτῷ
δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. βλάβας ἔξ
5 ἀνθρώπων ἢ διὰ μῖσος ἢ διὰ φθόνον ἢ διὰ καταφρόνησιν
γίνεσθαι, ὧν τὸν σοφὸν λογισμῷ περιγίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν
διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἐκόντα. πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθῆ-
σεσθαι, (δ) οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐκ
10 πάσης σώματος ἕξεως σοφὸν γενέσθαι ἂν οὐδ' ἐν παντὶ ἔθνη. |
118 καὶ στρεβλωθῇ δ' ὁ σοφὸς εἶναι αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα. . μόνον τε
χάριν ἕξει τὸν σοφόν, καὶ ἐπὶ φίλοις καὶ παροῦσι καὶ ἀποῦσιν
ὁμοίως διατε(λεῖν) εὐλογοῦντα. ὅτε μέντοι στρεβλοῦται, ἔνθα
καὶ μύζει καὶ οἰμώζει. γυναικί τε οὐ μιγήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν
5 ἢ οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, ὥς φησι Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἐπιτομῇ
τῶν Ἐπικούρου ἠθικῶν δογμάτων. οὐδὲ κολάσειν οἰκέτας,
ἐλεήσειν μέντοι καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἕξει τῶν σπουδαίων.
ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ ταφῆς φρον-
τιεῖν. οὐδὲ θεόπεμπτον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, ὥς Διογένης ἐν τῷ
10 . . . οὐδὲ ῥητορεύσειν καλῶς. συνουσίῃ δέ, φασίν, ὤησε

11 δὲ] δὴ coniecit Usener

spectandum notavit Usener

μ(ὴν ὡς) ἄλλον Kochalsky

Kochalsky

118 3 διατε(λεῖν) εὐλογοῦντα. ὅτε Kochalsky: διὰ

τε libri: ὁδοῦσθε B¹: ὁδ' οὐχ ὅτε B²: ὁδοῦ χ' ὅτε Q: ὁδοῦ. ὅτε P:

ὁδοῦ. ὅτε FH: λόγου (καὶ διὰ πράξεως ἵεναι) ὅτε Usener

FP²: μύζει BP¹Q: οἰμώζει FP²QH: οἰμώζει B: οἰμῶ. εἰ P

6 οὐδὲ Usener: οὐτε libri

117 3 ἃ τε αὐτῷ] ἃ αὐτῷ τε ex-

8 πάθεσι] πάθεσι (τισι) Bignone

μᾶλλον] μὴν Usener: 9 (δ) addidit

Kochalsky

118 3 διατε(λεῖν) εὐλογοῦντα. ὅτε Kochalsky: διὰ

τε libri: ὁδοῦσθε B¹: ὁδ' οὐχ ὅτε B²: ὁδοῦ χ' ὅτε Q: ὁδοῦ. ὅτε P:

ὁδοῦ. ὅτε FH: λόγου (καὶ διὰ πράξεως ἵεναι) ὅτε Usener

FP²: μύζει BP¹Q: οἰμώζει FP²QH: οἰμώζει B: οἰμῶ. εἰ P

6 οὐδὲ Usener: οὐτε libri 7 τῶν σπουδαίων F: τὸν σπουδαίον

The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth.

Now we must proceed to the letter.

83 Such was his letter on Physics: then follows his letter on Celestial Things.

116 Such was his teaching on things celestial. As regards
117 the principles of living and the grounds on which we ought to choose some things and avoid others, he writes the following letter. But before considering it let us explain what he and his followers think about the wise man. Injuries are done by men either through hate or through envy or through contempt, all of which the wise man overcomes by reasoning. When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has. He will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom. A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation.

118 And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament. The wise man will not have intercourse with any woman with whom the law forbids it, as Diogenes says in his summary of Epicurus' moral teaching. Nor will he punish his slaves, but will rather pity them and forgive any that are deserving. They do not think that the wise man will fall in love, or care about his burial. They hold that love is not sent from heaven, as Diogenes says in his . . . book, nor should the wise man make elegant speeches.

BPQH 10 συνουσίη δὲ FP²H¹: συνοουσίην δὲ B: συνοῦσιν ἡδὲ
Q: συνουσίην δὲ Usener ὠνησε] ὀνήσαι Usener

- 119 μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε. | καὶ μὴν καὶ
γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν, ὥς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς
Διαπορίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς Περι φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ
ποτε βίον γαμήσειν. καὶ διατραπήσεσθαι τινας, οὐδὲ μὴν
5 ἐπηρεάσειν ἐν μέθῃ φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμπόσιῳ.
οὐδὲ πολιτεύεσθαι ὥς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περι βίων· οὐδὲ τυραν-
νεύσειν· οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν, ὥς ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περι βίων· οὐδὲ
πτωχεύσειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πηρωθεῖς τὰς ὄψεις (οὐ) μετ(αλλ)άζει
αὐτὸν τὸν βίον, ὥς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φησι. καὶ λυπήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν
120^a σοφόν, ὥς Διογένης ἐν τῇ εἰ τῶν ἐπιλέκτων. | καὶ δικάσεσθαι.
καὶ συγγράμματα καταλείψειν· οὐ πανηγυριεῖν δέ. καὶ κτήσεως
προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. φιλαγρήσειν. τύχῃ τε
ἀντιτάξεσθαι, φίλον τε οὐδένα προήσεσθαι. εὐδοξίας ἐπὶ
5 τοσοῦτον προνοήσεσθαι, ἔφ' ὅσον μὴ καταφρονήσεσθαι.
μᾶλλον τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις. |
121^b εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν· εἰ ἔχοι, ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίῃ. μόνον τε
τὸν σοφὸν ὀρθῶς ἂν περὶ τε μουσικῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς διαλέξασθαι,
ποιήματά τε ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι. οὐκ εἶναι τε ἕτερον
ἑτέρου σοφώτερον. χρηματίσεσθαι τε, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας,
5 ἀπορήσαντα. καὶ μόνραρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν. καὶ
ἐπιχαρήσεσθαι τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι. καὶ σχολὴν κατα-
σκευάσειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥστε ὀχλαγωγῆσαι· καὶ ἀναγνώσεσθαι
ἐν πλήθει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐκόντα· δογματιεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀπορήσειν.
καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς δὲ ὅμοιον ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλου ποτὲ
10 τεθνήξεσθαι.
- 120^b [Τὸ ἐξῆς] δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς | ἁμαρτήματα ἄνισα εἶναι. καὶ τὴν

119 5 ἐπηρεάσειν scripsi: τήρησειν libri (τήρησιν P¹): ληρήσειν
C. F. Hermann: τήρη(σιν) κοσμίον μεθή(σιν) ἐν μέθῃ Kochalsky
8 πηρωθεῖς PQF: πυρωθεῖς B: π. ρωθεῖς H (οὐ) supplevi: μετα-
λάξει scripsi: μετάξει PQF: μετέξει B: μετέξει (sc. μετέξειν) H:
μεθέξειν f: καταξιοῖ Usener: μετ' (ἀταραξίας) ἐξάξει Kochalsky
9 αὐτὸν αὐτὸν Usener, Kochalsky τὸν βίον scripsi: τοῦ βίον libri
λυπήσεσθαι BP¹Q: λυπηθῆσεσθαι FP²H 120^a 1 δικάσεσθαι f:
δικάσασθαι BFPQH 4 ἀντιτάξεσθαι H²: ἀντιτάξασθαι BFPQH¹
φίλον BPQH: φίλων F: φίλην Usener τε] γὰρ Usener οὐδένα
BH: οὐδὲν P¹QF προήσεσθαι Bignone: κτήσεσθαι libri: (ἀπο)κτῆ-
σεσθαι Kochalsky 121^b εἰκόνας τε... δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς totum
hunc locum ex § 121 huc transferendum docuit Bignone 1 ante
εἰ ἔχοι lacunam indicavit Usener: in notis πλοῦτον vel τέκνα supplevit;
οἰκίσιν Kochalsky σχοίῃ Kühn: σχοίης libri 2 διαλέξασθαι
FQH¹: διαλέξεσθαι BPH² 3 τε] δὲ Kochalsky ἐνεργείᾳ Usener:
ἐνεργεῖν libri οὐκ εἶναι Sambucus: οὐκ εἶναι τε B: οὐ κινεῖται

Sexual intercourse, they say, has never done a man good, and he is lucky if it has not harmed him.

119 Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the *Problems* and in the work on *Nature*. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life. He will feel shame in the presence of some persons, and certainly will not insult them in his cups, so Epicurus says in the *Symposium*. Nor will he take part in public life, as he says in the first book *On Lives*. Nor will he act the tyrant, or live like the Cynics, as he writes in the second book *On Lives*. Nor will he beg. Moreover, even if he is deprived of his eyesight, he will not end his whole life, as he says in the same work. Also the wise man will feel grief, as Diogenes says in the fifth book of the *Miscellanies*.

120^a He will engage in lawsuits and will leave writings behind him, but will not deliver speeches on public occasions. He will be careful of his possessions and will provide for the future. He will be fond of the country. He will face fortune and never desert a friend. He will be careful of his reputation in so far as to prevent himself from being despised. He will care more than other men for public
121^b spectacles. He will erect statues of others, but whether he had one himself or not, he would be indifferent. Only the wise man could discourse rightly on music and poetry, but in practice he would not compose poems. One wise man is not wiser than another. He will be ready to make money, but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy. He will pay court to a king, if occasion demands. He will rejoice at another's misfortunes, but only for his correction. And he will gather together a school, but never so as to become a popular leader. He will give lectures in public, but never unless asked; he will give definite teaching and not profess doubt. In his sleep he will be as he is awake, and on occasion he will even die for a friend.

120^b They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that

FPQH: οὐ κινεῖσθαι Usener 7 ἀχλαγωγῆσαι BPOH; σχολαγωγῆσαι F 8 ἐκόντα FP²; ἐκὼν BP¹QH 11 τὸ ἐξῆς ut indicium ad librarium scriptum seclisit Bignone 120^b 1 ante ἀμαρτήματα Cobet τὰ supplevit, τὰ τε κατορθώματα καὶ τὰ Usener

ὕγιαν τισὶ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τισὶ δὲ ἀδιάφορον. τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γινέσθαι, λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος. καὶ τὴν φίλῳ διὰ τὰς χρεῖας· δεῖν μέντοι προκατάρχεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ 5 τὴν γῆν σπεύρομεν), συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωनीαν ἐν 121^a τοῖς ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἐκπεπληρωμένοις). | τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῇ νοεῖσθαι, τὴν τε ἀκροτάτην, ὅσα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσιν καὶ τὴν (κατὰ τὴν) προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν. μετιτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολήν. |

Sequitur epistola ad Menoeceum.

- 135 7 Μαντικήν δ' ἄπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀναιρεῖ, ὥς καὶ ἐν τῇ μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ. καὶ φησί· μαντικὴ οὐσα ἀνύπαρκτος, εἰ καὶ ὑπαρκτή, οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἡγητέα τὰ γινόμενα· τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν· καὶ ἐπὶ πλείω διελέκεται ἀλλαχόθι. |
- 136 Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίκοις περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει. ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω (τὰ γένη) ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους 5 καὶ ἐν ᾧ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φίλους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ 15 τῶν ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητροδώριος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω· Νοούμενης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἰρέσεων οὕτω λέγει· Ἡ μὲν γὰρ 10 ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαὶ εἰσιν ἡδοναί· ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεῖα βλέπονται. |
- 137 Ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίκοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ χεῖρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγυδόνους τῶν ψυχικῶν, κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας σώματι· ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικὰς· τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χεῖμαίξω, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν 5 καὶ τὸ μέλλον· οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς

5 ἐν τοῖς ταῖς BP¹Q : ἐν ταῖς FP²H : μεγίσταις Usener 6 ἐκπεπληρωμένοις Bignone : ἐκπεπληρῶν P¹Q : ἐκπεπληρῶν B : om. FP²H : ἐκπεπληρωμένην Usener 135 7 μικρᾷ] μικρᾷ Gassendi 9 παρ' ἡμᾶς] παρὸς ἡμᾶς Meibom : παρ(ᾶ τὸ παρ') ἡμᾶς Bignone ἡγητέα τὰ Usener : ἡγητὰ B¹ : ἡγῆ τὰ FPQH : ἡγητέον τὰ Meibom : ἡγοῦ τὰ Cobet : ᾗδῃ τὰ Gassendi 136 3 ἀμφοτέρω] ἀμφοτέρων Meibom : ἀμφοτέρως Gassendi τὰ γένη supplevit Bignone : σχήματα Kochalsky : lacunam indicavit Usener 5 φίλους] φιλοσόφους Gassendi 8 δε] διχῶς coniecit Usener 137 5 τῆς] (τὰς) τῆς Cobet

health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage. That friendship too has practical needs as its motive: one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those
 121* who have reached the fullness of pleasure. They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures. Now we must proceed to the letter.

135 In several works he rejects all kinds of prophecy, and specially in the *Shorter Summary*. He says, 'Prophecy does not exist, and even if it did exist, things that come to pass must be counted nothing to us'. So much for his theory of morals, which he has discussed more fully elsewhere.

136 Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on *Choice and Avoidance* and in the book on *The End of Life* and in the first book *On Lives* and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of *Miscellanies* and Metrodorus in the *Timocrates* speak thus: 'Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static'. And Epicurus in the work on *Choice* speaks as follows: 'Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion'.

137 A further difference from the Cyrenaics: they thought that bodily pains were worse than those of the soul, and pointed out that offences are visited by bodily punishment. But Epicurus held that the pains of the soul are worse: for the flesh is only troubled for the moment, but the soul for past, present, and future. In the same way the plea-

ψυχῆς. ἀποδείξει δὲ χρήται τοῦ τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ τὰ
 ζῷα ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ
 προσκρούειν φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου. αὐτοπαθῶς οὖν
 φεύγομεν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα· ἵνα καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς καταβιβρωσκό-
 10 μενος ὑπὸ τοῦ χιτῶνος βοᾷ

δακρύων ἰύζων· ἀμφὶ δ' ἔστενον πέτραι,

Λοκρῶν τ' ὄρειοι πρῶνες Εὐβοίας τ' ἄκραι. |

138 Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι' αὐτάς,
 ὥσπερ τὴν ἱατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν· καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης
 ἐν τῇ κ' τῶν ἐπιλέκτων, ὅς καὶ διαγωγὴν λέγει τὴν ἀγωγὴν.
 ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ἀχώριστόν φησι τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν
 5 μόνην· τὰ δ' ἄλλα χωρίζεσθαι, οἷον βρωτά.

Καὶ φέρε οὖν δὴ νῦν τὸν κολοφῶνα, ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις,
 ἐπιθῶμεν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς συγγράμματος καὶ τοῦ βίου τοῦ
 φιλοσόφου, τὰς Κυρίας αὐτοῦ δόξας παραθέμενοι καὶ ταύταις
 τὸ πᾶν σύγγραμμα κατακλείσαντες, τέλει χρησάμενοι τῇ τῆς
 10 εὐδαιμονίας ἀρχῇ.

Sequuntur Sententiae.


10 χιτῶνος FP²H: χειμῶνος P¹: χειμόνος B βοᾷ Menagius:
 βοῇ libri (βοH B) 11 δακρύων Casaubon: δάκνων libri: βοῶν
 Soph. Trach. 787: δεινῶς Menagius: λάσκων Dobree: δάκνων
 Kochalsky ἰύζων B²FQH: [ἰ]ύ[ζ]ων P¹: ἡύζων B¹ ἔστενον]
 ἐκτίπουν Soph. Trach. 787 12 Λοκρῶν τ' FP²QH: Λοκρῶν τε
 BP¹: Λοκρῶν Soph. Trach. 788 ἄκραι BP²QH: ἄκρα F 138 1 οὐ
 δι' αὐτάς FH: οὐδ' αὐτάς? P¹: οὐ δι' αὐτάς BP²Q 5 βρωτά
 B²PQH: βρωτά B¹F: βρωτά (τινά) coniecit Usener

asures of the soul are greater. As proof that pleasure is the end he points out that all living creatures as soon as they are born take delight in pleasure, but resist pain by a natural impulse apart from reason. Therefore we avoid pain by instinct, just as Heracles, when he is being devoured by the shirt of Nessus, cries aloud

With tears and groans: the rocks re-echoed far
From Locris' mountain peaks, Euboea's hills.

- 138 He says that virtue is preferred for the sake of pleasure, and not for its own sake, just as the doctor's art is employed for the sake of health. So Diogenes says too in the 20th book of *Miscellanies*, and he adds that education is a 'way of life'. Epicurus says also that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, but that other things may be separated, such as things to eat.

Come, then, let us put the crown, as it were, to the whole work and to the life of our philosopher, in setting out his *Principal Doctrines* and closing the whole work with them, thus using as our conclusion the starting-point of happiness.



COMMENTARY

LETTER TO HERODOTUS

THE first letter, addressed to Herodotus, is an exposition of the main principles of Epicurus' system, intended, as he explains at once, not for the outside world or for novices, but for those who have already made some progress in acquiring the master's ideas. It accordingly assumes considerable knowledge on the part of the reader, especially of many of the technical terms and phrases used by him, and is often allusive and compendious. It is, moreover, carelessly written, and abounds in long sentences, which give the appearance of never having been thought out as a whole, but merely built up in the course of composition, as new thoughts and modifications occurred to the writer. It has no doubt suffered also in transmission, and consequently, as we have it, is one of the most difficult and obscure pieces of writing in the Greek language. Even in the sequence of the subjects treated it is dislocated and incoherent, but it seems useless to attempt to reconstitute a logical order of discussion.

The genuineness of the letter has never been contested, and it may be accepted as an example of Epicurus' esoteric and more crabbed style, just as the third letter is of the more lucid and polished style which he adopted when writing for a wider and less initiated audience. It is, with the exception of the poem of Lucretius, the most complete exposition of Epicurus' philosophy which we possess.

Of Herodotus, to whom the letter was written, we know nothing, except that he was of course a disciple and that he wrote a work *On the Youth of Epicurus* (*Vit.* § 4).

INTRODUCTION (§§ 35-37).

Epicurus explains his reasons for writing this new summary, which is intended as a reminder to those who have already made some advance in the comprehension of his system: it is to be a *résumé* of the chief points in the doctrine, to which they can refer and which they may commit to memory.

§ 35. 2. τὰς μείζους . . . βίβλους: i.e. Epicurus' more detailed works and in particular the *Περὶ φύσεως*, of which there were thirty-seven books (*Vit.* 27).

3. ἐπιτομήν: i.e. the work known as the μεγάλη ἐπιτομή, which was intended, as he explains here, chiefly for beginners, and set out the main principles in the different departments of the system. It was probably on this work in the main that Lucretius based the *De Rerum Natura* (see Giussani, *Stud. Lucr.*, p. 10). The present letter was sometimes known as the μικρά ἐπιτομή.

πραγματείας, 'the system': so Aristotle speaks of ἡ Πλάτωνος πραγματεία, *Metaph.* i. 6. 1.

4. κατασχέιν, 'to grasp', 'get by heart'. Cf. § 83 οὗτος ὁ λόγος δυνατὸς κατασχεθῆναι μετ' ἀκριβείας.

τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων γε δοξῶν, 'at least of the general principles covering the whole ground', *sc.* in the different departments. The variations in the MSS. strongly support Usener's suggestion of inserting γε, and it greatly improves the sense: it might not be possible for a beginner to retain the details of the system, but by the aid of the Greater Epitome he will at least comprehend the general ideas.

5. αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύασα. Usener quite unnecessarily alters to ἄν τις παρασκευάσαι, probably because he did not realize that Epicurus is referring to the Greater Epitome, and took the reference to be to the present letter. αὐτοῖς picks up τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, a not infrequent habit in Epicurus (cf. K. Δ. xxx, xxxii, xxxix, though the instances there are not quite so clumsy).

6. αὐτοῖς. An obviously necessary correction for the MS. αὐτοῖς.

7. καὶ τοὺς προβεβηκότας δὲ . . ., 'and those also who have made progress'. The more proficient disciples need reminding of the main principles, and for them the present letter is intended. It is certainly written in an 'esoteric' style. The point seems clear enough without reading καὶ δὴ καί, as Giussani suggests (*Stud. Lucr.*, p. 7, note 2).

8. τὸν τύπον . . . κατεστοιχειωμένον, 'the scheme of the whole system set out in its main principles'.

10. τῆς ἀθρόας ἐπιβολῆς. ἐπιβολή is one of the most difficult technical words in Epicurus. It is used without qualification here and in two other places in this paragraph, but it cannot be separated from ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας in §§ 38, 51, and K. Δ. xxiv. It means first a 'projection (of the mind or senses) towards an image', so an 'act of attention', and with the added idea of the result of the act 'view', 'apprehension'. So here 'we need the comprehensive grasp'. See also note on § 38, and a full discussion in Appendix, pp. 259 ff.

§ 36. 1. βαδιστέον ἐπ' ἐκείνα. ἐκείνα must be 'the general principles', τὰ ὅλα of § 35. 8, though the reference is not very explicit. For the form of the phrase cf. § 83 εἰ μὴ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα βαδίσῃ τις. The MSS. have καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνα συνεγῶς ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ, which is more easily and satisfactorily mended by Gassendi's transposition of καί after ἐπ' ἐκείνα, than by Usener's ἐν τε μνήμῃ or von der Muehl's ἐν δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ.

3. ἡ . . . κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολή: here again as in 6, 'the most essential view, grasp, comprehension' of the truth.

ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα: not simply 'over things', but over things as Epicurus saw them, 'the truth'. Cf. the use of *πραγματεία* above.

4. τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκρίβωμα, 'accurate knowledge in detail'. Cf. § 83 τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβομάτων.

6. τοῦ τετελεσιουργημένου, 'of the man who is perfected in the system', 'fully initiated'. Cf. § 83 ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων. Giussani apparently takes it as a neuter participle with τοῦ παντὸς ἀκριβώματος, 'of the perfect and complete knowledge of the whole system', but both the order and the parallel of § 83 are against this. Bignone agrees in taking it as masculine: von der Muehl unnecessarily reads the dative τῷ τετελεσιουργημένῳ.

7. τὸ . . . χρῆσθαι, 'to be able to make a rapid use of observation and mental apprehension'. ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς is used here in a rather more technical sense, and for the plural we must compare § 38 ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δῆποτε τῶν κριτηρίων: it means the 'apprehensions either by the mind or by the senses'. The truly initiated man must be able to interpret quickly what he perceives and to apply rapidly his mental conclusions.

8. καὶ . . . ὁ συναγομένων. The MS. text will not construe as it stands. Usener drastically corrects it ἐκάστων . . . ἀναγομένων, 'by referring everything to elementary principles and formulae'. But this is not quite the point, and the emendations are both considerable: it looks rather as if something were lost. Bignone supplies after *χρῆσθαι* (περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ περὶ τῶν ὄλων), but l. 3 shows that the preposition used after ἐπιβολή is ἐπὶ, not περί, and the correction ignores the καὶ of the MSS., nor again is the sense quite what is wanted. The initiate must be able to form his conclusions rapidly, and for this purpose he needs short mnemonic formulae. I therefore suggest that the words lost were something like (τοῦτο γίνουτ' ἐν ἀπάντων). Von der Muehl reads *συναγομένοις*, which I do not understand.

φωναί, probably 'formulae', made by the combination of *φθόγγοι* (§ 37. 6) and corresponding to *προλήψεις* in the mind.

9. τὸ πύκνωμα, 'the condensation, abbreviation, abridgement'.

10. τῆς . . . περιοδείας: lit. 'the continuous circuit of the whole system', 'elreult' because it is all so closely linked that it is constantly coming back on itself.

§ 37. α. φυσιολογίᾳ, 'the investigation of nature', but of course with the implication that it is the Epicurean method of investigation.

τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ: l. c. the course he has just suggested of resuming important points for the benefit of the initiated like Herodotus.

β. παρεγγυῶν . . . δοξῶν. A difficult clause in which I have with some hesitation accepted Usener's corrections. *παρεγγυῶν* τό is in effect the MS. text, *ἐνέργημα* has less authority than *ἐνάρχημα*, but it is impossible to make sense of the latter here, *τοιούτω* is a not very serious correction for *τὸ τοῦτων*, and *ἐγγαληνίζων* is as likely to be concealed by

the MS. variations as any other case of the participle. The most serious change is *ἐποίησά σοι* for *ποιήσασθαι*, but it seems required by the sense, and is the natural conclusion for this section. The whole sentence should be compared with the conclusion of the letter in § 83, where he comes back to the idea of the *γαληνισμός*, which results from the study of natural science.

παρεγγυών, 'recommending', like an officer passing along the watchword.

3. *τοιούτω*: Bignone proposes an alternative correction, *τοιούτος ὢν*, which is not palaeographically much better, and is awkward in combination with the other two participles.

I. METHODS OF PROCEDURE (§§ 37, 38).

Epicurus starts with a brief summary of the important points in his *Canonica*, which is to be regarded not so much as a 'Logic' of the system, for he had no belief in logic, but as 'rules of procedure', or, as it presented itself to him metaphorically, the 'measures (*κανόνες*) and squares and plumb-lines' with which the builder keeps his building straight (Lucr. iv. 513 ff.). For further references to the *Canonica* see Usener, pp. 175-190.

The first principle is one of language. Every word must correspond to an exact conception (*πρόληψις*) in the mind, and this conception must be the first and most obvious associated with the word.

6. *τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις*, 'that which is attached to sounds'—i.e. the ideas or conceptions (*πρόληψεις*) associated with words. *φθόγγοι* appear to be 'words' which in combination make *φωναί*.

7. *τὰ βεβαζόμενα*, 'matters of opinion'. According to Epicurean doctrine, the mind receives the data of sense-perception and makes its inferences from them. These inferences in themselves have no necessary validity, but must be tested by constant reference to sense-perception, and only accepted if they are confirmed (*ἐπιμαρτυρεῖται*) or not refuted (*οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται*) by it (cf. § 50). But sense-impressions by frequent repetition form in the mind general conceptions (*πρόληψεις*)—'composite photographs', as it were—and these *πρόληψεις*, being derived from sense-impressions, have an equal validity with the sense-impressions as a criterion of truth (cf. *Vit.* 31, 33). The *φθογγοί* are the symbols of the *πρόληψεις*.

ζητούμενα are problems concerned with the investigation of external things; *ἀπορούμενα*, problems raised in the mind, apart from immediate sense-impression.

9. *ἡμῖν* (*ἡ*): the MSS. read simply *ἡμῖν*, G alone adding *ῆ*, of which *ῆ* seems a simpler and safer correction than *ἡ*.

ἀποδεικνύουσιν, 'explaining' rather than 'proving', as Bignone points out.

§ 38. 1. *τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα*: in Epicurus' idea all thought proceeds by means of visualization, or more exactly, the *πρόληψεις* come before

the mind: an *ἐνόνημα* then is a 'mental image', and Epicurus therefore uses the verb *βλέπεσθαι*. We are to make it the rule to consider the 'first' image, i.e. the most literal picture associated with a word. Epicurus no doubt meant this rule partly to be a protest against the use of metaphorical language in philosophy, but it can hardly be said that he carried it out very successfully himself.

4. *ἔτι τε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις... 8. σημειωσόμεθα*. An extremely difficult sentence involving several highly technical notions. Having dealt with the phraseology to be used in investigation, Epicurus passes now to the methods of investigation. The order is somewhat illogical because, as we have seen, the determination of the phraseology really involves the standards of judgement. He starts with the simple principle, which is the keystone of the whole metaphysic of Epicureanism *κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν*, 'all our investigations' (*πάντα* takes its content from the general tone of the context) 'must be controlled by sensations'. Sensations are infallible; their evidence must always be accepted at once, when it is available, and in cases where it is not (*ἀδελλα*), any hypothesis must be submitted to the test of sensation, and only accepted if it is not then contradicted (§ 50). Similarly, in the field of morality or conduct, the *ὑπάρχοντα πάθη*—the immediate feelings of pleasure and pain must be the supreme test: pleasure is good, pain is bad (cf. Ep. iii. 129 *ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες*). Thus far the idea is clear: we are left with the words *καὶ ἀπλῶς (κατὰ) τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δῆποτε τῶν κριτηρίων*, which are fully discussed in the Appendix on *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας*, pp. 259 ff. We may sum up the conclusions there reached thus: the *ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας* are the 'apprehensions of mental images' of things imperceptible by the senses in two cases: (a) when certain images too subtle to be perceived by the senses, make their way directly into the mind and are 'apprehended' by it in a kind of secondary sense-perception; such especially are the images of the gods; (b) when the concepts of science are grasped by an act of attention on the part of the mind employing the process of verification which consists in their reference to the test of sensation and finding that they are not contradicted (*οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται*). The *ἐπιβολαὶ τῶν κριτηρίων* are similar 'acts of apprehension' on the part of the senses (*κριτήριον* is here used in an active sense of the 'instrument of judgement'), which are not now content to receive a merely passive impression, but 'look' or 'listen' actively in order to obtain confirmatory evidence (*ἐπιμαρτύρησις*) with regard to the 'problem awaiting solution' (*προσμένον*) by means of the 'clear view' (*ἐναργές*). This process is exactly parallel to the second process of the *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας*. For the whole idea of the *ἐπιβολαὶ* compare phrases in §§ 50, 51, 62, and K. Δ. xxiv, and for the processes of verification by the test of the senses § 50 *fin.* and notes there. *ἔτι τε*, Arndt, seems a more satisfactory correction of the MSS. *εἴτε* than Usener's *ἔπειτα*.

5. ἀπλῶς probably means 'in particular': though Epicurus insisted that every αἴσθησις was true, i.e. the image formed in the sense-organ corresponded exactly to the 'idols' that fell upon it, he insisted no less strongly that before we allow opinion to pronounce upon the nature of the object (στερέμνιον) from which the 'idols' originally came, we must get the confirmation of the 'nearer view'. The 'nearer view' obtained by ἐπιβολή was thus in reality a surer indication of the truth of the image to the objective reality than the original passive αἴσθησις. This Epicurus never liked to admit, as it undermined the validity of αἴσθησις as a criterion of truth, but the latter is not without indications, such as this, that he preferred the clear view of ἐπιβολή, and indeed for purposes of scientific investigation demanded it.

τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολάς means 'the immediate apprehensions' apart from any addition made to them by δόξα: cf. the exactly parallel phrase in K. Δ. xxiv τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας.

6. τῶν κριτηρίων cannot be here used in its full technical sense of the 'standards of judgement', which are αἴσθησις, πάθος, and πρόληψις (and, according to later Epicureans, ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (*Vit. Ep.* § 31)), because αἴσθησις and πάθος are separately mentioned, and you cannot have an ἐπιβολή τῆς προλήψεως (still less an ἐπιβολή τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς διανοίας). I take the word both here and in § 51 ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων to mean 'the individual senses' sight, hearing, smell, &c., regarded in their capacity as κριτήρια, 'instruments of judgement'. Giussani wrongly interprets the word in a general sense 'signs' or 'indications', and propounds a most improbable explanation.

If the general view here taken is correct, we must follow Gassendi in reading κατὰ before τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολάς and Giussani in changing καὶ before τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη to κατὰ. Otherwise we get the statement that the αἰσθήσεις are to control the various ἐπιβολαί and the πάθη, which is impossible for Epicurus. Bignone reaches the same sense by omitting κατὰ after ἔτι τε, reading πάντων for πάντα and then preserving the MS. text. But this is palaeographically improbable, and the expression τὰς αἰσθήσεις . . . πάντων seems very unlike Epicurus. Von der Muehl reads here τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως τηρεῖν, but πάντως is difficult, I doubt the phrase τὰς αἰσθήσεις τηρεῖν and the whole idea is not so Epicurean.

7. ὅπως ἂν . . . σημειωσόμεθα. Notice the implied parallelism of ideas: the προσμένον, the problem of sensation, is to be solved by an ἐπιβολή of one or other of the senses, the ἄδηλον, the problem of thought, by the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας. Epicurus is also harking back to the beginning of the section: there the ζητούμενα are the problems of sense-investigation, the ἀπορούμενα the problems of thought.

II. THE UNIVERSE AND ITS CONSTITUENTS.

A. *Things imperceptible: the three principles.*

Epicurus plunges at once into the discussion of the *ἄδηλα*, the ultimate constituents of the universe, which never could fall within the ken of the senses. He here enunciates with brief proofs three fundamental principles: (1) that nothing is created out of nothing; (2) that nothing is destroyed into nothing; (3) a deduction from the two former principles—the universe is ever the same. The first two principles had already been enunciated by Empedocles and Anaxagoras and adopted by Democritus, whom Epicurus is here following.

The first principle that 'nothing is created out of nothing' really covers two important ideas: (1) in general, that the sum of matter is never increased by new additions, and (2) in reference to particulars, that every material object has a material cause. The proof seems at first sight irrelevant as it appears to deny fresh creation on the ground that there is not indiscriminate creation. But it is based as usual on the appeal to the evidence of sensation: every creation of which we have cognizance implies a previous 'seed': but if 'spontaneous creation' were possible, things would be created without 'seeds', which sensation denies. Lucretius elaborates the proof at great length in i. 159-214.

9. Ταῦτα . . . διαλαβόντας: lit. 'having made these distinctions', i.e. between the right and wrong use of words and the true and false standards of judgement.

δεῖ: either δεῖ must be read here for δέ or it must be inserted with Meibom after ἦδη or with von der Muehl after διαλαβόντας.

συνορᾶν, 'to consider', 'obtain a comprehensive view of': notice again the suggestion of thought as visualization.

περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων, 'imperceptible things', such as never could come within the cognizance of the senses. Of these Epicurus distinguishes two classes: (1) certain atomic compounds too subtle to be perceived by the senses, which yet make themselves known directly to the mind by means of εἰδωλα: e.g. the gods (cf. Lucr. v. 148-149); (2) imperceptible things which cannot be perceived by εἰδωλα even by the mind, and can only be reached by ratiocination; e.g. the atoms and space, the ultimate constituents of the universe. He also sometimes applies the term *ἄδηλα* loosely to phenomena so distant that the near view of them cannot be obtained: e.g. τὰ μετέωρα.

11. ἐγίγνετ'. Usener's suggestion in the notes that ἐγίγνετ' should be read is contradicted by ἐφθείρετο in the next line, and is inconsistent with Epicurus' view of creation as a continual process: 'sporadic creation' would be going on now.

§ 38. The second principle that 'nothing is destroyed into the non-existent' is the complement of the first, and like it has two implications: (1) in general, that the sum of matter is never decreased by any

absolute loss—the principle of the ‘permanence of matter’; (2) that no individual thing is utterly destroyed, but only dissolved into its component particles (see *Lucr.* i. 215, 216). The proof is again succinctly put, but more obviously than that of the first principle. If everything which passed from our ken (τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον) utterly passed out of existence, then seeing that this process of ‘perishing’ is always going on all round us, the whole sum of nature would long ago have been destroyed. As it is, destruction is prevented by the ‘seeds’. Again Lucretius elaborates at great length (i. 217–264).

2. οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο, ‘since the things into which they were dissolved did not exist’. This clause is the link between the two principles: it is the existence of the permanent σπέρματα which secures the permanence of the universe, and this existence is of course the ultimate basis of the atomic theory.

The third principle that ‘the universe is unchanging’ is in part a deduction from the other two: if nothing is ever added by fresh creation from the non-existent, the universe cannot increase: if nothing is ever destroyed into nothing, the universe cannot decrease. The expression here is very compressed, and Epicurus only uses the latter of these two arguments explicitly in the last clause; the former is implied. Moreover the argument is expressed from the point of view of change, which is slightly different from that of the previous clauses. Change, in Epicurus’ view, is always destruction: see the constantly recurring and almost axiomatic lines in Lucretius (i. 670, &c.):

nam quodcunque suis mutatum finibus exit,
continuo hoc mors est illius quod fuit ante.

In the parallel passage of Lucretius ii. 304 ff., which was probably based on the Greater Epitome; it is implied that there are three possibilities by which the universe might change: (1) if there were anything outside it into which any part of it might escape; (2) if there were anywhere from which a new force might enter the universe and alter it. These two causes are those most prominent in this section. But there is another (3), the possibility of change by internal rearrangement, which might at first sight seem, in view of the constant dissolution and recombination of the atomic compounds, to be a cause actually at work in the universe. Epicurus’ answer lies in the conception of equilibrium (ἰσονομία): the atoms, not infinite but unlimited in number, have long ago entered into all possible combinations and nothing new can be created by their combinations. This Lucretius (ii. 297 ff.) puts vividly:

quapropter quo nunc in motu principiorum
corpora sunt, in eodem ante acta aetate fuere
et posthac semper simili ratione ferentur,
et quae consuerint gigni gignentur eadem
condicione et erunt et crescent vique valebunt,
quantum cuique datumst per foedera naturai.

Bignone (Appendix, iii, p. 253) has rightly called attention to this

third point, and sees a reference to it in the words οὐθέν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς δ μεταβαλεῖ. I think on the whole that it is more probable that this sentence refers to the first of the causes enumerated above, change due to dissolution into something else; but the idea of change by internal alteration seems to be lurking in Epicurus' mind, as is shown by his use of μεταβάλλειν.

4. μεταβάλλει is the reading of all the MSS. and can, I think, be retained, although Usener's correction μεταβαλεῖ would produce a more normal construction. Brieger's omission of εἰς would make the clause a mere tautology of what follows, and is based on a misunderstanding. Still more so is Giussani's violent change παρὰ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν οὐθέν ἐστιν εἰς δ μεταβαλεῖ ἢ δ ἂν εἰσελθὼν . . .

5. οὐθέν ἐστιν, δ . . . Bignone thinking that there should be direct mention of the possibility of change by loss would amplify οὐθέν ἐστιν δ(ποι ἂν τι ἐξέλθοι, ἢ δ) ἂν εἰσελθὼν . . . But this is unnecessary, if we can suppose that this cause of change is implied in the previous sentence.

6. ποιήσαιο: a curious use of the middle, but it is unnecessary to alter to ποιῆσαι with Usener, or with Crönert to ποιῆσαι (δύναι)το. Epicurus not infrequently employs the middle unexpectedly.

B. Bodies and space.

Epicurus proceeds at once to consider the constitution of the universe. It consists of bodies (matter) and space. That body exists is attested by the universal experience of mankind, and space must needs exist in order that bodies may exist and move in it. The line of argument is familiar in Epicurean writings (the Scholiast here notes that it recurred both in the Greater Epitome and in the Περὶ φύσεως) and is closely followed with some amplification by Lucr. i. 419-448.

7. (σώματα καὶ τόπος): the addition made by Usener is amply justified by Ep. ii. 86 τὸ πᾶν σώματα καὶ ἀναφῆς φύσις, by quotations from Epicurus in Sext. *adv. Dogm.* iii. 333 (Fr. 13) and Plut. *adv. Col.* 11, p. 1112c (Fr. 14), and by Lucr. i. 420. The omission is due to 'haplography'. Arndt and Kochalsky propose to read τὸ πᾶν ἐστι without any addition, but it is absurd that he should here state the existence of the universe after assuming it in the previous section, and the following sentence would then be left without connexion.

8. αὐτῇ ἢ αἰσθησις: we are at every moment conscious of the existence of bodies and our consciousness cannot be denied. Reason must take its evidence from the senses in judging of ἄδηλα.

ἐπὶ πάντων: not neuter 'on all occasions' but 'before the eyes of', as often in legal phraseology (e.g. Dem. 781. 4 ἐλέγχεσθαι ἐπὶ πάντων). This is proved by Lucr. i. 422 'corpus enim per se communis dedicat esse sensus'.

9. ὥσπερ προείπον: sc. § 38.

10. τὸ πρόσθεν: Usener's τόπος δέ is an unnecessary emendation

of the MS. τὸ πρόσθεν: δέ must be inserted, as Gassendi saw, after εἰ.

§ 40. 1. δ κενόν . . . Epicurus' list of synonyms is carefully reproduced by Lucretius: τόπος = *locus*, κενόν = *inane*, χώρα = *spatium*: ἀναφής φύσις is represented by the adjective *intactile* in i. 437 (cf. *intactus*, 'intangibility', i. 454). The words are used as absolute synonyms by Epicurus, but their interchangeable use suggests an uncertainty, and Epicurus seems to oscillate between the ideas of 'space' = extension in an almost mathematical sense, and the more concrete notion of the 'unoccupied space' between bodies. δ has the best MS. authority: Usener reads δν from the δν of some MSS., to agree with τόπος in his emendation.

2. ἀναφή φύσιν regards space from a slightly different point of view and leads up to the mention of properties. The one property of space, that by which alone it can be known, is that 'it cannot be touched': but it is a φύσις—an existence—just as matter is a φύσις. The idea really goes back to the controversies of Leucippus and Democritus with their opponents. 'The real' (τὸ δν), said Leucippus, meaning what his opponents called real, i.e. matter, 'exists not a whit more than the unreal, the void exists no less than matter'.

3. καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα. Notice again the appeal to sense, but in this case it cannot be so direct: sensation cannot tell us of the existence of the void, as it can of body. But it does tell us of the positions and motions of bodies: and neither position nor motion is possible without 'empty space'. Here then we have a case of the μαρτύρησις of phenomena.

παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . . Epicurus repeats his position from a slightly different point of view, stating it now negatively. Besides bodies and space there is nothing else which exists as a 'complete thing' (ὅλη φύσις), nothing, that is, which has an independent existence. Anything else we can conceive (e.g. a quality or a state) has an existence dependent on or relative to something else, is, as Epicurus says, a property (συμβεβηκός) or accident (σύμπτωμα) of body or space. Lucretius is again (i. 430-432, 445-448) following closely and goes on naturally enough to discuss properties and accidents, a subject relegated in the letter (possibly out of place) to § 68. Bignone notes that Epicurus' view is here stated in opposition to the Platonic theory of ideas and to any spiritual view of the ψυχή.

4. οὔτε περιληπτικῶς οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς, 'neither by way of conception nor on the analogy of conceivable things'. Epicurus' idea of thought is 'always the grasping (περιλαμβάνειν) of a visual image (εἶδωλον)—sometimes this is the πρόληψις, which has been formed in the mind by a succession of εἶδωλα from outside (περιληπτικῶς), sometimes by a combination of images the mind forms an image of its own (ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς)'.

Usener is probably right in regarding the form περιληπτῶς in the MSS. as impossible and emending to περιληπτικῶς.

5. ὥς . . . λαμβανόμενα . . . λεγόμενα. There seems no need to follow Usener in emending to ὅσα . . . λαμβάνομεν . . . λέγομεν: the construction is loose, but not too loose for Epicurus.

6. συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα: cf. § 68 and notes there.

7. καὶ μὴν καὶ . . . Having established matter and void as the sole existences, Epicurus proceeds to consider the form in which matter or body exists. 'Body' is an ambiguous term. We normally mean by it material things, such as we perceive: these are in reality compounds (συγκρίσεις) of matter and void. In its more technical sense it means 'absolute matter', matter apart from void. Once more Lucretius follows closely (i. 483, 484):

corpora sunt porro partim primordia rerum,
partim concilio quae constant principiorum.

§ 41. 1. ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν . . . This 'absolute matter' exists in the form of indivisible, unalterable particles, 'atoms'. Epicurus' very brief proof—that otherwise the dissolution of things would mean their absolute destruction—is elaborated by Lucretius into a long series of arguments to show that the ultimate particles are 'solid, single, and eternal' (i. 503-634, especially 540-550).

ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, 'they cannot be separated into smaller particles, nor can there be any internal change by rearrangement of their parts', both ideas come directly to Epicurus from Democritus, but the latter has greatly elaborated in the conception of the πέρατα, §§ 56, 57.

3. ἰσχύόν τι. The MSS. have ἰσχύοντα, but (a) it cannot be taken with πάντα, for Epicurus could not have said 'all things remain strong', meaning that their component particles so remained, (b) Bignone's suggestion that it might refer to ταῦτα at the beginning of the sentence would involve a considerable stretch of grammatical probability. Usener emends to ἰσχύειν τι, but ἰσχύειν as a mere equivalent of δύνασθαι is unlikely. E. Rohde in a MS. note in his copy of Usener, now in my possession, suggested ἰσχύοντά τινα, which is on the right lines: the things are dissolved but 'some permanent existences' remain, i.e. the atoms survive. I suggest (and I now find that Bignone in his notes has the same proposal) ἰσχύόν τι, 'something with strength', 'something permanent', which is nearer to the MS. text. The participle is strongly confirmed by § 54 ἐπειδήπερ δεῖ τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον, and by Lucretius' recurrent description of the atoms in the corresponding passage as 'solida pollentia simplicitate' (i. 574, 612).

Crönert's ὑπομενεῖν for ὑπομένειν is hardly necessary in Epicurus in spite of φθαρήσεσθαι.

4. πλήρη: i.e. each of the atoms is a solid corporeal *plenum* without any admixture of void.

ὄντα: the MS. ὅταν is clearly a mistake: Bignone's correction οἷα δὴ is less satisfactory than Usener's ὄντα, and Meibom's ὄντα καὶ is hardly necessary.

ἄπη ἢ ἄπως: quite literally, there is no part of themselves in which they could break up and no means by which they could do it—another anticipation of the idea of the *πέρατα*.

C. *Infinity of the universe.*

Epicurus proceeds to a new point. The universe, the sum-total that is of body + space (τὸ πᾶν), is infinite. This he proves characteristically by an appeal to sense-experience. In the case of any limited thing, you must come to the end of it, and you perceive its end 'against something else', i.e. as standing out against something which is not 'it'. But in the case of the universe there is no such end and nothing outside it. The argument is brought out more clearly by Lucretius (i. 958-964):

omne quod est igitur nulla regione viarum
finitumst; namque extremum debebat habere.
extremum porro nullius posse videtur
esse, nisi ultra sit quod finiat; ut videatur
quo non longius haec sensus natura sequatur.
nunc extra summum quoniam nil esse fatendum,
non habet extremum, caret ergo fine modoque.

It is clearly illustrated by the famous problem of the throwing of the spear (968-983).

7. παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. Usener, thinking the argument is incomplete as it stands, suggests (Intro., p. xviii) that a clause has been lost by 'homoeoteleuton': ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πᾶν οὐ παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται, the equivalent of which is found in Cic. *de Div.* ii. 50. 103 'at quod omne est, id non cernitur ex alio extrinsecus'. But I agree with Bignone that in a brief epitome like this it is quite likely that one step in the argument was omitted.

9. καὶ μὴν καὶ . . . Not only is the universe infinite as a whole, but each of its two component parts is infinite, 'the bodies' in number, space in extent. For (if the whole is infinite, one or other or both of its constituents must be infinite—another omitted step conscientiously supplied in Lucr. i. 1008 ff.), and (a) a limited number of atoms in infinite void could never meet or remain in union to form things, (b) unlimited atoms in finite space would not have room to take up their place (an argument slightly varied by Lucretius in i. 988-1007).

§ 42. 3. οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰ ὑπερέειδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀνακοπὰς. The idea involves the Epicurean cinetics. The atoms are continually falling in the void of their own weight, but they swerve from time to time owing to the *παρέγκλισις* (Lucr. ii. 216 ff.) and this causes them to collide. The result of constant collisions is that they are driven off in all directions, even upwards, and are so both prevented from falling and kept in their places within compounds. The *ἀνακοπή* is the single

blow which lies at the basis of the process of ἀντικοπή (see §§ 46 b, 47 b). Meibom's proposal to read ἀντικοπᾶς here is out of place.

4. οὐκ ἂν εἴχε . . . : i.e. there would not be room for infinite atoms in limited space. Lucretius (l. 988 ff.) argues rather differently that the particles would all collect in a mass at the bottom of limited space. The two ideas differ only in the relative extent attributed to a limited space.

D. Differences of shape in the atoms.

Epicurus' position on this point is a little unexpected and needs explanation. The varieties of shape in the atoms are caused by the number and arrangement of their πέρατα—their inseparable parts. In order to produce the great variety of perceptible things—συνγκρίσεις—the variety of atomic shapes must be immensely large. But Epicurus is unwilling to say that it is infinite for a reason which becomes clear in § 56. Further variety of shape can only be produced by the increase in the number of πέρατα in the atoms, and if this increase were carried on to infinity, the atoms would become so large as to be perceptible to the senses. Democritus had indeed boldly said that some atoms are μέγιστα, but Epicurus, feeling that the evidence of sense-perception was against this conclusion, decided that the varieties of atomic shape were not infinite, but only inconceivably many. See Lucr. ii. 478 ff.

6. μεσotά, 'compact', 'solid'; one of the regular atomic words to denote the solidity and unbreakability of the atoms.

7. ἀπερίληπτα, 'incomprehensible', 'not to be grasped by the mind': see the note on περιληπτικῶς (§ 40). The idea is again visual: you could not put the varieties of shape together and conceive them as a collection with a boundary round the outside.

9. τὰς τοσαύτας διαφοράς: i.e. in συνγκρίσεις.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων: i.e. in the atoms. One MS. (G) omits αὐτῶν, but there seems no reason to suspect it: 'by repeating the same shapes' we might say.

περιελημμένων, 'limited'; so as to become comprehensible in number.

10. καθ' ἐκάστην δέ: though the number of shapes is only incomprehensible, the number of atoms of each shape is infinite: this idea greatly assists the possibility of the formation of compound bodies with so vast a variety of shape.

11. οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄπειροι, 'not quite infinite': an almost colloquial use.

12. After ἀπερίληπτοι the MSS. have the words οὐδὲ γὰρ φησιν ἐνδοτέρω ('further on', sc. § 56) εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν, λέγει δέ, ἐπειδὴ αἱ ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται, εἰ μέλλει τις μὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀπλῶς εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν. This has generally been recognized by editors as a scholium, as is shown by its introductory words. Bignone (*Atti della Reale Acc. delle Scienze di Torino* xlvii, 1912, pp. 680 ff.)

has shown that Usener's emendation of λέγει to λήγειν is unnecessary, and that the general sense is that if you deny infinite division, as Epicurus did, and yet wish to account for variations in quality in things, you still need not suppose an infinite variety of atomic shapes, and if you do, some will become so large as to be visible. Von der Muehl would retain the words εἰ μέλλει . . . ἐκβάλλειν in the text, which is possibly right, as it completes the argument, but it makes the scholium leave off very abruptly at μεταβάλλονται.

E. Motion of the atoms.

The never-ceasing motion of the atoms and the consequent internal vibration in compound bodies is a very important point in Epicurean physics and is treated at length by Lucretius (ii. 80-332). The present statement is very much abbreviated and entirely confined to the internal movement in compounds. It is however fairly certain, as modern editors assume, that something must have been lost in which Epicurus dealt with the two primary causes of atomic motion, their weight, which causes them to fall downwards at an equal rate in the void, and the swerve (παρέγκλισις, *clinamen*) which produces their collisions and constant motion in all directions. The text resumes where he is describing the internal movement of the atoms inside compounds: there some atoms recoil at great distance, and thus constitute rarified bodies, such as air and fire, in which there is a large admixture of void, others are kept more closely together either by their own interlacings, as in hard solids, or by the interlacing of an outer atomic 'case' which confines them, as in the case of liquids. In such compounds there is a constant internal vibration of atoms, recoiling at short distances between their collisions with one another.

§ 43. 1. καὶ αἱ μὲν . . . Bignone places the lacuna here, and suggests as giving its general form the words (κατὰ στάθμην, αἱ δὲ κατὰ παρέγκλισιν, αἱ δὲ κατὰ παλμόν. τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν φέρονται). This will fit well with the context and is fairly clearly what a lost passage might have contained. Usener places the lacuna after τὸν αἰῶνα, but does not indicate its exact contents. It is almost inconceivable that Epicurus should not have spoken of the two primary causes of atomic motion, and it is noticeable that in the letter as we have it there is no mention at all of the all-important doctrine of the παρέγκλισις, which would have come in naturally here.

2. αἱ δὲ αὖ τὸν παλμόν is Usener's correction for the MS. reading αἱ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν παλμόν. It is difficult to attach much meaning to αὐτὸν, though it would be easier if mention of the παλμός had been made in the lost passage. The correction to αὖ is simple, αὐτὸν having resulted from the repetition of τὸν. Von der Muehl, following Brieger, reads αὐτοῦ, 'there', sc. in the compound. The παλμός is of course the internal vibration within close compounds resulting from the constant movement and recoil of the constituent atoms.

3. ἴσχουσιν, not merely 'have' but 'keep up'. Usener suggests the correction ἴσχουσαι, but (a) if Bignone's idea of the form of the lost passage is correct, the indicative would be natural; (δ) even otherwise this abrupt breaking away from exact parallelism in clauses is very much in Epicurus' manner.

τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλιμένοι . . . Epicurus assumes two varieties of these closer compounds. In one the atoms, those still moving in the παλμός, are actually interlaced with one another as in most solids, in the other there is as it were an outer case of interlaced atoms, which shuts in a number of other atoms moving freely within it (στεγάζομεναι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν). It was in this latter form that he conceived the body of fluids. The MSS. have τὴν περιπλοκὴν, but it is impossible to construe the accusative.

4. παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν, G only, must be right as against the περὶ of the other MSS.

§ 44. 1. ἡ τε γὰρ . . . Epicurus' explanation of the twofold cause of the internal vibration is rather obscure. When the atoms have entered a compound they are unable to stay still because they are even now individually surrounded by void, which offers no resistance to their movement; on the other hand, their constant collision with other perfectly hard and unyielding atoms makes them recoil in all directions.

2. αὐτῇν: emphatically predicative, 'each by itself'. The αὐτῶν of G seems pointless and Meibom's correction ἀτομον needless, and not in Epicurus' manner.

4. κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν, 'on their collision', almost 'as the result of their collision'.

ἐφ' ὅποσον ἂν . . . This is clearly a greater distance in the case of atoms in the fluid body than in the solid.

6. τούτων, 'these motions'.

οὐκ ἔστιν. Usener's suggested addition οὐδὲ τέλος is quite unnecessary.

αἰτίων. Usener adopted H. Weil's conjecture αἰδίων, and it has been received by subsequent editors. But there seems no need for it: 'there is no beginning to these motions, because their cause is the atoms and the void', and they are the ultimate constituents of the universe which here existed for all eternity. Kochalsky would read ἀναίτιων, 'uncaused' (*ursachlos*), but such a meaning is surely doubtful.

§ 45. 1. Ἡ τοσαύτη δὴ . . . : a short conclusion to this section, which would perhaps be better in place after the next paragraph. It is expressed in the material terms of the Epicurean phraseology. In order to have a visual image (ἐπίνοια) of unseen things, the mind must have an example (τύπος) on which to build. This example is given in the audible sounds (φωνή) of Epicurus' words, the written text being regarded, as always in Greek, as a record of the spoken words. τοσαύτη δὴ has better MS. authority than τοσαύτη δὲ and is more

natural. Bignone takes it to mean 'of so great importance', but it surely means 'so brief'.

2. τῆς . . . ἐπινοίας. The MSS. have ἐπινοίας which Usener keeps, inserting (ταῖς περὶ) before τῆς. But Z f have ἐπινοίας, which Bignone adopts, and the correction is simpler. For the construction of τύπον with gen. he compares § 35 τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας.

F. Infinite number of worlds.

This section comes as a sort of afterthought. Other worlds than our own are in fact another kind of ἄλλα, not because, like the atoms and space, they are in their nature imperceptible, but because we can never perceive them. It was a regular tenet of the atomic school that there is an infinite number of worlds, some like ours, some unlike, and differing too from one another. The proof given by Epicurus is also traditional, that with infinite atoms moving in space the sequence of their movements will cause the creation of other worlds just as it has of this world: no limited number of worlds could exhaust the supply of matter. Lucretius (ii. 1023-1089) argues also from the typically Epicurean idea that nothing is unique, and that on the whole there is about an equal number of all things (ἰσονομία).

3. οἱ θ' has the support of the majority of the MSS.: the alternative εἰθ' would involve the change made by f of καὶ οἱ to εἶτε. τούτῳ is of course 'our world'.

4. αἷ τε γάρ. The τε suggests a complementary clause with reference to the infinite extent of space and something may have dropped out, as is suggested by the parallel passage of Lucretius ii. 1053-1055:

undique cum versum spatium vacet infinitum
seminaque innumero numero summaque profunda
multimodis volitent aeterno percita motu.

ὡς ἄρτι ἀπεδείχθη: sc. in § 42.

6. ἐξ ὧν . . . ποιηθείη. It is difficult to see the difference between the two clauses. Perhaps ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο refers rather to the original creation of the world, ὅφ' ὧν ἂν ποιηθείη to its maintenance.

7. οὐθ' ὅσοι . . . διάφοροι τούτοις. τούτοις is the reading of all the MSS.: the parallel of οἱ θ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ would lead one to expect τούτῳ here, 'like or unlike our world', but there is no authority for the change. The idea then must be a new one, 'neither all those which are like one another nor all those which are different from these', i.e. from those which are alike.

III. SENSE-PERCEPTION.

A. Sight by means of the 'images'.

Epicurus now starts on a quite different topic. αἴσθησις is the foundation of the Epicurean theory of knowledge, and it is therefore

necessary to know how it is brought about. He starts directly on sight and enunciates the main theory that it is caused by 'images' which come off from things and travelling through the intervening air collide with the organs of sense and so cause perception. The theory was inherited from the Atomists and is described by Lucretius in a section which, though not closely following the present treatment, in many respects throws light on it (iv. 46-268).

(1) The 'images'. The first section gives a very careful description of the 'images'. They are in fact a film or framework, the outer atomic 'case' of things which comes off from the surface. It is thus hollow within and extremely thin. Here again we are dealing with something beyond the ken of the senses, and according to the *Canonica*, the theory may be accepted, if it is not contrary to our experience. This accounts for the strangely negative form of the proof *οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστάσεις ἀδυνατούσιν* . . .

§ 46^a. 1. *τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμονες*, 'images like in shape or outline' to the solid bodies from which they come. Cf. *Lucr. iv. 51-52* :

*quod speciem ac formam similem gerit eius imago
cuiuscumque cluet de corpore fusa vagari.*

2. *τῶν φαινομένων*, 'the objects of sense', a traditional philosophic term, rather oddly used by Epicurus, in whose theory external objects are never directly perceived except by touch. The 'subtlety' of the images far exceeds that of the objects, so that they can never be perceived by touch but only by the organs of sense.

3. *ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι*, 'in whatever surrounds the object', a perfectly vague phrase: in the case of the majority of things it is of course the air.

4. *τῆς κατεργασίας*. The MSS. are divided between *τούς*, *τάς*, and *ταῖς*, which points to some case of the article; the variations may be due, as Kochalsky suggests, to a mistaking of the rare *ἐπιτηδεύτητες* for some case of the superlative of *ἐπιτήδειος*. *τῆς* therefore seems a simpler solution than Usener's *πρός*, the genitive being a perfectly natural construction after *ἐπιτηδεύτητες*.

τῶν κοιλωμάτων καὶ λεπτοτήτων. I take this to be a very careful description of the 'images', which are merely films or cases, hollow within and extremely thin in the outer crusts. Usener emended to *λειοτήτων* and took the whole phrase to mean, as Hicks translates, 'materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and smoothness of the surfaces', i.e. of reproducing those of the original object: so Bignone. This seems to be quite unnecessary and really to anticipate: Epicurus does not come to the relation of the image to the object till the next clause.

5. *θέσιν καὶ βάσιν*: *θέσις* is the position held by the atom in relation to itself (i.e. whether it is upside down or on its side), *βάσις* its place in the series with reference to its neighbours. The words correspond to the *τροπή* and *διαθίγη* of Leucippus, which Aristotle

explains to mean *θέσις* and *τάξις*: Giussani wishes to emend *βάσιν* to *τάξιν*, but that is unnecessary. The importance of the preservation of these positions in the 'image' is that it enables it to reproduce not only the shape but also the colour of the object, colour being due to the arrangement and movements of the atoms. Cf. *θέσιν καὶ τάξιν* below, § 48.

§ 48. καὶ μὴν καὶ . . . § 47. τοῦτο κατασχέιν τὸ στοιχείον. There follows a considerable section which interrupts the sequence of thought about the *εἰδωλα* and deals with the motion of atoms in the void and in compounds. Giussani suggested its transposition to §§ 61, 62, where he adjusted the two sentences naturally to the context, and with some hesitation I follow him. Bignone (*Epicuro*, Appendix I, II) has argued at length for the retention of the passage in its place, regarding it as a preliminary explanation of the general principles of atomic motion intended to lead up to the discussion of the motion of the *simulacra* at the end of § 47. But (1) it seriously interrupts the sequence here: Epicurus states at the outset of § 46 that there are 'images like in shape to the objects', and that 'they far surpass perceptible things in subtlety'. The first statement he immediately confirms in the sentence *οὐτε γὰρ ἀποστάσεις . . .*, the second is dealt with in the words *εἴθ' ὅτι τὰ εἰδωλα . . .*. It is most improbable that these clauses should be interrupted by a long discussion of atomic motion intended to explain the subsequent *ὅθεν καὶ τάχῃ ἀνυπέρβλητα ἔχει*. Even if the explanation is required, it is not in place. (2) In order to obtain the reference to the *simulacra* Bignone has to adopt an improbable emendation in the text (*τὰποφερόμενον σῶμα*). (3) The sentences fit admirably in the place to which Giussani transfers them in §§ 61, 62, and indeed seem necessary there to complete the argument. It is best therefore to regard these sentences as belonging to the later context and transferred here by a scribe in order to assist the understanding of what is undoubtedly an anticipation of the general ideas of the atomic cinetics at the end of § 47: such an anticipation Epicurus might well make in a letter intended for persons already acquainted with the system. Von der Muehl retains the sentences here and believes them to refer to the motion of the *εἰδωλα*, but they seem to me to contain many statements quite inapplicable to the 'images'.

§ 47^a. (2) The subtlety and speed of the images. Having said that nothing in sense-experience contradicts the possibility of the formation of images, Epicurus proceeds to state that there is similarly nothing to contradict the notion of their extreme subtlety. This is the normal Epicurean 'proof' with regard to *ἄδηλα*. He then proceeds to deduce from their subtlety an extreme speed in motion. The text here is uncertain and the argument difficult as it assumes a knowledge of the Epicurean cinetics (see §§ 61, 62). Briefly the idea is this: the unimpeded atom passes through space at 'inconceivable' (*ἀπερινοήτω*) speed: the only cause of delay is collision, which causes

arrest during the infinitely brief time of contact, and then the atom moves again at 'atomic' speed. In a compound body there are two causes of delay: firstly, it may collide with other bodies outside itself; secondly, the collisions and movements in all directions of the atoms which compose it delay the motion of the whole body, and it is only through this delay that its motion becomes perceptible. (For both kinds of collision Epicurus uses the word *ἀντικοπή*.) Now the 'images' are mainly fine in texture: they are shot off from the body by the impulse of atomic movement within it, which starts the whole complex film in movement in one direction, they can move through space without encountering any—or only a few—obstacles, and there is little or no internal vibration. For these reasons the images are able to move almost at atomic speed: they are imperceptible in their transit, and it is only when they touch our eyes that we then perceive them. Lucr. iv. 176–229 deals with the subject fully and in an independent manner, but he is, I think, of considerable value for the interpretation of the present passage.

1. *λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις*, 'unsurpassable fineness of texture', indefinitely greater than that of any compound perceptible by the senses. Cf. Lucr. iv. 110–128.

3. *πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα*: a difficult expression which recurs in § 61. The analogy of § 53 *ὅγχοι . . . σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν* suggests that we should emend here *πρὸς (τὸ) τῷ . . .*, 'they have all their movement proportionate to the fact that . . .'. This was the view taken by the Ambrosian version and recently by Tescari and Kochalsky. But in § 61 the expression is used absolutely, and the two passages must be taken together. Bignone would render it 'having all their movement in one direction', and Giussani explains that the component atoms of the 'image' are not impeded by any *ἀντικοπή* of their own owing to movements in many directions and consequent collisions. It is hard to see how even in the subtle complex of an 'image' there can be no *ἀντικοπή* at all, and Epicurus himself seems to suggest that there is some: it is therefore best to take the expression in a vaguer sense, 'having all their motion uniform', i.e. in speed and direction.

πρὸς (τῷ) τῷ . . . ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν. It is clear that an additional article must be inserted, and if we reject *τὸ* (see above), Meibom's *τῷ* is inevitable, 'besides the fact that'. The MSS. then have *ἀπείρῳ*. This Usener retains, and proposes to translate 'besides the fact that nothing . . . hinders their infinite subtlety', referring to Lucr. iv. 196–197:

deinde quod usque adeo textura praedita rara
mittuntur, facile ut quasvis penetrare queant res.

This Giussani adopts with some reluctance, and Hicks translates, 'owing to their infinitesimal fineness they meet with no resistance'. But this is a quite impossible sense for *ἀπείρῳ*, especially in view of

the occurrence of ἀπείροις immediately afterwards in a normal sense. Tescart, feeling that Usener's solution was impossible, supposed a lacuna after ἀπείρω in which the meaning required by Usener would be expressed. Bignone would read τῷ (μὴ) ἀπείρω, 'nothing hinders the limited number of atoms in the images', as opposed to ἀπείροις just afterwards. But though there is no difficulty in the neuter and genitive, for which he quotes parallels, the expression τῷ μὴ ἀπείρω αὐτῶν sounds very unlike Epicurus, who would surely have said πεπερασμένοις. In the parallel passage Lucretius (iv. 205) says:

cum iaciuntur et emissum res nulla moratur,

which suggests a word equivalent in sense to *emissum*. I therefore propose ἀπορρῶ: it does not elsewhere occur in Epicurus though ἀπόρροια does in § 46, but it seems a quite probable word for him to use.

4. πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις εὐθὺς ἀντικόπτειν τι. The MS. text is apparently πολλαῖς, though Usener in his notes quotes it as πολλοῖς. With the latter we should supply εἰδῶλοις, and the meaning would be that though any one image would meet with but few obstacles, yet the continuous flow of them would be soon interrupted. This gives good sense, though it is surely possible to retain πολλαῖς (*sc. ἀτόμοις*). 'The images with their subtle texture and few atoms meet with little opposition, whereas the many or infinite (in a loose sense) atoms which compose a normal compound body must at once be brought up against obstacles'.

(3) Epicurus proceeds to the question of the creation of the images. It must be that they not only move to us with incredible speed, but also that there is an immediate and unbroken flow: otherwise we should not have a steady vision of the object but a broken chain of images. It is also this constant and immediate flow which enables us to correct impressions which might be produced by the disturbance of individual images owing to collisions in transit, though occasionally (as in the familiar instance of the square tower seen at a distance) the whole series may be so affected. The images preserve 'for a long time' the order and position of the atoms on the original body, but cannot do so for an indefinite time or distance: hence we do not see distant objects so clearly or certainly as those near at hand. Epicurus adds further that images may be formed by the union of atoms in the air or in other ways, and finally, rather more elaborately than usual, states his 'proof': that nothing in his theory is contradicted by our experience of the clear view of things or of the details of colour, movement, &c. For the whole passage cf. Lucr. iv. 143-175.

§ 48. 1. δτι: . . . *sc. οὐθέν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων* from above.

2. ἅμα νοήματι, 'as quick as thought', almost a colloquial phrase. Cf. § 61.

3. ῥεῦσις is here used generally not only for the flow of images, but for the constant efflux of individual atoms from compounds. Com-

pound bodies are always losing matter in this way and at the same time taking in fresh atoms from without.

3. ἐπιπολῆς: the correction of Z³ and f for the MS. ἐπὶ πολλῆς: συνεχῆς from the margin of P for συνοχήs. Both corrections are necessary and inevitable.

οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μειώσει. Usener's correction for σημειώσει of the MSS.: ἡ μειώσει in F and the margin of P points in this direction. This is an interesting point in the theory, which is not reproduced by Lucretius. The constant efflux of images does not diminish the size of the object, because the place of the atoms lost is immediately taken by other atoms joining the compound body from the surrounding atmosphere (διὰ τὴν ἀναναπλήρωσιν). Cf. especially Plut. *adv. Col.* 16 μυρίων μὲν εἰδώλων ἀπερχομένων αἰεὶ καὶ ρεόντων, μυρίων δ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἑτέρων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιρρεόντων καὶ ἀναπληρούντων τὸ ἄθροισμα, though he is of course wrong in supposing that it was by other images, not of other atoms, that the place of the lost images is taken. Giussani wrongly interprets the ἀναναπλήρωσις as of the images; Epicurus does not mean that what is rubbed off from them in transit is replaced by the influx of new atoms.

4. σφίζουσα: from this point the ῥέουσιs, which is the subject, is definitely the flow of images.

5. θέσιν καὶ τάξιν: see note on § 46^a, l. 5.

6. συγχεομένη. Epicurus admits that the images may become blurred by collisions in transit; when this happens only to individual images the necessary correction is made by the 'cinematographic' effect of the whole series: but since, in the case of distant objects, the series may be thus affected we must be careful to regard what we see as a προσμένον. Usener adds ὑπάρχει after συγχεομένη from the margin of H, but the participle can well stand alone.

συστάσεις, 'compound idols', which correspond to no real object, but are formed by the spontaneous congregation of atoms in the air. Compare Lucr. iv. 129-142, where he illustrates the idea by the configurations formed by clouds in the air.

7. ὀξεῖαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν . . . Such idols can be formed quickly because it is only necessary for enough atoms to unite to form the external film, whereas in order to make a normal compound body, it would be necessary for all the interior to be filled up (κατὰ βάθος) as well. This is another interesting point which seems to have escaped Lucretius.

8. ἄλλοι δὲ τρόποι τινὲς . . . Lucretius notes one other such possibility (iv. 724 ff.), when images emitted from things unite in the air to form a new compound image. These are the cause of the belief in such monsters as Centaurs, Scylla, and Cerberus.

9. ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται, the passive, seems a necessary correction of Weil's for ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ. Epicurus could not say, 'none of these things witnesses against the senses'.

10. ἂν βλέπῃ τις . . . ἀνοίσει. A difficult and obscure sentence.

All editors agree with Gassendi's correction *ἐναργείας* for *ἐνεργείας* and that the *ἀνοίσει* of B is the origin of the strange variants *ἀνόιση* and *ἀνεισι*. Usener also altered the MS. *ἵνα* to *τίνα*; but with his accentuation *ἂν βλέπῃ τίς τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἐναργείας, τίνα καὶ . . . ἀνοίσει* I am unable to construe the sentence. It is surely probable that we have two parallel clauses, and should accentuate *ἂν βλέπῃ τις τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἐναργείας, τίνα καὶ . . . ἀνοίσει*: the subject of *ἀνοίσει* will be *αἰσθησις* (derived from *ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι*) and we shall get the meaning 'if one looks to see in what way sensation will bring us the clear visions from outward things and in what way their qualities', i. e. if we try to investigate by means of our sense-perceptions how we get those sense-perceptions both of the near view of objects and of their qualities, we find nothing which contradicts the present theory.

Bignone keeps the MSS. *ἵνα* and translates, 'if one observes in a certain way the evidence of phenomena to which he must refer . . .', but *τίνα τρόπον* is then very weak, the use of *ἵνα* is unnatural and the whole idea out of place here.

τὰς συμπαθείας occurs again in § 50. It means the corresponding affections in the images to the atomic positions and movements in the original, to which are due the qualities of colour, &c., and any incidents of change. It is almost impossible to render it in a single word. Bignone says, 'the constant continuity of the sensible properties of the external objects': this seems to me to miss a little the idea of correspondence: we may perhaps say, 'the corresponding sequence of qualities and movements'.

(4) The letter passes from the consideration of the images and their character to that of the act of sight. Two points of some importance emerge in this section: (1) The idea that thought as well as sight is due to images; this was part of the material conception of the nature of the soul, and explains Epicurus' habit, already noticed, of regarding all thinking as a kind of visualization. (2) The refutation, very rare in the letters, of rival theories, namely that of Democritus of an impression made on the air and that of Empedocles and others of the effect of rays passing from the eye to the object. In contradiction to these Epicurus reasserts clearly and distinctly his own theory, and makes the new point that the emission of the images from objects is due to the internal vibration of the component atoms.

§ 49. 2. *καὶ διανοεῖσθαι*: an important addition. Thought too as well as sight is due to the influx of images directly into the mind: cf. Lucr. iv. 722 ff. He is thinking here, however, not so much of the ordinary processes of thought, which employ images or conceptions (*προλήψεις*) already stored in the mind, as of those rarer processes by which we obtain a direct mental image of an external object by means of 'fine idols' which pass directly into the mind without stirring the senses. This is above all the means by which we obtain knowledge of the gods (cf. Lucr. v. 1169-1182).

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο . . . Epicurus dismisses two rival

theories. The first is that of Democritus, from whom his system was derived, but whose over-refinements he not infrequently rejected. Democritus held (Theophr. *de Sensu* 52) that the effluence from the object did not itself penetrate the eye, but that it formed in the air an impression (*ἀποτύπωσις*) in two dimensions, like the impression which an object makes in wax, and this impression being hard was able to enter the soft material (*ὕγρον*) of the eye and appear there as the image in the pupil (*ἐμφασις*), which is what we actually see. This subtlety Epicurus rudely brushes aside, apparently because he did not believe that the air could receive and retain such an impression. Note that *ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο* recalls closely the Democritean idea of the *ἀποτύπωσις*.

4. οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων. The second theory is usually attributed to Empedocles and was certainly held by Parmenides, namely that rays came from the eyes of the percipient and acting on the effluence from the objects joined in forming the image. This theory, which was no doubt designed to emphasize the active element in perception, was adopted by Plato (*Theaet.* 153 e, *Tim.* 45 c, &c.). τῶν ἀκτίνων is the MS. text, and Usener's alteration to *τινῶν* is unnecessary: Epicurus means 'the rays' of which Parmenides and Plato speak.

6. οὕτως ὥς with the whole sentence: 'the impression could not be produced so but with either of these two means as by my theory'.

τύπων, 'models': he wishes for the sake of argument to avoid his technical term *εἰδώλων*.

7. ὁμοχρόων: the ἀπὸ χρόων of the MSS. appears to be a mere mistake derived from ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων just before.

κατὰ τὸ ἐνάρμοτον μέγεθος, 'according to the appropriate size', i.e. the grosser images affect the sight, the more subtle pass directly into the mind and awake a mental image.

8. ταῖς φοραῖς: the margin of H alone has preserved what must certainly be the right reading as against *μορφαῖς*—it is because of the celerity of their creation and the swiftness of their motion that the successive images are able to give a continuous and steady vision.

§ 50. 2. συνεχούς, 'continuous', that is in time, 'uninterrupted'.

συνπάθειαν: see note on § 48, l. 8.

3. κατὰ τὸν ἐκείθεν σύμμετρον ἐπερισμόν—a careful phrase, 'owing to the uniform contact kept up from the object': the succession of images makes a continuous line of contact between the object and the percipient: for *σύμμετρον* see note on § 47, l. 3.

4. ἐκ τῆς . . . πάλλεως. This is a new point: it is the constant internal vibration of the atoms deep down within the object which forces off the outer film that comes to us as an image.

(5) Truth and falsehood in vision. After describing the genesis of the images and the method of their apprehension by the sight and the mind, Epicurus returns to the crux of the whole position, the nature of truth and falsehood in sight-perception. In the remainder of the section he distinguishes carefully between that which is seized by an

act of apprehension (*ἐπιβλητικῶς*) either by the mind or by the senses, which is true, and the additional inference made by the mind (*προσδοξαζόμενον*), which must not be regarded as either true or false until it has received the confirmation of the near vision. The general idea is familiar, but it is very difficult to seize the exact meaning, and the reader is left with the impression that Epicurus did not very successfully get out of the difficulty caused by the possible alteration of the images in their transit from the object to the percipient.

5. καὶ ἦν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν . . . τοῦ στερεμνίου. Another reference to the idea of the *ἐπιβολή* both of the mind and of the senses: see note on § 38 and Appendix, pp. 259 ff. Here, since Epicurus is speaking of the image of a concrete object (*στερέμνιον*), it is probable that *ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ* refers only to the first of the two senses of *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας*, the apprehension by the mind of subtle images too fine for sense-perception, and indeed mainly to the apprehension of images of the gods. The sense then is, 'When we have apprehended an image either by an act of attention on the part of the mind, undistracted as, for instance, in sleep, by other images, or by the active apprehension of the senses confirming the first passive impression by the near view, we may be certain that the image exactly represents the concrete object'. *φαντασία* is the image created in sense-perception by the rapid succession of 'idols', no one of which is perceptible in itself: in the mind the image may sometimes be produced by a single 'idol'.

ἐπιβλητικῶς must be taken both with *τῇ διανοίᾳ* and *τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις* and the whole expression corresponds to § 38 *τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων* and § 51 below *ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων*.

6. εἴτε συμβεβηκότων: this refers back to the *συνπάθεια* of §§ 48 and 50. It is the 'corresponding sequence' which gives us the 'accidents', colour, movement, &c., of the original object.

7. μορφή ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου. Epicurus states unhesitatingly the correspondence of image and actuality in the case of perceptions, sensible and mental, made *ἐπιβλητικῶς*, i.e. by an active act of apprehension, and not a mere passive reception of the image. This involves in the case of sight the clear vision of the *ἐνάρρημα*: he could not say that the first vision of the tower as round was 'the shape of the object': to be sure of that we must get the near vision obtained by looking (*ἐπιβλητικῶς*).

Included in *μορφή* we must understand καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα.

γινομένη: sc. φαντασία (not of course *μορφή*), which is picked up in αὕτη.

κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου: a very difficult and widely differently interpreted phrase. (1) Giussani would take it of the succession of images coming to the percipient, 'the successive fullness or failure of the images'. This is of course impossible with the singular τοῦ εἰδώλου. (2) Bignone takes it 'the complete integrity of the image or a remainder of it', and explains that it refers to the

image which arrives at the percipient without loss and that which has suffered detrition on the way. But (a) this omits *ἐξῆς* altogether, (b) it is surely impossible that Epicurus could say that the image produced by the 'idol' which has suffered detrition (e.g. that of a rounded tower) is the shape of the object: (Bignone does not; as I do, lay stress on *ἐπιβλητικῶς*.) (3) It is tempting to translate 'according to the successive fullness and hollowness of the idol', i.e. its successive concave and convex parts represent those of the outline of the original—but I think this is an impossible sense for *ἐγκατάλειμμα*. (4) With some hesitation I believe that the two alternatives here correspond to *τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις* and *τῇ διανοίᾳ* above. The image of sight-perception is produced by the 'successive repetitions' (*τὸ ἐξῆς πύκνωμα*) of the idol: the image in the mind is due to 'the impression left by' (*ἐγκατάλειμμα*) the idol which penetrated to it. *ἐξῆς* then goes only with *πύκνωμα* and not with the whole phrase.

9. *τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος* . . . The information given to the senses by the images is always true; they represent nothing which is not there in the original, even though it may need the 'near vision' to determine whether as they reach us they correspond exactly to the object. Where then does the possibility of error lie? Epicurus here recurs to the ideas already sketched in §§ 37, 38: it lies in the additions made by opinion to sensation (*ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ*). The vision of an object at a distance should always be regarded as a problem awaiting the confirmation (*προσμένον*) of the nearer view, by which, if it is either confirmed or not contradicted, it is true.

10-12. (*ἐπὶ τοῦ προσμένοντος*) . . . (*ἡ ἀντιμαρτυρουμένου*): the additions made by Usener are in exact accord with Epicurean usage elsewhere and seem demanded by the context.

12. After *ἐπιμαρτυρουμένου* the MSS. have what is clearly a note on *τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον* derived from the material of the next section: *κατά τινα κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν, καθ' ἣν τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται*, 'by means of a movement in ourselves closely linked with the visual act of apprehension, but differing from it, by which falsehood is produced'.

§§ 51, 52. There follows a summing up of the doctrine about truth and falsehood in vision. On the one hand the exact correspondence of the image in sensation to the external object can only be brought about by the transit of the 'idols' from the object to the sense-organs: on the other error can only arise by the spontaneous movement of the mind (opinion) which is akin to the movement of apprehension (*ἐπιβολή*). It is essential to keep this in mind, if we are successfully to distinguish the true from the false.

§ 51. 2. *οἷον εἰ*, the reading of the MSS., is certainly right. The 'idols' are received by us as 'though they were a picture' of the thing, and the two processes by which this may occur are either (*ἢ*) when they visit the undisturbed mind directly in sleep or (*ἢ*) when they are grasped by an act of apprehension in waking life. Usener's

οιον ἢ would make three processes, but would establish a cross-division, as there is no distinct process by which the images are received *οιον ἐν εἰκόνι*.

ἐν εἰκόνι: Bignone translates 'in a plastic representation', and draws attention to the 'solid' three-dimension appearance even of the visions of sleep. But it is not easy to insist on this sense for *εἰκών*, nor does it seem necessary.

3. ἢ καθ' ὕπνου *γινομένων*: the images seen in sleep are true, i.e. they are produced by 'idols' which enter us from without and therefore originate from reality.

ἢ κατ' ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας: i.e. mental apprehensions of an image, when awake—but he is still thinking of direct apprehensions and not those formed by a combination of *προλήψεις*: see Appendix, pp. 259 ff.

4. ἢ τῶν λαμπρῶν κριτηρίων: see note on § 38, l. 5. Here again it must mean 'or of the other instruments of judgement', i.e. the senses, and the whole phrase therefore corresponds closely to § 50 *ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις*. The *ἐπιβολή* of the senses is the grasping by attention of the 'clear vision' (*ἐναργεία*). It is possible here that he includes *πάθος*, though it is doubtful whether it could have an *ἐπιβολή*: the nearest instance to such an idea would be K. Δ. xxiv τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ . . . τὰ πάθη. Note that here *διάνοια* is classed as a *κριτήριον* even more clearly than in § 38.

6. *τοιαῦτα προσβαλλόμενα* is a necessary correction of the MS. text *ταῦτα πρὸς δ (δ) βάλλομεν*. Von der Muehl retains *ταῦτα* (sc. the bodies which emit the images) *πρὸς δ βάλλομεν*, but it is not clear how he takes the last words.

τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον. The δὲ of the MSS. is quite necessary: he is here opposing the source of error to the source of truth, and Usener's *τε* really weakens the text.

7. ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν: i.e. opinion, which like the *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* is, in Epicurus' view, ultimately a spontaneous movement of the atoms of the mind.

8. *συνημμένῃ μὲν (τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ)*: the missing dative is supplied with certainty from the gloss on § 50 above. Opinion is closely linked with the *ἐπιβολή* because it combines images in *σύνθεσις*, but it differs in that it acts at random and does not check its conclusions by *ἐπιμαρτύρησις* and *οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις*.

διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσιν, 'but having a difference'. This must certainly be the meaning, as Bignone agrees: earlier commentators took it to mean 'having opinion', but it is itself opinion, and both substantive and verb are used in the sense of 'distinction', 'distinguish', in § 58.

9. κατὰ δὲ ταύτην . . . : a recapitulation of the ideas of *ἐπιμαρτύρησις* and *οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις* already familiar.

§ 52. 1. καὶ ταύτην οὖν . . . : an emphatic warning. 'We must have this doctrine constantly in mind', for otherwise on the one hand

we shall annul the value of the clear view given by the *ἐπιβολαί* of the mind and the senses, and on the other by placing the false inference of opinion on a level with their information, we shall undermine all our standards of judgement and cause universal confusion. For the general idea compare K. Δ. xxiv.

B. Hearing.

Epicurus passes from the sense of sight to that of hearing. Once again it was necessary to establish a material link between the object and the percipient, and this he finds in a stream of particles emitted by the object. But here there was a new difficulty. In the case of sight, since every object is constantly giving off 'idols' in every direction at once, it is clear that it may be seen simultaneously by many people. But in the case of sound we have a single emission of particles apparently in one direction: how then can many persons hear at once? Epicurus gets over this difficulty by supposing the material 'sound' after its emission to split up into a number of small particles, each preserving the same characteristics (*ὄγκοι ὁμοιομερεῖς*), and stretching back in a continuous chain to the object. These particles radiate off in different directions, and reaching the ears of many persons, produce an apprehension of their meaning (*ἐπαίσθησις*) or at least a recognition of the presence of an external object. Epicurus does not himself directly indicate the necessity for this rather elaborate supposition, but it is brought out clearly by Lucretius (iv. 563-567):

praeterea verbum saepe unum perciet auris
omnibus in populo, missum praeconis ab ore.
in multas igitur voces vox una repente
diffugit, in privas quoniam se dividit auris
obsignans formam verbi clarumque sonorem.

As in his discussion on sight, so here he disposes briefly of rival theories.

5. *ρέυματος*: the MSS. have *πνεύματος*, which is not in itself impossible and is supported by *ρέυματος πνευματώδους* below (§ 53), but *τὸ δὲ ρεῦμα τοῦτο* in the next sentence makes Gassendi's correction necessary.

6. *ἀπὸ τοῦ φωνούντος . . . παρασκευάζοντος*: a most scrupulous expression of all the possible kinds of sound, showing that Epicurus is writing here with care.

8. *ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους*, 'particles like, as parts, to the whole'—the adjective employed by Anaxagoras to express his famous theory that all things were composed of particles like in substance to the whole: likeness of shape, however, is what Epicurus would most wish to insist on here. The *ὄγκοι* will be small atomic compounds, of acute particles for shrill sounds, and rounder particles for lower sounds: Giussani is wrong in attempting to see a technical sense of 'molecules'.

συμπάθειαν, 'correspondence', as in §§ 48, 50. Here of general likeness of character.

9. ἐνότητα ἰδιότροπον: another careful expression, 'a unity consisting in peculiarity of character'. The idea is of several chains of similar particles, stretching from the speaker to the hearer.

10. τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν, 'comprehension' as opposed to mere αἴσθησις: we not only hear a person speaking but 'catch his words', i.e. understand what he is saying.

ἐπ' ἐκείνου: in the percipient as opposed to τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν.

ὥς τὰ πολλά is wrongly expunged by Usener as a gloss: we do not always comprehend what we hear.

11. ποιούσαν and 12. παρασκευάζουσαν, is the MS. reading and is probably right; Epicurus conceives of the ἐνότης ἰδιότροπος as a perfectly concrete 'chain' of particles, which actually causes the hearing: Usener alters unnecessarily to ποιούντας . . . παρασκευάζοντας referring to ὄγκους. But the ὄγκοι would not themselves cause ἐπαίσθησις if they were not connected by the 'chain' to the object which emits the sounds.

εἰ δὲ μή γε . . .: even if we do not hear distinctly enough to comprehend the meaning of the sounds, at least the particles which reach us make clear to us the presence of some object outside us.

§ 53. 2. οὐκ αὐτὸν οὖν δεῖ νομίζειν . . . Epicurus is once again arguing against Democritus, whose explanation of hearing was given on just the same lines as his theory of vision (Theophr. *de Sensu* 55). He held that 'the air is torn up (θρύπτεσθαι) into bodies of similar shape (ὁμοιοσχήμονα) and is assimilated to the particles which issue from the voice' (Aet. iv. 19. 13): i.e. that the bodies of voice, which we emit, form ἀποτυπώσεις of themselves, just as do the idols of sight, and that it is these 'impressions' which come into contact with our sense-organs. Epicurus' comment is again purely contemptuous, 'this is very far from happening'.

4. τῶν ὁμογενῶν: i.e. 'similar sounds', i.e. noises which are not significant: cf. ἤχουόντος ἢ ψοφούντος above.

5. πάσχειν is a necessary correction of the variants πάσχων and πάσχον. Von der Muehl retains πάσχων, referring presumably to ἀήρ.

6. ἐκθλιψιν, 'a squeezing out'. The MSS. here show traces of a serious corruption, most of them getting no farther than ἐκ. Usener emends ἐγκλισιν, 'swerve', a very improbable word for Epicurus to have used here, and one which would not account for the variants ἐκλήθην, ἐκλήθην of the only MSS. which produce a word at all. I have little doubt that ἐκθλιψιν is right: Brieger (*Epicurus Lehre von der Seele*, p. 6) has confidently made the same emendation. It would account well for the variants, and is a technical term of the atomists for the 'squeezing out' of particles between others surrounding them. It is then a very appropriate word for the emission of particles from the throat. For its use in Epicurean writings see Ep. ii, § 109. 4.

ὄγκων τινῶν: the authority of the MSS. is distinctly in favour of

τινῶν, rather than τινός; which is preferred by Usener and Bignone, but would involve a very unnatural order of words.

7. ἀποτελεστικῶν again is the MS. reading, and there is no reason to follow Usener in altering it to ἀποτελεστικῇν. It is indeed more natural to conceive of the particles forming the stream of breath, than of their emission doing so. A favourite word in the second letter: see §§ 101, 102, 108.

C. *Smell.*

Continuing with the senses in order Epicurus proceeds to smell: and decides that it too is due to the effluence of particles, which are of such a size as to enter into and stir the sense-organs. Lucretius has again (iv. 673-705) considerably elaborated the treatment of the subject, and explains (a) that it is owing to the accommodation or the reverse of the various shapes to the sense-organs of the percipients that smells which are good to some animals are bad to others; (b) that the particles of smell are much more easily destroyed in transit than those of sound or the idols of sight.

10. οὐκ ἂν ποτε . . . ἐργάσασθαι: because no sensation (πάθος) can be produced without touch, and therefore contact must be produced between object and percipient by means of a concrete effluence.

11. σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ . . . κινεῖν: σύμμετρος is not here used in the technical sense in which it occurred in §§ 47, 50, but more generally 'fitly formed to . . .'

12. τετραγαμῆως καὶ ἀλλοτρίως . . . ἔχοντες: i.e. they are both disordered among themselves, they do not fit well together, and are alien in shape to the particles which compose the sense-organs of the percipient, and therefore produce the effect of a bad smell. Cf. Lucr. ii. 414-417:

neu simili penetrare putes primordia forma
in naribus hominum, cum taetra cadavera torrent,
et cum scena croco Cilici perfusa recens est
araque Panchaeos exhalat propter odores.

It might have been expected that there would be sections on taste and touch: Lucretius deals fully with taste in iv. 615-672. But probably Epicurus would assume a knowledge of these in his more advanced disciples.

IV. THE ATOMS: THEIR PROPERTIES, PARTS, AND MOTION.

Epicurus now returns to the atom and discusses at length its properties, constitution, and motion. The main conception of the nature of the atom he inherits from Leucippus and Democritus, but he has greatly elaborated it, especially in the conception of the *minimae partes*, and in some details as regards motion. This section would more naturally have preceded the discussion of the theory of sensation and ought possibly to be transposed, but the order of topics

in the letter is so irregular as compared with that in Lucretius, which may be taken to represent the normal Epicurean tradition, that it is best not to attempt transposition, except in certain small sections where it seems absolutely necessary (e.g. §§ 46, 47).

A. *Properties of the atom.*

These are, according to Epicurus, shape, size, and weight. The last was probably added by Democritus in order to explain the movement of the atoms.

(1) Epicurus argues that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities (or properties) which attach to compound bodies, except the primary properties of shape, size, and weight. For qualities are changeable and the atoms are *ex hypothesi* unchangeable, and it is their arrangement one with another, which is the cause of change in compounds. In elaborating the conception of shape he introduces the idea of the inseparable parts of the atom, which is dealt with at length in §§ 58, 59. The argument of this subsection is not explicitly stated in Lucretius, but is implied in i. 503-634 and again in ii. 478-521.

§ 54. 2. προσφέρεσθαι: lit. 'claim for themselves'.

3. ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματι συμφυῇ ἔστι: the necessary accompaniments of shape in the Epicurean doctrine would be ἀντιτυπία, the capacity to strike against other atoms (cf. Sextus, *adv. Dogm.* iv. 257 κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν σχήματός τε καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους τὸ σῶμα νενοήσθαι), and the possession of inseparable parts: cf. §§ 58, 59.

4. οὐδέν: a necessary correction made by Z and f for οὐδέ.

5. ἐπειδήπερ δεῖ... Epicurus here bases his argument on the fundamental principles of the system enunciated in §§ 38, 39: 'nothing is created out of the non-existent' and 'nothing is destroyed into the non-existent'. In the dissolution of compound bodies, whose qualities are then lost, there must be something which remains constant; we must ultimately arrive at particles which are not dissoluble, but permanently retain their shape, size, and weight, i.e. at the atoms. It is they which cause the creation, alteration, and dissolution of compound bodies by their meetings, changes of position, and separations. For the general idea compare Sextus, *adv. Dogm.* iv. 42 (Us. fr. 291).

7. ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις... 8. ἀφόδους. The MSS. have ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις ἐν πολλοῖς τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους. (1) The traditional correction, adopted by Giussani (Lucr. i. 681 note) is ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις μὲν πολλῶν, τινῶν δὲ καὶ... But, apart from palaeographical difficulties, this represents 'rearrangement' and 'addition and subtraction' of atoms as concurrent causes needed to produce change, whereas they are in fact alternative causes: change may be due to atomic rearrangement, or it may be due to the addition or subtraction of atoms in the compound. (2) Usener would excise ἐν πολλοῖς... ἀφόδους as a *varia lectio* to explain μεταθέσεις, but the words τινῶν...

ἀφ' ὧν are absolutely essential to the sense: μεταθέσεις will not account for all changes in compounds, some (e.g. increase or decrease in size) must be due to the addition of new atoms or the departure of some hitherto included in the compound: cf. Lucr. i. 675 ff.:

certissima corpora quaedam
sunt quae conservant naturam semper eandem,
quorum abitu aut aditu mutatoque ordine mutant
naturam res et convertunt corpora sese.

(3) Bignone excises ἐν πολλοῖς (sc. ἀπογράφους) as a lemma introducing the addition τινῶν δὲ καὶ . . . and supposes that (τινῶν) has fallen out by haplography. This gives the required sense, and seems on the whole the best solution of a rather uncertain passage.

9. τὰ μὲν μετατιθέμενα. The MSS. have τὰ μὴ μετατιθέμενα, which is impossible, and Usener's τὰ δὴ μετατιθέμενα is very improbable. τὰ μὲν might be justified either as used with an implied apodosis (cf. § 36 βαδιστέον μὲν οὖν and § 37 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, where μὲν does not go closely with οὖν), or as picked up rather irregularly by ὅγκους δὲ . . .

10. ὅγκους δὲ καὶ σχηματισμοὺς ἰδίους. The atoms have 'parts and arrangements of their own' which are constant and unchangeable. ὅγκους is here an anticipation of the discussion in §§ 56-58, and is used of the 'least inseparable parts' of the atom which Epicurus there calls πέρατα, and which are the measure of its extension. The σχηματισμός of an atom depends on the arrangement of its πέρατα. Bignone points out that Epicurus is here arguing against both the vague indeterminate matter (ἄλη) which Aristotle, following Plato, had assumed as the ultimate constituent, and also against Democritus, who had said that the atom has no parts. Epicurus holds that it has determinate parts, but these are inseparable.

11. ὑπομένειν, the reading of the MSS., must certainly be kept: 'this much (sc. the parts and the shape) must remain as constant': the shape of the atoms, constituted by the arrangement of their *minimae partes*, is the ultimately permanent thing in all matter. τοῦτο is used loosely, but need not be emended to ταῦτα (cf. § 55 τούτου προσόντος). Usener, misunderstanding the passage, altered ὑπομένειν to ὑποτιθέναι, 'this we must assume', but the alteration is quite gratuitous: Kochalsky retaining ὑπομένειν cuts out τοῦτο . . . ἀναγκαῖον, 'the atoms must remain as particles and shapes', again a gratuitous alteration based on a misunderstanding. Bignone agrees with me in retaining the MS. text: ὑπομένειν is vouched for by τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα below.

§ 55. 1. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς . . . 5. ἀπολλύμεναι: a rather difficult and obscure sentence. Epicurus is as usual appealing to the experience of phenomena: when they change their shape by being reduced in size, we see that they lose their other qualities, but still retain the property of shape: much more must the atoms, which have no other qualities to lose, and cannot be diminished in size, retain their shape. Bignone aptly compares Lucr. ii. 826, where Lucr. explains that if you divide a piece of purple cloth into smaller and smaller particles, the

smaller the particle the fainter becomes the colour until it is finally lost: but the smallest particle will still have shape.

2. κατὰ τὴν περιαίρειν, 'by taking off bits all round', *sc.* by diminution in size.

5. ἱκανὰ οὖν . . . : i.e. it has thus been shown that atoms, possessed only of size, shape, and weight, are sufficient, since they remain permanent, to account for all the varieties in sensible things.

7. καὶ (μῆ): the MSS. have only καὶ, which Usener boldly emends to οὐκ. It is surely more natural to suppose that μῆ has dropped out owing to the succeeding εἰς τὸ μῆ ὄν. Bignone supplies μῆδέν as a reference to the fundamental axiom that nothing is destroyed into the non-existent.

(2) Epicurus now passes to a new consideration with regard to the size of the atoms. They vary in size, but are not of all sizes. A certain amount of variation in size is sufficient to account for the varieties in phenomena, and if the atoms were of all sizes, some would have to be so large as to be actually visible to us. Here again Epicurus is diverging from Democritus, who, apparently not perceiving this objection, stated that the atoms were 'unlimited in size' (ἀπείρους κατὰ μέγεθος, D. L. ix. 44), and again that 'some atoms were very large' μεγίστας. Lucretius apparently dealt with this subject in a passage which has been lost before ii. 478, for he speaks of the point as already proved in 499.

10. παραλλαγῆς: not of course changes of size in individual atoms, which are unchangeable, but a series of variations of size.

11. τούτου: i.e. the variation of size, used vaguely as τοῦτο γάρ in § 54 *fin.* Differences of size together with differences of shape in the atoms account for differences of sensation and qualities in phenomena.

§ 56. 1. ὑπάρχον is the reading of the MSS. and will construe quite well: it is unnecessary to alter with Usener to ὑπάρχειν, which would moreover almost demand an article.

2. ἄμ' ἔδει (Usener) seems to be indicated by the ἀμέλει of the MSS., though H. Weil's suggestion ἄν ἔδει might be right.

4. ὁρατὴ ἄτομος need not be excised from the text with Usener as a gloss. It is not absolutely required for the construction, but makes it clearer.

B. *Parts of the atom.*

Epicurus, having decided that there is an upward limit to the size of the atoms, proceeds to consider the downward limit: can the atoms be infinitely small? His decision is again in the negative: there is a limit also to the smallness of the atom. But his discussion of this point leads him necessarily to the wider consideration of the limit of divisibility in general, and so to the conception of the atom itself. He argues against infinite divisibility on two main grounds: (1) that unless you can reach a permanent existence, a point beyond which division is impossible, there is no substratum of strength and durability in the

universe: it is necessary, as he said in § 41, that there should be *ἰσχυόν τι*, which is permanent; (2) that on the analogy of sensible things, in which there is a *minimum visibile*, there must also be a *minimum* of existence in the atom. The conception of the atom thus reached is that it is of a determinate size, has extension, and therefore must have parts; you could think of a top and bottom and right-hand and left-hand parts of it: but the atom could never be divided into these parts. These parts are the *minimum* of extension and can only exist as parts of the atom: the atom itself is the *minimum* of physical existence.

The argument is complicated and difficult. Considerable help is obtained from the parallel passage in Lucretius (i. 599-634) where the doctrine of the *minimae partes* of the atom is expounded. Giussani in his essay on the Lucretian *Atomia* (vol. i, pp. 39-84, and especially pp. 52, 56-75) has done great service in elucidating the general ideas, though his treatment of individual passages is sometimes arbitrary. Bignone in his notes and Appendix brings out many points clearly, especially as regards Epicurus' opposition to the Eleatics.

Epicurus first argues generally that in a limited body there cannot be an infinite number of parts nor can the parts be infinitely small: the two ideas are of course interdependent. If the parts were infinite in number, they must be infinitely small in size and vice versa. We must therefore in the first place reject the belief in *τομὴ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον*, in the possibility of an infinite physical subdivision of matter into smaller and smaller particles: for otherwise we shall 'make all things weak' and have no permanent substratum, and by constantly 'pounding' matter up into smaller and smaller particles we shall annihilate it. Secondly, we must not believe in the possibility of an ideal progress in thought to ever smaller and smaller particles, such as the Eleatics conceived. The argument against this idea is set out in the following sections.

5. ἐν τῷ ὁρισμένῳ σώματι is here quite general 'in any limited body'. He proceeds to apply the idea to a perceptible body in § 58 and by analogy to the atom in § 59.

6. ἀπείρους . . . ἀπηλίκους οὖν, 'infinite in number' or 'of any size you will', i.e. as is obvious from the context 'of any smallness you will', 'infinitely small'. The ideas are complementary.

ὅστε οὐ μόνον . . . Of the two processes discussed in this clause the first is the physical process of infinite division (*τομὴ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον*) and corresponds to the notion of *ἀπειροὶ ὄγκοι*, the second a mental or ideal process of 'passing' in thought to ever smaller and smaller particles (*μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον*) and corresponds to the notion of *ὄγκοι ἀπηλικοί οὖν*.

7. τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον τομήν: the 'cutting up' of the limited body, first into halves, then into quarters, then into eighths, and so on to infinity. Lucretius argues against the possibility of such infinite division in l. 551 ff., in a subtle passage which has been well expounded by Giussani.

ἵνα μὴ πάντα ἀσθενῇ ποιῶμεν: Epicurus states two reasons why infinite divisibility must be rejected. In the first place, if we could carry on the process of division without limit and cut things up into ever more and more minute particles, we should utterly deprive things of physical force. For any particle capable of further subdivision must have in it an admixture of void and would therefore be 'weak', i.e. subject to further dissolution from external blows: we should never arrive at anything which could be a source of permanent strength. The idea is that of § 41 εἴπερ . . . μέλλει . . . ἰσχύον τι ὑπομένειν. Lucretius (i. 565 ff.) puts the same notion more simply: if there are hard permanent particles (the atoms) we can explain the creation of soft things by the admixture of void: but if the particles are 'soft', we cannot account for the creation of hard things.

8. κὰν ταῖς περιλήψεσι . . . 9. καταναλίσκειν. The second reason. We must follow Usener in writing κὰν for the MS. καί, but even so the clause is obscure. The meaning I take to be this. In the formation of actual compound bodies, the solid atoms are the source of strength, which enables the compound to have the powers of matter (cf. Lucr. i. 628-634). If there were a possibility of infinite subdivision, aggregate bodies would be built up of 'weak' particles: they would not thus have the underlying strength, which is necessary to create material things, and to enable them to keep together: they would cease to be 'matter' or 'body' at all. In his own atomic world Epicurus denies the possibility of anything being dissolved into the μὴ ὄν: in a world without ultimate hard particles it would inevitably occur.

περίληψις means literally 'a marking off of a thing so as to be separate from others' (cf. ἀπεριλήπτως in i. 42): so 'the separating off of atoms to aggregate themselves into a compound body'. Bignone, following Kochalsky, would translate 'conception', but Epicurus is speaking here of actual things and not of our conceptions of them.

9. τὰ ὄντα: Giussani insists that this means compound bodies, 'things'; Bignone that it must mean 'atoms', the only real existences. It is surely inclusive and implies both, just as does τῷ ὀρισμένῳ above. Through this section Epicurus' argument is general, and it is only in §§ 58 and 59 that he is thinking specially first of phenomena and then of the atoms.

θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν are more than usually picturesque words for Epicurus, 'by pounding things up to fritter them away into nothing'.

10. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν . . . 11. μὴδ' (ἐπὶ) τοῦλαττον. We pass to the second idea, which must be rejected. Not only is it possible to conceive of the physical division of things into smaller and smaller particles, but in imagination we may conceive a mental process by which we 'pass' from one part of a body to another. In perceptible things, as Epicurus explains below, we may look at one ἄκρον or extreme point after another: with the atoms we may conceive ourselves conducting the same process. Now it is clear that in a limited

body we cannot do this *εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον*: if we conceive of these minute particles as all of one size and 'pass' from one to another successively, we shall sooner or later reach the sum total which constitutes the aggregate body. Still less can we have *μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον*, in which we proceed from smaller to larger particles: for we shall reach the aggregate sooner. But we might suppose ourselves to continue the process *εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον*, passing first in perception and then in thought to ever smaller and smaller particles. Such an idea is of course Eleatic, and we may compare the old problem of Achilles and the tortoise. But, says Epicurus, we must not even suppose such a process possible: for, if it were, we should similarly have a finite body composed of infinite particles, even though each were smaller than the last. The argument is leading up to the conception of the *minimae partes*.

II. *μηδ' (ἐπὶ) τοῦλαττον*. Gassendi's addition *ἐπὶ* is necessary for the sense, and is of course vouched for by *τομὴν ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον* above. The MSS. (reading *μηδέ* or *μὴ δέ*) clearly indicate *μηδ'*, though the passage might be easier without it: Giussani, who has interpreted the general notion very clearly, has ignored its effect: 'not only must we reject *μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον* or *ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον*, but we cannot even admit it *ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον*'.

§ 57. Epicurus proceeds to support his rejection of *τομὴ* and *μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον* by two arguments: the first based on the idea of *τομὴ* shows that logically such a conception is impossible; the second examines the notion of *μετάβασις* and shows that it too in a finite body cannot be conducted *εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον*. The text and the structure of the sentences is rather uncertain, the view I have adopted with some hesitation being that of Bignone.

(a) The argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*. You cannot either conceive how infinite parts, however small, could be contained in a finite body, nor how, if the parts were infinite, the body could be finite. For the parts must be of some size, however small, and the sum of an infinite number of them must itself be infinite in size.

I. *οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως . . . ἔστι νοῆσαι* is then parallel to the direct question *πῶς τ' ἂν . . . τὸ μέγεθος*, and with *ὅπως* must be supplied something like *τοῦτο γένοιτ' ἂν*; cf. § 56. 3 *οὐδ' ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὁρατὴ ἄτομος ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι*. The ellipse is awkward, but not, I think, impossible, especially in the near neighbourhood of the fuller expression. Giussani would follow F in omitting *ὅπως*, and then construct *οὔτε ἔστι νοῆσαι πῶς τ' ἂν . . . τὸ μέγεθος . . . , ἄκρον τε ἔχοντος . . . (οὐκ ἔστι . . . νοεῖν) μὴ οὐ . . .* But (a) *οὔτε* has then nothing to correspond to it, (b) the picking up of *οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι* by *οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν* in the second member is awkward, (c) the MS. testimony is overwhelmingly in favour of the retention of *ὅπως*.

2. *ἄπειροι ὄγκοι . . . ἢ ὀπηλικοί οὖν*: corresponding exactly to *ἀπείρους ὄγκους . . . οὐδ' ὀπηλίκους οὖν* in § 56. 6. Usener would read *οἱ ὀπηλικοί οὖν*, constructing it after *νοῆσαι*, 'for, if you once say that

there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive of what size they would be', but (α) this is quite irrelevant to the argument, (β) the previous parallel makes η certain, (γ) Usener appears to neglect *ὅπως* altogether.

4. *πηλικοὶ γὰρ τινες . . . 6. καὶ τὸ μέγεθος*. A parenthesis reinforcing the last argument: a body composed of infinite parts, however small, must itself be infinite: for the parts must have some size, and if they are infinite in number, their sum will be infinite in size.

5. After *καὶ οὗτοι* all the MSS. except B have *ἐξ ὧν*, which must, as Usener points out, be intended as a variant for *καὶ οὗτοι*: but there is no reason to adopt it.

6. *ἄκρον τε ἔχοντος . . . 10. τῇ ἐννοίᾳ*. The second argument has been well explained by Giussani (*loc. cit.*, p. 67). Epicurus' opponent might admit that a *μετάβασις εἰς τὸ ἴσον* could not proceed to infinity, but he would say that a *μετάβασις εἰς τὸ ἑλάττω* could. Epicurus asks him to consider the process more closely: he might go on for a while 'passing' from a larger to a smaller part of a perceptible thing, but he would ultimately reach a part of it so small that though 'it was distinguishable, it was not perceptible by itself', i.e. could only be seen as part of the whole. On either side of this he could proceed to 'equal' parts, but not to smaller parts, as they would not be visible at all. Similarly, as he will show in § 59, in the atom itself we must reach a part which is 'distinguishable but not separable'. *μετάβασις εἰς τοῦδελάττω* then cannot be continued to infinity, for after a while it becomes *μετάβασις εἰς τὸ ἴσον*, and that *ex hypothesi* is incapable in a finite body of prolongation to infinity.

ἄκρον, 'the extreme visible point' of the perceptible body, which is, as Epicurus very exactly explains, *διαληπτόν*, for it can in thought be separated from other component *ἄκρα*, but *οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν*, perceptible only as a part of a whole: by itself it would pass out of the field of vision.

7. *θεωρητόν* is a necessary correction for the MS. *θεωρητέον*.

8. *οὐκ ἔστι . . . 10. τῇ ἐννοίᾳ*. The construction is *οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν (α) μὴ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς τοῦτον τοιοῦτον (εἶναι) καὶ (β) οὕτω . . . βαδίζοντα . . . ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖσθαι*, 'it is not possible to conceive that the next *ἄκρον* should not be similar (in size), or that a person going on in this way to successive *ἄκρα* should be able to proceed to infinity'.

οὕτω with *βαδίζοντα*. Usener adopts *τοῦτο* from BF¹, taking it with *ὑπάρχειν* 'that this should occur, namely that he should arrive': the construction is unnatural. Giussani with less probability reads *οὐ τῷ*, constructing the sentence *οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν μὴ οὐ (α) καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς τοῦτον τοιοῦτον (β) καὶ οὐ τῷ . . . βαδίζοντα ὑπάρχειν*: the sense is the same, but the accumulation of negatives unnecessary and almost unbearable.

10. (τὸ) is a necessary insertion made by Schneider.

§ 58. Epicurus proceeds to a more careful analysis of the 'least part in perception' in order to apply the analogy from *αἰσθησις* to the

idea of the structure of the atom. The *ἄκρον* is *ἀμετάβατον*; you cannot within the limits of this 'smallest visible' part, pass to anything less than itself. It is like *μεταβατά* in that it has extension, but it is unlike them in that it has not itself distinguishable parts. If trying to look at an 'extreme point' we think that we are 'passing' within its own limits to something smaller, i.e. to a part of it, we are mistaken, and our eye has in reality only slipped on to the next extreme point. We may, however, pass from one *ἄκρον* to the next, which is like it and equal to it, and so in course of time our eye might travel over the whole surface of the object. In this way the *ἄκρον* becomes the measure of the object's size: for the larger the object the more *ἄκρα* it will contain.

1. τὸ . . . ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει. 'The least part visible', 'the minimum for perception', which Epicurus refers to also as *ἄκρον*: cf. Lucr. i. 599 'extremum . . . cacumen'.

2. οὔτε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν . . . : it is unlike in that it has itself no distinguishable parts.

3. τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον, 'that which does permit of passing from part to part'. Bignone notes rightly that the plural *τὰς μεταβάσεις* must include *μετάβασις ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον* and *ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον* as well as *ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον*. We may take as an illustration a line, which we may divide either into equal parts, of which we may proceed from one to the other, or into a series of unequal parts, when we may either proceed *ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον* until we have reached the end of the line, or *ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον* until we come down to the *minimum visibile*, when we still have to proceed *ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον* until we reach the end: see notes on § 57.

οὔτε . . . ἀνόμοιον: it is 'not altogether unlike' *μεταβατά* in that it has extension.

4. ἔχον . . . τινα κοινότητα, 'having some community' or 'affinity' with *μεταβατά*.

5. διάληψιν μερῶν, 'possibility of distinguishing parts': cf. *ἄκρον . . . διαληπτόν, εἰ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν* in § 57. 6. The *ἄκρον* is itself the least distinguishable part of the whole and cannot itself have distinguishable parts.

5. ἀλλ' ὅταν . . . δεῖ προσπίπτειν. We may sometimes be misled by this affinity with *μεταβατά* and suppose that because the *ἄκρον* has extension, we shall be able to divide it too up into a right-hand and a left-hand part, i.e. to proceed farther in the process of *μετάβασις εἰς τοῦλαττον*. But if we try experimentally to do so, we shall find that each time we think we are looking at the right-hand or left-hand part of an *ἄκρον*, we have really passed in sight to the next *ἄκρον*, and from it are surveying the first.

ἀλλ' ὅταν. The MSS. have ἀλλ' ὅτε or ἄλλοτε, but Cobet's correction ἀλλ' ὅταν is necessary.

διὰ τὴν . . . προσημφείαν, 'on account of the similarity of the common characteristic', i.e. extension.

7. τὸ ἴσον, sc. another *ἄκρον* like the first: *προσπίπτειν*, 'fall into our

ken', 'meet our sight', used no doubt with reference to the idea of the εἰδωλα of vision 'falling into' the eye.

ἔξῃς τε θεωροῦμεν . . . ἐλάττω ἔλαττον. As we move our sight over the object, we see a succession of such ἄκρα: and by reckoning up their number, thus successively perceived, we can reckon the size of the object. But the sentence contains some new and subtle points.

8. οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: when on the analogy of the μεταβατά we tried to distinguish the parts of the ἄκρον, we imagined they would be 'inside the same' ἄκρον: but, as shown above, we found that we were really looking at fresh ἄκρα outside it. I have little doubt that with ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ we should supply ἄκρῳ (Giussani, Bignone) and not take it, as Hicks does, to mean 'in the same space', which is quite inconsistent with the argument. The argument is largely directed against Anaxagoras.

9. οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν ἀπτόμενα. Contact implies parts which touch: if I place two bodies in contact, it means that parts of each are in juxtaposition: but as the ἄκρα have no parts, this is with them impossible. They cannot touch but only succeed one another, you cannot see the edge or extreme point of an ἄκρον, but only look at it, as it were, from the next ἄκρον. As Giussani points out, Epicurus is here meeting a possible argument of the Eleatic School: a line, they might say for example, consists of a series of points, which touch each other: but each of these points again consists of smaller points in juxtaposition and so on to infinity. But Epicurus imposes a limit: you reach in perceptible objects one so small that it has no parts which can touch, and beyond that you cannot go farther in the world of vision.

ἀλλ' ἢ . . . ἔλαττον. Though these ἄκρα have themselves no parts and cannot be in contact, yet because they have extension, they form a unit of size, and to say that a body is larger or smaller is in effect only to say that it contains a greater or smaller number of ἄκρα.

ἐν τῇ ἰδιότητι τῇ ἑαυτῶν, 'by virtue of their peculiar characteristics', i.e. of the possession of extension without distinguishable parts.

After this very careful examination of the ἀμετάβαρα or 'least points' in sensible things, Epicurus turns to its application to the structure of the atom and maintains that the analogy is complete. The atom too has its least parts, which themselves have only extension and no parts, and never came together to form the atom, but have always existed in it; for indeed apart from it they could have no material existence at all. Having explained the character of the sensible points so elaborately, he is content now with a brief drawing of the parallel. The assumption of the analogy may appear arbitrary, but it is a characteristic application of the Epicurean principle that the ἀδηλα must be explained on the analogy of phenomena.

11. ἀναλογία. Giussani translates 'the same characteristics', Hicks 'follows the same analogy', Bignone 'such an analogy'. But the word in Greek means 'proportion', 'relation', and ταύτη must mean

'this which I have described' in relation to the sensible *minima*. I should then translate 'the same proportion' or 'relation' to the whole body. So again in § 59. 2 below.

§ 59. 3. κέχρηται: Gassendi's correction is necessary: the κεχρησθαι of the MSS. is merely due to κεχρησθαι above, § 58. 12.

4. κατὰ τὴν (τῶν) ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν, 'in virtue of its relation to things here' (i.e. perceptible things). Usener's addition (τῶν) is necessary, and the MSS. are particularly liable to leave out one of two consecutive articles: cf. § 47^a. 3.

κατηγορήσαμεν: i.e. in § 54.

μικρόν τι μόνον μακρὰν ἐκβάλλοντες. Usener's correction, μακράν for μακρόν, seems necessary, but even so the form of expression is odd: lit. 'only as a small thing casting it (the atom) far away', i.e. 'only placing it far below perceptible things in smallness'. So apparently Giussani who paraphrases, 'only that its size is very much smaller'. Bignone takes it slightly differently, 'only removing to a distance (*protrarre lontano*) a determined degree of smallness', i.e. assuming that the *minimum* of perceptible things repeats itself far below in the scale as a minimum of extension, but this is putting rather too much into μικρόν τι. Hicks takes it, 'herein we have merely reproduced something small on a large scale' (reading presumably μακρόν), an unnatural sense for ἐκβάλλοντες and not what Epicurus wants to say.

5. ἐπὶ τε . . . τῶν ἀοράτων: a development of the analogy: just as the sensible least points act as a unit of the measurement of the size of concrete bodies, so do the least points act as the measurement of the size of the atom, i.e. the atoms vary in size according to the number of *πέρατα* which they contain. Epicurus conceived the normal atom as consisting of three or four *πέρατα*: cf. Lucr. ii. 485 ff.

There is some difficulty as to the construction of the sentence. The older editors took τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ *πέρατα* together, in which case we must either translate νομίζειν, 'believe in', which is very improbable, or suppose that it is constructed with the participle παρασκευάζοντα, which is again irregular. Usener, perceiving this difficulty, supposed a small lacuna after παρασκευάζοντα, which would have contained an infinitive such as φαίνεσθαι or φανερὰ γίνεσθαι. This is unnecessary, if with Giussani and Bignone we take τὰ . . . ἀμιγῆ as subject and *πέρατα* as predicative 'we must regard the least indivisible points as *πέρατα*'.

Most editors take τῶν *μηκῶν* with *πέρατα*, placing a comma after *μηκῶν* and another after παρασκευάζοντα: so Bignone, who translates, 'the extreme boundaries of extension'. This would surely require τοῦ: *μηκοῦς*, and I prefer to take τῶν *μηκῶν*, 'the sizes of individual atoms', with τὸ καταμέτρημα, placing the comma after νομίζειν.

6. ἀμιγῆ: i.e. themselves perfectly single and 'unmixed', sc. not consisting of parts: this idea Lucretius expresses by *solida simplicitate*, i. 609. Von Arnim's correction ἀμερῆ is unnecessary.

πέρατα: a new word specially introduced by Epicurus to denote the least parts of the atom, as *ἄκρα* above denotes the least perceptible parts of the sensible body. The 'least part' is at once the 'boundary' in that there can be nothing smaller, and the 'unit of measurement' an idea also contained in *πέρασ*.

ἐξ αὐτῶν πρώτων, 'starting from themselves as units': *sc.* the size of the atom depends on the number of *πέρατα* which it contains. *αὐτῶν* is again a necessary emendation of Usener's for *αὐτῶν*. The MSS. are divided between *πρώτων* and *πρώτων*: Bignone prefers the latter, constructing it with *τὸ καταμέτρημα*, but *πρώτων* seems more in accordance with the general idea of the passage.

7. *τοῖς μείζουσι καὶ ἐλάττοσι*, 'to larger and smaller things', that is, in the first instance to the atoms and through them to the compound bodies which they form.

8. *τῇ διὰ λόγου θεωρίᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων*, 'in our contemplation by thought of invisible things'. We have no direct perception of the atom, still less of its parts, but according to the Epicurean canons we must consider it in thought on the analogy of perceptible things. We may remember that to Epicurus thought itself was always a process of mental visualization, and in this we can, as it were, contemplate the atom and count its *πέρατα*.

ἡ γὰρ κοινότης ἢ ὑπάρχουσα . . . συντελέσαι. There is again difficulty as to the construction and meaning of the sentence.

(1) I agree with Bignone in taking *αὐτοῖς* to be the *πέρατα* of the atom, *πρὸς* to be constructed after *κοινότης*, *τὰ ἀμετάβολα* (leaving for the moment the question of the reading) to be the *ἄκρα* of the sensible body, and *συντελέσαι* to mean 'to form a conclusion': 'for the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the least perceptible parts of the sensible body is sufficient to justify this conclusion', i.e. though the *πέρατα* in fact differ from the *ἄκρα* in that they are physically indivisible, whereas the *ἄκρα* are capable of further physical subdivision, yet the analogy between them as the minimum in their respective spheres is enough to justify the conclusion we have formed.

(2) I was formerly inclined, keeping the same idea of the construction, to take *συντελέσαι* to refer to the arrangement of the *πέρατα* in succession to one another in the atom, as opposed to *συμφόρησιν* which follows: 'the affinity . . . is sufficient for them to be ranged alongside each other (just like the *ἄκρα*) to the extent we have described (i.e. in succession without contact of parts)'. *συντελέσαι* would then be a metaphorical extension of its usual constitutional sense, 'to belong to a class' (e.g. *συντελεῖν εἰς ἀνδρας*, Isocr. 277 B), and the whole would form a close parallel to Lucretius' description of the atom in the passage corresponding to this section (i. 609-612):

sunt igitur solida primordia simplicitate
quae minimis *stipata cohaerent* partibus arte,
non ex illarum *conventu* conciliata,
sed magis aeterna pollentia simplicitate.

But one can go too far in attempting to get an exact parallel with Lucretius, and I doubt this meaning for *συντελέσαι*.

(3) Giussani takes the clause in an entirely different way. αὐτοῖς is the atoms (he suggests that it might be better to read αὐταῖς), κοινότης is their affinity with perceptible bodies, πρὸς means 'in respect of', and *συντελέσαι* is 'the coming together of the atoms for creation': 'the common characteristics, which the atoms have with sensible things in respect to their smallest parts is what makes them fit for the composition, that is the creation, of things up to the point which we see'. This is surely a very unnatural sense to give both to αὐτοῖς (the *πέρματα* being the subject of the previous sentence), to πρὸς, and above all to *συντελέσαι*: Giussani is, I think, carried away by a desire to find in Epicurus a conclusion like that of Lucr. i. 628-634.

9. ἀμετάβολα. All modern scholars before Bignone adopted Usener's obvious emendation ἀμετάβαρα: cf. § 58 τῶν μεταβατῶν. Bignone, however, quotes from Sex. Empir. *adv. Math.* i. 118 μονοειδῆς καὶ ἁσύνθετος καὶ ἀμετάβολος, where it appears to have the sense 'unchanging', 'homogeneous'. This is an admirable description of the *ἄκρα*, and would correspond exactly to ἀμειγῇ in l. 6. There seems therefore no reason for departing from it.

10. συμφόρῃσιν, 'a bringing together' (*conventus*, Lucr., *loc. cit.*). The atoms are 'brought together' to form things, but their least parts can never have been brought together to form the atoms, for the atom is *ex hypothesi* indivisible.

ἐκ τούτων κίνησιν ἔχόντων, 'out of the store of first parts as bodies capable of movement'. If the *πέρματα* could have a separate existence, they could have movement: and if movement they might have been brought together, but all this is impossible. The expression is loose but not, I think, impossible for Epicurus. Brieger's insertion of (οἷκ) before ἔχόντων is not only unnecessary, but mistaken, as it then makes κίνησιν οἷκ ἔχόντων the main reason why there is not a *συμφόρησις*, whereas it is only a secondary cause, derived from the primary cause, that the *πέρματα* have no independent existence. More probable is Bignone's emendation τοῦ(των ὡς) τῶν, and indeed ὡς is rather badly needed, but I think the passage can stand as it is.

§ 60. A detailed paragraph follows dealing with an important point: Can there be motion upwards and downwards in infinite space? The paragraph fits in badly where it stands, and Giussani would attach it to other sections concerning the universe (§ 42 and § 47). But it is almost more closely connected with the motion of the atoms, which Epicurus is about to consider. It seems best on the whole to leave it here in parenthesis, unless one is attempting to reconstruct the whole letter.

The argument is characteristically Epicurean. We cannot, says Epicurus, predicate upward and downward motion in infinite space with reference to a highest and lowest point, an absolute top and bottom, for such do not of course exist, but we can with reference to ourselves or to any point in space of which we choose to think. The

motion from our feet to our head, however prolonged, is to us motion upwards and the opposite motion downwards. From a mathematical point of view of infinity this is, of course, as Brieger says, *inepte excogitatum*, but, as Giussani points out (i, p. 169), the contradiction is inherent in the conception of space itself, at once infinite and relative. Moreover, the conclusion is reached in strict accordance with the Epicurean canons. We are bound to ask ourselves if *αἰσθησις* provides any evidence on the point, and the answer is that it does: we know what we mean by motion upward and downward in reference to ourselves, and we have only to prolong such motion to infinity, and we then have the conception we need.

1. καὶ μὴν . . . ἢ κάτω. A sentence of some difficulty. I take it to mean literally, 'moreover in the infinite we must not speak of the "up" and the "down" as though (measured by) the highest or a lowest'. τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω is, I think, 'up or down' in anticipation of the idea of the motion of the atoms, which is to follow in the new section: if so, we must read ἀνωτάτω . . . κατωτάτω with Usener. Giussani and Bignone who take τὸ ἄνω . . . κάτω as 'the high' and 'the low', making it a merely special reference without consideration of motion, keep the MS. ἀνωτάτω . . . κατωτάτω, 'we must not speak of high or low as of a highest or lowest'. Neither the sense nor the reference seem to me so probable.

The MSS. are divided between ἀνωτάτω καὶ κατωτάτω and ἀνωτάτω ἢ κατωτάτω: the parallel of ἄνω ἢ κάτω below seems to decide for ἢ. After κατηγορεῖν Usener marks a lacuna, which presumably would contain something like τὴν φοράν εἰς. But it is unnecessary: he is here thinking simply of the directions 'up' and 'down', and the question of motion arises later.

2. εἰς μέντοι . . . ἡμῖν. With Bignone I regard this clause as a parenthesis strengthening the previous sentence. The general sense is, 'indeed, even if we were to prolong to infinity the line passing above our heads, we shall never reach the top (nor the bottom, if we prolong the line passing below our feet)'. τοῦτο is then τὸ ἀνωτάτω.

There is, however, difficulty in the text after εἰς ἀπειρον. The MSS. read ἄγειν ὄν (or ὄν). Palaeographically one would suppose this stood for ἄγειν (ὀν sscr.), i.e. the correction of the infinitive into the neuter participle: but I cannot see any sense to be derived from this: Usener would read τείνον for ἄγειν ὄν, which I cannot construe. Hicks (in *Stoics and Epicureans*, presumably translating Usener's text) says, 'Still a line may be drawn vertically upward and stretch to infinity from the point, wherever it is, where we stand, and we must not say that this distinction of up and down will never be found in it'. This is good sense, but can hardly be extracted from the text. Bignone would read ἄγειν (νοοῦσι, δηλ.) ὄν, 'even if we imagine ourselves proceeding to infinity above our head . . . it is manifest that we shall never find this extreme limit', but the insertion is too large. Giussani suggests ἄγειν (ἐξ) ὄν, 'if it were possible to go on'; this seems to me

far more probable, but I suggest <ἐν>όν as more likely to have produced the MS. text.

4. ἡ τὸ ὑποκάτω . . . πρὸς τὸ αὐτό. The construction runs on grammatically from οὐ δεῖ κατηγορεῖν after the parenthesis, and ἡ takes the place of the expected δέ corresponding to ὡς μὲν ἀνωτάτω. 'While we cannot postulate a top and bottom in infinite space, we must not either say that that which stretches downwards to infinity below the point thought of can be at once up and down in reference to the same thing', i.e. though 'up' and 'down' cannot be used in reference to a top or bottom, they can with reference to a point selected in space: in other words, the terms are not absolutely true, but they have a relative truth. As in the parenthesis, there is an implication, and the same is assumed with regard to the line upwards.

R. D. Hicks (*Class. Rev.* xxxvii, p. 108) has a different view of the whole sentence. He retains ἴσμεν and ἀγεῖν ὄν, takes τοῦτο, 'this point or region', as the subject of φανείσθαι, and places ἡ τὸ ὑποκάτω τοῦ νοηθέντος εἰς ἄπειρον in a parenthesis. 'As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space—or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity—appear to us to be at the same time "up" and "down" with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable'. This is an ingenious interpretation and requires careful consideration: it certainly gets over the somewhat awkward want of parallelism between the two clauses.

6. ὥστε ἔστι μίαν λαβεῖν φοράν . . . So far he has spoken of direction: he now proceeds to what, in its effects on the general theory, is the more important question of motion. We may then in this conventional sense say that there is a motion upwards and a motion downwards in respect to us.

7. ἂν καὶ μυριάκις . . . : even though there are thousands of worlds above and below us to whom this same motion passes from us. But the clause is not very satisfactory, because if motion upwards from us went on arriving at the feet of persons in worlds above us, it would still be motion upwards to them too, and similarly with motion downwards: our ideas would be confirmed. I strongly suspect that πρὸς τοὺς πόδας and ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ought to be interchanged. We then get very good sense: it is still motion upwards to us, even though persons in many other worlds are, in our view, upside down, so that to them it appears to be motion downwards. The two expressions might easily have been reversed by a scribe who did not properly understand the argument.

9. <ἐς> again seems a necessary addition.

10. ἡ γὰρ ὅλη φορά . . . : a summing up: for in any case, whether you call them up and down or not, the two motions are diametrically opposed to one another. Of course once more, not a mathematical statement but a conclusion based on experience.

C. *Motions of the atoms.*

The two following sections together with portions of §§ 46, 47, which should be placed here, constitute an account of the motions of the atoms and their relation to the motion of compound bodies. The subject is very difficult, but both the general ideas and the phraseology have been very brilliantly elucidated by Giussani in his essay *Cinetica Epicurea* (Lucr., vol. i, pp. 97-124).

It will perhaps be well to begin by an attempt to state the main ideas. The free atoms in the void are borne downwards by their own weight at an incredible speed (*ἄμα νοήματι*). All move at an equal rate, differences of weight making no difference of speed in a vacuum: for retardation is only due to the opposition of external bodies or, as we shall see, to internal vibration (*ἀντικοπή*), which cannot occur in the individual atoms. But owing in origin to the *παρέγκλισις* or spontaneous swerve of the atoms (which strangely enough is omitted in the letter, though it was an all-important point in the system and is treated at length by Lucretius ii. 216-293), the atoms collide. Then either they rebound in any direction, even upwards, and continue their movement at precisely the same speed but in a new direction, or they unite to form a compound body. But even in the compound their motion does not cease or slacken: continually moving, meeting, and clashing, and starting off again at the same atomic speed, they keep the body in a constant state of internal vibration. When the body is at rest, this means that the sum total of internal movements balances and produces an equilibrium: when the body moves, for instance, as the result of an external blow, this means that to all the atoms is communicated over and above their natural motions a tendency towards movement in a certain direction. Yet even so their tiny trajectories in all directions continue and act now as a retardation (*ἀντικοπή*) of the compound body. These main notions are refined by certain subtleties of thought, as Epicurus proceeds, but with them in mind, we can consider the passage.

§ 61. 2. *εἰσφέρωνται*. The compound verb is undoubtedly difficult, and both Brieger and Giussani have noticed that one would expect the simple *φέρωνται*. The MSS. however, in spite of variations, all point to the compound, and it should probably be regarded, with Giussani, as picturesque. Epicurus is thinking of the atoms plunging on into the void before the eyes of an imaginary spectator. It is consistent with his invariable conception of thought as visualization. It is unnecessary to follow Brieger in reading *εἰς* (*ἐνὰ τόπον*) *φέρωνται*.

μηθενὸς ἀντικóπτοντος: the Epicurean idea of *ἀντικοπή* must be carefully thought out and applied in each case, where it occurs. Its primary notion is of course the clash of atom with atom. In the case of the individual atom the sole cause of retardation is the collision with other atoms, nor indeed can any one collision do more than momentarily check its course before it starts off in a new direction. But

a series of such collisions may by constantly diverting its course in different directions, delay its advance in the original direction: such, for instance, would be the case, if the atom was moving not through the void, but through air. In the case of the compound body, however, the collision of the atoms which compose it translates itself into an internal vibration, which is a cause of delay and the slackening of speed. It is in this latter sense that ἀντικότη becomes a technical term of Epicurean phraseology. Giussani wishes to interpret it in this technical sense all through, and even to take ἀπαντᾷ below in the same sense: so here, 'when the atoms are moving through the void, without internal vibration' (which the atom cannot have, because it has not separable parts, §§ 58, 59). But this is surely mistaken here and leads to great difficulties in the next sentence: we must interpret the idea of ἀντικότειν according to its context as (1) external collision, (2) internal vibration, remembering of course that the latter is only the former looked at from the point of view of the compound body (Giussani is too apt to think of them as distinct things). Here, as Epicurus is speaking of the individual atoms, it is external collision alone. Bignone (Appendix, p. 226) strongly supports this view.

οὕτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα . . . Epicurus now supports his previous statement about the atoms with a wider statement about bodies in general (τὰ βαρέα neut.), but he is still thinking of external collision: the technical notion of ἀντικότη does not appear till later. The idea here then is quite simple: 'you might think that owing to their weight heavier bodies move faster than light: but provided the latter meet with no external collisions to deflect and delay them, this is not the case: the reason why, e.g. we see light bodies falling more slowly, is because the air offers to them a more successful resistance'. The idea is exactly parallel to Lucr. ii. 230-242. Giussani wishes to take even ἀπαντᾷ here of internal vibration—a manifest impossibility. The interpretation would be greatly simplified all through if we could take τὰ βαρέα, &c., merely of the atoms, but coming immediately after τὰς ἀτόμους the neuter must be intended to have a wider application.

3. τὰ βαρέα . . . τῶν μικρῶν καὶ κούφων. The antithesis is incomplete. Usener may well be right in suggesting τὰ (μεγάλα καὶ) βαρέα: this is better than Gassendi's excision of μικρῶν καὶ.

4. ὅταν γε . . . : an emphatic limitation, 'provided, that is, that . . .'
αὐτοῖς: sc. τοῖς μικροῖς.

οὕτε τὰ μικρὰ . . . ἀντικότε. It might be held by others that small bodies would naturally move faster than large bodies, because they meet with less opposition. Bignone points out that Epicurus is thinking not merely of the natural downward motion of the atoms, but also of the motion sideways and even upwards owing to blows, and as regards upward motion it might well be supposed that the small would move faster than the great. But this too, says Epicurus, is a mistake, provided always there is no collision of atom with atom: motion in all directions is at the uniform maximum speed. Usener's

insertion of *βραδύτερον* after *τὰ μικρά* is due to misunderstanding and produces a mere tautology: both Giussani and Bignone condemn it.

5. *πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα*: the expression has already occurred in § 47^a with reference to the motion of the *εἰδωλα*. I take it to mean here as there 'having their whole course uniform', i.e. they are always moving at the same rate and in the same direction, provided that there is no collision. Bignone takes it to mean only 'having their whole course in the same direction', but I think that the idea of uniform speed is also implied. Giussani here, as in § 47^a, with the idea of the internal *ἀντικοπή* in his mind, translates 'having a symmetrical course of all their parts', i.e. having all their component parts moving in the same direction so that there is no internal *ἀντικοπή*. Apart from the strain thus put upon *πάντα*, such a conception is only applicable to the atom, which has no separable parts, whereas here Epicurus' idea is intended to have a wider application.

Giussani's emendation *ἐχόντων* for *ἔχοντα* is tempting, as it would be more natural that Epicurus should apply this notion to the heavy bodies, as a reason why they should not be slower than the lighter bodies, but the notion is true of either, and it is best not to disturb the reading of all the MSS.

μηδὲ ἐκείνοις: sc. *τοῖς μεγάλοις* as opposed to *αὐτοῖς* above.

6. *οὐθ' ἢ ἄνω* . . . Though the expression is still general in form Epicurus is thinking mainly now of the motion of the atoms in the void. They can move either sideways or even upwards owing to the blows received in collision with other atoms, but motion in these directions is still exactly equal in speed to that of their original motion downwards owing to their own weight: the blow deflects but does not diminish the pace—a very important point in the Epicurean cinetics.

The clause is loosely appended and we must carry on the general notion, 'quicker'. Usener would supply *θάπτων ἢ βραδύτερα*, but this is not necessary: either notion is sufficient for the general idea.

7. *ἐφ' ὅποσον γὰρ* . . . The summary of the preceding propositions. Once started in any given direction the atom will continue to move in that direction at absolute speed until it is again deflected either by a new blow or by its own natural tendency to move downwards, which now counteracts the effect of the blow. In effect these two counteractions would work differently: a new collision will start an immediate change of direction, whereas the tendency to move downwards would assert itself gradually and cause a gradual deflexion.

8. *κατίσχη*, 'holds out', 'prevails'.

ἐκότερα αὐτῶν. The MSS. have *ἐκατέρων*, for which Usener proposed *ἐκότερον* in the sense 'either of the two kinds of motion', and modern editors have followed him. But can *ἐκότερον* have this sense? If it is retained, it must surely mean 'either the heavy or the light body', referring back to the opening clauses. I suggest *ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν* in the sense which Usener postulates.

ἅμα νοήματι, 'quick as thought', Epicurus' regular expression for the immeasurably swift motion of the unimpeded atom. Remember that thought was to him an atomic motion and the swiftest of all motions.

9. ὥς (ἄν τι) ἀντικόψῃ: a necessary insertion of Usener's: ἄν τι would naturally fall out by 'haplography' before ἀντικόψῃ.

ἢ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους. A new point: the atom moving along at absolute speed in any direction may be checked or deflected suddenly by a collision or gradually tend to its natural downward motion as the force of the blow is exhausted. ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους is used rather loosely with ἀντικόψῃ, for it is not of course strictly a case of ἀντικοπή, but ἢ ἔξωθεν leads up to it.

10. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλῆξαντος δύναμιν, which Usener excludes as a gloss, is essential to the sense: the original downward motion asserts itself 'against the force of the blow'. Bignone (Appendix, p. 228) would read τὴν (ἐκ) τοῦ πλῆξαντος, pointing out that it is not strictly the force of the atom which delivered the blow that is in question, but the force of the blow received from it. He may be right, but the comparatively loose expression of the text is intelligible.

§ 46^b. 1. καὶ μὴν καὶ . . . ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει. With some hesitation I follow Giussani in inserting here the last two sentences of § 46 (see notes on § 46^a). They cannot be in place there for (a) together with the opening section of § 47 they interrupt a close consecutive argument, (b) the question of the rate of movement of the εἶδωλα is not raised till later: § 47 ὅθεν καὶ τάχῃ ἀνυπέρβλητα ἔχει . . . On the other hand, they refer more naturally to the pace of the atoms and, like the beginning of § 47, may have been inserted there to explain the general notion of atomic movement as a preliminary to the description of the movement of the εἶδωλα. Here they are very much in point.

Epicurus proceeds then to a new point: the atoms, he has said, all move at an equal pace: he now passes to the question, What is that pace? It is true that he has to some extent anticipated the answer in the words ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φορὰν σχήσει above, but that is vague and general, and this is a careful and reasoned statement. The atoms moving uninterruptedly through the void can cover any comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time: in fact, the speed of the atoms may be described with Giussani as 'absolute speed'.

κατὰ μηδεμίαν . . . γινομένην, 'if it takes place without a meeting of things which might collide'. As we have seen, such collision cannot diminish the speed of atomic motion, but only momentarily check it and deflect its direction. But it can therefore prevent its covering a certain μῆκος, i.e. the distance between two points in a certain time: if starting from *a* it only ultimately reaches *b* after a series of deflexions, it takes a longer time for the whole transit than if it passes uninterruptedly through the void.

2. ἀντικοψόντων. The MSS. have ἀντικοψάντων, which seems impossible. Usener emends to the future, Giussani more violently proposes

ἀντικοπτόντων: the future will surely stand as ἀπάντησιν does not strictly mean the clash but a 'coming to meet'.

περιληπτόν, 'comprehensible as a unit marked off from other periods of time'. Cf. §§ 40, 42, 56 for use of this and kindred forms.

3. βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους . . . : i.e. the deflexion of the atom from one direction to another has the appearance of greater slowness of movement in its transit from one point to another: we think it has taken longer to pass from *a* to *b* (see note on l. 1). But of course Epicurus has also in his mind here the compound body, to which he is leading up: there the internal collisions of the component atoms produce the appearance of greater slowness of movement of the whole compound body. Some MSS. have βραδύτης, but βράδους goes more naturally with τάχους.

§ 62. Another very difficult paragraph, in which most editors seem to me to have gone strangely wrong: with three small alterations (θάπτων for θάπτον (2), τὸν ἐλάχιστον for τῶν ἐλαχίστων (4), and ἀντικοπτοῦσιν for ἀντικόπτωσιν (6)) the MS. reading seems to me to make perfect sense, which the editors, mainly owing to preconceived notions, have missed.

Epicurus passes now from the motion of the free atoms in the void, to the motion of atoms in compounds, where the individual atoms are of course still moving in void, for even in the most compact bodies there is a διάστημα of void between atom and atom. Now here, just as in the case of the free atoms, hasty considerations might lead to the conclusion that some atoms move faster than others. Take the case of two compound bodies *A* and *B* moving in the same direction, of which *A* is moving at twice the pace of *B*: even if we narrow our observation to the least period of time which is continuous (καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχῆ χρόνον), *A* still covers twice the distance that *B* covers. We are inclined then to infer (προσδοξάζεσθαι) that the atoms which compose *A* are moving twice as fast as those which compose *B*. But now let us try to pass beyond the region of sense-perception to what we might call 'atomic' time (note that the whole idea is exactly parallel to the notion of the πέρατα in the question of size, §§ 57, 58): take an instant of time, such as we can only conceive in thought (λόγῳ θεωρητὸν χρόνον), a division of time so small that it cannot be called continuous at all. Our inference from observation might again lead us to think that the atoms of *A* were moving at twice the speed of those of *B*. But let us now try the test of the mental vision (ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας) which we have obtained from our conception of the movements of the free atoms in the void. We see now at once that our inference was wrong. For we must think of the construction of the body, of atoms still, as we have seen, moving in void, but restricted by their collisions with one another. In this instant of time then, the individual atoms of both bodies are all moving at an equal rate, colliding and clashing momentarily, and striking off on their new little trajects in all directions. What then is the atomic difference

between the bodies *A* and *B* which causes the difference in the speed of motion of the aggregate body? It is simply that in *A* more atoms are moving in the direction of the whole body than in *B*: in *B* there is more ἀντικοπή, it is more retarded by adverse atomic motion and therefore as a whole body moves slower. Indeed it is this ἀντικοπή alone which renders the motion of bodies perceptible to us (ὅτι τὴν αἰσθάνειν τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς φορᾶς γίγνεται): the atomic motion is far too fast for us to perceive: the union of atoms in compounds retards the motion by ἀντικοπή till at last, when the compounds are large enough, the motion is slow enough for us to perceive it. Once again the idea is exactly parallel to the notion of size, and the whole is wonderfully clearly brought out by Lucretius in his illustration from the motes in the sunbeam (ii. 114-141, but especially 132-141).

[The editors and commentators have curiously misunderstood the passage.

(1) Usener, not seeing the force of ῥηθήσεται, inserts (οὐ) before θάττων, reads ἡ μὴ ἐφ' ἑνα, and excises κατὰ τοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους as a gloss. How he understands the clause from τῷ ἐφ' ἑνα . . . ἡ μὴ ἐφ' ἑνα I, like Giussani, fail to perceive. Hicks, who apparently follows Usener, except that he keeps κατὰ τοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους (and ? reads οὐ θάττων φορηθήσεται), translates: 'Moreover, of the atoms in composite bodies, one will not travel faster than another, since all have equal velocity, and this whether we consider (τῷ) the motion of the atoms in an aggregate in one direction during sensible and continuous time or their motions in different directions in times so short as to be apprehended only by the reason'. Apart from grammatical difficulties, I take this statement to be quite untrue: the 'motion of atoms in an aggregate in one direction during sensible and continuous time' is faster in some cases than others: see above.

(2) Brieger rightly keeps θάττων without οὐ, reads φορηθήσεται, and then proceeds to insert and suppose lacunae in his usual wild manner, with the general idea that the atom which makes a number of trajects in all directions moves slower than the atom which goes straight in one direction (cf. § 47). This idea seems to me quite inapplicable and inappropriate here.

(3) Giussani, to whom I owe a great deal for the explanation of the general meaning of the passage, has been misled by not observing the force of ῥηθήσεται. He therefore accepts Usener's οὐ, understands 'you cannot say even in compounds that one atom is faster than another', and then, being driven to take the τῷ ἐφ' ἑνα clause as giving a reason, not for the apparent difference of pace, but for its real equality, emends εἰ μὴ τοῖς αἵμα μὴ and invents a quite gratuitous idea that at the first moment of the starting of a compound body after a blow for a very brief continuous period the atoms *do* all move in one direction, and then ἀντικοπή sets in—an idea surely quite foreign, as Giussani himself seems to feel, to the whole Epicurean cinetics.

(4) Bignone, who agrees very closely with me in the general sense

of the passage and has in his Appendix ably expounded the Epicurean conceptions of the minimum of time and the minimum of space, which correspond with the notion of the *minimae partes*, like Giussani, takes the clause τῷ ἐφ' ἑνα . . . συνεχῇ χρόνον as an explanation of ἰσοταχῶν: 'they are equal in speed because they move in only one direction and in the least continuous time of their motion'. But this implies 'each' as the subject, takes καὶ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχῇ χρόνον in an unnatural sense, and destroys the parallelism of τῷ ἐφ' ἑνα τόπον . . . εἰ μὴ ἐφ' ἑνα.]

2. θάπτων, the reading of f, must, I think, be accepted for θάπτον of the MSS. The latter could only be kept if we supposed that φέρεσθαι had dropped out (or must be 'understood') after ῥηθήσεται. I have shown above that there is no need to insert οὐ before it.

ῥηθήσεται, 'it will be said to be', though as a matter of fact it is not. The inference from our experience of compound bodies would be exactly on a par with the supposition dealt with above that heavier atoms will move faster downwards than lighter ones.

3. ἰσοταχῶν οὐσῶν by itself, 'though in fact they are all equal in speed'.

τῷ . . . χρόνον then gives the reason of this false assumption. The atoms in compound bodies are perceived in any continuous period of time, even the shortest (retain καί), to move as an aggregate in one direction. But it is wrong to infer from this that each individual atom is during that time moving *only* in this direction at the speed of the aggregate body.

5. εἰ μὴ . . . γίνηται is really Epicurus' reply to the false objection, though in form he appends it rather oddly as an exception to the theory he is contradicting.

ἀλλὰ πυκνὸν ἀντικόπτουσιν . . . : again the statement of the fact: 'but in truth they are constantly jostling and by their collisions gradually retard the motion of the whole until it becomes perceptible to us'. See above.

6. ἕως ἂν . . . γίνηται: cf. Lucr. ii. 138-139:

sic a principiis ascendit motus et exit
paulatim nostros ad sensus.

7. τὸ γὰρ προσδοξαζόμενον . . . We see compound bodies moving at different rates in continuous perceptible periods, and we infer that the atoms which compose them are doing the same even in the ideal *minima* of time. But this is not the case. In matters of perception we must trust αἴσθησις, but in matters beyond its ken we must not make hasty inferences by analogy, but think out by an act of apprehension what the truth is. For the general idea of the προσδοξαζόμενον see §§ 50, 51.

9. ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων, 'in the matters under discussion', i.e. matters concerning the character and behaviour of imperceptible atoms.

10. ἐπεὶ τό γε θεωρούμενον . . . : a return on the first principles of

inquiry. In dealing with phenomena αἰσθησις will give us the truth, but with regard to ἀδηλα it cannot.

ἐπεὶ . . . ἀληθές ἐστίν. See Appendix on ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, pp. 259 ff. It is this passage which primarily demands the extension of the meaning of this difficult phrase beyond the immediate apprehension by the mind of images too subtle to be perceived by the senses: for that clearly cannot be his meaning here. I have argued in the Appendix that the meaning here is to be found in the parallelism of the sentence: τὸ θεωρούμενον is what Epicurus elsewhere (§ 56) calls τὸ ἐπιβλητικῶς λαμβανόμενον τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις—the result of observation on the part of the senses as opposed to passive sensation: so τὸ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον is the image apprehended as arising from a scientific deduction, each step of which has been referred to the test of the αἰσθήσεις to make sure that there is no ἀντιμαρτύρησις. We have a passive sensation of a moving body: by observation we see that each of its perceptible parts is moving in the same direction as the whole: δόξα by combining images applies this idea at random to the atomic parts: but the mind apprehends true images of atoms in motion, which is derived from a chain of concepts—the atoms, their collisions, their resultant vibratory motion in all directions—each of which has been scientifically tested: the conclusion of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας is therefore true.

§ 47^b. 1. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἅμα . . . I have here with more confidence followed Giussani in inserting this section from § 47. It could only with the greatest difficulty be forced into significance, where it stands, in connexion with the theory of 'idols', whereas here it follows on quite naturally with the preceding account of the movement of atoms. It is in fact a precaution against a misunderstanding of the theory just stated, and has been brilliantly expounded in most of its details by Giussani (pp. 14-118). The motion of the whole body is, it has been said, the sum of the motions of its component atoms: but these motions are an infinite series of tiny trajects in all directions: it might then be supposed that the whole body performs this entire series of motions, and arrives at the end of its journey after having followed a devious course in all directions. Such an idea is really inconceivable, and would moreover be a direct contradiction of αἰσθησις: for in that case the whole body will have come from any possible spot in any direction from which one of its atoms started and not from the place from which we saw it start. The objection is put in a very exaggerated form, but it is not difficult to see the thought underlying it: if the motion of the compound body is only the sum of the motions of its component atoms, are not those imperceptible motions alone real and is not the motion of the compound a delusion? Epicurus replies with an emphatic negative. The motion of the compound is a reality, determined by the ἀντικοπή of the component atoms: or, if we may translate it more literally, the motion of the compound is the sensible likeness (δμοιον) of the sum of the component motions. As separate

identities the atoms perform their tiny trajects at infinite speed, but as parts of the new unity (*ἄθροισμα*, or *concilium*, as Lucretius calls it) they combine to perform a new motion. The compound is more than an aggregate, it is an entity: its motion is more than the sum of motions: it is a new reality.

Thus both the motions of the compound, sensible, continuous, taking place in perceptible time, and the motions of the atoms, imperceptible, constantly broken, occurring in time perceptible only in thought, are alike realities: ἐπεὶ τό γε θεωρούμενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστίν (§ 62 *fin.*). The idea is the very foundation of the Epicurean physics: both the sensible world and the imperceptible world comprehended by thought are real and true. Again, we have exact parallels in the theory of the secondary qualities: the atoms, for instance, are colourless, but by their different shapes and collocations they produce colour in the compound body: and that colour is no delusion but a reality. This is the natural conclusion of the section on atomic motion, and I have little doubt that Giussani's transposition and general explanation of this passage are right, though I differ from him at one point.

οὐδ' (οὐδέ) is the reading of the MSS. and may be kept: this idea or criticism is no more to be accepted than the fallacy with which he has dealt in § 62. Both Usener and Giussani alter it to οὐθ' to correspond to the οὐτε which they insert after καὶ τοῦτο below. Bignone, who keeps this passage in its original place, can find no reference for οὐδ' and reads οὐδαμῇ for οὐδέ ἅμα. The MS. οὐδέ is indeed a small but strong argument for the transposition.

2. καὶ τὸ φερόμενον σῶμα. It is impossible to make sense of the MS. κατὰ τὸ φερόμενον, and καὶ and κατὰ are frequently confused in these MSS. (e.g. § 38). Bignone, supposing the passage to have special reference to the motion of the εἰδῶλα, reads καὶ τὰποφερόμενον.

ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους: sc. the several places which each of the component atoms reaches in its trajects.

3. Usener, followed by Giussani, confines the parenthesis to the words ἀδιανόητον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο: in that case it is necessary to insert a negative in the following clause, which must be οὐτε to correspond with the οὐτε which they read in l. 1. Usener reads οὐτ' ἀφικνούμενον (supposing συν a corruption, which is improbable), Giussani οὐτε συναφικνούμενον, keeping the significant compound to express the motion of the whole body together with its component atoms. Giussani then explains the sentence by a very subtle and improbable idea: he points out that all the atoms composing a compound must, before they entered the compound, have travelled in their course to far distant parts of space: the theory then which would identify the motion of the whole body with those of its atoms must suppose that with them it has arrived from all these distant parts of space and not from the spot from which we have watched its motion. He compares especially Lucretius' description of the formation of lightning,

vi. 340-345. But such an idea is very far-fetched and, as Bignone points out, there could be no reason to identify the motion of the body with those of its atoms *before they entered the compound*.

Bignone's own solution is far more satisfactory, and I have followed it without hesitation: he continues the parenthesis to *ἔσται ἀφιστάμενον*, and keeps the MS. text without the insertion of a negative. The clause then is an additional reason for rejecting the theory just enunciated: it is unthinkable, and moreover it involves the supposition that the compound might arrive not from where we saw it start, but from any spot in any direction, as it would if in devious course it followed the various trajects of its component atoms.

4. *ἔθεν δὴ ποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου* goes then with *συναφικνούμενον*.

6. *ἀντικοπή γὰρ ὅμοιον ἔσται*: the motion of the whole body is the outward appearance (*ὁμοίωμα* § 46^b 4) of the various internal motions of its component atoms.

μέχρι τούτου. Giussani, with his thoughts very much on the Lucretian account of the formation of the *fulmen*, takes this to mean 'up to the moment of departure', i.e. of the formation of the compound and the start of the compound motion: up till that moment the motion of the free atoms was *οὐκ ἀντικοπτόν*. But it is very hard to extract this meaning from the context (*τούτου*, the reading of BG, would make it easier), and it is surely inconsistent, for Epicurus is apparently thinking just as much of compound bodies formed long ago and at rest before the moment of departure, when it could not be said that 'the speed of the motion was *οὐκ ἀντικοπτόν*'. The natural meaning to be extracted from the context is "*μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ χρόνου*", and that I believe to be what Epicurus intends. In the *χρόνοι λόγῳ θεωρητοί* the motion is the independent motion of the individual atoms at atomic speed, *οὐκ ἀντικοπτόν*, but the moment we arrive at a *χρόνος αἰσθητός* we have the motion of the compound, the outward expression of the *ἀντικοπή*.

7. *ἀντικοπτόν*: Usener corrected the MS. reading to *ἀντικόπτον*, but the active participle will not make sense, and I prefer to read *ἀντικοπτόν*: 'the speed of its motion is not liable to retardation by collision'.

χρήσιμον δὴ . . . τὸ στοιχεῖον. Giussani demurs to transporting this clause with the rest of the passage on the ground that it sounds odd at the close of a section, and would be more natural in introducing a new section. But we may compare the parallel phrase at the close of the discussion of the nature of vision, § 52. *ἰ καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν κατέχειν*.

V. THE SOUL, ITS NATURE AND ACTIVITIES.

The next main section of the letter (§§ 63-68) deals with the nature of the soul, or vital principle (*ψυχή*). The main points in Epicurus' theory are (1) that it is material in character, a corporeal existence

(*σῶμα*), constructed like other material existences of atoms in composition; (2) that the component atoms are extremely subtle in nature; (3) that the soul particles are most like those of wind and heat, which he also conceives as material substances; (4) that added to these two elements is a third unnameable substance, far finer in structure than either of them; (5) that the soul is distributed over the body and is by it preserved from destruction, and in turn communicates sensation to the body; (6) that at the dissolution of the body the soul is dissolved too and perishes.

All this is in harmony with the general Epicurean account of the soul, but it is put very summarily, and when compared with other Epicurean sources would seem to have some omissions. In particular there are two notable divergencies from the account given by Lucretius in Book III.

(1) To the elements of breath or wind (*ventus*) and heat (*calor*, *vapor*) Lucretius adds the third element of air or mist (*aer*) (iii. 233). This account is supported by other Epicurean sources, e.g. Plut. *adv. Coloten* 20 (Usener 314) ἔκ τινος θερμοῦ καὶ πνευματικοῦ καὶ ἀερώδους and Aet. iv. 3 (Usener 315) κρᾶμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου. Giussani (vol. i, pp. 184 ff.) has ingeniously explained that by this means the idea was obtained of atmosphere in three different temperatures, hot air (*θερμόν*), air at normal temperature (*ἀήρ*), and cold air (*πνεῦμα*). There is no reason to suppose a discrepancy on this point between Epicurus and his disciples, but we must regard the present passage as a rough statement, elsewhere elaborated. The 'unnameable' element thus becomes in Lucretius the *quarta natura* (iii. 241).

(2) Lucretius distinguishes (iii. 94-135) between the *anima*, the vital principle, distributed, as Epicurus says here, all over the body and thus the origin of sensation, and the *animus*, the mind, an aggregate of pure soul atoms situated in the breast. This distinction had already been made by Democritus, and is vouched for not only by the scholium on § 67, but by Aetius iv. 4 (Usener 312) and Plut. *adv. Coloten* 20 (Usener 314). It is indeed a fundamental idea in the system, and it seems strange that Epicurus should have omitted it here. Brieger has endeavoured to find a reference to it in § 65, but Giussani has, I think, shown conclusively that this is not the case. It may be that a passage has been lost in which Epicurus mentioned it, but here again it seems more probable that he is speaking summarily and does not refer to what was a cardinal point in the doctrine of the soul which would have been familiar to the advanced pupils for whom the letter to Herodotus was written.

(1) The first section (§ 63) deals with the nature and atomic composition of the soul.

§ 63. 1. *συνεσπᾶν*, 'to consider', lit. 'to obtain a comprehensive view': we may notice the verb: thought is always to Epicurus a kind of visualization.

ἀναφέροντα, 'referring to' the external and internal sensations; i.e. using them, as always in the Epicurean system, as standards or criteria of judgement.

3. σῶμα: this is a point of the greatest importance. The soul is purely material and corporeal, and the popular idea that it is ἀσώματον can have no place in a purely materialist system: see § 67.

λεπτομέρῃς, 'of fine particles', i.e. as we learn from Lucr. iii. 177 ff., of small round and smooth atoms put together in a subtle structure: cf. the scholium on § 67 ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων, πολλῶν τινι διαφέρουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.

παρ' ὅλων τὸ ἀθροίσμα παρεσπαρμένον, mingled in, that is, with the atoms which compose the body all over; but not necessarily, as Democritus held, arranged in alternate layers (see Lucr. iii. 370-395).

4. προσεμφερέστατον. Lucretius says straightforwardly that it is air and wind and heat: Epicurus more guardedly that it is 'most like' breath and heat.

πνεύματι: we ought perhaps to notice the strange variant of F σπέρματι, though it cannot of course be right. By πνεῦμα Epicurus probably means 'wind' rather than 'breath': it like heat was to him a corporeal body.

5. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μέρος, 'there is also the part . . .', is the reading of all the MSS. and should be kept, though it is rather abrupt. We should remember that Epicurus is writing to Herodotus, who is assumed to have considerable acquaintance with the system already. Woltjer, followed by Brieger, would prefer ἔστι δέ τι μέρος, which is unnecessary. Usener's violent alteration ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους has little to commend it; he does not realize the introduction here of the 'nameless' element.

6. πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν, 'a large step in the scale' of fineness of texture. For this idea of παραλλαγὴ as a series or sequence cf. § 55. 10.

7. συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι: τούτῳ, as Usener quite rightly insists, is a dative of cause, and τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι is governed by συμπαθὲς. The third μέρος is most capable of acting in harmony with the rest of the body owing to its subtlety of structure, which enables it to interpenetrate the structure of the body more completely than can either of the other two elements. Brieger, who wishes to read τούτοις μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι, quite misunderstands both construction and meaning.

8. τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν . . . The evidence of all our experience of the soul's nature and actions, &c., makes it clear that the explanation just given is the right one. Cf. Lucretius' arguments, amplifying this idea at great length, iii. 417-829.

δῆλον (ποιούσι). Brieger's addition, adopted by Giussani, is a far better correction of a meaningless text in the MSS. than Usener's alteration to διήγον. Bignone, following Giussani, reads δηλοῦσι: the omission is more probable than the corruption.

10. ὧν στερόμενοι θνήσκομεν: lit. 'the loss of what causes our death',

i.e. what passes away when we die : if we can find out that we shall know what the soul is, and the evidence shows that it is particles of wind and heat and this other subtle element.

(2) The second section (§ 64) deals with the origin of sensation. This is produced by the movements of the soul-atoms, kept together by the body which encloses them, and to which the soul thus communicates sensation. Giussani has called attention here to Brieger's very useful distinction between two sorts of compound bodies in the Epicurean system : (1) *mixturae*, solid or liquid bodies which are capable of holding together by themselves ; (2) *texturae*, bodies of rarer formation, which cannot keep together unless they are enclosed (*στεγάζεσθαι*) in some more solid body. The soul is eminently an example of the latter kind : it could not hold together by itself (it is dissipated after death), but when protected by the body it has the capacity (*δύναμις*) of producing the 'accident' (*σύμπτωμα*) of sensation by the motion of its own component atoms (notice the purely materialist idea), and further of communicating that sensation to the body. Thus it is that, thanks to the presence of the soul, the body does itself feel, but that immediately the soul has departed it ceases to feel—for sensation was never a capacity of the body as such. The idea is subtle and of great importance for the Epicurean psychology, and is very clearly set out by Lucretius in iii. 323-416, some passages of which show a marked correspondence with the present text.

11. τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν : notice this careful expression : the soul has the largest share in the causes of sensation, for it is the soul which starts the movement (*κίνησις*, see below) which produces it : but not all, for it could not produce sensation, unless through the protection of the body : that is a cause contributed by the body.

κατέχειν : compare §§ 52. 2, 47^b 8.

§ 64. 1. ταύτην : sc. αἰσθῆσιν, not τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν.

2. ἐστεγάζετο, 'enclosed', 'protected', 'held together'. Cf. Lucr. iii. 323 :

haec igitur natura tenetur corpore ab omni.

παρασκευάσαν ἐκείνη τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην : notice again the accuracy of the expression : the protection is a *cause* of sensation, afforded by the body to the soul.

3. μετεῖληφε : the body, as a consequence, has 'a share' in sensation.

συμπτόματος, 'contingent capacity', or in the logical sense, 'accident' : cf. §§ 68-73. Sensation is not a 'property' (*συμβεβηκός*), something essential to the existence of either soul or body, but it is an 'accident' or 'secondary quality' produced by the fact of their combination.

4. οὐ μέντοι πάντων . . . , 'it does not possess all the συμπτώματα which result from the combination', e.g. those of thought and visualization, which the mind in the body possesses. This clause

again suggests that a passage dealing with the mind has dropped out.

5. *διό*: and so, when the soul departs, as it has not in itself the right kind of movements to produce consciousness, the body loses sensation. Giussani wishes to refer *διό* not to the previous clause, but to the whole preceding description. But this is contrary to Epicurus' general practice in this section: he argues carefully clause by clause, and there is no real difficulty in the connexion: if the body possessed all the *συμπτώματα* of the soul, it would be able to continue consciousness after its departure: but as it only has sensation, and that only owing to the presence of the soul, it cannot.

οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ . . . : for it does not have sensation independently, as a capacity of its own. The sequence of thought between this and the preceding clause is very exactly reproduced by Lucretius, iii. 356, 357:

at dimissa anima corpus caret undique sensu;
perdit enim quod non proprium fuit eius in aevo.

6. *ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ ἅμα συγγεγεννημένῳ αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν*: the datives are strongly supported by the MSS. *ἑτέρῳ* . . . *συγγεγεννημένῳ*, and I agree entirely with Brieger that it is quite impossible that Epicurus can have used *παρεσκεύαζεν* above (l. 2) of something afforded by the body to the soul, and later of something afforded by the soul to the body. Giussani, preferring Usener's *ἑτέρον* . . . *συγγεγεννημένον*, 'something else (sc. the soul) born with it supplied it with this faculty', argues against Brieger, that whereas above it was the opportunity (*αἰτία*) for sensation which the body supplied, here it would have to be the sensation itself, and that Epicurus could not have said. But he forgets surely the meaning of *παρεσκεύαζεν*, which contains in itself the notion of 'affording an opportunity for'. I have little doubt that Brieger is right: the difference does not, however, as Giussani notes, affect the main idea. Bignone also follows Brieger with confidence.

7. *συρτελεσθείσης* . . . *δυνάμει*: the latent capacity which the soul always had is now perfected or brought into action: an almost Aristotelian expression.

8. *περὶ αὐτό*, 'within itself', and not, as Giussani suggests, 'owing to its being within the body': this is much more difficult to extract from the Greek, and down to the word *ἀπεδίδου* Epicurus is thinking of the creation of sensation in the soul, and nothing else.

κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν: it is the atomic movement within the soul which gives rise to sensation.

9. *εὐθύς*, 'immediately', 'without external assistance', and so 'spontaneously'.

δμούρησιν: the 'juxtaposition' of the particles of soul and body.

10. συμπάθειαν: their correspondence of movement; compare §§ 48, 11, 50. 2, and Lucr. iii. 335-336:

communibus inter eas conflatur utrimque
motibus accensus nobis per viscera sensus.

καὶ ἐκείνῳ, of course, 'to the body too'.

εἶπον: sc. ll. 2 and 3 above.

(3) This section (§§ 65, 66) contains deductions from the combination of the soul and body just explained. The soul, being the principal cause of sensation, can retain sensation even though portions of the body be lost: but the body, which only derives its sensation from the presence of the soul, must lose it the moment the soul is gone. Again, if the body is utterly broken up, the soul too must lose sensation, as it no longer has the body to hold it together. The passage is comparatively simple and straightforward, but has been considerably vexed by the editors. Brieger, who believes that the third μέρος of the soul is, in Epicurus' view, the *animus*, and is alone the cause of sensation, thinks that a passage has been lost before this section, in which Epicurus made a transition from the *anima* to the *animus*, and that this section itself deals with the latter. But his whole position has, I think, been shown to be untenable by Giussani (pp. 197-208), and his view involves, as Giussani has noticed, a very unnatural interpretation of this first sentence: even the clause (δοκον ποτὲ ἐστὶ . . . ψυχῆς φύσιν) which might be thought to tell most in favour of this view has, as I shall have to show, been very seriously mistranslated by both Brieger and Giussani.

§ 65. 2. ἐνυπάρχουσα: quite literally, 'continuing to exist inside the body'.

ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου, 'if some other part (of the whole structure of soul and body) be lost'. Compare, for instance, Lucretius' description in iii. 642 ff. of the effect of the loss of limbs in battle. Brieger, taking ἡ ψυχὴ here to mean 'the mind' (*animus*), i.e. in his theory the third μέρος, interprets 'any other part of the soul', sc. the wind or the heat. But the expression would be, to say the least, extremely ambiguous, and the idea of either of these two elements being separately 'lost' is quite contrary to the general notion of Epicurus.

3. ἀναισθητήσῃ is probably the best restoration (suggested by Kühn) for the ἀναισθήσῃ or ἀναισθησία of the MSS.: but it is a curious corruption.

ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ ταύτης again seems to be demanded by the sense: ἀλλ' ἂν is given by FP³ (as against ἀλλὰ ἂν) and ταύτης is fairly guaranteed by the curious ταύτη of the MSS.

τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος εἶθ' ὅλου εἴτε καὶ μέρους τινός. I follow Bignone here in taking τοῦ στεγάζοντος to mean not 'the whole body which encloses the soul', but 'that which enclosed' the particular part

of the *ψυχή* which is lost, e.g. an arm or a leg suddenly cut off: *λυθέντος* will then be parallel in meaning to *διαλυομένου*, used below (l. 9) of the whole body. Giussani takes τοῦ στεγάζοντος to refer to the whole body: *λυθέντος* cannot then mean 'shattered' because of εἶθ' ὅλου: if the whole body is shattered, the soul, as Epicurus says below, must perish. He is therefore driven to take *λυθέντος* in the unusual sense of 'shaken' by a severe shock, and tries to find a contrast between it and the compound *διαλυομένου*. But, as Bignone points out, this is mere juggling: the compound is appropriate to the whole body, the simple verb to a limb 'loosed' from the rest of the body.

4. εἰάν περ διαμένη, ἔξει: the subject is ἡ λοιπὴ ψυχή, the part of the soul which remains, when the portions of it in the lost limbs are removed. The construction is loose, but intelligible.

5. ἔξει: the MSS. all agree on δέξυ, another queer mistake, of which ἔξει is a certain correction.

6. καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος: a loosely tacked on apposition (cf. above): the body will not have sensation either in the whole or in any part (e.g. a leg or arm cut off), if certain atoms have departed.

7. ἐκείνου ἀπηλλαγμένου . . . τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν, 'if that sum of atoms, however small it be, is lost, which goes to make up (*συντείνειν* . . . εἰς) the nature of the soul'. The body can by no means continue to have sensation, if the tiny collection of soul atoms be lost. Both the sense and the construction seem quite straightforward: for *συντείνειν εἰς* cf. § 79. 3 πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τὰς γνώσεις *συντείνειν* and § 80. 2 πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν *συντείνειν*, and for the general idea Lucr. iii. 119-123:

principio fit uti detracto corpore multo
saepe tamen nobis in membris vita moretur;
atque eadem rursum, cum corpora pauca calor
diffugere forasque per os est editus aer,
deserit extemplo venas atque ossa relinquit.

But the editors have made great havoc.

(a) Brieger, with his idea that the *ψυχή* all through this section is the *ánimvs*, the pure third *μέρος*, would take it 'if that is lost, which, however small it be, is that which links together the vast mass of the atoms to the nature of the soul': i.e. the breath and heat again, which act as a link between 'pure soul' and body. But we have already seen the impossibility of this idea.

(b) Giussani, arguing against Brieger, adopts with some hesitation the rendering: 'if there is lost that *quantum* of matter, however small it be, which attunes the mass of the atoms into harmony with the animal life'. He then makes the very far-fetched supposition that Epicurus is arguing against Aristoxenus and those philosophers who

thought that the soul was a *harmonia*, and therefore ironically uses the musical metaphor *συντείνον*. The *quantum* of matter is of course the soul itself, which attunes the body into harmony with *τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν*. The looseness of Giussani's translation obscures the difficulty that you would then have expected *ἐαυτοῦ* instead of *τῆς ψυχῆς*, but this, he thinks, may be justified owing to the preceding neuter periphrasis.

But the fatal objection to both these renderings is that they translate as if the text were *τὸ συντείνον τὸ τῶν ἀτόμων πλῆθος*. It is not, and, unless *τό* be inserted, which is quite unnecessary, *τὸ συντείνον τῶν ἀτόμων πλῆθος* must go altogether as nominative.

I am glad to find that Bignone here agrees with me exactly.

9. *διαλυομένον*: of the dissolution of the body into its component parts, each of which *λύεται*. Though *διαλυομένου* is only read by F, it is supported by B's *δυομένου* against the simply *λυομένου* of the other MSS., and I follow Giussani in adopting it.

10. *κινεῖται*. There is great probability in Brieger's conjecture, adopted by Giussani, that the words *τὰς αὐτὰς κινήσεις* have fallen out. Cf. Lucr. iii. 569 *moventur sensiferos motus*. Bignone, to obtain the same sense, would read *κινήσεις* for *κινεῖται*. But the clause will make good general sense without it, and on the whole it seems best not to 'restore'.

§ 66. 1. *οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε νοεῖν . . .*: it is inconceivable that the soul can exist as a sentient being outside the protection of the body. This of course paves the way for the essential idea of the Epicurean philosophy that the soul is mortal.

αὐτὸ: a rough reference to *ἡ ψυχή*. Seeing the many changes from feminine to neuter in this passage, it may probably be retained: Usener's alteration to *τὸ* going with *αἰσθανόμενον* is of course easy, but unnecessary.

2. (δν), which Usener suggests in his note, is badly needed to complete the sense and may easily have fallen out before *ἐν*.

συστήματι, 'organism': i.e. the *ἄθροισμα* of soul and body—another word with an Aristotelian flavour.

4. *ἐν οἷς*. Usener suggests *ἐν οἷοις*, but it is not really necessary.

At the end of this section there is an interesting scholium in the MSS. (see crit. app.).

This supplements the brief account of the letter in several important respects: (a) the shape and nature of the soul-atoms; (b) the division between the 'vital principle' (*τὸ ἀλόγον*) distributed over the body and the 'mind' (*τὸ λογικόν*), situated, as Epicurus thought, in the breast; (c) the origin of sleep (cf. Lucr. iv. 907 ff.). It is also a conclusive proof against Brieger's view that the present section deals with *τὸ λογικόν* only.

(4) In the last section of this chapter Epicurus, having established his own view, proceeds to refute the popular belief that the soul is an incorporeal existence. The only incorporeal existence, he argues,

which can be conceived of as existing independently (i.e. not as a quality or relation or accident of some corporeal entity) is the void. Now the void, as it cannot touch or be touched, cannot act or be acted on by anything else. The soul then, which manifestly does act and is acted on, cannot be in nature like the void, cannot therefore be an independent incorporeal existence. It must be tangible and therefore corporeal.

The general sense of the passage is clear, but it has considerable difficulties in detail, which have been passed over rather summarily by the editors. Giussani, for instance, remarks that it is not even necessary to translate the section.

§ 67. 2. προσκατανοεῖν, 'to obtain a clear mental vision of this in addition to what we have already seen'. The MSS. have *ὅτι τὸ ἀσώματον λέγει γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἄν*. Three lines of correction are possible, none of which is completely satisfactory. (1) Usener noting that *λέγει γὰρ* is the regular formula of introduction for a scholium, would remove *λέγει γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν* from the text as a gloss. He then writes *ὅ τι τὸ ἀσώματον*, sc. *ἔστι*, 'what the incorporeal is', and takes *τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος ἄν* as a genitive absolute, and in this is followed by Giussani, but neither of them gives a hint how the words should be translated: presumably 'if the name were to be thought of in reference to the independent existence'. But (a) the *ἄν* is unnecessary, (b) the next sentence shows clearly that *τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος* must be taken together. Moreover, as against Usener's view in general, the usual form of Epicurus' introduction of new topics demands *ὅτι* not *ὅ τι*, and, though *λέγει γὰρ* often introduces scholia, the note 'he is speaking in the ordinary acceptance of words' would be a very strange one.

(2) We may then assume that *ὅτι* is right. Giussani then follows the suggestion of Lortzing, who adds after *ἀσώματον* (*οὐ δὲ κατηγορεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς*), 'that we must not predicate incorporeality of the soul'. But there is no warrant for such an insertion, and the whole run of the section is against it. Epicurus speaks first of the incorporeal in general, and only applies the idea to the *ψυχὴ* in l. 7. Moreover it would necessitate *καθ' ἑαυτὸ γὰρ* (not *δέ*) in the next sentence.

(3) Far better is the suggestion of Bignone, who retains *ὅτι* and *κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν* (with *τοῦ ὀνόματος*) and emends *λέγει γὰρ* to *λέγεται*: 'that the incorporeal is applied in the general acceptation of the term to that which can be thought of independently'. I have with some hesitation followed him. The sense is far better, but (a) *λέγεται* for *λέγει γὰρ* is not very probable (nor is von der Muehl's *λέγομαι*, which would give the same sense), (b) the use of *ὁμιλία* in this sense is unparalleled in classical Greek, and (c) one would expect the conclusion to be 'that which can be thought of independently as such', i.e. as incorporeal. For *κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν* compare § 70. 3 *κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φoράν*.

5. τὸ δὲ κενὸν . . . The void cannot act or be acted on because its only property is intangibility (*intactus*, Lucr. i. 454), and for all forms of action or suffering touch is a necessity.

6. κίνησιν . . . παρέχεται: cf. § 40.

7. ὡς οἱ λέγοντες . . . : for the application of the idea to the soul compare Lucretius iii. 161-7, where the poet very clearly brings out the necessity of touch for action, which is rather implied in the present text.

8. οὔτε πάσχειν. Usener suggests in his notes that we should alter to οὐδέ. But the assumption of the first οὔτε of a pair is fairly common in Greek at all periods.

9. διαλαμβάνεται. The MSS. agree here upon *διαλαμβάνει*, which will not make sense. Usener boldly alters to *συμβαίνει*, which is of course perfectly easy, and he is tacitly followed by Giussani. But the alteration is very serious. In § 69 in defining the nature of *συμβεβηκότα* Epicurus speaks of them as *ἐπιβολὰς ἔχοντα ἰδίας . . . καὶ διαλήψεις*, sc. they can be perceived independently and distinguished. On the strength of that statement I suggest that *διαλαμβάνεται* is the right reading here: the occurrences of 'both action and suffering are separately perceived in reference to the soul', i.e. we are aware of both and distinguish between them. Though the sense is a little difficult, it is I think possible, and the change is not so unwarrantable as Usener's. Bignone suggests in the same sense *διαλαμβάνεις*, which is palaeographically easier, but the introduction of the second person is awkward: there would be less objection to von der Muehl's proposed *διαλαμβάνομεν*.

10. τὰ συμπτώματα: action and suffering are, of course, in Epicurus' technical sense 'accidents'; cf. § 70.

§ 68. 1. ταῦτα οὖν πάντα . . . : the conclusion of the section: these general formulae will, by constant reference to the facts of internal and external sensation, give sufficient ground for the comprehension of the details.

διαλογίσματα, 'results of reasoning', i.e. results of *ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας* as opposed to mere *προσδοξαζόμενα* from sensation: cf. § 62 *fin*.

2. (τὰ) is a necessary insertion of Usener's.

3. τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥηθέντων: sc. in §§ 37 and 38 as to the principles of procedure.

ἱκανῶς must go with *ἐμπεριελημμένα*, not, as Giussani apparently takes it, with *κατόψεται*. 'He will see the investigations of reason sufficiently embodied in these general formulae to make him . . .'. For *τύπος* in this sense cf. § 35.

4. (καὶ τὰ): again a necessary addition, and once more a confusion between *καί* and *κατά*, this time taking the form of 'haplography'.

VI. 'PROPERTIES' AND 'ACCIDENTS'.

Epicurus passes, with a more obvious link of connexion than usual after his discussion of τὸ δῶματον, to consider another class of things which might be regarded as δῶματα, namely qualities. Of these, including time, he treats in the next four sections (§§ 68-73): the text is difficult, and the general theory has been much discussed by the commentators. He divides qualities into συμβεβηκότα and συμπτώματα. We may roughly render these words by 'properties' and 'accidents', as Lucretius does by the corresponding terms in general use in Latin, *coniuncta* and *eventa* (i. 449, 450), but we must attempt to get more closely at the underlying ideas.

(1) *Properties*. In the first section (to § 69 *fin.*) Epicurus deals with συμβεβηκότα: these he regards as the qualities, which are essential and inseparable physical constituents (though not of course material parts) of a corporeal existence. It is these qualities which are immediately perceptible by the senses, and the perception of a body is the aggregate perception of its properties. To the συμβεβηκότα then it owes its continued existence as body, and if any of them were to be removed from it, it would mean the break-up of its physical existence: cf. Lucr. i. 451-452 (a very careful statement):

coniunctum est id quod nusquam sine perimitali
discidio potis est seungi seque gregari.

Similarly, no συμβεβηκός can exist by itself apart from the aggregate body, which with other συμβεβηκότα it constitutes: but with them it has a corporeal existence as a constituent part of a σῶμα.

Much of the criticism which has been brought against Epicurus' theory of συμβεβηκότα, especially by Brieger and Munro (on Lucr. i. 449 ff.), takes the line of charging him with inconsistency. They argue that he has no definite line of cleavage between συμβεβηκότα and συμπτώματα, that, for instance, he sometimes classes colour as a συμβεβηκός, sometimes as a σύμπτωμα. Giussani, who has dealt carefully with this criticism (pp. 33-37), has, I think, completely absolved Epicurus from the charge. He points out that the terms are not absolute but relative, that what is a συμβεβηκός of one thing is the σύμπτωμα of another, or even of the same thing looked at from a different point of view. 'Slavery', for instance, which Lucretius (i. 455) takes as an example of an *eventum* (σύμπτωμα), is an *eventum* of 'man', but a συμβεβηκός of 'slave'. 'Colour' again, to deal with the example of the critics, is a σύμπτωμα of body, because in the dark a body has not colour, yet its physical existence is in no way impaired; but it is a συμβεβηκός of an *ὄρατόν*, for nothing can be seen except as coloured. It is strange that when Epicurus at the outset had, as we shall see, carefully guarded against this misconception, he should have been attacked on this very ground. Bignone, who would defend Epicurus on the same lines,

seems to me to go too far in regarding *συμβεβηκός* and *σύμπτωμα* not as technical terms at all, but almost interchangeable in their application: see note on *ὅσαυτε συμβεβηκόντα*, l. 7.

The three main points then to be remembered are (1) the essentially material conception of the *συμβεβηκόντα* as physical constituents of body, (2) their immediate relation to the senses, (3) the impossibility of their existence except in relation to 'things'. Epicurus is throughout arguing both against the Platonic conception of the 'ideas' and against the Stoic view that qualities were in themselves *σώματα*.

6. *τὰ χρώματα*: we need not then be surprised at the presence of 'colours' in this list. The other qualities enumerated are the properties of all bodies (*πάντων* below), 'colours' belong to *τοῖς ὁρατοῖς*, which Epicurus has scrupulously added. Similarly sound and smell would be qualities belonging to bodies as recognizable (*γνωστοῖς*) by other senses.

7. *ὅσαυτε συμβεβηκόντα*. The MSS. have *ὡς ἂν εἰς αὐτὰ βεβηκόντα*, of which the emendation attributed by Casaubon to Galesius has been almost universally adopted, 'as though they were the concomitant properties'. Bignone, however, believing *συμβεβηκόντα* to be a general term and not sufficiently explicit in itself, prefers *ὡς ἂν αἰεὶ συμβεβηκόντα*, 'as though permanent concomitants', distinguished from the occasional concomitants which Epicurus usually describes as *συμπτώματα*. If, however, we follow Giussani in his explanation of the relative character of the terms *συμβεβηκός* and *σύμπτωμα* (see the general note at the beginning of the section), this is unnecessary, as *συμβεβηκόντα* in itself conveys the idea of permanence, and *ὡς ἂν αἰεὶ συμβεβηκόντα* sounds an unnatural form of expression.

8. *ἢ πάντων ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς*: of the examples given by Epicurus above *σχήμα μέγεθος* and *βάρος* are *συμβεβηκόντα* of *πάντα* (all corporeal things) and *χρώματα* of *τὰ ὁρατά*.

κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν αὐτῶν γνωστοῖς, 'recognizable by the sensation of these qualities', i.e. all concrete bodies are recognized by the perception of their qualities: shape, size, and weight apply to all, and beyond this some may be known by their colour through sight, others through their taste or smell. This is the reading of the third hand in P and seems the best solution. The MSS. however all have *αὐτοῖς γνωστοῖς*, and this would, I think, just construe, 'recognizable for what they are by perception', i.e. if we go into a dark room and smell a certain smell we recognize the object for what it is, a rose. There is certainly no need to follow Usener in the drastic emendation *σώματος γνωστά*, 'the *συμβεβηκόντα* which are recognizable in the perception of the whole body', and it is unfortunate that much of Giussani's argument (pp. 36 ff.) should be based upon it.

9. *οὐδ' ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι φύσεις*: the properties are not 'physical existences by themselves', i.e. independent of other physical existences. He is thinking here specially of the Platonic conception of the 'ideas'.

το. οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν . . . : the usual Epicurean test: we cannot 'visualize' shape or weight, &c., existing by itself apart from a body of which it is a property.

§ 68. 1. οὔτε ὅλως ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, 'nor can we say that they do not exist at all', a seemingly rather futile addition, but not so, when we remember that to Epicurus existence, except in the case of the void, means corporeal existence. He has probably in mind here the sceptical attitude of Democritus.

2. οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερ' ἅττα . . . ἀσώματα: they are not incorporeal existences, subsisting as accompaniments of body: we have seen (§ 67) that the only independent incorporeal existence is the void: it might be supposed that qualities were independent or relative incorporeal existences (practically the theory of Aristotle). But this Epicurus cannot accept because they are perceptible to the senses.

οὐθ' ὡς μέρη τούτου: nor again are they separable parts of the body: something into which it might be physically divided up like the *δγκαι* mentioned below, l. 5. The argument here is directed against the Stoics, who spoke of properties and accidents alike as *σώματα*.

3. καθόλου: the body 'in its entirety' is constituted of an aggregate of qualities: there is no part of it of which this is not true: it owes its existence as a unity and as a 'whole' to its constituent properties.

(ἐκ) τούτων: a necessary insertion made by Meibom.

4. αἰδιον, 'permanent', lit. 'everlasting'; not, of course, with the implication that body is eternal, but only that, so long as it exists, its existence is continuously and always bound up with its constituent properties.

οὐχ οἷον δ' εἶναι (ἐκ) συμπεφορημένων, 'yet not such as to owe its existence to things that have been brought together to form it'. The testimony of the MSS. is overwhelmingly in favour of *συμπεφορημένων* and ἐκ must be inserted as above before τούτων. Usener adopts *συμπεφορημένων* from F, but (a) the parallel of (ἐκ) τούτων above is strongly against this, (b) the compound body could not be said to be *συμπεφορημένων*, but only the particles which composed it (compare *συμφορητικὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων κίνησιν ἐχόντων* . . ., § 59. 10).

5. ὥσπερ ὅταν . . . The material parts of a body, the atoms and the larger molecules, are of course 'brought together' to form the compound body: with the properties it is not so: they are physical constituents, but not material parts.

δγκων: in a general sense 'the parts', great or small, of which a body may be composed, subsequently subdivided into (a) τῶν πρώτων . . . μεγεθῶν: the *δγκων* in the technical sense, 'the first parts' or 'molecules', the *minima* of sensation (cf. §§ 57, 58), or (b) τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων, larger 'parts' of the whole body, which are still fractions of it.

6. μεγεθῶν: the MSS. have *μεγεθῶν*, which may be kept (so Bignone): both the order of words and the expression are a little

awkward and Schneider's *μερῶν* would make it much easier, but there seems no necessity for adopting it.

7. τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων, 'smaller than the body, whatever it is', the idiomatic use of *τις* (cf. Soph. *Ant.* 252 ἄσσημος οὐργάτης τις ἦν).

8. ἐπιβολὰς . . . ἔχοντα ἰδίας, 'they have their own occasions of perception', ἐπιβολὰς here τῶν αἰσθητηρίων (cf. § 50 and notes): i.e. they are capable of being looked at individually; we can pay attention to the colour of a thing apart from its weight or its size. Bignone translates 'intuitions', but here it is probably not used in the technical sense of ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας.

9. καὶ διαλήψεις, 'and they have their distinctions': we can make a distinction between the various properties; size, weight, &c.

συμπαρακολουθοῦντος δὲ τοῦ ἀθρόου: a limitation of the last clause, we can 'look at' or 'pay attention to' the colour of a body, apart from its weight or size, but only so long as the whole body is there too: it is not to be supposed that we could 'abstract' the colour and look at it.

10. ἀποσχισμένον . . . εἰληφότος. Usener has again done violence to the text and meaning by altering both these participles to the neuter plural nom.: 'if the properties are never separated from the whole, but thanks to the conception of the whole body acquire predication' (so Bignone): i.e. the properties are predicable owing to their share in the complete comprehension of the body, constituted by the aggregate of qualities. This is quite good sense and not at all inconsistent with Epicurean doctrine, but it is an unnecessary change. The genitives need not be altered: 'the properties have their own ἐπιβολαί and διαλήψεις, provided the aggregate is always with them and is never torn from them, but derives its predication as body from the aggregate comprehension of the properties': i.e. we call a thing body, because we are aware of size, shape, weight, &c., in combination. Again, it is unfortunate that much of Giussani's elucidation should be built up on Usener's perversion of the text.

(2) § 70. *Accidents*. Epicurus' conception of 'accidents' is rather easier than that of 'properties'. The 'accident' in just the same way is not an independent corporeal existence, nor is it incorporeal, but has corporeal existence only in connexion with the body to which it is attached. But it differs from the property in that it is not a necessary physical constituent of body, but may or may not attach to it at any given time, and does not by its presence or absence alter the essential nature of the body. Lucretius (i. 456-458) has again put it clearly:

cetera quorum
adventu manet incolumis natura abituque,
haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare.

Thus Socrates remains Socrates, whether he is free or slave, good or bad, speaking or being spoken to. Secondly, just as the συμβεβηκότα are immediately perceptible in sensation ἐπιβολὰς ἔχοντα, so the

συμπτώματα are an inference from sensation (*κατ' ἐπιβολάς τινας*). Roughly then the *συμπτώματα* are 'contingencies' or 'accidents', and under them we may class 'secondary' qualities, states, actions, and occurrences, but we must again remember that the term is not absolute, but relative to the body with which it is connected and to the point of view from which it is considered: colour is a *σύμπτωμα* of body, but a *συμβεβηκός* of τὸ δραστόν.

The repetition in this section is almost more noticeable than in the last—a sure sign that Epicurus is dealing with a matter of importance.

§ 70. 1. καὶ οὐκ αἰδίων . . . ἀσώματα. There is serious corruption here, but editors are not agreed as to where it lies. The MSS. have καὶ οὐκ αἰδίων παρακολουθεῖν (παρακολουθεῖ B) οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς δραστοῖς καὶ οὐτε ἀσώματα.

(1) Usener keeps παρακολουθεῖν and marks a lacuna after it, adding in his note '*συμπτώματα* scriptor definit'. This is hardly explicit enough, and his change just after of καὶ to ἔσται is not convincing; a future is not wanted. Giussani follows Usener's text and is content to leave the lacuna vague.

(2) Bignone marks no lacuna but reads παρακολουθεῖ ἃ γ' (AT corrupted to N) οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς δραστοῖς καὶ ἀναισθήτοις δοξαστέον εἶναι οὐτε ἀσώματα. 'There frequently occur to bodies without permanently belonging to them contingencies which we must not suppose to be among things invisible and imperceptible nor incorporeal'. But the emendation ἃ γ' is not very probable, and the supplement is in itself gratuitous and does not cover what Epicurus would have been likely to say.

(3) If we take the words as they stand in the MSS. (a) the infinitive παρακολουθεῖν may well have been explained by something in the lacuna, if it is necessary to suppose one. (b) οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς δραστοῖς εἶναι οὐτε ἀσώματα is clearly a reference to the two Epicurean categories of real existence, the atoms (ἄδηλα or ἀόρατα) and the void (ἀσώματον). The *συμπτώματα*, he says, do not come under either of these two heads. (c) Would Epicurus have been content to deny these two forms of existence to the *συμπτώματα* or would he have added more? Clearly, I think, there must have been a reference to the existence of compound things (τὸ ὅλον) as above, and further he would most likely have denied, as he did of the *συμβεβηκότα*, the idea that they did not exist at all. (d) εἶναι is a more probable restoration of καί than ἔσται. I therefore read the passage as in the text, and should suppose that it originally ran something like καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῖς σώμασι συμπίπτει πολυλίκης καὶ οὐκ αἰδίων παρακολουθεῖν (φαίνεται οἷα οὐτε ὅλως ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ δοξαστέον, οὐτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ἔχειν) οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς δραστοῖς εἶναι οὐτε ἀσώματα.

3. κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φoράν, 'according to common usage': compare § 67. 2 κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν, and remember that at the beginning of the letter Epicurus laid down the principle that ordinary words were

to be used in their ordinary sense. Lucretius (i. 458) faithfully reproduces this point :

haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare.

4. οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ἔχειν : see above § 68. 9 : like the *συμβεβηκότα* they are not independent corporeal existences.

5. δ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα προσαγορεύομεν, 'which we call body, comprehending it altogether in the aggregate', *sc.* of its properties ; see the last clause of the last section.

6. οὔτε τὴν τῶν αἰδίων παρακολουθούντων : here the *σύμπτωμα* differs from the *συμβεβηκός* : it is not a permanent and essential constituent of body.

ὣν ἀνευ σῶμα οὐ δυνατόν νοεῖσθαι : Giussani rightly points out (p. 30, note) that this must not be taken to mean 'without which it is impossible to conceive body as such', for in that case size, shape, and weight would be the only three *συμβεβηκότα*, but it must mean 'a body', 'any given body', thought of either as body simply, or as an *ὁρατόν, ἀκουστόν, &c.*

7. κατ' ἐπιβολὰς δ' ἂν τινος : the *συμβεβηκότα* are directly perceived in acts of apprehension, but the *συμπτώματα* only in relation to such acts : e.g. we see a man in a certain attitude, &c., and thus know that he is writing. *ἐπιβολαί* is again used here in the untechnical sense of 'acts of apprehension' on the part of the senses.

παρακολουθούντος τοῦ ἀθρόου : the same important provision as in the case of the *συμβεβηκότα* : we cannot infer an 'accident' any more than we can perceive a property apart from the body to which it happens.

8. προσαγορευθεῖη, ἀλλ' ὅτε δήποτε . . . θεωρεῖται. Usener again supposes a lacuna after *προσαγορευθεῖη* and changes ἀλλ' ὅτε to ἀλλ' ὅτῃ, taking the clause presumably to have run, 'we can apply the name *συμπτώματα* to them not as independent existences but in connexion with whatever body they are seen to be happening to on each occasion'. Bignone has however shown that if the MS. text ἀλλ' ὅτε is retained, it is unnecessary to suppose any loss : ἀλλ' ὅτε . . . then becomes a limiting clause, 'we can call them *συμπτώματα* but only at the moment when each is seen to be happening'. We may notice, as showing the interchangeability of his terminology, that Epicurus here uses *συμβαίνοντα* of the *συμπτώματα*—but there is an obvious difference of meaning between the present and the perfect.

§ 71. 2. αἰδίων : both here and in the several successive places where it occurs some or all of the MSS. have corrupted αἰδίων into αὐδίων owing to the surrounding genitives.

3. ταύτην τὴν ἐναργεῖαν, 'the immediate vision', i.e. the perception of the *συμπτώματα* as part of the direct data of sense : there is in the MSS. the usual corruption to *ἐνεργεῖαν*.

4. ὅτι, 'because' : the following clause gives the reasons which might

lead us to regard the *συμπτώματα* as not belonging to the real. Hicks translates 'this clear evidence *that*', but (a) this is an unusual construction in Epicurus, (b) it involves a tautology in the next sentence, which he avoids by translating *καθ' αὐτά*, 'permanent existences', which is not justifiable. The *συμπτώματα* are themselves an *ἐναργεία*, and we must not either deny them reality or think of them as independent existences.

The words *ὁ δὲ καὶ σῶμα προσαγορεύομεν* which occur in the MSS. after *συμβαίνει* are rightly excluded by Usener as a gloss derived from several similar expressions in these sections. They are, however, retained by von der Muehl.

7. *ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται*: we must accept as truth just what is presented to us in sensation—an emphatic declaration of the main Epicurean position, of which this notion of the *συμπτώματα* is the direct outcome.

8. *πάν(τα κα)τὰ τὰ σώματα* (Bignone) is a better correction of the meaningless *πάντα τὰ σώματα* of the MSS. than Usener's *πάντα σώματος* or von der Muehl's *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*.

9. *τάγμα*, 'a position in the ranks' of independent existences: a rather unusual word for Epicurus.

ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον . . . θεωρεῖται: the construction breaks off into a main clause. Such abruptness is not unusual with Epicurus, and it is probably unnecessary to adopt either Bignone's suggestion *ἀλλ' (ὃν) ὃν τρόπον* or Usener's *θεωρεῖσθαι* or *θεωρητέον*, any of which would mend the construction grammatically.

10. *ιδιότῃτα*, 'peculiar characteristics' (*proprietas* in Latin).

§ 72. (3) *The nature of time*. As a kind of appendix to the explanation of the *συμβεβηκότα* and *συμπτώματα*, Epicurus deals with the special question of the nature of time. The general idea is clear, but the expression unusually obscure. Time differs from everything else in that we cannot have a general conception (*πρόληψις*) of it, i.e. a visual mental image resulting from a number of individual perceptions (see § 37 note). This we have of all classes of objects, and of their properties and accidents. We have, for instance, a conception of stone, with which is associated hardness and roughness, and we recognize an individual stone as such by reference (*ἀνάγοντος*) to this *πρόληψις*. But we have not a general conception (a mental image) of time, nor again is there anything else like it to which we might refer it (space was of course to Epicurus a real existence and not a relation). What then can we say about it? We must refer to the test of our experience, as usual: and we then perceive that it is something that we associate (*συμπλέκομεν*) with day and night, or again with our internal states, or with the external states of motion and rest. We decide then on the basis of this intuition (*ἐνάργημα*) without waiting for further discussion that time is a special kind of 'accident' associated with these states, &c., that are themselves accidents of body. In fact, time is not either a

συμβεβηκός or a *σύμπτωμα* of concrete things, but as Sextus Empiricus tells us that Epicurus stated (*adv. Math.* x. 219) time is a *σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων*. The conclusion is in absolute harmony with the Epicurean principles, and the whole idea is well brought out by Lucretius l. 459-463 :

tempus item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis
consequitur sensus, transactum quid sit in aevo,
tum quae res instet, quid porro deinde sequatur.
nec per se quemquam tempus sentire fatendumst
semotum ab rerum motu placidaque quiete.

1. *προσκατανοῆσαι* : used of an additional point connected with what has preceded ; cf. § 67 *ini.*

2. οὐ ζητήτεον, 'we must not look to find it'. When we use the word 'time' there does not come up in our minds any mental picture of an object with which we associate it, as there does, for instance, if we think of weight or redness.

τὰ λοιπά is then 'all other *συμβεβηκότα* and *συμπτώματα*', which, as has been seen in the last two sections, are invariably connected with an *ἄθροον*.

ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, 'in an object'. The *ὑποκείμενον* is that which 'lies beneath', i.e. the actual thing, which is the cause of sensation and from which the *εἰδωλα*, &c., which stir our senses are derived.

4. *προλήψεις*, 'concepts', lit. 'anticipations', the 'composite photographs' formed in our mind by the combination of many individual impressions, by which we identify fresh objects of sensation. They are of course with the *αἰσθήσεις* and the *πάθη* (and possibly the *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας*) the *κριτήρια* of truth : compare K. Δ. xxiv. We may notice that the idea is so definitely that of mental visualization that Epicurus actually uses the participle *βλεπομένας*, 'which are seen' : it is true, however, that it is not his usual word for the actual sensation of sight, though it comes near it in § 48. 10.

αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνάργημα, 'the actual intuition' or 'sense impression' which we get of time. The word is usually used by Epicurus of the 'clear vision' of an object which we get on the nearer view, but here in a slightly extended sense of the 'immediate perception' which we have of time without any associations of theory or analysis. This we must examine (*ἀναλογιστέον*) to see what it really is and how it arises.

5. *συγγενικῶς τοῦτο ἐπιφέροντας*. The MSS. have *περιφέροντες*, which it is not easy to make sense of, and Usener's emendation to *ἐπιφέροντες* has been generally accepted. This can only be construed grammatically with *ἀναφωνοῦμεν*, 'we speak of a short time or a long time, applying this (*sc.* the idea of length or brevity) as we do to other things', i.e. using for duration the conception of measure, which we usually apply to spatial relations. This is not very satisfactory, and Bignone is probably right in taking the words with *ἀναλογιστέον*, only if so, it is essential to emend to the acc. *ἐπιφέροντας*. He then trans-

lates 'by keeping before us the specific determinate character of these modes of speaking'. I do not see how this is to be extracted from the Greek, and would rather take it to mean 'by applying our intuition to time as we do to other things', i.e. just as in other cases we use the immediate data of sense to determine the nature of the thing perceived, so here we must use our direct intuition to determine the nature of time, and if we do so, we find, as he goes on to say, that it is really a *σύμπτωμα* associated with various *συμπτώματα* of things. But I feel very doubtful about the words.

6. *διαλέκτους*, 'expressions', almost 'descriptions' of time. Hicks notes that time had, for instance, been defined as 'number of motion' or 'measure of motion'.

7. *κατ' αὐτοῦ*: both times the phrase occurs the majority of the MSS. have *καθ' αὐτοῦ*, a mere error due to the occurrence of similar phrases in the previous sections.

8. *οὔτε ἄλλο τι* ... We cannot predicate anything else about time: we cannot assign it to any special category of existences, for there is nothing else which is similar to it in nature: it is *sui generis*. He must of course here be thinking of some special efforts to class time with something else, but it is not clear what.

9. *ἔχον*, MSS. *ἔχοντος*, a mistake due either to the neighbourhood of *κατ' αὐτοῦ* or possibly to a misunderstanding. Von der Muehl retains *ἔχοντος*, but in what sense is not clear.

ιδιώματι, 'a peculiar' or 'unique existence'; cf. *ιδιότητα*, § 71. 10.

10. *συμπλέκομεν*, 'associate it', in our ordinary thought or ways of speech.

11. *ἐπιλογιστέον*, 'we must turn our thoughts to it', 'reflect on it', in a quite general sense: so *ἐπιλογισμοῦ*, § 73. 2.

§ 73. 1. *ἀποδείξεως*, 'logical proof': it is not a matter for reasoning, but simply of careful attention to our experience.

2. *ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ συμπλέκομεν*. Our normal association of time is with the succession of day and night. Now they are themselves *συμπτώματα* of the earth, or the sky, or the sun, or generally of 'our world': time then is a *σύμπτωμα* of them, or a *σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων*.

4. *τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις*: another association of time is with our own feelings or absence of feelings (e.g. in sleep), because we perceive these states as lasting for a longer or shorter period: so, too, with motion and rest.

5. *ἰδίον τι σύμπτωμα*, 'a special kind of accident': the duration of states, &c., is an *eventum* which is *sui generis*.

πάλιν: i.e. in the case of *πάθεσι*, &c., 'again', just as in the case of day and night. Usener, looking in this clause for a summary of the whole section, reads *πάντα* for *πάλιν*, referring *ταῦτα πάντα* to the whole list *ἡμέραις καὶ νυξὶ* as well as those mentioned in the second clause. But this is rewriting, and in fact the section is left without any summing up.

At the end of the section there is a scholium: 'this he says also is the second book of the *Περὶ φύσεως* and in the Greater Epitome'.

VII. WORLDS, THEIR CREATION, DESTRUCTION, SHAPES, AND CONTENTS.

Epicurus passes with a perfectly abrupt transition to the consideration of the various worlds contained in the universe. He had already dealt with this question in § 45, and shown that there is an infinite number of worlds: here he deals with their creation, their ultimate destruction, their shapes, and their contents. It is possible that one or other of the sections has been misplaced, and that they ought to be brought together, but the letter is so disjointed that to secure a logical order in it would require a very great readjustment, and it is better to leave the paragraphs where they are. The subject is dealt with again in the letter to Pythocles (§§ 88 ff.) and is treated fully in the fifth book of Lucretius.

The short paragraph, in which there is one considerable lacuna, divides itself into three sections:

(1) In the first section (§ 72) Epicurus states that worlds were created out of the infinite by the aggregation of certain nuclei (*συστροφαί*), out of which worlds 'separated out', i.e. the various parts of them went to their respective places, earth sinking down to the centre, water lying above it, and the lighter and more fiery elements rising to form air and the heavenly bodies. Just as they have been created, so they will ultimately be dissolved into their component atoms, whether owing to external blows or to internal disruption. For a fuller and very picturesque description of the process we may compare *Lucr. v. 432-494*, and for the general idea of growth, decay, and destruction *ii. 1048-1089*.

§ 73. 7. τοὺς κόσμους. Epicurus' conception was of an infinite series of worlds in different parts of space, each an ordered system of earth, sky, and heavenly bodies.

πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην, 'every compound organism which has a limit'. Epicurus does not of course suggest that there are compound bodies without limit, but merely points the contrast: the limited comes out of the unlimited. It is not, however, quite clear what he is thinking of here, but probably some aggregation of atoms which was not definite enough to be called a *κόσμος*.

8. τὸ ὁμοιοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις πυκνῶς ἔχουσιν: Bignone translates 'like in kind to the things which we constantly see', but the order of words is strongly against this, and *πυκνῶς* must go with *ἔχουσιν*, not with *θεωρουμένοις*. It will mean then 'exhibiting continuously, i.e. throughout its extension, a likeness in appearance to the things we see'. The expression is a little obscure, and it is possible that Epicurus is intending to exclude from his statement the bodies of the gods, which, though of atomic structure, were not made 'like the things we see'.

10. *συστροφῶν*: vague masses of matter forced by the aggregation of atoms and void, *congressus materiai*, Lucr. ii. 1065. There may be the added notion that they move round in a whirl (*δῶς*), as in the old atomic motion. We may compare the modern conception of nebulae.

ἀποκεκριμένων, 'separated out', another early cosmogonical notion going right back to Anaximander's 'separating out of opposites'.

11. *καὶ πάλιν διαλύεσθαι πάντα*: an important point in the Epicurean physics: as all worlds (like all other compound bodies) have a beginning, so they are all ultimately dissolved: compare Lucr. v. 235-379.

τὰ μὲν . . . πάσχοντα: the main causes of dissolution would be external blows, such as the collision with another *κόσμος* and the gradual internal disruption due to the escape of atoms shooting off from the *κόσμος* into the surrounding void.

13. *πάσχοντα*: there is considerable divergence of reading in the MSS. which seems to be due to a blot or erasure, but there is little doubt that *πάσχοντα* is right. It is, however, awkward standing by itself, and there is much to be said for the reading of the second hand in H *τοῦτο πάσχοντα*, of which a trace may also be found in BQ's *τοῦτο σχάα*.

At the end of the section follows an interesting scholium: see crit. app. Bignone takes *τῶν μερῶν* to be the four elements, but there seems no justification for this, and it is more natural to understand it of the local physical parts of a world which become dislocated after long internal atomic vibration. The reference in the last clause is to the idea set out in Lucr. v. 534 ff., that the earth is sustained in its place by a gradual thinning out of its structure underneath, which acts at once as a link with the surrounding air and as a kind of 'spring-mattress'. Von der Muehl may be right in retaining the words *δῆλον οὖν ὥς* as part of the text, supposing a lacuna after them.

§ 74. (2) *Shapes of the worlds*. The worlds are not all of the same shape. At this point there is a lacuna owing to the intrusion of a considerable scholium; see crit. app. We may conclude that Epicurus stated that worlds were of different shapes, yet not of all possible shapes, and then enumerated some of the shapes.

2. *ἔχοντας*. We can deduce the form of the text which was ousted by the scholium. There must have been a verb, probably *γεγονέναι*, after *νομίζειν*, then the second *οὔτε* clause, probably *οὔτε αὖ πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχοντας*. Then possibly a reason for this belief and a statement of the shapes that are found among *κόσμοι* as in the scholiast's quotation from the XIIth Book of the *Περὶ φύσεως*.

(3) *Contents of the worlds*. A strange addition is made by Epicurus in the idea that other worlds than ours contain animals, plants, &c., such as we see here. The section must have begun in the lacuna, and Usener has suggested that it ran something as follows: *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς κόσμοις δεῖ νομίζειν ζῶα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν θεωρούμενα ἐνεῖναι*.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη. Usener has most acutely seen the meaning of this sentence, which at first sight might seem the reverse of what would be expected. The emphasis lies on καὶ before οὐκ ἂν ἐμπεριλήφθη. 'No one could prove that in one kind of worlds these seeds might have been included (or might not, as chance dictated); and that in another they could not have been included', i.e. there are two kinds of supposed worlds, one in which the inclusion or exclusion of such things was, so to say, 'optional' and due to chance, the other in which they were excluded, and both kinds are contrasted with our world, in which they are included. It is Epicurus' general conception of *ισονομία* which makes him decide that such formations are in fact impossible.

3. (ἐν) is a necessary insertion, and may well have dropped out before μέν.

5. (τά) is again a necessary insertion; it dropped out after the last syllable of πάντα.

6. At the end of the section the MSS. have the not very illuminating scholium ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐντραφήναι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς νομιστέον. Von der Muehl would retain the words from τὸν αὐτὸν δέ, supposing them to be the beginning of a section dealing with animal and plant life.

VIII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIZATION AND THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.

Another rather sudden transition. From the consideration of the κόσμοι in general Epicurus passes to our earth and the development of civilization among men.

§ 75. (1) In the first sentence he announces his general theory: that surrounding circumstances first compelled men to certain actions or that nature gave them an example: these actions they subsequently developed by deliberate reflection leading to improvements and new inventions. The whole idea is elaborated at great length and with many examples by Lucretius (v. 925-1457): we may notice especially the passages in which he explains that lightning taught men the use of fire (1091-1104), and the action of the sun the melting and moulding of metals (1241-1280).

1. ὑποληπτέον. We may perhaps notice the less forcible word than the usual νομιστέον: this is not a matter of 'faith', of immediate deduction from the main Epicurean principles, but a conjecture as to probable occurrence: at the same time we may observe the regular Epicurean progress from αἴσθησις to λογισμός.

τὴν φύσιν: not here 'nature' in general, but 'human nature', and so throughout this section: perhaps 'their nature' would more exactly represent it: compare phrases like ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις and Lucretius' usage of *natura* in such places as ii. 17.

2. διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι: the distinction is clear: some

things, e.g. the clothing of their bodies to avoid cold they were compelled to do: others, like the lighting of fire, they learnt from the example of natural phenomena.

3. ὕστερον: καὶ ὕστερον MSS., but it is not easy to make sense of καὶ (perhaps 'later again', like the καὶ ἐλάττους below), and we may follow Usener in excluding it.

5. ἐν μὲν τισὶ περιόδοις . . . ἐλάττους. A corrupt and very difficult clause, of which I do not think that the solution has yet been discovered.

(1) Usener emends ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου to ἀποτομὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου and then excludes it as a gloss, probably originally part of the scholium on § 74. 2—a very arbitrary proceeding, such as Usener has taken in other places (cf. § 62). He then supposes a lacuna which would have contained something like μείζους λαμβάνειν ἐπιδόσεις, 'in certain epochs and at certain times it made greater progress at others again less'. This makes admirable sense, and is indeed what one would expect Epicurus to say, but the text can hardly be treated with such violence.

(2) Bignone would retain the words ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου, and with great ingenuity compares K. Δ. xiii τῶν ἀνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ. τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ, he argues, were the chief cause of fear in the early history of man, and one of the main marks of progress would be liberation from them. He would therefore 'suppose the sentence to have run ἐν μὲν τισὶ περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου (φόβων μείζους παρασκευάζεσθαι λύσεις), ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἐλάττους, 'and that in certain epochs and at certain times it provided greater liberation from the fears resulting from the infinite, at others again less'. But (1) the suggestion is grammatically improbable: (a) K. Δ. xii τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν shows that Epicurus would have written τῶν φόβων λύσεις and not ἀπὸ τῶν φόβων, (b) it would surely have been τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου φόβων, (c) could one speak of a μείζων or ἐλάττων λύσις? (2) The early part of this section is meant to lead up to the discussion of language, and it is improbable that Epicurus would have introduced a reference to superstitious fears which, however important, are irrelevant.

I think the sense must have been something simple on Usener's lines, but I do not yet see how to deal with the words ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου, which seem to be quite genuine.

(2) *The origin of language.* In the second part of the section Epicurus passes to the particular question of the origin of language. His theory is subtle and carefully worked out and should be noted particularly, as later Epicurean tradition, especially as represented in Lucretius (v. 1028-1090), only imperfectly preserved it. (Giussani's essay, vol. i, pp. 267-284, is very illuminating and important.) There was always a question in antiquity whether language originated φύσει or θέσει. Epicurus' answer is twofold. Approaching the question as a problem in the actual history of primitive man, he maintains that

language in its earliest stage was developed φύσει: it was a natural emission of sounds corresponding to emotions and impressions received. Later, in the stage that corresponds to that of λογισμός above, it was regulated, developed, and extended deliberately (θέσει). Lastly, as new things and new ideas were introduced, names were found for them partly by natural imitation or suggestion, partly by deliberate invention or analogy. His speculation is singularly acute and should be reckoned among his best contributions to anthropology—a subject on which Epicureanism was notably successful in its conjectures.

7. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει: closely and emphatically together; 'in origin names were not deliberately imposed'.

8. καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη . . . φαντάσματα: this curious idea that the emotions and impressions of different races were actually different is a weakness in Epicurus' theory, but is to be accounted for, as we have seen, by his conception of the brevity of the whole process.

9. τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν: for the physical process of the uttering of sounds, from which Epicurus derives this very literal expression, cf. §§ 52, 53.

10. στελλόμενον, 'formed', 'shaped'; cf. σχηματίζεσθαι in the parallel context, § 53.

12. εἴη of the MSS. may be retained, as it might be on each occasion, though Usener's ἦ would produce a more normal construction after ὡς ἂν.

§ 76. 1. κοινῶς, 'by common action', or almost 'common consent', a very strong expression of the deliberate nature of the process of the second stage.

3. ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλήλαις MSS.: a very good correction of Meibom.

οὐ συνωρώμενα πράγματα, 'things previously unseen', i.e. those either introduced from foreign tribes or invented for the first time. Surely not 'tried to introduce the notion of things not visible' (Hicks).

5. τοὺς (μὲν) ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι, 'being constrained by necessity to utter some of the sounds'. The MSS. have τοὺς alone, which Usener omits taking ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι with the whole clause, and assuming that here again ἀνάγκη was always the cause. In that case it must apply also to the second clause τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐλομένους, and if so, it would be better, as Giussani points out, to adopt Schneider's conjecture ἐπομένους: there was a necessity even in obeying the dictates of reason. I greatly prefer, however, as does Bignone, to follow Schneider here in inserting μὲν. In the introduction of new words at this stage both the causes ἀνάγκη (or φύσις) and θέσις work side by side: e.g. when a foreign thing was brought in, ἀνάγκη would compel the imitation of its foreign name, when a new thing was invented, it would be given a new name θέσει.

6. τοὺς δὲ . . . ἐλομένους . . . οὕτως ἐρμηνεύσαι: as so often in Epicurus (e.g. § 71. 9) the construction breaks off into a main clause, 'and some names they chose by reasoning and thus expressed their

meaning'. Bignone, anxious to preserve the exact parallelism, would construct *ἐρμηνεύσαι* after *αἰτίαν*: this is doubtful Greek, and it would be better, if strict syntax is required, to read (τοῦ) οὕτως ἐρμηνεύσαι: but Epicurus' laxness in these matters makes it unnecessary.

κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν: cf. κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμολίαν, § 67. 2, and κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φοράν, § 70. 3, 'in accordance with the usual cause', i.e. the usual method of formation in such cases, *sc.* normally analogy. I agree with Giussani and Bignone that there is no reason to suppose with Usener that *αἰτίαν* is corrupt: the suggestion in his note, *φαντασίαν*, is quite unnecessary.

X. CELESTIAL PHENOMENA.

Epicurus passes from the earth and its inhabitants to a new department of inquiry. There is in this letter no full exposition of the nature or causes of celestial phenomena, as there is in the letter to Pythocles, but only a careful and elaborate precaution against the theological view of their creation and government, and a statement of the attitude which the true Epicurean should take up and the lines of thought which he should pursue.

(1) In the first section (§§ 76, 77) he protests against two distinct forms of the belief in the divine character of celestial phenomena. We must not believe either that the motions of the heavenly bodies are controlled by any divine being (for that is inconsistent with our belief in the untroubled blessedness of the divine nature), nor again must we suppose that the heavenly bodies are themselves divine, for they are merely material atomic conglomerations. We must be careful not to derogate from our idea of the majesty of the divine nature. All is, on the contrary, due to regular atomic motion proceeding directly from the development of the original congeries into a world. For the general idea we may compare Lucretius v. 78-90.

8. (καὶ τῇ): a necessary addition of Usener's, vouched for by the opening of almost every section of the letter.

ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις: τὰ μετέωρα are for Epicurus celestial phenomena in general, including besides the action of the heavenly bodies also the phenomena of weather.

φοράν: the normal course of the heavenly bodies in the sky: compare Ep. ii, § 92, and Lucr. v. 509-533.

τροπήν: regularly used of the 'turning' of the course of the sun at the tropics (τροπαί): compare Ep. ii, § 93, and Lucr. v. 614-649: here also probably of other heavenly bodies as well.

9. ἔκλειψιν: the 'eclipses' of sun and moon: cf. Ep. ii, § 96, and Lucr. v. 751-770.

ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν: cf. Ep. ii, § 92, and Lucr. v. 650-655.

τὰ σύστοιχα τοῖς, 'questions in the same category as these', such, for instance, as the origin of the moon's light, the equinoxes, the size

of sun and moon, which are dealt with in the parallel passages of the second Epistle and Lucretius v.

10. *λειτουργούντος τινός*: the first of the false explanations of popular mythology, that the movements of the heavenly bodies are controlled by some divine being, who either has ordered them once for all or continues to do so.

11. *διατάξαντος*: the majority of the MSS. read the fut. participle *διατάξοντος*, which Usener has placed in his text. But the distinction must be between the two ideas about the Supreme Being, (1) that he continues to control the revolutions, &c., of the heavenly bodies, (2) that at the Creation he set them once for all on a course which they then pursue automatically. We should therefore adopt the aorist participle from GHZ.

§ 77. 1. *οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν . . .*: the idea of such labours is inconsistent with the life of tranquillity which we attribute to the gods and regard as an essential in the conception of blessedness: compare *Κύριαι Δόξαι* i. Lucretius argues in the same way v. 82 ff.

3. *μήτε αὖ πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα συνεστραμμένον . . .*: the second of the false explanations, that the heavenly bodies are themselves divine beings, who voluntarily take upon themselves these recurrent motions. The MSS. here show signs of corruption, but there seems no reason for abandoning the text to which they point *πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα συνεστραμμένον*, 'as they are only aggregations of fire'. Usener, following up a suggestion of M. Casaubon, emends very ingeniously to *πυρὸς ἀνάμματα συνεστραμμένον*, 'rekindlings of fire gathered together', in allusion to Heraclitus' famous theory of the *ἡλίου ἀνάμμα*, that the sun was extinguished every night and rekindled in the morning by a fresh gathering of fire. This is quite gratuitous and indeed improbable, as Epicurus did not regard Heraclitus' theory with much favour and is therefore not likely to have placed it here as his only statement of the nature of the heavenly bodies. Moreover, *συνεστραμμένον* is a clear reference to the *συστροφαί* at the creation of the world to which he refers below, l. 7.

5. *κατὰ βούλησιν*, 'of their deliberate choice'.

6. *τὸ σέμνωμα*: the idea of divine majesty (in perfect tranquillity and blessedness) which we attribute to the divine beings.

κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενα: sc. not only the titles and epithets which we apply to the divine beings, but also in all statements which we make about them. Both the ideas stated above are really a degradation of the idea of the divine majesty, because they attribute *πραγματεία* to the divine beings. The *φερόμενα* of the MSS. makes quite good sense, and there is no need to follow Usener in reading *φερόμενον* with *σέμνωμα*.

τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννόας: i. e. the conceptions of tranquillity, peace, blessedness, absence of care, &c., which we attribute to the gods.

7. *ἵνα μὴδ'*: it seems necessary to adopt this emendation of Usener's for the MS. *ἐὰν μὴδ'*. It is true that Epicurus likes putting an important

point in a subordinate conditional clause (cf. § 62. 5 *εἰ μὴ ἐφ' ἑνα . . .*), but we can hardly take it so here: we must keep the idea of *σέμνωμα* pure, in order that our opinions may not be contradictory. *ἐὰν μὴδὲν ὑπενάντιον . . . δόξῃ*, Meibom's conjecture, which is adopted by von der Muehl, seems an unnecessarily large departure from the tradition.

γέγονται: another necessary addition; the clause must have a verb.

8. *εἰ δὲ μή*, 'otherwise', 'if we do not preserve the *σέμνωμα*'.

τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον: compare a striking parallel to the general idea in Lucr. vi. 68-78.

10. *κατὰ* once again has become *καί* in the MSS.

τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν: a slightly different idea of the *συστροφαί* to that in § 73. 10. There they are the great agglomerations, each of which ultimately resolves itself into a world, here smaller agglomerations 'caught up' within the larger one, and ultimately forming into sun, moon, or star.

11. *τὴν ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ περίοδον* should be taken closely together, almost as a hendiadys, 'this necessary revolution', so 'the law of their revolution'.

§ 78. (2) *Human knowledge and happiness*. Epicurus turns from the divine aspect to the human aspect. Just as it is an insult to the divine majesty of the gods to attribute to them the control of the affairs of the world, since it would be a disturbance to their eternal repose, so an accurate knowledge about the nature of these things is an essential for human happiness, as it removes those fears which arise as long as we believe celestial phenomena to be due to the arbitrary action of divine powers. Moreover, in the acquisition of this knowledge lies man's greatest happiness. But this is only true of the first essentials and the ultimate nature of things celestial. The details of celestial phenomena, the causes of risings and settings, eclipses, &c., cannot in themselves remove our fears: nay, by the awe which they arouse, they may even increase them. Such knowledge in itself contributes nothing to human happiness, though in combination with the knowledge of the essentials it may go to increase it. In such particulars then we must not be disappointed if we are not able to fix on some one cause as the sole cause: the phenomena may be produced in several ways, or we may not be able to say for certain which of several causes is the one which operates in our world. But as regards the ultimate nature of *τὰ μετέωρα* we must be certain. The introductory paragraphs of the second letter should be compared, and the whole of Lucretius' astronomical section (v. 509-770) affords constant illustrations of the principles.

1. (τὸ): again a necessary addition of Usener: the article with the infinitive seems specially liable to be lost: cf. §§ 47^a 3, 57. 10.

τῶν κυριωτάτων, 'the essential facts', i.e. the comprehension of the divine nature and the knowledge that celestial phenomena are not produced by it. Cf. § 35. 6, where the word is used in a broader sense.

2. *φυσιολογίας*, 'the science of *φύσεις*', of the underlying structure

and character of things: compare Lucretius' *rerum natura*. It is contrasted here with *ιστορία* (§ 79. 2), the inquiry into details of special phenomena.

τὸ μακάριον: of course here 'human happiness': compare below, § 80. 2 τὸ . . . μακάριον ἡμῶν. The peace of mind (*ἀταραξία*) which arises from the comprehension of the fundamental principles given to man, the nearest approach to the blessed life of the gods.

3. ἐν τῇ περὶ μετεώρων γνώσει: there seems no reason to follow Usener in excluding these words as a gloss.

ἐνταῦθα: Usener's suggestion that (τε) should be added seems unnecessary: καὶ ἐν τῷ . . . is appended as an afterthought.

4. τίνες: the τινάς of the MSS. is a mere mistake.

5. συγγενὴ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοῦτο ἀκρίβειαν, 'have an affinity to accurate knowledge for this purpose', i.e. to the knowledge requisite for human happiness (τοῦτο is τὸ μακάριον, as Usener points out in his note). συγγενὴ is quite natural and Usener's alteration to συντείνει gratuitous: so Bignone.

τὸ πλεοναχῶς, 'that which may happen in several ways', e.g. as Epicurus believes, eclipses or the waxing and waning of the moon; see Lucr. v. 705 ff., 751 ff.

6. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις: sc. the knowledge of the ultimate nature of celestial things, in which alternative causes have no place: there is here one final certainty.

τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, 'that which can happen sometimes in one way, sometimes in another', e.g. thunder and lightning, see Lucr. vi. 96 ff. Bignone retains the reading of the majority of the MSS. τὸ ἐνδεχομένως as parallel to τὸ πλεοναχῶς, but it seems an almost impossible formation.

8. τῶν . . . ὑποβαλλόντων, 'things which suggest uncertainty as to their real cause, or alarm because we do not understand their cause', i.e. phenomena of which there may be several explanations.

9. καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἀπλῶς εἶναι, 'of this (sc. the nature of the celestial bodies and their independence of the gods) we can know that it is absolutely', i.e. when we have worked on atomic principles to the right explanation we can be perfectly certain of it.

§ 79. Epicurus now turns to the other side of the picture. The knowledge of detailed causes is not necessary for happiness, and indeed it may even increase our fears, unless we are acquainted with the ultimate nature of the heavenly bodies and the true causes of their movements.

1. τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκός: ἱστορία is the detailed investigation of particular causes as contrasted with φυσιολογία, which is the knowledge of the ultimate principles. The genitives τῆς δύσεως, &c., are connected with ἱστορία.

3. πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τῆς γνώσεως, 'for the blessedness which knowledge confers', a possessive genitive, a favourite device of Epicurus', as Bignone points out. Usener unnecessarily alters to τὰς γνώσεις,

which he then takes with τῆς δύσεως, &c., leaving τὸ ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκός in suspense.

4. ἀλλ' ὁμοίως . . . προσήδρισαν ταῦτα: as Bignone notes, Epicurus is probably thinking here of astrologers and other superstitious persons who, although they have observed the detailed movements of the heavenly bodies and may know something of their immediate causes, yet postulate a divine agency behind all and regard celestial phenomena as an indication of the divine will.

ὁμοίως goes with καὶ εἰ μὴ προσήδρισαν ταῦτα, 'just as much as if they had not learnt these things'.

5. κατιδόντας, 'when they have perceived them': Epicurus regards the knowledge of the detailed causes of celestial phenomena as a matter of observation rather than of reasoning. It is quite unnecessary to alter with Usener to κατειδόντας.

7. πλείους: sc. φόβους ἔχειν.

9. οἰκονομίαν, 'ordering', 'regulation': a curiously personal word for Epicurus to use, when he is so carefully disclaiming personal agency.

διὸ δὴ κἀν πλείους . . . εὐρίσκωμεν: we must accept Usener's correction for the καὶ . . . εὐρίσκομεν of the MSS. In many such cases of detail Epicurus propounds several causes which are not contradicted by the evidence of the senses without deciding between them (see the second letter and Lucr. v. 509-770 *passim*). We must here be content with such uncertain knowledge, and it is all that is required for our happiness.

10. τῶν τοιοῦτοτρόπων: an ingenious correction of Meibom's for τῶν τοιούτων τρόπων (or τροπῶν) of the MSS. τρόπων could hardly be used in the sense of 'occurrences', and the corruption is probably due to the neighbourhood of τροπῶν.

11. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος γινόμενοις ᾗν: i.e. in such investigations as are contained in the letter to Pythocles, which would be familiar to the more advanced disciples for whom the present letter was written. ᾗν again seems a necessary correction of the MS. ᾗ or ᾗ.

§ 80. 1. χρεῖαν, 'investigation', 'inquiry'.

3. ὥστε παραθεωροῦντας . . . A practical conclusion. The right method of procedure in inquiring into the details of celestial phenomena is by the analogy of things within our experience on earth. We must investigate kindred phenomena there, and consider in how many different ways they might be produced, and then apply our conclusions to the heavenly bodies, which owing to their distance from us we never can investigate closely. And even though we think that one explanation is the right one, we must be prepared to recognize that there may be others, and not allow the discovery to disturb our peace of mind. This is a typically Epicurean conclusion, and a good instance might be found in Epicurus' theory of eclipses (*Ep. ad Pyth.*, § 96, Lucr. v. 751 ff.). We consider in how many different ways the light on earth may be obscured. Then, though we think that the cause of the sun's

eclipse is the passing of the moon between earth and sun, we are yet prepared to admit that it may be that some other body intervenes or that the sun's fires are temporarily damped.

παρθεωρούντας: probably 'considering in comparison with' celestial phenomena.

5. παντὸς τοῦ ἀδήλου: ἀδήλα to Epicurus fell under two categories, phenomena like the celestial which are too far off for us to investigate, and those like the atoms and the atomic structure of things, which are below the ken of our senses. In both these cases we should reason from our experience of earthly things.

τῶν οὕτε . . . ἀταρακτῆσαι: *sc.* ordinary unphilosophic persons who do not investigate at all or distinguish between different classes of knowledge or realize the importance of their distinction.

οὕτε (τὸ), Gassendi's correction of the MS. οὐδέ, which is practically demanded by the corresponding οὕτε τό.

7. (ἐπὶ τῶν) τὴν . . . παραδιδόντων. I have adopted with some hesitation Bignone's correction of the clause, 'in the case of things which provide an impression of themselves from a distance', i.e. the first class of ἀδήλα, the celestial phenomena to which we can never get near enough to obtain an ἐνέργημα. Usener reads τὴν τ' . . . παριδόντων, 'but neglect the impression made on us by phenomena at a distance' (Hicks), i.e. presumably, base their belief on προσδοξαζόμενα instead of considering the evidence of sensation, but the expression is forced, and his main point here is that in considering the heavenly bodies we cannot get sufficient evidence from the senses. I think it would, as a third course, be just possible to accept Usener's τὴν τ' and retain παραδιδόντων, 'but are content to hand on the traditional account based on the appearance of phenomena from a distance'; a description of the ordinary conventional man who is content with the first-sight appearance of celestial phenomena without reasoning by analogy and would be satisfied. e.g. to say that the sun passes round the earth without considering Heraclitus' theory that it is lit up afresh every day. But Bignone's restoration seems to bring the sentence nearer to Epicurus' general phraseology and to the particular drift of this passage.

9. καὶ ὁδὶ πως, 'in some such way as this': if, that is, we think that we have reached an approximate explanation which is right, we must still be prepared to admit that there may be several explanations and must not be upset by that conclusion.

καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀταρακτῆσαι, 'and that in circumstances where we may be equally at peace in mind', even if there are several explanations, i.e. in the consideration of the detailed causes of celestial phenomena. Usener omits both καί and ἐστίν, which is only the reading of GH: ἐστίν seems necessary to the construction, and I think καί may be retained. Bignone would read καὶ (ἔχειν) on the analogy of τὸ μοναχῶς ἔχον ἢ γινόμενον, l. 5, which may be the right solution.

10. αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς . . . ἀταρακτῆσομεν: *sc.* our recognition

of the possible plurality of causes will not disturb our peace any more than if we knew that there was one approximate cause.

(3) *The causes of men's fears.* At the end of this long discussion of τὰ μετέωρα Epicurus swings round to the practical moral conclusion. The two chief causes of mental disturbance, the opposite of the ideal ἀταραξία, are firstly this belief that the heavenly bodies are divine beings, performing actions quite contrary to the divine nature, and secondly the fear of death, whether it be of punishment in another life, or of the annihilation of sensation as something felt by 'us'. Peace of mind, on the other hand, consists in the release from these fears. The argument of the whole section is quite straightforward, and is repeated in many passages by Lucretius; compare especially i. 80-135, iii. 41-93, v. 1194-1240.

§ 81. 2. τάραχος. Usener suggests the insertion of μέν to balance ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία below, § 82. 1, but that clause may well be an afterthought.

3. ταῦτα: sc. the heavenly bodies, of which he has been speaking in the preceding sections. Von der Muehl's ταῦτά is ingenious but hardly necessary.

δοξάζειν. Usener's addition (εἶναι) seems unnecessary: it can be supplied in thought.

4. τοῖσι: sc. τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, easily extracted from the previous clause. Usener's 'correction' τοῦτω is no improvement.

5. αἰτίας: here 'motives', i.e. anger and favour: compare § 77. 1 ff.

δεῖ for καί, a good correction of Usener's.

6. εἴτε καὶ αὐτὴν . . . κατ' αὐτούς: a new point. Some men do not fear punishment in another life, but fear the annihilation of sensation as though it were something that would affect 'them': but, as Epicurus would say, when the soul has once left the body and dissolved, 'they', who are a combination of soul and body, no longer exist: compare Lucr. iii. 838-842 and 870-893. καὶ αὐτὴν is a good correction of Casaubon's for κατὰ ταύτην: the constant confusion of κατὰ and καί occurs again in the MSS. just below, l. 7.

8. δόξαις: as the result of an inference of opinion from phenomena: cf. the constant use of δοξάζειν and προσδοξάζειν.

ἀλόγῳ γέ τιτι παραστάσει, 'an unreasoning presentation of a picture to the mind', 'imagination' not even grounded on an inference, however false, from phenomena. Hicks translates 'an irrational perversity', but is there evidence for παράστασις in this sense?

9. μὴ ὀρίζοντας, 'not limiting', i.e. not knowing the limits of pain, which in the Epicurean system are set by the right comprehension of what man needs and the limits of his suffering, and the knowledge that the gods do not intervene in the world and that death is nothing to us.

10. ὥς εἰ καὶ ἐδόξαζον ταῦτα: constructed in sense after ἴσθιν. With some hesitation I propose the substitution of ὥς for MS. τῷ (or τῶ).

Usener, keeping τῷ, proposes the much more violent change, τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα: but Epicurus would not have admitted that any one held these opinions εἰκαίως. Hicks's translation 'than if we held these beliefs' seems to imply ὥς or ἤ: τῷ would give this sense too, but is very harsh.

§ 82. 2. τό: I can see no reason for following Usener in his alteration to τῷ, with which presumably ἐν is to be supplied from the construction of the previous sentence: 'peace of mind is freedom from these fears and the recollection of the main principles'.

(4) *Trust in the senses.* As the conclusion of the whole discussion which started from the consideration of celestial phenomena, Epicurus comes back to the position which he enunciated at the beginning of the letter. The only safe principle in life is always to trust to the direct evidence of our external sensations and our internal feelings. Inference from them (δόξα) may be false, and may lead, as he has shown, to conclusions which greatly militate against our peace of mind; but the sensations are always true. This is the ultimate basis of the whole Epicurean system, physical and moral, and forms a fitting conclusion to the argument of the letter.

4. πάθεσι: all the MSS. have the curious mistake πᾶσι.

τοῖς παρούσι, 'those present to us', so 'immediate': see § 38. 5 τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολάς.

5. κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν . . . ταῖς ἰδίαις: Bignone has shown the meaning of this. We must trust the common sensations of mankind (Lucretius' *communis sensus*) when we are considering common experiences or wish to correct individual experiences of our own, which are due to the particular state of our organism (e.g. when fever warps our taste). We must, on the other hand, trust our individual sensations when we are considering matters on which we can pronounce judgement, e.g. our own feelings of pleasure or pain. K. Δ. xxxvi affords an interesting example, where Epicurus distinguishes τὸ δίκαιον which is κοινόν to all mankind, from that which is ἴδιον to particular nations or peoples.

6. καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν κριτηρίων: sc. the senses and feelings, the πρόληψις or general concept, and possibly also the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, which combines perceptions and concepts into ideas which have validity in the region of the ἀδηλα.

7. ἐναργεῖα: the 'clear vision' or 'intuition', as usual.

9. ἀπολύσομεν: probably goes not with τὸ ὅθεν ὁ τάραχος . . . but with ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους.

10. τῶν ἀεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων, 'things that occur casually from time to time', i.e. sporadic as opposed to normal recurring phenomena.

Conclusion. The last paragraph of the letter returns to the ideas of the exordium. The advanced student, absorbed in the examination of details, must have a careful statement of the general principles always in his mind, to which he may constantly refer. This was the primary purpose of the present treatise, but it will also, as Epicurus

adds at the end, enable even those who cannot enter into details to obtain a 'bird's-eye view', which will be sufficient to secure their peace of mind (*γαληνισμός*). The language of this section should all through be compared with that of the exordium. The general drift is clear, but the text in several places uncertain.

11. *κεφαλαιωδέστατα* is apparently an adverb going with *ἐπιτετμημένα*, but there is a strong temptation to read (*τὰ*) *κεφαλαιωδέστατα*, 'the most important heads', which would give a better sense.

12. *τῶν ὅλων*, 'the general principles' or 'the system as a whole'. Cf. § 36. 10 *τῆς συνεχούς τῶν ὅλων περιουσίας*.

§ 83. 1. *ὥστε ἂν γένοιτο οὗτος ὁ λόγος δυνατὸς κατασχεθῆναι*, 'so that this account would be able to be comprehended'. The MSS. have *κατασχεθῆ*, except that H writes *κατασχεθῆ*, which suggests *κατασχεθῆναι* as the obvious correction: with this change the MS. text can be kept. Usener, followed apparently by Bignone, places a full stop at *ἐπιτετμημένα*, changes *ἂν γένοιτο* to *ἐὰν γένηται*, adopts *δυνατὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος* from F, *κατασχεθείς* from Gassendi, and places a comma at *ἀκριβείας*, 'so that, if this account becomes effective, being grasped accurately, I think...'. This seems quite unnecessary, and the participle is a much less likely emendation of *κατασχεθῆ* than the infinitive.

2. *οἶμαι*: a lapse into a rather more colloquial style quite consistent with the turn to the personal address to Herodotus.

3. *ἀκριβομάτων*: compare § 36. 6 *τοῦ παντὸς ἀκριβώματος*.

4. *ἀσύμβλητον*, 'incomparable', going closely with *πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους*. The man who knows the main principles will be in a far superior position as regards the fears which attack men. There is, I think, no reference to the *ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἀνθρώπων* of K. Δ. xiii and xiv.

ἀδρότητα, 'ripeness', 'strength': a Homeric word which reappears in later Greek as a technical term of rhetoric.

5. *καθαρά*, 'free from difficulties', 'clear', an unusual word for Epicurus.

6. *κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν*: compare *τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας*, § 35. 8.

7. *βοηθήσει*: compare *βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς δύνανται*, § 35. 6.

8. (*καὶ τὰ*): again lost by 'haplography' before *κατὰ*.

9. *ικανῶς ἢ καὶ τελείως*, 'sufficiently for practical purposes or even with scientific completeness'.

10. *ἐπιβολάς*: again in the semi-technical sense in which it appears in the exordium: 'acts of apprehension', so 'survey', almost 'principles'. Cf. § 36. 3 *ἡ κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολή*.

τῶν περιουσιῶν: cf. *τῆς συνεχούς τῶν ὅλων περιουσίας*, § 36. 10.

11. *δοσι δέ*: Epicurus reverts to the thought of l. 3: even those who are not intending to go into the full details of the system can use it as an epitome to give them the general ideas, and so to secure their peace of mind.

τῶν ἀποτελουμένων, 'those who are being perfected', i.e. those who

work through the whole Epicurean system and so attain perfection. A word which would suggest initiation.

12. εἰσὶν οἱ, 'some', picking up and limiting σοῖ. This seems the obvious correction of the MS. εἰσὶν ἡ, though its sense is not very convincing. Usener conjectures ἱκανήν (ic = κ) taking it with πρὸς γαληνισμόν: the sense would be good, but it seems a rather violent correction. Bignone reads ὄση δὴ ἡ, 'a hasty view in so far as it can be obtained by the method without oral instruction': again a rather violent change.

κατὰ τὸν ἀνευ φθόγγων τρόπον: apparently 'by instruction and not orally', for most of the disciples learnt the doctrine from the Master in person. But it is a curious phrase, and there may be some corruption: you would expect him to say 'by the method without details'.

13. ἅμα νοήματι, 'quick as thought', 'hasty'. Here in an even more untechnical sense than when he applies it to atomic movement in § 61. 8.

πρὸς γαληνισμόν, 'for peace of mind' (ἀταραξία), which was the aim of the Epicurean, and to which the knowledge of the principles of φυσιολογία contributed the greatest part: cf. § 37. 3 μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ βίῳ.

APPENDIX

On the meaning of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας.

OF all the technical terms of the Epicurean philosophy none is nearly so obscure and elusive as ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας. We are confronted with it or its equivalent five¹ times in the Letter to Herodotus and once² in the *Kύρια Δόξαι*; Diogenes³ further tells us that the 'Epicureans' added it to Epicurus' three criteria of truth: yet each fresh context seems at first only to shed further obscurity on its meaning. Nor can it be said that modern critics and historians of philosophy have for the most part assisted much towards its elucidation: finding it in a prominent place in the Epicurean philosophy they have felt bound to give some equivalent for it, but most of them have been content to make wild guesses⁴ without, as it seems, any careful consideration of the contexts in which it occurs: yet the very divergence of these guesses shows how little the phrase conveys a direct indication of its meaning. Only two⁵ scholars, so far as I know, have made a really critical study of the subject, Tohte⁶ and Giussani,⁷ and they again differ widely in their conclusions. I should be loth to enter the discussion, but that I feel bound to justify the views assumed in the translation and commentary, and also believe that something may yet be said, which may help towards a solution.

It will be convenient, before entering the details of the discussion, to give in full the passages of Epicurus dealing with the subject, which will frequently be required for reference, and to state summarily the conclusions at which this note will arrive.

¹ §§ 38, 50, 51 (twice), 62.

² xxiv.

³ x. 31 (*Vit.*).

⁴ We may instance Zeller, 'sensible impression'; Überweg, 'intuitive apprehension of the understanding' (which is nearer to part of the right idea than most conjectures); Ritter and Preller, 'a form of πρόληψις not differing from images seen in delirium or sleep'; Steinhart, 'the free activity of the imagination'.

⁵ Brieger's contribution (*Lehre von der Seele*, pp. 19, 20) is so vague and uncritical that it does not really come into question, though, as will be seen, he has grasped one essential part of the full meaning. F. Merbach (*De Epicuri Canonica*, pp. 28-35) has some interesting pages on the subject, in which he agrees in the main with Tohte, but does not touch the crucial difficulty of § 62 of the Letter to Herodotus.

⁶ *Epikurs Kriterien der Wahrheit*, pp. 20-24.

⁷ Lucretius, vol. i, pp. 171-182.

I. Letter to Herodotus :

A. § 38 ἔτι τε¹ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς (κατὰ) τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

B. § 50 καὶ ἢν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφὴ ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ στερεομένου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου.

C. § 51 ἢ τε γὰρ ὁμοιότης τῶν φαντασμάτων οἷον εἰ¹ ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανόμενων ἢ καθ' ὑπνοὺς γινομένων ἢ κατ' ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς οὐσί τε καὶ ἀληθέσι προσαγορευμένοις, εἰ μὴ ἦν τινα καὶ τοιαῦτα προσβαλλόμενα.

D. § 51 (immediately following the preceding) τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μὲν (τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ),¹ διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσιν.

E. § 62 ἐπεὶ τὸ γε θεωρούμενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστίν.

II. Κύρια Δόξαι xxiv εἴ τι ν' ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ¹ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίᾳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς.

To these passages of Epicurus must be added two others of great importance :

Diog. Laert. x. 31 ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας.

Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 4, p. 157 (Usener, fr. 255) πρόληψιν δὲ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπὶ τι ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπύνοιαν.

Briefly put, the line of argument which I propose to pursue is as follows : (1) The natural meaning of ἐπιβολή used of operations of the senses or the mind is a 'projection upon', and so 'attention to', and, with the added notion of the result, 'apprehension' and even 'view'. (2) Epicurus in several of the crucial passages implies an ἐπιβολή of the senses, as 'apprehension' by 'looking' as opposed to passive seeing. (3) ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας corresponds exactly to this and means firstly (a), the immediate apprehension by an act of mental attention of certain subtle 'images', too fine to be apprehended by the senses, and, in particular, of the 'images' of divine beings: secondly (δ), the immediate, or 'intuitive' apprehension of concepts,

¹ For the text see the notes on the passages.

and in particular of the 'clear', i.e. self-evident concepts of scientific thought. With this preface, which may be of assistance in the course of a rather intricate and necessarily controversial argument, we may proceed to full discussion.

1. It was one of the cardinal principles of the *Canonica*¹ (§ 38) that words must be used in their first and obvious meaning, and though it may well seem to us at times that Epicurus has hardly succeeded in carrying out his principles, yet his intention suggests that the best starting-point for inquiry is to ask what is the natural meaning of the word ἐπιβολή. Proceeding from such literal usages as ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας it is natural to conclude that ἐπιβάλλειν (τὸν νοῦν or the like) will mean, like the commoner ἐπέχειν, 'to project the mind towards', 'to turn the attention to' an object: so Diod. Sic. xx. 43 has πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐπέβαλλε τὴν διάνοιαν, 'he paid no attention to anything'. In an absolute sense without the accusative we find τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν in Plut. Cic. 4 as an equivalent of *rem publicam capessere*, and in a famous passage of St. Mark xiv. 72 καὶ ἐπιβαλὼν ἔκλαιε. The verb is used in this way in an Epicurean passage of some importance, Aet. iv. 8. 10, p. 395 (Usener *fr.* 317) Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδῶλων ἔξωθεν προσιώντων· μηδεὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδῶλου, and again in Iambl. *Protr.* 4. 56 ἡ ὄψις τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἐπιβάλλει: for the moment we will suspend the question of the exact sense in these rather technical places.

ἐπιβολή, the substantive, should then mean 'a projection towards', 'attention to', and so with the added notion of the result of such attention, 'view' or 'apprehension': the substantive is thus used by Clem. Alex. 644 ἐπιβολή τῆς ἀληθείας, a 'grasp' or 'apprehension' of the truth. The simple ἐπιβολή without further qualification occurs six times in the Letter to Herodotus. (1) In § 35 Epicurus is speaking of the reason for writing an epitome, τῆς γὰρ ἀθρόας ἐπιβολῆς πυκνὸν δεόμεθα, τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὐχ ὁμοίως, 'for we have frequent need of the general view of the system, but not so often of the detailed exposition'. (2) In § 83 again, summing up the uses of the Letter, he says that even those who are working out the system in detail will be able εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀναλύοντας ἐπιβολὰς τὰς πλείστας τῶν περιουσιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ποιεῖσθαι, 'to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis with reference to such a survey as this'. (3) With these two passages goes the earlier of two instances in § 36 βαδιστέον μὲν οὖν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ τὸ τοσοῦτον ποιητέον, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ τε κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολὴ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἔσται, 'it is necessary to go back on the main principles and constantly to fix in one's memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth'. The meaning in these three passages is direct and clear. Slightly more technical are

¹ Ep. i, § 38.

(4) § 69, where he is speaking of the properties (*συμβεβηκότα*) of compound things *καὶ ἐπιβολὰς μὲν ἔχοντα ἰδίᾳ πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ διαλήψεις*, 'all these properties have their own peculiar means of being perceived and distinguished', and (5) § 70 *κατ' ἐπιβολὰς δ' ἂν τις... ἕκαστα προσαγορευθεῖν*, 'as the result of certain acts of apprehension... they might each be given this name'. Here we are clearly approaching a more esoteric use, though still on the same lines, and the last passage, (6) § 36 *τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὀξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι*, and the last passage of Alexandria quoted above, in which it is stated that *πρόληψις* is an *ἐπιβολή* towards an *ἐναργές*, must be kept over for the present. *ἐπιβολή* then would appear to mean an 'act of attention', and so 'view' or 'apprehension'. Both Tohte and Giussani, however, believe that it has also in Epicurus the 'passive' or 'objective'¹ meaning of the 'impression' resulting from such an act of apprehension. It is true that there are close parallels in Epicurus' technical phraseology for this derivative passive sense: *αἰσθησις* is certainly used both for the act of sensation or perception and also for the passive sensation or perception received, and *πρόληψις*, which should strictly mean the 'act of anticipation' is never, I think, used in this sense by Epicurus,² but always of the 'general concept' or 'compound image', which is the basis of such an 'act of anticipation'. But, although it is sometimes possible that the passive sense rather than the active may be intended, it is never³ necessary, and its indiscriminate introduction has, I believe, done a good deal to confuse issues.

2. We may get much light on the meaning of *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* if we ask first whether Epicurus contemplates any other kind of *ἐπιβολή* besides that of the mind. The answer is not far to seek, though its importance seems not to have been sufficiently noticed: Epicurus clearly recognizes an *ἐπιβολή* of the senses. They are not (at any rate, not always) the merely passive recipients of an impression, but by an 'act of attention' they apprehend the images which are flowing in upon them: they 'look' or 'listen' as opposed to merely 'seeing' or 'hearing'. In that case it is clear that *ἐπιβολή*⁴ will be connected with the process of *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*, the close view of the *ἐνάργημα*, which is to check the rash inferences of *δόξα*, and tell us with certainty the true nature of the object. The passages in the Letter to

¹ Giussani, loc. cit., p. 180.

² It seems, however, to be so used in the Epicurean passage from Clem. Alex. quoted above.

³ Except possibly in § 38.

⁴ Tohte remarks it (p. 21) and points out that it is in distinction from the *ἐπιβολή* of the senses that Epicurus speaks explicitly of *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας*. So also does Merbach (pp. 31, 32). Giussani seems not to realize it at all, and is consequently driven to a very unnatural interpretation of some of the passages in which it is referred to.

⁵ This connexion, which seems to me both necessary and extremely important, has escaped both Tohte and Giussani.

Herodotus which mention or imply this ἐπιβολή of the senses are four in number, and it will be convenient to consider them in the order of their increasing difficulty.

B. § 50. The clearest and easiest of the passages is that in which Epicurus most emphatically and directly sums up his doctrine as to the value of ἐπιβολή in general. The idea here seems exactly to bear out what has been said. 'The image which we obtain by an act of attention or apprehension on the part of the senses (we must leave out the mind for the moment) of the shape or property (e.g. the colour) of an object, is in fact its shape (or property).' This is exactly the idea of ἐπιμαρτύρησις which Epicurus has just been expounding in the preceding context. Our first passive sensation of a distant object is 'true', for the image is a faithful representation of the successive 'idols', but it is not until we have 'looked at' the close, clear view (τὸ παρόν, τὸ ἐναργές), that we can be sure that the image exactly reproduces the shape and colour of the object. ἐπιβολή is required for the confirmation (or non-confirmation) of the δόξα founded on the original passive perception.

E. § 62, though a very different passage from the point of view of the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας, strongly confirms this notion of the ἐπιβολή of the senses. Epicurus is considering the motion of the atoms in a moving compound body: by 'looking' we perceive that the motion of a whole body is the sum of the motions of all its perceptible parts in the same direction as the whole (e.g. an army). δόξα applies this analogy to the motion of the atomic parts of a moving body and infers that it will be the same, whereas ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας shows that it is different. Here τὸ θεωρούμενον (what is seen by 'looking' as opposed to τὸ ὁρώμενον) is clearly equivalent in sense to τὸ ἐπιβλητικῶς λαμβανόμενον τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις in B, and the general idea is the same as in the previous passage. The ἐπιβολή of the senses gives us the certain image of a σύμπτωμα (in this case movement) of a στερέμνιον.

We are now in a position to deal with the other two passages, where the sense is slightly more obscure.

A. § 38. After speaking of the necessity for keeping the terminology of our investigations in exact correspondence with the ideas which it represents, Epicurus proceeds to consider the methods of investigation. For clearness' sake we may extract the words which refer to the ἐπιβολή of the senses: κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς (κατὰ) τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς . . . ὅτου δῆποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, . . . ὅπως ἂν . . . τὸ προσμένον . . . ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα: 'in order that we may have certain indications by which to judge the image awaiting confirmation (i.e. the original image of the distant object), we must keep everything under the control of the senses (i.e. free from the additions of δόξα), and in particular of the close apprehension (τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς is equivalent to τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἐπὶ τὸ παρόν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, cf. K. Δ. xxiv) of any of the standards of judgement'. The

*κριτήρια*¹ here are clearly the individual senses, sight, hearing, &c., the *αἰσθητήρια* of B, which are indeed *κριτήρια* because they are the instruments of *αἴσθησις*: the expression is a little loose, but the meaning in view of the parallel passages quite unmistakable. The general notion of the passage is then exactly the same as that of the two preceding quotations, but it is much more clearly and elaborately stated. The *ἐπιβολή* of the senses, the *προσμένον* and the process of *ἐπιμαρτύρησις* are all brought into close connexion. The all-important matter for scientific investigation in the region of perception is the pure sensation, and in particular the observation of phenomena in the close view, which will give us the certainty that the sense-image corresponds to objective reality.

C. § 51. Epicurus is here arguing for the exact resemblance of the sense-images to the objects from which the 'idols' emanate. Extracting again the portions relating to the *ἐπιβολή* of the senses, we get: *ἡ τε γὰρ ὁμοιότης τῶν φαντασμῶν ὅσον εἰ ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανομένον . . . κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς οὐσί τε καὶ ἀληθείαι προσαγορευομένοις, εἰ μὴ ᾗν τινα καὶ τοιαῦτα προσβαλλόμενα*, 'unless "idols" came to us, which are exact reproductions of the object, we could not be certain of the exact resemblance of the images obtained by the "apprehensions" of the senses', that is, the images seen by observation in the nearer view. The expression, as far as concerns the *ἐπιβολή* of the senses, is exactly parallel to what we have already met: the present passage adds no new ideas, but once more confirms our conclusion.

There is now no difficulty in interpreting the phrase of Iamblichus, which was noted on p. 261. *ἡ ὅψις τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἐπιβάλλει* expresses clearly enough the act of *ἐπιβολή* on the part of the sense of sight in immediate relation to its own peculiar object, visible things. Before leaving the *ἐπιβολή* of the senses, we may notice that the whole notion of the act of attention on the part of the senses and the resulting apprehension is clearly brought out by Lucretius iv. 807-810 (as an illustration of similar 'attention' on the part of the mind):

nonne vides oculos etiam, cum tenuia quae sunt
cernere coeperunt, contendere se atque parare,
nec sine eo fieri posse ut cernamus acute?

The ideas of the *ἐπιβολή* and the 'clear view' could hardly be expressed more accurately.

3 (a). It is now time to pass to the consideration of the *ἐπιβολή* τῆς διανοίας, and it is clear that the first question to be asked is whether

¹ Giussani (p. 177), not realizing the *ἐπιβολή* of the senses, takes *κριτήρια* here to be 'signs' (*σημεῖα* as Epicurus ordinarily calls them), and, since he naturally feels that 'signs' could not be standards of reference, does not insert *κατὰ*, but leaves the *ἐπιβολαί* both of the mind and of the *κριτήρια* subordinate to *αἴσθησις* in general: but apart from all other objections (see notes on the passage) the parallel of § 51 makes this impossible.

there is any act performed by the mind in Epicurus' psychology which is analogous to the apprehension of an image by an act of attention on the part of the senses? We are at once reminded of course of the very subtle 'idols' which, being too fine to be perceived by the senses, pass on into the mind and are there immediately apprehended by it, the images seen in sleep, the visions of dead persons, above all the 'images' of the gods. In these cases there seems to be a very close parallel: the act of apprehension by the mind is, as it were, a kind of subtle sense-perception, and moreover we are informed by Lucretius¹ that such images are so fine, that, even when they have penetrated to the mind, they cannot be perceived by it except by a special act of attention, so that we see them most often in sleep, when the senses are dormant and the mind is undisturbed. This seems to be exactly what we should expect of the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, the perception of what is really a sense-image by an act of attention on the part of the mind. It is necessary to see how this notion tallies with the passages in Epicurus: it will again be convenient to take them in the order which will most naturally develop the idea.

D. § 51, the passage in which Epicurus is arguing for the exact correspondence of the sense-images to the object from which they come. We are now concerned with the list of 'images' whose likeness is guaranteed by that of the idols. They are 'the images perceived as a kind of likeness (i.e. the normal images of sensation) or those occurring in sleep, or owing to any of the other apprehensions of the mind . . .'. It would be impossible to have clearer confirmation than this: the images of sleep are perceived by one kind of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, and there are others (such as the images of the gods and the visions of the dead) perceived by other similar ἐπιβολαί. All of these, just like the sense-images perceived by the ἐπιβολαὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, require as the guarantee of their truth the correspondence of 'idols' to object.

B. § 50. 'Any image which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind . . ., whether it is of shape or quality, is (i.e. exactly represents) the shape (or quality) of the object.' Is this true of our present notion of the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας? It certainly is true of the images of the gods, for they are formed by a succession of 'idols' which come directly from the divine beings to the mind: the 'idol' is that which was once the 'body' of the god. It is equally true of visions of the dead, for again they are caused by 'idols' which came from their bodies when alive. But there are certain other kinds of images similarly perceived by the mind, which cannot here be passed over, for example, the *οὐσιότητες*, the strange, grotesque, compound images which form themselves in the air, and the visions of delirium. In neither of these cases does the 'image' correspond to an external reality. Epicurus saved himself in such cases by arguing that

¹ Compare iv. 757-776 with 800-815.

the image is 'true', because it corresponds to the 'idols', and¹ it is a mistaken inference of δόξα to assume that the 'idols' in their turn represent actual realities. But it would perhaps be the truest account of the case to say that Epicurus is in the present passage thinking primarily of the other kinds of 'mental apprehensions', and in particular, as Tohte² believes he usually is, of the images of the gods. At any rate this passage again is a strong confirmation of the present view.

A. § 38 contains nothing which is inconsistent with this interpretation. The objects known to us by this mode of cognition, the immediate apprehension by the mind, are necessarily ἀδηλα, because they are imperceptible by the sense-organs. Selecting then the portion of the aphorism which concerns us, we get the principle: 'in order that we may have standards by which to judge the imperceptible, we must keep all under the control of the senses, and in particular of the close apprehension of the mind'. This suits well enough with our present idea, but seems to suggest that it is not yet complete: for there seems nothing in the perception by the mind of the subtle images to correspond to 'a judgement on the imperceptible by means of the close view', or at any rate to get it we should have to press facts a little. Here then there is no contradiction of our present position, but a distinct hint for the first time that the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας covers something more.

D. § 51 and E. § 62 must still be left aside for the present, but we are now in a position to consider the reference in Κύρια Δόξαι xxiv, and it will be seen to sum up admirably the account at present given of the ἐπιβολαί both of the senses and of the mind. In xxiii, which is closely connected with it, Epicurus has said: 'if you reject all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those which you say are false'. In xxiv he pushes his argument still farther: 'if you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation on the one hand, and on the other the close view made by sense-perception or feeling, or every kind of mental apprehension of an image, you will confound all other sensations as well by your groundless opinion, so that you will lose all standard of judgement'. This agrees excellently with what has been said: alike in cases of sense-perception and mental apprehension we must respect the validity of every sensation and attend to the close view, carefully distinguishing between the vague image of the indistinct view and the clear vision obtained by an act of apprehension. But here once again there is a suggestion of something more in the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας than we have yet discovered: how does it obtain a clear vision in contrast to an image awaiting confirmation? and what is

¹ Sex. Emp. *adv. Math.* viii. 63 (Usener 253) ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ὑπ' εἰδώλων κινουμένη ἀληθὴς ἦν (ὕπνεκτο γὰρ τὰ εἴδωλα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἰόμενος ὅτι στερεώμενός ἐστιν Ἐρᾶνες (he is taking the case of Orestes) ἐψευδοδόξει.

² Op. cit., p. 23.

meant by 'every ἐπιβολή of the mind'? Surely something more than the apprehension of the various kinds of subtle image.

So far we have concluded that the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας is a 'mental apprehension of an image perceived directly by the mind without the intervention of the senses', and we might naturally suppose that Epicurus insisted on its truth and, even if he did not quite class it as a κριτήριον,¹ yet named it so frequently among the κριτήρια, mainly in order to support his theological contention that our mental vision of the forms of the gods is evidence of their existence. This is in effect the view of Tohte, except that he leans (unnecessarily, as I think) to the passive interpretation, and would speak of the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας as an 'impression received by the apprehension of the mind'. And if this were all the evidence we had, we might be content with his explanation. But it has already been noted that this view does not seem to cover the full meaning required either in A. § 38 or in K. Δ. xxiv: we have, moreover, been compelled at present to leave over D. § 51, as there seems nothing in what has been said to explain it, and an examination of E. § 62 in its context will show at once that it can have nothing whatever to do with the mental apprehension of subtle images. If a complete explanation of ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας is to be discovered, it will be necessary to make further inquiry.

3 (δ). We must ask then, can the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας grasp or apprehend anything else besides these subtle images, exactly analogous to the images of normal sense-perception? At this point the passage quoted above² from Clement of Alexandria becomes of crucial importance. 'Epicurus', he says, 'explains "anticipation" as an apprehension of something clear or of the clear thought-image of the thing.' Now from our knowledge of the nature of πρόληψις this is not difficult to explain: the 'act of anticipation'—for πρόληψις³ is here used, contrary to Epicurus' usual custom, in an active sense—is the apprehension of the general or compound image, made up of many individual sense-images. This 'apprehension' must be mental—must be an ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας, for the general image can only be perceived by the mind and not by the senses, and what now is its object? Not a sense-image, nor anything analogous to it, but a concept. An ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας then can grasp a concept, and with this new notion in mind we may turn to the examination of the difficult passage in the Letter to Herodotus, which has been left over for consideration.

E. § 62. The particular question at issue in the context is: What is the nature of the atomic motions in a compound body? 'We know', says Epicurus in effect, 'that the perceptible parts of a moving body are all moving in the same direction as the whole body: this is the truth guaranteed to us by an ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθητηρίων (τὸ θεωρούμενον is clearly that which is grasped by the senses when "looking" at the close view, i.e. by an ἐπιβολή). By analogy we apply the same idea in

¹ D. L. x. 31, quoted on p. 260.

² p. 260.

³ See p. 262, n. 2.

thought to the imperceptible atomic parts and suppose that they too are all moving in the same direction as the whole: this is the work of opinion (δόξα) combining images and forming what Epicurus would call technically an ἐπίνοια κατ' ἀναλογίαν. But we know as the result of scientific investigation that the atoms are really in a constant state of vibratory motion (πάλσις) in all directions, and this conclusion must be true as against our previous supposition, *because it is obtained by an ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας*. What does this mean? how do we know this fact by an ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας and why is it therefore certainly true? Giussani, largely on the strength of this passage, but influenced also by his general theories of the process of thought in Epicurus, has argued for a far wider sense of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας than that proposed by Tohte. 'The ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας for Epicurus comprehends both what Tohte supposes, but not that alone, and πρόληψις, as Brieger wishes, but not it alone, and scientific concepts in general, including the concepts of those ἄδηλα—be they real or *coniuncta* or *eventa*—which do not give off "idols". In fine the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας is mental representation in general.'¹ The one fatal objection to this all-embracing view of the ἐπιβολή is to my mind just this passage (§ 62) on which it is based. Seeing that all mental operations, including δόξα itself, are carried on, according to Epicurus, by visualized images or 'mental representation', it is impossible that Epicurus could have said that 'everything that is grasped by mental representation is true'. Giussani went farther, I think, in this last clause than he really meant, and wished to distinguish the 'concepts of science' from the images formed by opinion, but that is just the crux of the whole matter.

Turn once more to the instance in § 62. We have a problem: What is the motion of the atoms in a moving compound body? Two solutions are offered, one that they are all moving in the same direction as the whole, the other that they are moving in imperceptible little trajects in all directions. The former is the solution of opinion based on the analogy of the perceptible, and it is false: the latter is the solution of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, and it is true. Why? What is the difference in process by which the two solutions are aimed at? 'Opinion', Epicurus himself tells us—for we may now make use of D. § 51—is a movement of the mind closely connected with the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, but distinct from it? What is the distinction? Why is one liable to produce false results, while the other can only give us what is true? If we could answer that question with certainty, we should have solved not merely the particular problem before us, but much of the difficulty of the Epicurean theory of knowledge. With some hesitation I venture to give an answer. So far what we know of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας in the secondary sense is that it can apprehend concepts, as in πρόληψις (Clem. Alex.), and that its operation is in some way parallel to that of the ἐπιβολὴ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων in the

¹ Loc. cit., p. 179 *fin.*

process of ἐπιμαρτύρησις (A. § 38 and K. Δ. xxiv). Let us attempt to apply these ideas to the problem of atomic motion. Δόξα frames the theory that the atoms in the moving compound all move in the direction of the whole body, as do the perceptible parts of the body. How is this theory to be tested? According to the ordinary rule of the *Canonica* in dealing with ἀδηλα by reference to the senses. But in this case, either the senses would give us no criterion of judgement, or, as in the case of celestial phenomena, several possible theories might meet with no ἀντιμαρτύρησις and be equally true. Scientific theory requires a greater accuracy than this, and as a matter of fact Epicurus does not test the δοξαζόμενον by reference to the senses, but by reference to an ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας. Scientific thought then about the ultimate realities is conducted on some different lines, and results in a 'one and only' truth. I suggest that in Epicurus' view the concepts of science are built up step by step by the juxtaposition (σύνθεσις) of previous concepts, each in their turn grasped as 'clear' or self-evident by the immediate apprehension of the mind (ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας). What is important here is to show that this conclusion is forced upon us by the passage in question. Epicurus refers the δοξαζόμενον not to the senses, but to 'that which is grasped by ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας'. What is it that is thus apprehended? Clearly the 'vision' or 'image' or 'concept' of the atoms still, even inside the moving compound body, themselves moving in every direction. And how is that vision (ἐναργές) formed? Clearly by the juxtaposition of the previous concept of the movement of free or uncompounded atoms (itself similarly formed by the apprehension of other 'clear visions' in juxtaposition) with the concept of atoms enclosed in a moving ἄθροισμα; such a juxtaposition can only make one new image or concept—only form one picture and not several alternative pictures—and that concept, because it is 'clear' or, as we might say, 'self-evident', is immediately or, as we should say, 'intuitively' apprehended by the attentive mind in an ἐπιβολή. And the moment that concept is apprehended, is seen to be true, we know that the previous δοξαζόμενον, founded on an arbitrary analogy, is false. Here then is an exact illustration of what I conceive to be Epicurus' idea of the process of scientific thought. Moreover, we now see that this process is in reality exactly parallel to the ἐπιμαρτύρησις. The δοξαζόμενον of thought is tested, just as is the δοξαζόμενον with regard to a sense-impression, by the apprehension—now mental—of a 'clear' image, seen, as it were, in the nearer view: that apprehension declares against the supposition of opinion, and at the same time, as the near view should, gives the one and only truth. Finally, it is now possible to say that the difference between opinion and mental apprehension is that whereas δόξα arbitrarily combines many kinds of concepts with each other or with the images of sense, ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας immediately apprehends a new concept as the necessary result of the combination of concepts, themselves similarly apprehended. ἐπιβολὴ τῆς

διανοίας then, as it plays its part in the highest mental operation of scientific thought, is the immediate 'apprehension by the mind of the concepts of scientific truth', which is conceived of as a chain of necessarily connected and self-evident visualizations.

It remains to test this idea by reference to the other passages in Epicurus.

B. § 50 deals solely with the form and qualities of *στερέμνια*. The secondary sense of *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* has no place here, and we may say confidently that Epicurus is thinking solely of the primary sense of the mental apprehension of 'subtle images'. C. § 51 is similarly concerned with the theory of 'idols'. Again the 'mental apprehension' involved there is solely the semi-sensational apprehension of the subtle images. But in A. § 38 the new conception supplies exactly the lack which was felt on the first examination of the passage. In it the parallel between the two kinds of *ἐπιβολή*, that of the senses and that of the mind, is very prominent, as also is the conception of the *προσμένον* and *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*. Including the second meaning of *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* it is possible to complete the parallel: *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* is a test by which to judge the *ἄδηλα*, not merely because some *ἄδηλα* give us direct mental impressions, but because by the process of the 'near view' of scientific concepts, hypotheses about the imperceptible may be tested and the truth 'clearly' perceived. The passage is given a fullness of meaning which was before notably lacking. Once again in K. Δ. xxiv the secondary sense is, though not perhaps so clearly, included. The *ἀπορούμενον* of scientific inquiry is, like the distant view, a *προσμένον*: as opposed to it is the 'near view', *τὸ παρὸν ἥδη κατὰ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας*. If these be not kept distinct, science, like everyday life, will be confounded with groundless opinion.

I do not of course wish to substitute this new conception of the *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* for that of Tohte, but to add it to it: 'mental apprehension' is of course concerned with the subtle images, but also with the concepts of science. If we now turn back to Giussani's summary, and exclude the rash generalization of the final clause, we shall see that it precisely represents the conclusion we have reached, only that we now know the reason for the inclusion of all its parts. 'The *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* comprehends both what Tohte supposes (for there it is the immediate apprehension of an image perceptible only by the mind), but not that alone, and *πρόληψις*, as Brieger wishes (for the act of *πρόληψις* is again an immediate apprehension by the mind of an image that can exist only in the mind and is itself a criterion of truth), and (what Giussani wishes, but does not clearly express or explain) scientific concepts (for in their case *ἐπιβολή* is the act of apprehension in the nearer view of clear and self-evident concepts).' But *ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας* is not 'mental apprehension in general', for that would include also the operations of *δόξα*, which are liable to error. The result then of this long investigation is to confirm what

I believe Giussani really meant, only I hope that the process of investigation has put his theory on a firmer basis: for parts of my argument I cannot, I fear, claim complete ἐπιμαρτύρησις in the authorities, but I fully believe there is no ἀντιμαρτύρησις; and as I may certainly claim that the whole subject is ἀδῆλον, that is as much as can be demanded.

There remain over certain additional problems which are closely connected with the main question.

1. It is not difficult now to see that ἐπιβολαί in § 36 is used in a technical sense, but also in the widest possible meaning, including all ἐπιβολαί both of the αἰσθητήρια and of the διάνοια. 'The most essential thing', for a scientific inquirer, 'is to be able to conduct acutely his acts of observation or apprehension, both with the senses and in the mind.' Similarly we can now say that the passage from Aetius quoted on p. 261 is technical, and concerns ἐπιβολαί both of the senses and of the mind.

2. It will be noticed that in some of the extracts¹ there is prefixed to ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας the epithet φανταστική. The question has often been raised whether the φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας differs from any other form of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, and if so, what the difference is. Both Tohte and Giussani, though for different reasons, deny the difference, Tohte because it is obvious that the only ἐπιβολή he conceives—the direct apprehension of the subtle images—is always necessarily φανταστική, Giussani because, since all thought is conducted by visual images, it is impossible to imagine an ἐπιβολή (or even a δόξα) which is not φανταστική. I should be inclined to agree in denying the difference, of course for Giussani's reason, but I also think that in the passages where the epithet is used, Epicurus is thinking primarily of the ἐπιβολή of the subtle φαντασία of the gods, &c., and not of that of scientific concepts, for it is more obviously and immediately φανταστική.

3. A more difficult and important problem is the question why 'the Epicureans'² made the φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας a criterion of truth, with its almost equally difficult corollary, why Epicurus, after his constant coupling of it with the other criteria, did not. I hope that the previous discussion has thrown some light on this point. In justice to 'the Epicureans' we must in the first place notice how exceedingly close Epicurus himself comes to calling it a criterion. In E. § 62 he affirms that the conclusions reached (or, as we should rather say, the images grasped) by ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας are always true: in B. § 50 he states similarly that the image of the form of a concrete object apprehended by ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας is in fact its form: in A. § 38 he speaks of the ἐπιβολαί 'of the mind or of any of the κριτήρια' (used here, as we have seen, in an active sense, of the senses which make the ἐπιβολαί, = αἰσθητήρια), and in C. § 51 even

¹ §§ 31, 57 *fin.*, K. A. xxiv.

² D. L. x. 31.

more explicitly of 'the ἐπιβολαί of the mind or of the rest of the κριτήρια': finally in Κύρια Δόξα xxiv the φανταστική ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας is ranked alongside with αἴσθησις and the πάθη. The cumulative impression of these passages is certainly that of a tacit acceptance of ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας as a κριτήριον, and one feels that 'the Epicureans' had but a very small step to take. Yet Epicurus never in so many words states that the ἐπιβολή is a κριτήριον of truth and his authoritative list of the κριτήρια does not contain it. Can we explain his reluctance to make this identification as contrasted with the Epicureans' apparent insistence upon it? I think I can give an answer. Epicurus did not include the ἐπιβολή¹ mainly, I believe, for two closely allied reasons: (1) that he felt uneasy about the 'truth' of certain of the images directly apprehended by the mind, about the visions, that is, of delirium, the σνστάσεις and some of the images of sleep; (2) that in spite of all his insistence on the truth of αἴσθησις, he felt similarly uneasy about the passive sensation, and in particular about the 'distant view'. In other words, to put these two difficulties together, Epicurus did not wish to raise in any form the question of 'truth' involved in the relation of the image, the 'idol' and the real object, for any such 'stirring of the mind' might have imperilled his whole system. There are plenty of similar indications of the same hesitation at different points in his psychology. On the other hand, where their Master feared to tread, the Epicureans rushed in and included the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας² in the criteria. Their reasons were, I believe, somewhat as follows: (1) They strongly maintained the truth of the 'image' on the ground of its correspondence to the 'idols': it was then necessary to admit that the 'idol' of the 'distant view' (e.g. the small round tower) was untrue as a representation of the concrete object: ἐπιμαρτύρησις and the 'near view' obtained by ἐπιβολή is then the only method of securing full truth, i.e. complete correspondence of object, 'idol' and image. (2) Similarly in the region of thought the only method of distinguishing the certain concepts of science from the false hypotheses of δόξα, was by insistence on the truth of ideas obtained by ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας. (3) They were anxious (as Tohte has suggested) to maintain the certainty of the knowledge of the gods as obtained by the immediate mental apprehension of their images. The Epicureans had already been denounced on the ground of atheism, and it was necessary to rebut the charge.

4. In conclusion we must consider certain expressions in Latin

¹ Notice that all the passages in the Letter to Herodotus give us just as much justification for the inclusion of the ἐπιβολή of the senses as a criterion, as they do for that of the ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας: the passage in the Κύρια Δόξα alone places the φανταστική ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας on a different footing.

² It seems odd at first sight that they did not also put in ἐπιβολή τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, but the reason clearly is that it was already included under αἴσθησις, whereas in Epicurus' list there was no mental κριτήριον at all, under which ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας might be subsumed.

authors, which appear to have a connexion with the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας. In one passage of Cicero and two (possibly three) in Lucretius such an echo seems clear: we must ask whether it is the result of mere coincidence or of translation, and if the latter, what is the exact relation of the Latin passages to Epicurus' theory.

(a) Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 54 'si immensam et interminatam in omnis partis magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam *se inciens animus et intendens* ita late longeque peregrinatur, ut nullam tamen oram ultimam videat, in qua possit insistere'. The mind is here 'projecting and straining itself towards (or into)' the infinity of space.

(b) Lucr. ii. 1044-1047:

quaerit enim rationem animus, cum summa loci sit
infinita foris haec extra moenia mundi,
quid sit ibi porro quo prospicere usque velit mens
atque *animi iactus liber* quo pervolet ipse.

The mind is here similarly 'projecting itself freely' into infinite space to ask what there is outside our world.

(c) Lucr. ii. 739-744. The poet has stated that the atoms are colourless, and wishes to forestall the objection that we can have no mental pictures which can give us knowledge of such atoms:

in quae corpora si nullus tibi forte videtur
posse *animi iniectus* fieri, procul avius erras.

scire licet nostrae quoque menti corpora posse
verti in notitiam nullo circumlita fucō.

We can 'project our mind' to bodies without colour: they can form a concept in our mind.

(d) Lucr. ii. 1080 would, if Winckelmann's conjecture

in primis animalibus inice mentem

be right, offer us another example of the similar idea, 'turn your attention to the animals', but (a) *in* with the ablative *animalibus* as compared with *in* with the accusative in the other passages is not satisfactory, or indeed natural, (b) I doubt if the sense is right, as we may see subsequently. The MS. text *indice mente* should probably be kept.

(e) To these passages we must add, though the expression is different, another already quoted in connexion with the ἐπιβολή (iv. 802-817), and note especially:

et quia tenvia sunt, *nisi quae contendit*,¹ acute
cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt
praeterea pereunt, *nisi si ad quae se ipse paravit*. (802-804)

¹ Compare Cicero's 'animus . . . se *intendens*' in (a) above.

and

et tamen in rebus quoque apertis noscere possis,
si non advertas animum, proinde esse quasi omni
 tempore semotum fuerit longeque remotum.

(811-813)

It is clear in the first place that none of these passages (except the last, which has no phrase which can be a direct translation of *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας*) is concerned with the direct mental apprehension of subtle images. Tohte¹ therefore, who restricts *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας* to this sense, though he admits that the Latin *animi iniectus*, &c., is a translation of Epicurus' term, yet concludes that 'Lucretius and Cicero have used these expressions in another sense from that in which Epicurus used the corresponding Greek'. But Giussani² has rightly insisted that the very oddness of the Latin phrases, the coincidence between the expressions of Cicero and Lucretius, and the occurrence of Cicero's term in a passage where he is obviously following his Epicurean text carefully, will make it certain that the Latin expressions were an intentional and careful translation of Epicurus' technical term. Giussani, who of course approached the whole problem from the point of view of Lucretius, was in fact largely influenced by the apparent width of ideas embraced in these Latin passages to conclude that *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας* is a wide term for 'mental representation in general'. As we have seen, that contention will not hold and must be limited. Is there anything in these Latin passages which is inconsistent with our general conclusion about the *ἐπιβολή*?

In (a) and (b) the idea is the same, the 'projection of the mind' into the infinity of space: here we have exactly the notion of the *ἐπιβολή*, as we have explained it: it is the mental examination of a scientific concept. The Epicurean parallel is E. § 62. In (c) we have a particularly interesting instance of the same idea: we can have an *ἐπιβολή* of the colourless atoms, for again it is an image based on *πρόληψις* (*notitiam*, ii. 745, is always Lucretius' technical translation of *πρόληψις*). In (d) I think Winckelmann's emendation cannot be right, for we should not have an *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας* of 'animals' either as a direct mental apprehension of a subtle image, or as a scientific concept (though we might of course have an ordinary *πρόληψις* of 'animal'). Lucretius would more naturally have said simply, 'look at animals', as he practically does in ii. 342 ff. If *inice mentem* is right, it is a loose use of the phrase. Finally, in (e) we have an instance without a technical term of the general idea of the *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας* in the primary sense of the apprehension of subtle (*lenvia*) images.

It may fairly be said then that the Latin passages, so far from creating any difficulty or being in any way inconsistent with Epicurus' phraseology, strongly confirm the general view we have taken, and especially the second sense of *ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας* as the apprehension of a scientifically verified concept.

¹ p. 24.

² p. 171.

LETTER TO PYTHOCLES

THE authenticity of the Epistle to Pythocles appears to have been a matter of doubt even in antiquity, as we learn from a note¹ of Philodemus, the Epicurean, found among the rolls of Herculaneum. The work itself, as Usener has clearly shown,² strongly confirms this suspicion. The sections dealing with different topics are not united, as are those in the other epistles, by any link of thought or even by the familiar introductory phrases *καὶ μὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴν καί, &c.*: their order is unsystematic, and the stars are dealt with twice in §§ 90-98 and §§ 111-115, the latter passage being added as an afterthought. We may add that the style is neither the highly technical and crabbed writing of the first letter, nor the polished and more elaborate diction of the third, but a slipshod composition suggestive of abridgement. It might perhaps be answered to Usener's objections that the subjects with which the letter deals do not admit of much co-ordination, and are always put together in Epicurean documents in a rather haphazard manner, as in the sixth book of Lucretius: the double treatment of the stars, too, is not a greater dislocation than we find in the text of the first letter, as we now have it. But in fact the letter throughout bears the clearest marks of being an abridged compilation from some larger work, the gist of Epicurus' teaching being put down rather hastily into a small compass. Yet, as Usener has himself shown, this very fact allows us to place complete confidence in the authority, if not the authenticity, of the letter: we may be confident that, with the exception of the introduction, we have the exact teaching and in many cases probably the exact words of the Master himself. The letter is not of such great interest as the other two, either in the subjects treated or the manner of treatment, but it helps greatly, when compared with the sixth book of Lucretius, to fill in the details of the Epicurean system.

Pythocles, to whom the letter is addressed, was a young disciple of great beauty, of whom Epicurus was very fond. He thought him, we are told,³ a sort of Alcibiades, and a fragment of a letter addressed to him speaks of Epicurus waiting for 'the coming of his lovely and godlike presence'.⁴ In another place⁵ we find

¹ Voll. Hercul. coll. alt., l. i, f. 152 *ὑποψ[ία]ν τιν[ὰ] λαμβάν[ει]ν, ὡς περὶ τινῶν ἐπιστολ[ῶν] καὶ τῆς [πρὸς Πυθ]οκλέα [π]ε[ρὶ] [μ]ε[γ]άλων ἐπιτομῆς.*

² pp. xxxvii-xli.

³ Alciphro, Ep. ii. 3 *Ἀλκιβιάδην τινὰ Πυθοκλέα νομίζει.*

⁴ Fr. 34 *καθεδούμαι προσδοκῶν τὴν ἡμερτὴν καὶ ἰσθῆνός σου εἰσοδόν.*

⁵ Fr. 33 *παιδεῖαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε τὰκάτιον ἀράμενος.*

Epicurus adjuring him to 'unmoor his bark and flee from all culture', in the idea doubtless that he should give himself up to the study of Epicurean philosophy. A letter to Idomeneus¹ addresses him apparently as a sort of guardian of Pythocles, and suggests that his conduct needed control. It was then natural that he should be selected by the compiler as the recipient of this letter.

INTRODUCTION (§§ 84-88).

The introduction is, no doubt, the work of the compiler, and is closely modelled in thought and diction on the introductions to the other letters, but by an occasional strange word or phrase seems to show that it is not by Epicurus himself. §§ 84, 85 are the usual epistolary opening, the request from Pythocles for a treatment of τὰ μετέωρα and Epicurus' consent, together with the hope that it will be of value to other disciples as well: all this might be suggested by the opening of the letter to Herodotus.

§ 84. 1. Κλέων is otherwise unknown, and is possibly a quite imaginary person.

2. διετέλεις . . . ἐπειρῶ: of course epistolary imperfects.

3. εἰς μακάριον βίον, 'to a life of happiness', which results from the knowledge of, and obedience to, the Epicurean philosophy: cf. τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν, Ep. iii, § 128, &c.

4. διαλογισμῶν: cf. διαλογισμόν and διαλογίσματα below, but otherwise not an Epicurean word, and suggestive rather of other schools of philosophy in which discussion and dialectic played a larger part.

5. περὶ τῶν μετᾶρων 'the phenomena of the sky': a regular term in Epicurus of wide connotation, including not merely what we should now call meteorology, but astronomy and, indeed, all the phenomena of the sky, and certain subterranean phenomena as well: cf. e.g. K. Δ. x, xi.

εὐπερίγραφον, 'easy to be drawn in outline' or 'sketched'. Again otherwise unknown in Epicurus.

8. βαστάξεις: the MSS. have βαστάζειν, which would, of course, continue the construction of εἶναι, but is made impossible by the parenthetical ὡς ἔφης. The choice lies between Casaubon's βαστάξεις and Usener's βαστάζοντι, and in spite of the prevalence of epistolary imperfects, the simpler emendation is the better; it is adopted by Bignone and von der Muehll. The literal meaning 'you have in your hands', for purposes of study, is more probable than the derivative 'you carry in your mind', which would hardly be possible without some addition. Crönert proposes the more violent change to κἀδύνατον . . . βαστάζειν.

9. συνεχέσθην: i.e. 'I am constrained' by the great hopes I have of your future to accede to your request.

¹ Fr. 28 εἰ βούλει πλούσιον Πυθοκλέα ποιῆσαι, μὴ χρημάτων προστίθει, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφαίρει.

§ 85. 1. τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, 'all my other writings', a slightly odd expression, which would not however be improved by Usener's suggestion τὰ λείποντα.

4. φυσιολογίας: Epicurus' regular technical term for the knowledge of nature and natural laws: cf. Ep. i, § 37, l. 2; K. Δ. xi.

γνήσιον, 'genuine', i.e. the Epicurean science as opposed to any other.

τοῖς εἰς ἀσχολίας... ἐμπλεγεμένοις, 'for those involved too deeply (sc. to have time for full philosophical study) in one of the routine occupations'. For ἐγκύκλια in this sense cf. Fr. lviii τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικά δεσμωτηρίου.

6. περιόδευε, 'go through from point to point'. A good Epicurean word: cf. Ep. i, § 36, l. 10 τῆς συνεχούς τῶν ὅλων περιοδείας.

7. ἐν τῇ μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον ἀπεστείλαμεν: an attempt to link on this letter with the first that suggests doubts as to its genuineness. It is interesting to find that as early as the composition of this letter—in the first or second generation of Epicurus' pupils—the letter to Herodotus was known as the μικρὰ ἐπιτομή in distinction to the μεγάλη ἐπιτομή, which was probably a more complete but less elaborate exposition of the whole system, intended for novices. Bignone notes, however, that in the *Vita Epicuri*, § 135, a passage is quoted as from the μικρὰ ἐπιτομή which does not occur in the letter to Herodotus: this throws some doubt on the identification. It was the μεγάλη ἐπιτομή in all probability which was used by Lucretius: see Giussani, vol. i, p. 10.

§§ 85-87 are concerned with the purpose of this investigation of the phenomena of the sky and the principles of its conduct. The sections are entirely based on two main ideas and their interconnexion, and are modelled both in diction and subject on §§ 78-80 of the letter to Herodotus. (1) The purpose of this branch of inquiry, as of all others in the Epicurean philosophy, is to prepare the way for the tranquil life: so long as we have any disquieting suspicion that the movements of the stars or phases of the weather are due to divine action and portend or express the attitude of divine beings to men, we cannot live undisturbed: we must learn that they are all caused by the action of natural law. (2) In the method of inquiry we shall find a difference from the procedure employed in ethics and in the explanation of earthly phenomena. In both those spheres it is possible to trace any given effect to its one single cause, but in dealing with τὰ μετέωρα we shall often have to suggest several causes for the same phenomenon—and this for two reasons: firstly, that in these greater phenomena of nature there often is more than one cause which can produce the same effect; secondly, that, as we are not able to observe them as closely as earthly phenomena, we cannot be sure of the exact cause in any given case. We must then be ready to accept any probable explanation, provided it does not conflict with the data of sense-perception. But this plurality of causes need not cause us any

disturbance—and here the two ideas draw together—for it is not due to any arbitrariness or uncertainty in the sequence of occurrences, or to any breach in the laws of nature, but merely to the natural difference of the phenomena themselves and our relation to them. These two notions are repeated *ad nauseam* throughout the letter.

At the end of § 87 Epicurus proceeds more closely to the question of method, and says that we must use the analogy of earthly phenomena to explain the heavenly, but never in doing so lose sight of the exact sense-impression which the phenomena in question makes upon us.

9. μή . . . νομίζειν: this direct general prohibition with μή and the infinitive is not characteristic of Epicurus' own style: he would usually say οὐ δὲ νομίζειν or οὐ νομιστέον. For this reason Kochalsky proposed to alter ἐκ, which Usener regards as *suspectum*, to εἰκός. But μή (not οὐ) makes this impossible, and also invalidates Bignone's explanation that we should understand δὲ or δυνατόν or ἐνδέχεται.

10. κατὰ συναφήν, 'in connexion' with the other doctrines of the system, physical or moral: see below for the distinction which Epicurus makes. For the expression cf. § 88, l. 2 τὰ συναπτόμενα τούτω.

αὐτοτελῶς, 'independently', as a department by themselves. For the general idea of the ultimate moral purpose of all physical investigation cf. Ep. i, § 82, l. 1 ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι κτλ. and K. Δ. xi. Bignone notes the supremacy of the moral interest in philosophy after the time of Aristotle.

§ 88. 1. μήτε: notice the very slight connexion. As Usener remarks, Epicurus himself would have written ἔπειτα μήτε. Kochalsky would transfer καὶ from after ἀδύνατον before μήτε.

τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι, 'to try actually to force that which is impossible', i.e. to force on phenomena an explanation derived from prejudice, but inconsistent with the evidence of the senses. An expression quite in Epicurus' manner, the sense of which is resumed in ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας below, l. 9.

καὶ is a little forced, and is omitted in several of the MSS. Crönert would expunge it, and Bignone thinks that it attached a second adjective which has fallen out, and would read καὶ (ἄπρακτον), 'and would not lead to practical results'. I think καὶ may be retained as emphasizing παραβιάζεσθαι.

2. τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις, 'the theories on various types of lives', i.e. on ethics. The expression is odd, but doubtless intended as a link with Epicurus' treatise, Περὶ βίων (cf. D.L. x. 27. 30): this again seems to point to a compiler.

3. τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων: i.e. the problems of earthly phenomena and the problems of the ἀδηλα concerning the ultimate composition of the universe, in both of which there is only one right explanation.

3. *κἀθαρσιν*, 'explanation', 'clearing up', a very unusual use, but paralleled just below, § 87. 4, by *ἐκκαθαρομένων*.

4. *ὅτι τὸ πᾶν* . . . : a quotation from Ep. i, § 39, l. 7.

σώματα: the MSS. have *σῶμα*, and the passage in Ep. i is not decisive owing to a lacuna, but Epicurus elsewhere always uses *σώματα* in the plural. The atomic theory does not conceive of matter as one body, but an infinite number of bodies. We should, therefore, accept Usener's correction.

ἀναφῆς φύσις: sc. the void. Cf. Ep. i, § 40, l. 2, and note there.

ὅτι ἄτομα (τὰ) στοιχεῖα: cf. Ep. i, § 41, l. 1. Usener's insertion of the article is necessary.

5. *τὰ τοιαῦτα δὴ ὅσα* is Bignone's correction for the MS. *τὰ τοιαῦτα ἣ ὅσα*: this seems better than Usener's omission of *ἣ*, which it is hard to account for.

ὅσα μοναχὴν ἔχει . . . , 'all things that have only one method of harmony with phenomena', i.e. can only be explained in one way which is consistent with the evidence of the senses.

7. *πλεοναχὴν ἔχει καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν*: not 'have a complex cause of birth', but 'several possible causes of birth'; see introductory note above, and compare Ep. i, § 80, l. 10 *πλεοναχῶς γίνεται*.

8. *τῆς οὐσίας* . . . *κατηγορίαν*, 'an account of its existence'. *κατηγορία* is again not a normal word in Epicurus, though he uses the verb.

9. *ἀξιώματα κενά*, 'propositions assumed without ground', i.e. *a priori* statements not founded on the evidence of the senses: so *κενός* always in Epicurus; e.g. *κενῆς δόξης*, § 87, l. 2, below, and K. Δ. xv, xxix.

νομοθεσίας: similarly the 'laying down of principles' before inquiry. § 87. 1. *ἤδη ἀλογίας* has the best MS. authority, but B and other MSS. read *ἰδιαλογίας*, which may conceal *ἰδιολογίας* in the sense of 'personal prejudice', which would not be unlike Epicurean language. With the text as it stands *ἤδη* means 'now that we have learnt the right method'.

2. *τοῦ ἀθορύβως* . . . *ζῆν* is of course the Epicurean ideal of life. So in the corresponding passage, Ep. i, § 80 *ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἀταρακτῆσθμεν*.

3. *πάντα* . . . *γίνεται ἀσειστός* corresponds to *τὸ ἀθορύβως* . . . *ζῆν*: the ideal is fulfilled, and all life runs without disturbance.

κατὰ πάντων (τῶν) . . . *ἐκκαθαρομένων*: with some hesitation I have adopted the emendation of Bignone, 'all goes without disturbance in regard to all of the phenomena explained in several ways in harmony with our experience, when one admits convincing explanations of them': i.e. if you once accept the principle that all convincing explanations must be admitted, then you can have the same *ἀταραξία* with regard to the celestial phenomena as you can have in morals and earthly phenomena. HP^Q have *πᾶν τῶν* and the other MSS. have *κατὰ πάντων* without the article, which will not stand. Bignone's reading involves an unusual meaning of *κατά* with the genitive, but

is better than the alternative *κατὰ πᾶν τῶν*. Usener alters *κατά* to *καί*, 'even when all things are explained in several ways', but that is against Epicurus' teaching, for he only admits such plural explanations in regard to celestial phenomena. Crönert would omit *κατά*, making the construction an awkward genitive absolute.

6. *καταλίπη*, 'leaves undisturbed', does not try to get rid of it: so *ἀπολίπη* in the next clause as opposed to *ἐκβάλη*.

8. *ἐπὶ . . . τὸν μῦθον*, 'to superstition', for the characteristic of the religious explanation of phenomena is that it asserts one theory to the exclusion of all others, and claims certainty where it cannot be attained by reason.

σημεῖα, 'indications': earthly phenomena cannot give us certain explanations of heavenly phenomena, but they can afford hints and analogies, which we can follow up.

9. *δ' ἐπὶ*: Usener's text, which, on the whole, seems the best solution. The MSS. are divided between *δέ τι*, from which Usener's conjecture is derived, and *δέ τινα*, which would just construe, though the repetition of *τινα* just below would be very awkward. Bignone conjectures *δὲ πῖ(θα)νά*, carrying on the idea of *τὸ πιθανολογούμενον* in l. 5, but this is going very far away from the text.

10. *ἦ*: a brilliant correction of Woltjer's for the meaningless *ἡ* of the MSS.

καὶ οὐ τὰ . . . φαινόμενα: almost concessive in effect, 'though we cannot observe celestial phenomena'. The clause would certainly be made easier by Crönert's *οὐχ ὥς* (based on F's *οὕτως*), but the change is not necessary.

§ 88. 1. *τὸ . . . φάντασμα*: the actual appearance of the phenomena in sense-perception.

ἐκάστου: there seems no reason for accepting the conjecture in Usener's note *ἐκαστον*, which is derived from the *ἐκάστων* of Froben's edition.

τηρητέον, 'must be kept to', a favourite word of Epicurus' in this sense: cf. Ep. i, § 38, l. 4 *κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν*. A good instance of this principle is Epicurus' theory that sun and moon are actually the size we see them; *αἰσθησις* here gives us information and we must not try to get behind it.

καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συναπτόμενα . . . πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι: lit. 'and as regards what is associated with the actual appearance we must distinguish those things of which there is no evidence in our experience against several causes'. *τὰ συναπτόμενα* are the opinions (*προσδοξαζόμενα*) which we associate with the actual perception of sensation. In dealing with celestial phenomena we must distinguish those opinions, which may all simultaneously be true, from those which are certainly true or certainly false. This is Bignone's explanation of the passage, and I have little doubt that it is right. Usener reads *ἐν* for *ἐπὶ* and puts a comma at *διαιρετέον*, 'we must distinguish from the actual appearance that which is associated with it, and of which there is no

evidence against several causes'. But this is not so satisfactory, since among the *συναπτόμενα* of an appearance there may be some where there is no question of several opinions.

2. *ἡ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται*: another technical expression of Epicurus': we must bring our several explanations to the test of our experience and reject any which are refuted by it: there may still be several left uncontradicted.

I. WORLDS.

The compiler of the letter plunges at once into the physical theory of Epicurus, and deals first with the nature and formation of worlds. As he is obviously putting together his account from different sources (sometimes apparently from the letter to Herodotus), the result is a little disjointed and here and there obscure. But we are not justified in rejecting as glosses statements, for which there is good evidence elsewhere, on the ground that they do not fit in very well with the context (see notes on lines 5 and 6). A world is first defined as a circumscribed portion of sky: then its boundaries and shape are discussed. We are next told that there are infinite worlds, and their creation and growth are described with comments on certain false theories. All these are well-known Epicurean topics, and the details will be better discussed in the individual notes. §§ 45, 73, and 74 of the letter to Herodotus should be compared together with Lucr. ii. 1048-1117 and v. 416-508, 534-563.

4. *κόσμος*. Epicurus' conception of a 'world', like that of all ancient philosophers, was of a system in which the earth was the centre, and around it moved in orbits ever more distant, moon, sun, planets, and stars, the circumference of heaven forming the outer boundary. He differed from most of his predecessors in conceiving that there was an infinite number of such *κόσμοι* besides our own.

περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ: i.e. a certain portion of sky circumscribed by a boundary (*πέρας*).

ἄστρο: including sun and moon as well as stars: cf. § 90, l. 6 *ἡλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρο*. Lucretius similarly uses *astra* in an inclusive sense, v. 509.

γῆν, 'an earth', a body-like our earth to be the centre of the system.

5. *πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα*: both astronomical and meteorological; in fact, those with which he deals in the rest of this letter.

5, 6. From this point the rest of the sentence is very confused in the MSS.: it runs *ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ καὶ οὐ λυομένον πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σύγχυσιν λήψεται καὶ λήγουσα ἢ ἐν περιγεγραμμένῳ . . . περιγραφῆν*. It is, I think, clear that this has been put together from various sources, but we are not justified in assuming with Usener (who expunges *καὶ καταλήγουσα . . . ἢ πυκνῷ* and *καὶ οὐ λυομένον . . . λήψεται* as two separate glosses) that the composition was affected by any one other than the original compiler of the letter. It is surely more reasonable to suppose some

dislocation. οὗ λυομένου . . . λήψεται is clearly part of the definition and should come first: then follow certain descriptive participial clauses, (1) of its nature ἀποτομήν . . . ἀπείρου, (2) of its boundary καὶ καταλήγουσα . . . στάσιν ἔχοντι, (3) of its shape καὶ στρογγύλην . . . περιγραφὴν. καὶ λήγουσα then, which occurs in the MSS. after λήψεται, should be omitted as a mere repetition of καὶ καταλήγουσα above caused by the misplacement of the clause οὗ λυομένου . . . λήψεται, and a participle (ἔχουσα) must be supplied with the last clause. We thus obtain a consistent and reasonable statement, and are not excluding phrases which add much force to the description. Bignone follows Usener in excluding the two clauses, but notes that they hang closely together: it is because the worlds have a definite boundary that their dissolution implies the destruction of all within them.

5. οὗ λυομένου . . . λήψεται: i.e. the περιοχὴ is not any casual piece of sky 'cut off', but an organized whole, the dissolution of which implies disturbance in all its parts. The masculine οὗ goes back, slightly irregularly, to κόσμος in spite of the intervening περιοχὴ.

6. ἀποτομήν ἔχουσα . . . : i.e. it is a portion cut off from the infinite universe. This idea had been already stated by Leucippus: D. L. ix. 31 γίνεσθαι δὲ τοὺς κόσμους οὕτω φέρεσθαι κατ' ἀποτομήν ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου (sc. φύσεως) πολλὰ σώματα, παντοῖα τοῖς σχήμασιν εἰς μέγα κενόν. For ἀποτομήν ἔχουσα equivalent practically to ἀποτμηθεῖσα cf. στάσιν ἔχοντι, l. 8.

7. καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι: i.e. a world has a quite definite boundary: cf. Ep. i, § 73, l. 7 τοὺς κόσμους . . . καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην.

ἡ ἀραιὴ ἢ πυκνὴ: this boundary may in its composition be either dense or rare: that of our world, the 'flammantia moenia mundi' (Lucr. i. 73), is rare: cf. Aetius ii. 7. 3, p. 336 d (Usener, fr. 303) Ἐπικούρου ἐνίων μὲν κόσμων ἀραιὴν τὸ πέρασ, ἐνίων δὲ πυκνόν, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν τινα κινούμενα τὰ δ' ἀκίνητα.

ἡ ἐν περιανομένῳ ἢ ἐν στάσιν ἔχοντι: the outer circumference may either move round, as most probably, according to Epicurus, does that of our world (§ 92), or be stationary: cf. the passage from Aetius just quoted. Gassendi corrected the MS. error ἐνστάσιν to ἐν στάσιν.

8. καὶ στρογγύλην . . . περιγραφὴν: for this possibility of variation in the shape of worlds cf. Ep. i, § 74, l. 1 ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὕτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ νομίζειν ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας . . . : and the scholion on that passage, οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ῥοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἀλλοιοσχήμονας ἑτέροους. Bignone notes that the Pythagoreans conceived of a triangular world and Empedocles of an egg-shaped world.

9. (ἔχουσα): the only alternative to inserting a participle here seems to be to read κατὰ στρογγύλην for καὶ στρογγύλην as does the Tauchnitz text. But though the confusion of καί and κατὰ is very frequent in these MSS., the sense is unnatural, and the sentence becomes still more incoherent. Usener and Bignone follow the MSS. with no alteration,

constructing *περιγραφὴν* presumably after *ἔχοντι*, but this is very awkward and hardly sense: a *πέρας* cannot have a *περιγραφὴ*.

πανταχῶς: including, I think, all the previously mentioned alternatives, the density or rareness and movement or stationary character of eth *πέρας*, as well as the varieties of shape. The variant *πανταχοῦ* is a mere error.

10. *τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων* . . . : an application of the principle above, l. 2 *ἃ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν φαινομένοις πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι*. Though our world has a *πέρας* which is *ἀραιόν* and *περιαγόμενον*, and is in shape *σφαιροειδής*, there is no evidence that there are not elsewhere worlds in which these details differ.

(ἐν) *τῷδε*: a necessary correction of Usener's for the MS. *τῷδε*.

11. *λήγον οὐκ ἔστι καταλαβεῖν*: we cannot advance to the end of the world and ourselves perceive its nature: *καταλαβεῖν* here of sense-perception.

§ 89. 2. *εἰσὶν ἄπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος*: so Ep. i, § 45, l. 3 *ἀλλὰ μὲν κ' ἱ κόσμοι ἄπειροὶ εἰσὶν*, which may be the source on which the compiler draws: but the idea is an Epicurean commonplace: cf. Lucr. ii. 1048-1089.

καταλαβεῖν: here of mental perception: we can quite well picture it in our mind, and, as Lucretius shows (loc. cit.), can adduce many reasons to prove it must be so.

3. *ἐν κόσμῳ*: a curious idea, which I do not know elsewhere: a new world might form itself within an existing world, presumably as the old world dissolved.

4. καὶ (ἐν): the addition seems necessary, and Usener had already suggested *κάν* in his notes.

μετακοσμίῳ: a famous technical word of Epicurus'. There being in the universe all these *κόσμοι* of various shapes, there must be intervals between them, in which new worlds might be formed. It was in the *μετακόσμος* that Epicurus placed the abodes of the gods: Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* i. 8. 18, translates the word by *intermundia*.

ἐν πολυκένῳ τόπῳ: it would be a place in which there was much void, but not entire void, for there is no large space of that character in the universe: Leucippus then (*τινές*) was wrong in believing it to be a 'great space of pure void': cf. *μέγα κενόν* in the passage quoted above on § 88, l. 6.

5. *ἐν μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ*, sc. *τόπῳ*. There is no need with Zeller to write *ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ εἰλικρινεῖ κενῷ*. Bignone notes the difficulties which arose because the atomists did not sufficiently distinguish between space = extension and empty space. The phrase *μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ* is an attempt to express the latter, like Lucretius' 'locus intactus, inane, vacansque', i. 334.

6. *τινές*: Casaubon's correction for *τινα*, an obvious error.

ἀπικτηδείων τινῶν . . . The Epicurean theory of the formation of a world: many conditions are requisite besides the mere aggregation of atoms in a void: (α) they must be atoms of the right kind to form

combinations, &c.; (δ) they must be capable of uniting (*προσθέσεις*) and forming organized bodies (*διαρθρώσεις*) and causing changes of position; (ε) they must be able to supply the right material to the right places.

8. *προσθέσεις*: the juxtapositions of matter which are creative of things.

διαρθρώσεις, 'articulations', i.e. they must be able to form bodies which are organized: Bignone takes it to mean more definitely 'connexions', but it implies the notion of separation as well as that of union.

μεταστάσεις: the moving of portions of matter to their appropriate places, e.g. of the fiery materials to the sky, where they can form the heavenly bodies and ether.

9. *ἐπαρδεύσεις*, 'irrigations', not merely of liquid material, but of the constant supply of appropriate material to the appropriate quarter. The whole description should be compared with *Lucr. v. 449-494*, and especially with *ii. 1112-1119*, where the diction is very like that here:

nam sua cuique locis ex omnibus omnia plagis
corpora distribuuntur et ad sua saecula recedunt,
umor ad umorem, terreno corpore terra
crescit et ignem ignes procidunt aetheraque aether,
donec ad extremum crescendi perfica finem
omnia perduxit rerum natura creatrix;
ut fit ubi nilo iam plus est quod datur intra
vitalis venas quam quod fluit atque recedit.

10. ὥς τελειώσεως, 'until the period of completion'. Epicurus held that with worlds so with bodies there was a process of gradual growth, new material being always absorbed, until a limit of completion was reached, and from that time began the process of decay, in which more was given off than taken in: cf. *Lucr. ii. 1105-1174*.

καὶ διαμονῆς, 'and stability': Epicurus recognized such a period between those of growth and decay. It is unnecessary to follow Usener in altering to *διαμονήν* (*sc. ποιούντων*), which is very awkward in construction.

11. τὰ ὑποβληθέντα θεμέλια: the atomic foundations on which the world is built: i.e. the original nuclei which uniting in their turn formed 'things'.

τὴν προσδοχὴν δύναται ποιεῖσθαι: i.e. as long as they are capable of assimilating new material. See *Lucr. ii. loc. cit.*, and particularly *1122-1130*.

§ 90. 1. οὐ γὰρ ἀθροισμὸν δεῖ μόνον: a mere aggregation of atoms in a void, such as Leucippus had supposed, is not sufficient to make a world: the atoms must have these other characteristics, which will produce the proper unions, and enable the process of assimilation to take place.

οὐδὲ δῖνον: he passes from Leucippus to Democritus, τῶν φυσικῶν

καλουμένων τις, who thought that a world was produced mechanically by an atomic whirl, caused in its turn by his convenient 'maid-of-all-work' *ἀνάγκη*, acting thus in a purely arbitrary manner: Epicurus thus asserts his independence of both his predecessors in the atomic theory.

2. κατὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον, 'according to the mere fancy of the imagination'. Democritus' supposition of the whirl created by *ἀνάγκη* rests on no evidence of the senses, and it is directly opposed to *φαινόμενα* (see below): it was an *ἄξιωμα κενὸν καὶ νομοθεσία*. Epicurus had of course another quarrel with Democritus' notion of *ἀνάγκη* in the region of morals.

3. αὔξεσθαι τε: we must supply τὸν κόσμον. Democritus' notion apparently was that the whirl went on gradually increasing in size by the assimilation of external particles, until it grew so big as to come into collision with another world, and then followed destruction: cf. Hippol. 565. 13 a *φθείρεσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων προσπίπτοντας*.

τῶν φυσικῶν: said contemptuously. οἱ φυσικοί, for Epicurus, are the earlier cosmologists, whom he associates with the unbending application of *ἀνάγκη*, and therefore with determinism: cf. Ep. iii, § 134. 1 *ἐπεὶ κρείττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν*: but he is always thinking principally of Democritus.

4. τοῦτο γὰρ . . . τοῖς φαινομένοις: this might be very difficult to explain, if we had not got the illuminating passage at the end of Lucr. ii, for of course we have no sense-evidence of the creation and destruction of worlds. Epicurus clearly refers to the analogy of the growth of bodies, where we see the process of assimilation up to a point, after which decay sets in owing to the excess of matter lost over that taken in.

II. THE HEAVENLY BODIES.

The second main section of the letter, which extends to § 99, deals with the heavenly bodies as constituent parts of their respective worlds. A variety of points is dealt with in the order traditional in Epicurean works. The epitome is very brief, but can be supplemented from other Epicurean sources, and especially from the fifth book of Lucretius. The general ideas are founded on the notions of Epicurus' predecessors, and particularly of Democritus, but there are many characteristic additions and alterations. It is hardly necessary to add that the whole conception is geocentric.

(a) (b) § 90. 6-11 deal with the creation and constitution of the heavenly bodies. They were not independently formed and then included in a world, but were gradually fashioned inside the world, as appropriate bodies were linked on to them: these bodies were rare in texture, and of the nature of wind or fire. All these are doctrines of the Atomic School.

6. τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα : the sun and moon being themselves included as ἄστρα, as in § 88, l. 4, above.

(οὐ) is an old and necessary addition : the sentence must have been negative, as is shown by ἀλλ' (l. 7), and proved by our general knowledge of Epicurus' theories. Bignone has pointed out that there is no real contradiction between this passage and *De Placitis*, i. 4 (Usener, fr. 308), in which the air is said συμπεριλαμβάνειν τὰ ἄστρα in its rotation : this does not necessarily imply that they were originally outside the κόσμος.

καθ' ἑαυτά, 'independently', outside the κόσμος.

7. For the gloss after τοῦ κόσμου see note below.

8. εὐθὺς, 'from the start', i.e. from the origin of their own existence and that of the κόσμος : as soon as a world was formed, the heavenly bodies began to be created in it : cf. Lucr. v. 443-454.

προσκρίσεις : a technical term of Anaxagoras, here used exactly in his sense, and possibly with intentional reminiscence. From the original chaos bodies of like texture were separated out (κρίσις) and joined one another (πρός) : cf. Lucr. v. 443 sq.:

diffugere inde loci partes coepere paresque
cum paribus iungi res et discludere mundum
membraque dividere et magnas disponere partis.

9. δινήσεις, 'vortices', referring to the independent rotation of the revolving nuclei, and not to the δῶνος which causes the movement of the heavenly bodies through the sky.

λεπτομερῶν, 'of light parts' : the idea being that the lighter bodies were 'squeezed out' between the heavier, which formed the earth, and so lifted into the sky to form sun, moon, &c. : cf. Lucr. v. 453 :

expressere ea quae mare sidera solem
lunamque efficerent et magnis moenia mundi.

πνευματικῶν, 'of the nature of wind', and therefore volatile, and capable of rising and subsequently performing the revolution. Bignone translates 'gaseous', but that seems to introduce too modern an idea.

10. πυροειδῶν, 'of the nature of fire', and therefore capable of giving out heat and light.

ἡ αἴσθησις : perception cannot of course give us any information as to the creation of the heavenly bodies nor directly as to their composition : but it does show them to us moving through the sky and giving out light, and we must therefore infer their nature on the analogy of similar phenomena on earth.

In the course of the sentence at different places in different MSS., but in most after τοῦ κόσμου and αὔξῃσιν ἐλάμβανεν, are found the words καὶ ὅσα γε δὴ σώζει and ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γῇ καὶ θάλαττα. The variation of their position in the MSS. would alone justify us in

following Usener and excluding them as glosses, but the internal evidence is also strong. *καὶ ὅσα γε δὴ σώζει* was an ill-expressed note to include, e.g. comets, falling-stars, and other heavenly phenomena, which hardly come under the head of *τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρον*, but *σώζει* is a word Epicurus would not have used in this sense. Gassendi's proposal to attach the words to the other gloss, 'the earth and the sea and all that in them is', does not help, nor is it improved by Usener's suggestion *συζῆ*, and the Tauchnitz reading *ὅσα γε δὴ ζῶν* is very irrelevant. Bignone regards them as continuing the construction of *ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου*, 'by the world and those parts of it which serve as its defence', i.e. the *flammanitia moenia mundi*, but this seems very far-fetched. Similarly *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γῇ καὶ θάλασσα* was meant to note that earth and sea too were not an independent creation: this is of course quite good Epicurean doctrine, but it cannot have been in the text here, as sea and earth are certainly not composed of *λεπτομερεῖς φύσεις, ἤτοι πνευματικαὶ ἢ πυροειδεῖς*.

(c) § 91. The size of the heavenly bodies is in reality either the same or slightly larger or smaller than we see them. This is one of the most characteristic of Epicurus' doctrines both in its boldness and its childishness. It was of course based primarily on his complete trust in the evidence of sense-perception. We see sun, moon, and stars as of a certain size; we have no right to attempt to go behind the evidence of our senses: therefore they are that size. But he based it also on terrestrial analogies: in the case of earthly fires, we notice that we cease to feel their heat before they appear through distance to diminish in size (Lucr. v. 566-573): but we are very conscious of the sun's heat, therefore it has not diminished in apparent size. Again, the outline of a light becomes blurred before it decreases in size: but the moon's outline is not blurred: therefore it again has not diminished (Lucr. v. 579-584). This argument the compiler merely alludes to in l. 5, but it is clearer in the scholiast's reference to the eleventh book of the *Περὶ φύσεως*: see app. crit., 'if its size had been lost through the distance much more would its colour have been: for there is no distance better adapted for such loss than that of the sun', i.e. no earthly fire is ever so far away and therefore so likely to lose both in size and splendour.

1. (*καὶ σελήνης*): an almost certain addition of Usener's: 'Epicurus' would hardly have written *ἡλίου τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀστρον*: cf. § 90, l. 6, above.

2. *κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς . . . κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ' αὐτό*. At once an indication of the line of thought in Epicurus' remarkable decision, and an interesting illustration of the whole idea of *ἐπιμαρτύρησις* (see notes on Ep. i, §§ 50, 51, and K. Δ. xxiv). We see the sun a certain size: that is its size *πρὸς ἡμᾶς*: i.e. that is what the sun looks like at the distance we are from it, just as a distant tower looks round. Are we then to conclude at once that *is* its size *καθ' αὐτό*? No, it is a *προσμέον*: we must try for *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*. In the case of the tower we can go nearer

to it and see: we cannot do this with the sun, but we can use the analogy of terrestrial lights (see introductory note to this section), and shall then have confirmatory evidence that καθ' αὐτό it is about the size we can see it. Bignone takes κατὰ . . . τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς to mean 'as far as concerns us', i.e. as far as it is necessary for our happiness to know, but that does not make a natural contrast with τὸ . . . καθ' αὐτό.

μὲν τὸ: Schneider's correction of μέντοι.

3. φαίνεται: the reference to the eleventh book of the Περὶ φύσεως, which comes in at this point in the MSS., is a very obvious scholium. The illustration, which is important, is quoted in the introductory note.

ἦτοι μείζον . . .: the idea of μικρῶ is certainly to be supplied with μείζον as well as ἔλαττον: cf. Lucr. v. 564, 565:

nec nimio solis maior rota nec minor ardor
esse potest, nostris quam sensibus esse videtur.

And again 590, 591.

After τηλικούτων the MSS. have οὐχ ἅμα, which I take to be merely a note on μείζον . . . ἢ . . . ἔλαττον ἢ τηλικούτων, i.e. 'it can't be all these three at the same time'. Lachmann, believing it to be a corruption of a true reading, proposed τυχόν, Usener with more probability τυγχάνει. But no verb is needed, and I believe the words are simply a ridiculous comment: so Kochalsky.

οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρὰ . . . would be almost intelligible in itself, but is explained by the scholiast's quotation from the Περὶ φύσεως and the parallel passage in Lucr. (see introductory note).

6. καὶ πᾶν δὲ . . . As usual, what we must do is to look at the clear evidence of the senses and not confuse it with προσδοξαζόμενα: cf. Ep. i, § 50, &c.

ἔνσθημα, 'an objection': apparently from its occurrence in Sextus Empiricus an Epicurean word for the more usual ἔνστασις.

7. ἐναργήμασι, 'the clear visions' uncontaminated with opinion: a technical Epicurean word: cf. § 93, l. 9.

8. ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως βιβλίοις: i.e. presumably in Book XI, from which the passage quoted by the scholiast is taken.

(d) § 92. 1-8. The rising and setting of the heavenly bodies. Two possible explanations are given: (1) that of Heraclitus, that these bodies of light are extinguished at their setting and kindled again each day at their rising; (2) that of Anaximenes, that they appeared from behind the earth and then were hidden again by the land. Against neither of these explanations do phenomena afford any objection, and they must therefore be regarded as equally true: the phenomenon is one of those which may πλεοναχῶς γενέσθαι. The alternatives are put with almost equal brevity by Lucr. v. 650-655, though in speaking of the nature of dawn in the following paragraph he somewhat enlarges the ideas.

2. ἀναψιν : cf. Aet. ii. 20. 16 Ἡράκλειτος ἀναμμα νοερόν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. Xenophanes appears to have held the same view (cf. Hippol. *Ref.* i. 14). Heraclitus' own word is here intentionally recalled.

Usener, thinking that ἀναψιν and σβέσιν ought to be closely linked, inserts τε after ἀναψιν and omits κατά before σβέσιν : but they correspond exactly to ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις above. The rising is caused by the ἀναψις and the setting by the σβέσις, and a too close connexion would upset the correspondence.

3. δύνασθαι : an or. obl. infinitive, or else prolate after ἐνδέχεται understood : cf. γίνεσθαι, § 106. 2. It is not necessary to alter to δυνατόν with Usener.

περιστάσεως, 'the composition of the surrounding matter', a favourite word of the writer's : cf. § 102. 7, § 104. 9. Bignone translates 'conditions', but the two passages cited seem to show that the word has a more concrete meaning. The idea is explained more clearly by Lucretius, v. 660-668. The 'seeds of fire' gather together in the east towards dawn and make themselves into a compact body, which is the new sun. It is perhaps worth while noting that this theory of Heraclitus is quite incompatible with the idea of the gradual composition of the heavenly bodies in the growing κόσμος enunciated in § 90.

4. καὶ καθ' ἑκατέρους τοὺς τόπους, 'especially in regard to the two places on each occasion', i.e. the places of the daily composition and extinction of sun (or moon): there must in the east be an atmosphere conducive to its kindling and in the west to its extinction. Meibom early emended to τρόπους, which makes the clause meaningless, and Usener, adopting his reading, excluded the words as a gloss. Bignone shows that the inclusion of the words is essential: one of the objections made in antiquity to the theory of Heraclitus was that though it was easy to conceive of the extinction of the sun in the western sea, it was by no means easy to imagine its kindling in the east, and Lucretius (v. 660 ff.) lays special stress on this. There must therefore be the requisite atmospheric composition 'in both places'.

β. (καὶ) : a necessary addition made by Usener to correspond with καὶ κατά ἀναψιν, l. 2. As so often, it was lost before κατά by 'haplography'.

δ. ἐκφάνειαν . . . ἐπιπροσθέτησιν. We must remember that the early philosophers did not think of the earth as a sphere, and the sun's nightly course did not present itself to them as a passing *under* the earth, so much as a passing round behind the lofty ground in the north, corresponding to a journey round the southern sky during the day-time. The earth was tilted up to the north and the sun went behind it. So Aristotle (*Meteor.* B. i. 354 a 28) referring to Anaximenes, πολλοὺς πεισθῆναι τῶν ἀρχαίων μετεωρολόγων τὸν ἥλιον μὴ φέρεσθαι ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, ἀφανίζεσθαι δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν νύκτα διὰ τὸ ὑψηλὴν εἶναι πρὸς ἄρκτον τὴν γῆν.

ἐκφάνεια and ἐπιπροσθέτης are again probably technical terms borrowed from one of those who held this theory. Some editors have doubted the form ἐπιπροσθέτησιν and wished to 'restore' ἐπιπρόσθησιν: but it is exactly the kind of form that one would expect to find in one of the older philosophers, from whom it is probably quoted.

(c) §§ 92. 8-93. 3. The motions of the heavenly bodies are next dealt with and various possible causes suggested. There is an unfortunate lacuna, which almost certainly contained other explanations than the two given: we can restore them from the closely parallel passage in Lucr. v. 509-533.

8. τὰς . . . κινήσεις: including both the daily revolution and the orbit of the heavenly bodies, their apparent path round the heavens, as indicated by the successive points of their daily rising.

οὐκ ἄδύνατον: a rather more tentative statement than usual.

9. κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου οὐρανοῦ δίνην: sc. the whole heaven moves round in a whirl and takes the heavenly bodies with it. This was the theory of Anaximenes, who thought (Aet. ii. 2. 4) that the motion of the heaven was 'like a mill-stone' and not 'like a wheel', i.e. horizontal and not perpendicular: this of course corresponds with his notion of the daily revolution of the sun (see note on l. 1, above): cf. Lucr. v. 510-516, where the possible mechanism of this revolution is more fully explained.

ἢ τοῦτου μὲν . . . δίνην: sc. the heaven as a whole remains stationary, and the individual heavenly bodies perform their circuits (cf. Lucr. v. 517-533). This individual motion may again be due to various causes, of which the text, as we have it, refers to two.

10. κατὰ τὴν . . . ἀνάγκην: i.e. a 'natural law', initiated at the beginning of the world, causes all the bodies to move in one direction. This of course, with its characteristic assertion of ἀνάγκη, was the theory of Democritus, which is explained at greater length by Lucr. v. 621-636.

11. ἐπ' ἀνατολῇ, 'towards the east': as Lucretius explains, the orbit of the heavenly bodies is in reality in the reverse direction to what it appears to us: for the nearer a body is to the earth the slower it moves, the moon slower than the sun, the sun than the planets. But when we observe this motion against the background of the fixed stars, it seems to us by a familiar optical delusion that they are moving in the reverse direction, the moon quicker than the sun, the sun than the planets. It is possible that this notion was explained in the passage lost in the lacuna. Bignone translates ἐπ' ἀνατολῇ, 'for their origin', but it is surely impossible that the word could be used for the original creation of sun and moon: in reference to them it could only mean their daily rising.

§ 93. There is undoubtedly something, probably several lines, lost at this point. Lucretius in the parallel passage mentions two other possible causes of the individual revolution of the heavenly bodies, (1) 519-521, that they were impelled by an internal fire trying to

escape: this appears to have been the theory of Anaximander, (2) 522-523, that they were driven on by an external current of air: this was the theory of Anaxagoras (Aet. ii. 23. 2). Then we pass on to the fourth explanation, which is here left us in a fragmentary condition. In Lucretius this appears in the form that the bodies move on to places where they can find food, i.e. are naturally attracted to a fresh supply of fuel: this appears to have been the theory of the Stoics. The letter has it in a slightly different form, which seems more consistent with the theory of the constant rekindling of the heavenly bodies: the apparent progress of the stars is really the constant spread (*ἐπινέμησις*) of fire moving on to fresh fuel (we may perhaps compare the advance of a spark along a train of gunpowder). In this form the theory may certainly be attributed to Heraclitus, who held the *ἀναψις* (§ 92, 2, note).

1. * * *τάτῃ θερμασίᾳ*: the mutilated word must have been a superlative: possibly, as Usener suggests, *σφοδρотаτῇ*.

2. *ἐπινέμησιν*, 'spread', the verb, too, is so used of fire, e.g. *πῦρ ἐπενέμετο τὸ ἄστυ*, Hdt. 5. 101. Bignone would take the words after the lacuna in more direct correspondence with Lucretius' statement. He would complete the missing word *ἐπιτηδειοτάτῃ* (*εἰ* in the MSS.) and translates, '(it is possible that the heavenly body moves through the sky in search of the heat) most appropriate to it, and proceeds, as though feeding on the fire, successively from place to place'. But apart from the questionable meaning assigned to *ἐπινέμησις*, the rendering at the end is surely impossible with *ιδόντος*, which must go with *τοῦ πυρός*.

(f) § 93. ll. 3-8 deal with the question of the tropics of sun and moon. Besides appearing to perform a revolution, they seem also to go up and down in the sky, standing higher in the heavens at one part of their orbit than another. The highest and lowest points were known as the *τροπαί* or turning-places, and the problem now discussed is really the whole nature of this 'ecliptic', which ranges between the tropics. Again, various alternatives are presented, which correspond closely to the ideas of the causes of motion in the previous section.

4. *λόξωσιν οὐρανοῦ*: this theory goes closely with the first theory in the previous section. If the motions of the heavenly bodies are caused by the revolution of the whole heaven, then their 'obliquity' must be due to an 'obliquity' of the entire sky: i.e. it is set at an angle to the plane of the earth. This does not however appear, as one would expect (see note on § 92. 9), to have been the theory of Anaximenes, but of Empedocles: it is implied in Lucr. v. 691-693:

propter signiferi posituram totius orbis,
annua sol in quo concludit tempora serpens,
obliquo terras et caelum lumine lustrans.

τοῖς χρόνοις καταγκασμένου, 'constrained by', or 'in respect to the

times', probably refers to the obvious connexion between the ecliptic and the succession of the seasons.

5. *ἀέρος ἀντέξωσιν*, 'the contrary thrusting of a current': this theory goes with that of a stationary heaven and independent orbits: the revolution of sun and moon would be in the same plane as the earth, but that they are thrust out of their course towards the tropics by cross-currents of air. This was the theory of Anaxagoras: cf. Aet. ii. 23. 2 *ἀνταπώσσει τοῦ πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις ἀέρος*, and is fully explained by Lucr. v. 637-649.

ἡ καὶ ὕλης . . . ἐκλειπούσης must be taken in connexion with the last theory of the movements: the train of fuel along which the fire moves lies along this oblique orbit. This then was the theory of the Stoics and almost certainly, though we have no authority for it, of Heraclitus.

6. *ἐχομένως*, 'successively', Usener's correction of *ἐχομένους* or *ἐχομένης* in the MSS.

τῆς δ' ἐκλειπούσης, 'when the other', *sc.* the former fuel, 'fails'. I have with hesitation adopted Usener's correction of the MS. *τῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης*. There is no trace of an intransitive use of *καταλείπειν*, and it is not likely that *καταλειπομένης* (von der Muehl), which is the sense required ('being left behind'), should have been altered into the active, as might be the case if there were a neighbouring active participle.

7. ἡ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς . . . κινεῖσθαι: corresponds to the theory that the heavenly bodies were originally set in *δῖνοι* by *ἀνάγκη* (see note on l. 5 above). It is the theory of Democritus, and is in part set out as such, though in a paragraph where he has not quite understood his own argument, by Lucr. v. 621-636.

ἄστροις: a good instance of its use for sun and moon.

8. *οἷόν τιν' ἔλικα*: the combination of the daily revolution of sun and moon with the gradual mounting or descent to the tropics would of course produce a spiral movement. *οἷόν τιν'*, Usener, for *οἷόν τε*.

8-13. The section ends with the usual appeal to the principles of argument, here with greater elaboration than usual.

9. *οὐθενί*, Usener, for *οὐθέν*, a necessary correction as there is no evidence for *διαφωνεῖν* with the genitive.

ἐναργημάτων: cf. § 91. 7.

10. *μερῶν*, 'subjects', lit. 'departments of inquiry'; cf. § 91. 6 *εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος*.

12. *ἀνάγειν* is, I think, a slightly more probable correction of the *ἀπάγειν* of most MSS. than B's *ἐπάγειν* adopted by Usener. *ἀνάγειν* or *ἐπανάγειν* is Epicurus' technical word in this sense: cf. K. Δ. xxii, xxvi. Von der Muehl prefers the double compound *ἐπανάγειν*.

τὰς ἀνδραποδάδεις . . . *τεχνιτείας*, 'slavish', because they are wedded to one explanation instead of having an open mind for many possibilities, like the true Epicureans.

ἄστρολόγων: not 'astrologers' in our sense, but professional astronomers: a subdivision of the *φυσικοί* (§ 90. 3).

(g) *The moon.* (1) Its phases. § 94. The letter now passes to the consideration of certain problems with regard to the moon, which are, as usual, traditional among the physical philosophers. It deals first with the phases, and again reports several traditional explanations without the expression of any preference. The sentence should be compared with *Lucr. v. 705-750*, which shows the connexion of the explanations given here with the theories concerning the moon's light which are discussed in the following sentence.

1. *Κενώσεις . . . πληρώσεις*: all the MSS. agree on the plural in both cases, and it seems simpler to alter *δύναιτ' ἄν* (l. 2) to the plural with Meibom rather than 'restore' the singular here. The plural would be quite natural: each separate phase of the moon is a *κένωσις* or a *πλήρωσις*, and the whole process of waxing and waning is rightly described by the plural.

2. *στροφὴν τοῦ σώματος τούτου*, 'the turning round of the moon's own body'. If this idea is combined with the theory that the moon has its own light, then the moon, as Lucretius explains (*v. 720-730*), is thought of as a ball light on one side and dark on the other, and its gradual turning round causes the appearance of the phases. This was approximately the theory of Heraclitus, who (*Aet. ii. 24. 3*) thought that both sun and moon were 'bowl-shaped' (*σκαφοειδεῖς*), and that the turning of the concave side to us caused both the phases of the moon and also eclipses. Lucretius (*v. 727*) attributes the theory to the Chaldeans, from whom possibly Heraclitus took it. On the other hand, if the action of 'turning' be combined with that of the moon's reflected light, we get approximately the right explanation of the phases, as described by *Lucr. v. 705-714*.

3. *σχηματισμοὺς ἀέρος*, 'the conformation of the atmosphere'. This theory, which is not mentioned by Lucretius, goes naturally with the notion of the rekindling of the heavenly bodies: at times the 'fuel-track' of the moon runs through dense and moist tracts of atmosphere, so that portions or the whole of the light was extinguished. We may therefore compare the theory Lucretius puts forward (*v. 696-700*) of the unequal length of nights and days. This notion seems to have been held by Xenophanes (*Aet. ii. 29. 5*).

κατὰ προσθέσεις, 'by the interposition', as Lucretius explains (*v. 715-719*), of another opaque body which is itself invisible to us, so that the moon's own light is partially or completely hidden. This was the theory of Anaximenes (*Aet. ii. 13. 10*) and Anaxagoras (*Hippol. i. 8. 6*). Though *ἐπιπροσθέσεις* is more usual in this sense, e.g. § 92. 6, it seems unnecessary to alter with Usener to *κατ' ἐπιπροσθετήσεις*.

β. *τούτου τοῦ εἶδους*, 'of this appearance', almost 'of these phases'. *ἀποδόσεις*, 'accounts', 'explanations'.

γ. *ἀποδοκιμάζῃ*: an intentional use of a legal technical term.

οὐ τεθεωρηκώς: Cobet's restoration of *οὔτε θεωρητικώς*.

(2) Its light. § 94. 9-§ 95. 7. The next section deals with the

origin of the moon's light and with the two explanations that it is her own, or is reflected from the sun. Lucretius does not deal separately with this problem, but refers to it, as we have seen, in the discussion of the phases of the moon, and again in his discussion of its size (v. 575-576).

9. ἐξ αὐτῆς: this view was held by Anaximander (Aet. ii. 25. 1) and Xenophanes (id. ii. 28. 1).

10. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου: the belief of Thales, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras.

§ 95. 1. καὶ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν: the analogy of things on earth is in favour of the double possibility.

2. καὶ οὐθὲν ἐμποδοσται . . . : and nothing in the phenomena of the sky is against either explanation.

3. ἐάν τις . . . : another long exposition of the principles, but an unusually clear statement. The two mistakes we have to avoid are admitting explanations which are inconsistent with phenomena, and arbitrarily confining ourselves to a single explanation.

6. ταῦτ' ὄγκοι ματαίως: a good instance of the superiority of B, which alone preserves the text, which is dreadfully mangled in the other MSS.

(3) Its face. § 95. 7-§ 96. 4. The face in the moon is a subject not touched on by Lucretius, but dealt with by some of the early philosophers. Two causes are suggested for its appearance.

7. ἔμφασις, 'impression', the word ordinarily used to represent the image on the retina of the eye.

8. κατὰ παραλλαγὴν μερῶν, 'by the succession of varying parts', i.e. the contour of its surface changes in successive places and so causes the appearance: Anaxagoras had so explained the face in the moon (Aet. ii. 30. 2).

9. κατ' ἐπιπροσθήτησιν, 'by the interposition of other bodies' shutting out the moon's light, and so causing the shadows which produced the appearance. This may have been the theory of Anaximenes, who gave a similar account of the moon's phases; see on § 94. 3 above.

ποτ': the MSS. have πάντα, which must be a mere mistake.

θεωροῖντο, 'might be observed', i.e. in terrestrial phenomena, so as to suggest an explanation by analogy.

§ 96. 2. τὴν τοιαύτην (sc. ὁδὸν) ἱχνεύειν: it is unnecessary to emend with Usener to ἱχνεύειν. Bignone compares § 114. 3 παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἐναντίαν κινεῖσθαι.

3. τις ἢ μαχόμενος: the MSS. have τισὶ μαχομένοις (or βαλλομένοις): again this seems a necessary correction.

(h) Eclipses. § 96. 5-10. The letter proceeds to deal very briefly with the problem of the eclipses of sun and moon, and suggests two possible causes corresponding to the general theories of sun and moon already enunciated; either the temporary extinction of the luminaries or their obscuration by the interposition of some other body. The latter explanation is then subdivided according to the nature of the

interposed body. The text is rather uncertain and the whole passage made obscure by its brevity, but much light is thrown upon it by the longer discussion in *Lucr. v. 751-770*.

6. κατὰ σβέειν: i.e. just as we have seen the cause of the daily setting and rising may be the extinction and rekindling of sun and moon, their eclipses may be due to the same cause, when the 'fuel-track' passes through damp regions. So *Lucr. v. 758-761* (cf. 768-770):

solque suos etiam dimittere languidus ignis
tempore cur certo nequeat recreareque lumen,
cum loca praeteriit flammis infesta per auras,
quae faciunt ignis interstingui atque perire?

This was probably the theory of Xenophanes (cf. *Aet. ii. 24. 4*).

7. κατ' ἐπιπροσθέτησιν, 'by the interposition of another body', e.g. as, in point of fact, the eclipse of the sun is due to the interposition of the moon between earth and sun and that of the moon to the interposition of the earth between sun and moon. The writer is not satisfied with these possibilities, but must add others.

ἡ γῆς: this of course accounts for the eclipse of the moon, as *Lucretius* clearly explains *v. 762-764*:

et cur terra queat lunam spoliare vicissim
lumine et oppressum solem super ipsa tenere,
menstrua dum rigidas coni perlabitur umbras.

This explanation was given by *Anaxagoras*, *Aet. ii. 29. 6, 7* τὰς δ' ἐκλείψεις [τὴν σελήνην ποιέσθαι] εἰς τὸ σκίασμα τῆς γῆς ἐμπίπτουσιν, μεταξὺ μὲν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἀστέρων γενομένης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἀντιφραττομένης.

ἡ ἀόρατου τινὸς ἢ ἑτέρου τοιούτου. The MSS. at this point have ἡ οὐρανοῦ ἢ τινος ἑτέρου τοιούτου. οὐρανοῦ can hardly be kept, though von der Muehl retains it. Woltjer (*de Lucr. Philos.*, p. 135) proposed to read ἡ σελήνης ἢ τινος ἑτέρου τοιούτου: ἡ γῆς ἢ σελήνης would then give the right explanations of the eclipses of moon and sun respectively, and ἡ τινος ἑτέρου τοιούτου would allude to the theory of the interposition of some other opaque body mentioned by *Lucr. v. 756-757, 765-767*. Usener's objection (*Preface*, p. xviii) that this will not do because 'the writer is anxious to explain the eclipse of both sun and moon by the same cause', does not hold: for it applies equally well to ἡ γῆς, which can only explain an eclipse of the moon. The real objection to Woltjer's suggestion is surely palaeographical, that it does not at all account for the MS. οὐρανοῦ. Usener himself, thinking of the theory of the interposition of the opaque body, and comparing the passage in *Aet. ii. 13. 10*, where it is attributed to *Anaximenes* (περιέχειν δέ [sc. τὰ ἀστρα] τινα καὶ γεώδη σώματα συμπεριφερόμενα τούτοις ἀόρατα) together with *Lucr. v. 753-767*, made the brilliant restoration ἀόρατου for οὐρανοῦ, which may be considered

certain. He then proposes to omit η , and suggests that it may possibly conceal $\eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$. I prefer to transpose η and $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ and take $\eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\nu$ to refer, not to the possibility of the sun-eclipse by the interposition of the moon (which is now not mentioned, $\eta\ \gamma\eta\varsigma$ being taken as typical of this line of explanation), but rather to the interposition of 'any other such body'—one of those vague phrases by which the writer wishes to leave the way open to other possible explanations: cf. § 95. 9 $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\omicron}\sigma\omicron\iota\ \pi\omicron\tau'\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\iota\ \kappa\tau\lambda$. I do not however feel sure that we should not combine both Woltjer's and Usener's suggestions, and restore the passage $\eta\ \gamma\eta\varsigma\ (\eta\ \sigma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu\eta\varsigma)\ \eta\ \delta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\iota}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma\ \eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\nu$, when we should have a fuller account and a closer correspondence with Lucretius. Homoeoteleuton would account for the omission of $\eta\ \sigma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu\eta\varsigma$.

8. $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\omega}\delta\epsilon\ .\ .\ .$: the writer adds two cautions with regard to such explanations.

$\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ .\ .\ .\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$: (1) we must be careful that the explanations of eclipses are properly combined with the other theories adopted about the heavenly bodies: e.g. as Lucretius suggests v. 768, the idea that eclipse is due to extinction can only be applied to the moon, if it be held that she shines with her own light, or again, moon-eclipse can only be explained by interposition of the earth, if we suppose her light to be reflected from the sun.

9. $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ .\ .\ .$: (2) we must remember that several of these causes may be at work at once: e.g. it might be that the moon is extinguished at the same moment as an opaque body comes in front of it, or that the sun is shut off by both the moon and some other body at once. It is an additional argument for the $\pi\lambda\epsilon\omicron\nu\alpha\chi\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\varsigma\ .\ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, which is undoubtedly right, is preserved in BQCo and the second hand in H and P: the other MSS. have the corruption $\sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$.

10. $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$: at this point the MSS. have a reference to the eleventh book of the $\Pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, which is important as showing that Epicurus had there the full theory of eclipses 'by interposition': see app. crit. The word $\sigma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ connects the theory directly with Anaxagoras: see note on l. 7 above. The compiler of the letter probably had this passage of the $\Pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ before him.

(i) *Periods*. § 97. A brief sentence on the 'periods' of the heavenly bodies, with another elaborate warning against the falseness of the theological view and the mistake of the dogmatic assertion of one theory against all others.

1. $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma\ \pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\delta\omicron\upsilon$, 'the regularity of the period', i.e. the mechanical regularity with which the orbits ($\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\delta\omicron\iota$) of the heavenly bodies are performed, the moon in a month, the sun in a year, &c.

2. $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\alpha\rho'\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$: we can infer the kind of analogies of which the writer was thinking from the similar passage in which Lucretius (v. 737-750) adduces the succession of the seasons as a parallel to the regularity of the successive phases of the moon.

3. ἡ θεία φύσις . . . : such things must not be attributed to the gods, for such work would be inconsistent with their existence of perfect tranquillity. The argument is familiar: cf. Ep. i, § 77; iii, §§ 123, 124.

4. ἀλειτούργητος, 'not oppressed with burdens': cf. Ep. i, § 76. 10 μήτε λειτουργούντος τινός.

μακαριότητι: cf. Ep. iii, § 123. 5.

5. αἰτιολογία, 'the discussion of causes'. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 724 αἰτιολογία . . . ἐν φυσιολογία and Sext. *Emp.* i. 181 πᾶσαν δογματικὴν αἰτιολογίαν.

6. οὐ δυνατοῦ τρόπου ἐφασμένους, 'not clinging to the possible method', i.e. the method of accepting only such explanations as are consistent with possibility as revealed by phenomena.

7. τὸ καθ' ἓνα τρόπον . . . οἶεσθαι: it seems quite possible to retain the accusative τό, in apposition to τὸ μάταιον, instead of emending with Usener to τῷ.

9. τὸ ἀδιανόητον, 'that which cannot be thought': that which is inconsistent with the προλήψεις which exist in the mind.

10. σημεία: as 'hints' or 'indications' of the facts of celestial phenomena; cf. § 87. 6.

11. συνθεωρεῖν, 'to consider them with' celestial occurrences, i.e. to compare and so infer: cf. τοὺς οἰκείους ἀλλήλοις τρόπους συνθεωρητέον, § 96. 8. The strange reading of the MSS. σὺν θεῷ (sic) χαίρειν looks almost like a 'pious' emendation.

(j) *Length of nights and days.* § 98. 1-8. Another brief paragraph on the alternations in the length of days and nights at different times of the year. It is obscure and undoubtedly corrupt, but we may, I think, recover the sense and in part the text from the parallel section in *Lucr.* v. 680-704. I do not, however, at all agree with Usener as to the relation of the two passages or the state of the text.

1. παραλλάττοντα: cf. κατὰ παραλλαγὴν μερῶν, § 95. 8.

καὶ παρὰ τὸ ταχείας . . . θεωρεῖται: these clauses must all be considered together. The MS. text runs καὶ παρὰ τὸ ταχείας ἡλίου κινήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν βραδείας ὑπὲρ γῆς παρὰ τὸ μήκη τόπων παραλλάττοντα καὶ τόπους τινὰς περαιούντα τάχιον ὥς καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἡ βραδύτερόν τινα θεωρεῖται, an obvious muddle which the earlier editors practically gave up, though Meibom by inserting ἡ before παρὰ τὸ μήκη τόπων tried to distinguish a separate explanation from that in the beginning of the clause: this is merely unintelligent patchwork.

Usener, after emending the participles παραλλάττοντα and περαιούντα to the infinitives παραλλάττειν and περαιοῦν, and making the obvious transference of ἡ βραδύτερον to its place between τάχιον and ὥς καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν, then cuts out the whole clause from παρὰ τὸ μήκη τόπων . . . ἡ βραδύτερον as an explanatory gloss on the previous explanation and marks a lacuna. He thus leaves the passage with one explanation, the difference of pace in the sun's movements, which does not occur in *Lucretius*, and supposes all the three reasons which *Lucretius*

mentions to have been dealt with in clauses now lost. But seeing the close correspondence of the letter and Lucretius all through this astronomical section, this is not a probable nor, I think, a necessary supposition, and, further, the clause which Usener excludes is by no means a 'formula paullo accuratior' for what he has already said.

If we analyse the passage in Lucretius we see that the three explanations he gives fall naturally under two heads, corresponding to the two main theories about the sun. (1) If we suppose that the same sun performs a daily orbit round the earth, then the variation is due to the fact that he spends more time above the earth in summer than in winter. This may be caused (*a*) by an unequal division of the arcs of the orbit owing to the relation of ecliptic, equator, and horizon (682-695), or (*b*) by the presence of a *crassior aer* at some parts of his journey, which causes a delay in his rising (696-700). (2) If we suppose a new sun is kindled every day, then the variation is due to the slowness or quickness of the gathering of the flames which create the sun (701-704).

It is probable that the writer of the letter had the same explanations in the same order, and with but slight alteration of the text one can obtain this. I should keep *παρὰλάττοντα*, suppose that a verb of motion, say *διέναι*, was lost after it, after *καί* insert (*παρὰ τὸ*), adopt Usener's *περαιοῦν* for *περαιοῦντα* (the change may either be due to the neighbouring *παρὰλάττοντα* or to dittography of the first syllable of *τάχων*), and accept the transference of *ἡ βραδύτερον* after *τάχων*: it is also possible that there is a considerable lacuna after *ἡ βραδύτερον*.

The clause *καί παρὰ τὸ ταχείας . . . ὑπὲρ γῆς* then expresses the general view (1) that the sun in his daily orbit spends less time (*ταχείας*) above the earth at certain periods of the year than at others. This explanation is then subdivided into two possible causes: (*a*) corresponding to Lucr. v. 682-695 *παρὰ τὸ μήκη τόπων παρὰλάττοντα* (*διέναι*), 'because he traverses regions differing in length (above earth)', or (*b*) corresponding to Lucr. v. 696-700 *καί (παρὰ τὸ) τόπους τινὰς περαιοῦν τάχων ἡ βραδύτερον*, 'because he gets through certain regions' (i.e. those which have a thinner atmosphere) 'more quickly than others'. Then in all probability there was another clause beginning with *καί παρὰ* corresponding to *καί παρὰ τὸ ταχείας . . .* setting out (2) the explanation on the theory of the *ἀναιψις*. In this way with small alteration we can get a complete correspondence to Lucretius. *μήκη νυκτῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν παρὰλάττοντα* is left without any definite construction, but the looseness is not greater than in many places of the letter: 'the variation in length of nights and days (is) due to . . .'

Bignone, who agrees with me as to the general run of the passage, but wishes to mend the construction and refrain from any MS. alteration, except the transference of *ἡ βραδύτερον* (and possibly the substitution of *περιόδους* for *κινήσεις*—surely gratuitous), would suppose

a more considerable loss and restore as follows: *καὶ παρὰ τὸ ταχέως ἡλίου κινήσεις* (? *περιόδους*) *γίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν βραδείας ὑπὲρ γῆς, παρὰ τὸ μήκη τόπων παραλλάττοντα* (*περαιοῦν, ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, καὶ παρὰ τὸ τάχιον ἢ βραδύτερον κινεῖσθαι, παρεκτάσεις ἀέρος*) *καὶ τόπους τινὰς περαιοῦντα τάχιον ἢ βραδύτερον*. This appears to me a rather clumsy and unnecessarily elaborate change.

6. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐν λαμβάνοντες: the usual caution against the 'single' method.

7. εἰ: Usener's alteration to *ἦ* is unnecessary: the persons who dogmatically assert the single explanation, have surely failed to ask *if* it is possible for man to attain such accuracy in observation.

(k) *Weather-signs*. § 98. 9-§ 99. 2. Another brief sentence on signs of the weather as given by the heavenly bodies. The text is again corrupt, but in its most difficult place has been set right by a brilliant conjecture.

9. ἐπισημασίαι, 'weather-signs'. The writer is thinking here solely of such signs as are given by the heavenly bodies, e.g. the rising of Sirius, the red sunset, the blushing of the moon (*Virg. G. i. 431*), &c.

κατὰ συγκυρήσεις καιρῶν: it may be that such signs are due mainly to coincidence of occasion, e.g. the presence of Sirius and hot weather. For *συγκυρήσεις* cf. § 96. 9 above.

10. καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς . . . ζώοις: i.e. in the case of weather-signs given by animals, e.g. the low-flying swallow, the croaking crow, &c. With these the writer deals in § 115, and explains there that they are due to coincidence.

παρ' ἐτεροιώσεις ἀέρος καὶ μεταβολάς: a brilliant restoration of Usener's for the MS. text *παρ' ἐτέροις ὥσει ἀέρος καὶ μεταβολῆς* (*μεταβολάς* is due to Kühn). In some cases the signs are really due to the same changes in the atmosphere, which produce the change of weather: e.g. the flushing of the moon.

§ 99. 1. ἐπὶ δὲ ποίοις . . . : it is not possible for us to distinguish which of these two possible causes is at work on any given occasion. The writer seems to have been almost excessively cautious here, but consistent with his own principles. There is some authority in the MSS. for the reading *ἥδη δὲ ποίοις* adopted by Kochalsky.

III. METEOROLOGY: CLOUDS, RAIN, THUNDER, LIGHTNING.

§§ 99-104.

The discussion of signs of the weather leads naturally to the third main section of the letter, which deals with what we know more strictly as meteorology: it corresponds to the earlier portion of *Lucr. vi. 96-607*. The same principles are of course observed as in the section on Astronomy.

(a) *Clouds*. § 99. 3-8. The writer deals first with clouds and explains three methods of their formation, which correspond with those set out by *Lucr. vi. 451-482*: the fourth cause suggested by Lucretius,

the pouring in of moist elements from outside the κόσμος, is not noticed in the letter.

3. *πλήσεις ἀέρος*, 'the packing of the atmosphere': the ἀήρ is regarded always as being moist in character, and its condensation would form the masses of moist matter which we call clouds.

4. *(κατὰ) πνευμάτων συνώσεις*: the two last words are excluded by Usener as a gloss, *συνώσεις* being Meibom's correction of *συνώσεως*. But they are certainly not an interpretation of *πλήσεις ἀέρος*, but are required to explain the origin of the phenomenon: cf. *Lucr. vi. 462-466*, who describes the operation as taking place on a mountain-top:

propterea quia, cum consistunt nubila primum,
ante videre oculi quam possint, tenvia, venti
portantes cogunt ad summa cacumina montis.
hic demum fit uti turba maiore coorta
et condensa queant apparere.

The words should then certainly be retained. Meibom connected them with ἤ—but they do not express an alternative cause, Kühn with *καί*—but they do not give a parallel cause: rather the remoter cause of the *πλήσεις ἀέρος*; the air is condensed owing to the compression of the winds. I think, therefore, that it is a preposition which has dropped out, and have inserted *κατά*. Bignone, who takes the same view, inserts *διὰ*: Usener in his preface suggests *πνευμάτων συνώσει*, which is simpler, but a little abrupt. The theory was that of Anaximenes: cf. *Aet. iii. 4. 1* *νέφη μὲν γίνεσθαι παχυνθέντος ἐπὶ πλείον τοῦ ἀέρος*.

παρὰ περιπλοκάς . . . τοῦτο τελέσαι: atoms likely to form moisture come together and become interlaced, making the nucleus of a cloud which gradually grows. The process is described by *Lucr. 451-458*. The explanation, as one might expect from its atomic character, was that of Democritus: cf. *Aet. iv. 1. 4*. Giussani translates *ἀλληλούχων*, 'of every kind', but this is clearly wrong.

5. *κατὰ ρευμάτων . . . καὶ ὕδάτων*: particles of moisture came off from sea, rivers, and even the earth itself, and streamed together into the air to form clouds: cf. *Lucr. vi. 470-482*, and especially *476-477*:

praeterea fluviis ex omnibus et simul ipsa
surgere de terra nebulas aestumque videmus.

This was the theory of Xenophanes: cf. *Aet. iii. 4. 4*, and the fragment of Xenophanes himself which is there preserved:

μέγας πόντος γενέτωρ νεφέων ἀνέμων τε
καὶ ποταμῶν.

6. *καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ . . .*: the usual supposition that there may be other equally good explanations.

(b) *Rain.* § 99. 8-§ 100. 4. A short explanation is given of the way in which rain may be produced, corresponding to the origin of clouds above, and roughly with the account given by Lucr. vi. 495-526.

8. ἤδη: i.e. when the clouds are thus formed.

ἢ μὲν θλιβομένων, ἢ δὲ μεταβαλλόντων: the ideas are not at once clear, but are explained by Lucretius. (1) The clouds are piled up on one another: those underneath are 'squeezed' on their upper side by the clouds above them, and so the rain is pressed out: cf. Lucr. vi. 510-512:

ipsa

copia nimborum turba maiore coacta
urget et e supero premit ac facit effluere imbris.

This idea is found in Anaximenes: cf. Aet. iii. 4. 1 μᾶλλον δ' ἐπισυναχθέντος [τοῦ ἀέρος] ἐκθλίβεσθαι τοὺς δμβρους and corresponds to the first notion of the formation of clouds given above. (2) The clouds are 'altered' when they are struck by the sun's rays and so changed from solid to liquid, falling in the form of rain: cf. Lucr. vi. 513-516:

praeterea cum rarescunt quoque nubila ventis
aut dissolvuntur, solis super icta calore,
mittunt umorem pluvium stillantque, quasi igni
cera super calido tabescens multa liquecat.

§ 100. 1. πνευμάτων καταφορά: the MSS. have πνεύματα κατ' ἀποφοράν, the alteration is Usener's. The genitive πνευμάτων is required by the participle κινουμένων, and καταφορά expresses the swooping down of the wind on the clouds better than κατ' ἀποφοράν. The first cause of the rain is internal—in the clouds themselves; the second is external—the advent of the wind which disturbs them: this corresponds exactly to Lucr. vi. 510 'nam vis venti contrudit'.

Bignone, who apparently overlooked these words in Lucretius, complains that Usener's text does not give satisfactory sense, and reads ρευμάτων κατ' ἀποφοράν, in reference to the gathering of moist particles into the clouds described later on by Lucretius in vi. 520 ff.:

multa cientur semina aquarum
atque aliis aliae nubes nimbique rigantes
. omni de parte feruntur.

This change seems to me gratuitous, and ἀπὸ ἐπιτηδείων τόπων is much more forcible in reference to the wind: it would not matter from what places the moist particles came.

2. ἀπὸ ἐπιτηδείων τόπων: the wind must be blowing from the right quarter to affect the conformation of the clouds in the right way.

καὶ δι' ἀέρος: Usener omits καί, unnecessarily. The wind must not

only blow from the right quarter, but pass through the misty atmosphere, and so gather in its course more of the material of clouds.

3. βιαιότερας . . . ἐπιπέμψεις. Usener apparently (from his analysis) takes this clause solely with the second explanation ἐτι τε, regarding it as the true atomic and probably Democritean explanation as opposed to Anaximenes. But this is surely not right. Both the internal pressure of clouds and the external force of wind are causes of rain which would be recognized on any theory, atomic or otherwise, nor is there any good reason for the comparative βιαιότερας. Lucretius, too, vi. 517-518, after giving the two causes above as exactly parallel to one another, proceeds to consider the cause of a *vemens imber*, and though his explanation differs from that given here, it shows, I think, the purpose of the clause. I understand the writer to mean: 'there are two causes of rain, and with either cause the violence of the shower is increased, if the atomic conformation of the cloud is suitable'.

ἀθροισμάτων: the regular technical word for the combination of atoms in a thing: cf. K. Δ. ix, Lucretius' *glomeramina*. Bignone, reading ρευμάτων in l. 1, takes it of the accumulation of moist emanations, but it is very common in Epicurus in the atomic sense.

4. ἐπιτηδείων: it is interesting to note this reference to the main theory: to produce a given effect, a thing must be composed of the right atoms in the right formation.

(c) *Thunder*. § 100. 5-11. From clouds and rain the writer naturally proceeds to thunder, lightning, and thunderbolts, and suggests an unusually large number of causes for these phenomena. Lucretius similarly treats these subjects at great length (vi. 96-422), and as usual the letter corresponds closely with his explanations.

5. πνεύματος . . . ἀνέιλησιν: the wind shut up in the hollows of the clouds and by its whirl always thickening their sides, reverberates loudly. The idea is clearly explained by Lucr. vi. 121-131.

7. ἀγγείοις, 'vessels': the ordinary Greek jar with a narrow mouth would, as Bignone points out, make a noise when one blew into it. Lucretius' illustration from a bladder is really more appropriate:

nec mirum, cum plena animae vesicula parva
saepe ita dat parvum sonitum displosa repente.

πυρὸς πεπνευματωμένου βόμβον: an explanation not mentioned by Lucretius. The idea is no doubt of the flame excited by wind, which seems to get inside it and drive it about with a great roar, as in a forge. I do not think Usener is right in translating (in his analysis) *ignis in spiritum soluti*: it is not the natural meaning, nor required by the context. Bignone agrees with my view.

8. ῥήξεις . . . διαστάσεις: the clouds themselves are actually torn asunder, and make a noise, like the rending of awnings in a theatre or the tearing of paper, as Lucretius aptly says, vi. 108-115.

διαστάσεις: Usener unnecessarily corrects to διασπάσεις.
 παρὰ τριψεύς . . . κρυσταλλοειδῆ: a more difficult idea. The clouds,
 congealed to a kind of rigidity, scrape along one another and burst
 with a report: cf. Lucr. vi. 116-120:

fit quoque enim interdum ut non tam concurrere nubes
 frontibus adversis possint quam de latere ire
 diverso motu radentes corpora tractim,
 aridus unde auris terget sonus ille diuque
 ducitur, exierunt donec regionibus artis.

9. κατάρξει, 'breaking', 'bursting': doubtfully I follow Bignone in
 adopting this reading from Froben's *editio princeps*. The majority of
 the MSS. have τάξεις, which is impossible. F has διαστάσεις, whence
 Usener conjectured τάσεις, 'tension', the idea being that the clouds
 being stretched emit a sound like the string of a lyre: but this is very
 far-fetched.

κρυσταλλοειδῆ: surely not 'like glass', as Usener renders in his
 analysis, but 'like ice', it is a less violent form of the process which
 produces hail: see § 106.

καὶ τὸ ὅλον . . .: the usual appeal to the 'plural' method. τὸ ὅλον
 here apparently the whole subject of meteorology: τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, the
 special question of thunder.

11. ἐκκαλεῖται: cf. § 86. 10.

τὰ φαινόμενα: both the phenomena of thunder itself and phenomena
 on earth, which supply analogies.

(d) *Lightning*. § 101. 1-§ 102. 6. The causes of lightning are set
 out in a rather confusing profusion. The explanations may be
 analyzed thus:

(1) fire-atoms contained in the clouds are driven out of them—

(a) by collision or friction with other clouds (1-3);

(b) by wind (4, 5);

(c) by compression (6, 7).

(2) fire-atoms are driven out, which came originally

(a) from the heavenly bodies (8-10);

(b) from a filtration of light-particles through the atmo-
 sphere (10-12).

(3) the cause is wind—

(a) itself ignited in the cloud (13, 14);

(b) bursting the clouds and driving out fire-atoms (101. 1-3).

The last cause (3b) is hardly distinguishable from (1b), but it is now
 regarded from the point of view of the wind as cause. Nearly all the
 explanations can be paralleled in Lucr. vi. 160-218, and many can be
 discovered in the earlier philosophers.

2. παρὰ τριψιν καὶ σύγκρουσιν: παρὰ τριψιν, the side-friction of clouds
 rubbing against each other (cf. 100. 8); σύγκρουσιν, the collision of
 clouds charging against one another. The two operations are of

course distinct, but are classed together: it is unnecessary to alter καὶ to ἥ, as Usener suggests in his notes. This cause Lucretius also places first (vi. 160-163). It was the theory of Democritus, and Aetius in his account (iii. 3. 11) has just the same combination of σύγκρουσις and παράτρυψις: ἀστραπὴν δὲ σύγκρουσιν νεφῶν, ὅφ' ἥς τὰ γεννητικὰ τοῦ πυρὸς διὰ τῶν πολυκένων ἀραιωμάτων ταῖς παρατρίψεσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναλιζόμενα διηθεύεται.

ὁ πυρὸς ἀποτελεσματικὸς σχηματισμός: a splendidly atomic expression: the right conformation of the right kind of atoms to produce fire.

4. ἐκριπισμόν . . . παρασκευάζει: the second means of ejection; a violent casting out by winds. This is treated by Lucr. vi. 185-203, and may be traced in Anaximander and later in Metrodorus of Lampsacus (Aet. iii. 3. 3).

τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων ἅ . . . : again characteristic: the right sort of atoms for the purpose.

6. κατ' ἐκπιασμόν: the third possibility, the atoms are squeezed out by the presence of other clouds or of wind, a cause similar to the two preceding, but less violent. Lucretius does not deal with it separately. It was the theory of Anaxagoras.

7. κατ' ἐμπερίληψιν . . . διὰ τῶν νεφῶν: the writer now passes to the second class of causes in which the fire is not supposed to be originally contained in the clouds, but to enter them from without, and first from the heavenly bodies. This curious idea is explained by Lucr. vi. 204-213: it was apparently the theory of Empedocles. κατεσπαρμένον seems a very necessary correction of the MS. κατεσπειραμένου, which Usener strangely keeps.

10. κατὰ διήθησιν . . . τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου φωτός: the light-particles are now regarded as collected in the clouds from the air in which they previously floated. This is not mentioned by Lucretius, but seems to have been a notion of Anaxagoras, who regarded the αἰθήρ as fire and said that it was κατενεχθὲν ἄνωθεν κάτω, and that the lightning was διάλαμψιν . . . τούτου τοῦ πυρός (Arist. Meteor. 369 b 15): cf. also Seneca, Nat. Quaest. ii. 12. 3, who uses the word *distillare*, which is clearly a translation of διηθεῖν.

(διὰ): a necessary addition of Usener's.

11. λεπτομερεστάτου: particles of heat or light are always in the atomic theory extremely light and subtle, so that they can both rise and penetrate: cf. § 90. 9 λεπτομερῶν τινων φύσεων.

After φωτός the MSS. have ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς νέφη συνειλέχθαι καὶ τὰς βροντὰς ἀποτελεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτου κίνησιν. The words from ἡ ἀπὸ . . . ἀποτελεῖσθαι are excluded as a gloss by Usener, who then omits κατὰ and takes καὶ τὴν τούτου κίνησιν parallel to κατὰ διήθησιν. This is arbitrary, and Bignone has shown that the words can be preserved in the text with the slight changes of ἡ to ἥ and συνειλέχθαι to συνεφλέχθαι (Usener), and the omission of καὶ before κατὰ τὴν τούτου κίνησιν. The clause will then constitute a parenthesis connecting the phenomenon of lightning with that of thunder, which has already been discussed: it is

this penetration of the light particles from the ether which causes the kindling of the clouds and so the occurrence of thunder through the movement of the enclosed fire. He discovers the same connexion in *Lucr. vi. 150 f.*, where he says :

aridior porro si nubes accipit ignem,
urit ur ingenti sonitu succensa repente.

The infinitives *συνεφλέχθαι* and *ἀποτελείσθαι* will be dependent on a suppressed *ἐνδέχεται*, as in § 92. 3 *γενέσθαι δύνασθαι*.

In a later note Bignone is inclined to keep both *καί* and *κατά* and to suppose a lacuna: he would then write *καὶ κατὰ τὴν σίζιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτου κίνησιν*. *σίξις* occurs in *Arist. Meteor. ii. 9. 369 a* in the sense of 'a hissing noise', such as would be produced by the fire-particles in contact with the moisture of the clouds and might cause thunder. He then quotes as parallel *Lucr. vi. 145 ff.* where two causes are adduced: (1) the noise of the fire in contact with the wet clouds; (2) the onward rush of the increasing fire. An exact parallel would then be produced, but I think this is going too far in the way of imaginative restoration.

13. *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκπύρωσιν*: this is the third class of causes, namely wind. Here the wind inside the clouds catches fire owing to the severity of its motion. *Lucretius* explains this cause in *vi. 175-182*.

§ 102. 1. *κατὰ ῥήξεις . . . ἀποτελουσῶν*: wind is here the active cause which drives out the fire-atoms. This explanation is found in *Lucr. vi. 214-218*, and corresponds nearly to the theory of *Democritus*, given in § 101. 4, but is here represented from the point of view of wind as the main cause.

2. *ἐκπτωσὶν τε* for *ἐκπτωσιν τῶν*: the particle is essential.

3. *φάντασμα*: the 'appearance' which we perceive, not said of course with any sense of its unreality.

5. *αἰεί*: for the MS. *καὶ*.

τὸ τοῦτοις ὁμοιον: i.e. that which in earthly phenomena resembles what we see in the sky.

6. *συνθεωρεῖν*: cf. § 96. 9, § 97. 11.

(c) *Why lightning precedes thunder*. § 102. 6-§ 103. 2. The writer now deals with the question why the lightning precedes the thunder in our experience: he offers two solutions, one with the general idea that the lightning actually takes place first, the other that the two are simultaneous, but the lightning travels more quickly to us than the sound. The latter reason alone is asserted by *Lucr. vi. 164-172*, who for once seems to abandon his Epicurean suspense of judgement.

7. *περιστάσει*: lit. 'gathering of matter to form the clouds': so practically 'atomic conformation': cf. § 92. 3, § 111. 8. Bignone again takes it less concretely, 'in the case of such phenomena in the clouds'.

καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄμα . . . : this explanation goes with those of lightning and thunder above which attributed them to wind : the wind enters the cloud and at once expels the fire-particles, and then is itself caught in the cloud and rushing about causes the sound of thunder, so that the lightning does in fact occur first. A description of the idea will be found in a different context in *Lucr.* vi. 194-203.

8. ἀποτελεστικὸν σχηματισμόν : cf. § 101, l. 3 above.

ὑστερον δὲ . . . ἀποτελεῖν τοῦτον : cf. § 100. 5 above.

10. κατ' ἐκπτώσιν, 'owing to the falling out' both of the light and sound from the cloud at once. The MSS. are here much corrupted, B's κατέμπτωσιν being the nearest approach to sense. Usener keeps κατ' ἐμπτώσιν, but it is not a question of the light and sound entering the cloud (which the sound does not do on any theory), but of their being driven out of it simultaneously. Usener shows this clearly in his analysis, where he renders 'posse etiam simul utrumque nubibus emitti' : ἐμπτώσιν cannot possibly mean this, and it seems to me necessary to correct to ἐκπτώσιν. Bignone apparently retains ἐμπτώσιν in the sense of 'occurrence'.

τῷ τάχει . . . τὴν βροντὴν : involving of course the general idea that light travels quicker than sound. We must remember that on the Epicurean theory both sight and sound are caused by actual particles of matter, which move from the objects in all directions, and when they impinge on our sense-organs, cause sensation : cf. *Ep.* i §§ 49-53.

§ 103. 1. καθάπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων : *Lucr.* vi. 167-170 illustrates from the case of a woodman felling a tree : we see the blow of the axe before we hear it.

πληγὰς τινὰς ποιουμένων : a quite correct atomic expression, referring of course to the blows on the pupil of the eye and the drum of the ear, made by the impinging particles of the εἶδωλον and the φωνή.

(f) *Thunderbolts.* § 103. 3-§ 104. 4. The origin of thunderbolts is explained on the lines of the previous sections. Either they are portions of wind, fanned into flame by movement inside the clouds, or portions of the fire contained in the cloud, driven by the wind : in either case the outburst is due to the condensation of the cloud, which impedes further motion inside itself. The description is more detailed than usual, and from the fact that Lucretius devotes a long section (vi. 219-422) to the origin of the thunderbolt and its behaviour, we may gather that it was an important point in Epicurean meteorology.

3. κατὰ πλείονας πνευμάτων συλλογὰς, 'many gatherings of winds', i.e. the conjunction of several of those whirls of wind pent in the clouds, which are described in § 100. 5 above. The emphatic word is πνευμάτων as opposed to πυρός, l. 7 below : this is the distinction between the two theories, which in effect come to much the same. Lucretius (vi. 246-284) has a long description in which the ideas of wind and fire are not kept distinct, though it on the whole inclines to the present notion of ignited wind.

4. ἐκπύρῳσιν καὶ κατάρρηξιν μέρους: the whole is ignited, and then, as it comes into collision with denser and denser masses of cloud, a part breaks off and falls as a thunderbolt. There is no doubt that the sentence is continuous, and that καὶ κατάρρηξιν, &c., forms part of the first explanation: cf. Lucr. vi. 281-284, where he exactly describes this portion of the process. Usener in his text followed the authority of the better MSS. and printed ἐκπύρῳσιν καὶ κατὰ ῥῆξιν μέρους, starting an independent explanation: but, as he sees in his preface (p. xx), that leaves the first explanation incomplete (and μέρους in the second would be strangely vague). Bignone agrees in reading καὶ κατάρρηξιν.

6. διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐξῆς τόπους . . . : the violent rush of wind condenses the cloud more and more, and so it offers an ever increasing resistance to the wind itself as it advances, until it is compact enough to cause a portion of the wind to break off and fall out of the cloud.

7. καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ . . . In the second explanation it is the fire-particles which produce the thunderbolt, being driven violently by the wind, and then owing to the same opposition of the increasing density of the cloud, breaking through it and falling. The MSS. have κατὰ ταύτην, on which Usener's κατ' αὐτὴν is certainly an improvement, though even that is not very easily intelligible: it probably refers back to the theory of thunder in § 100. 5 ff.

8. καθὰ καὶ βροντὴν . . . : certainly a reference to the theory of § 100. 5. One would have expected a reference to one of the theories of lightning here rather than thunder.

9. πνευμαθέντος: cf. πεπνευματωμένου, § 100. 7.

10. διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ὑποχωρεῖν: just in the same way as the ignited wind above, l. 4.

11. τῷ πύλῃσιν γίνεσθαι. After these words the MSS. have τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς ὅρος τι ὑψηλόν, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα κεραυνοὶ πίπτουσιν. The words interrupt the sense badly and μέν has nothing to correspond with it, so I have followed Usener in rejecting them as a note. But the high mountain is a prominent feature in the Epicurean theory of clouds, as we may see from Lucr. vi. 459 ff., and the note is at any rate on quite correct Epicurean lines.

§ 104. 1. καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους . . . : Lucretius suggests several in vi. 295 ff., 300 ff., 309 ff.

3. ὁ μῦθος: of course the idea that the thunderbolt is the direct instrument of divine vengeance, which Lucretius combats at length vl. 379-422.

4. τῶν ἀφανῶν: it is of course the causes of celestial phenomena which are ἀφανῆ and not the phenomena themselves. We are to get hints (σημειοῦσθαι) from causes we know about causes beyond our ken.

IV. ATMOSPHERIC AND TERRESTRIAL PHENOMENA.

(a) *Cyclones*. § 104. 5-§ 105. 4. The writer deals first with cyclones and suggests three explanations: in the first cloud is the main constituent, which is forced down by wind: in the other two wind, which either forms itself into a spiral, or is impeded by the mass of cloud and so driven downwards. Lucr. vi. 423-450 deals with the same topic and, though he only suggests the first explanation, sets it out with much picturesque detail. The section owes much to the restorations of Usener, who has, however, gone a little too far in 'correcting' it.

5. κατὰ κάθесιν νέφους, &c. The cloud is forced down by wind, which also causes its rotation, and its advance sideways is caused by an external wind: cf. Lucr. vi. 431-442.

6. στυλοειδῶς, 'like a pillar': a brilliant restoration of Usener's for the MS. ἀλλοειδῶς: Lucr. vi. 433 'tamquam demissa columna' makes it almost certain.

7. πολλοῦ, 'by the violence of the wind', which in its whirling efforts to escape drives on the cloud. Usener reads κύκλω, comparing l. 9 κατὰ περίσταςιν δὲ πνεύματος εἰς κύκλον, but the sense is already sufficiently given by στυλοειδῶς, and a change here is unnecessary.

8. εἰς τὸ πλάγιον: another emendation of Usener's for εἰς τὸ πλῆσιον: again, l. 11 εἰς τὰ πλάγια διαρρηγῆναι gives it strong support.

9. κατὰ περίσταςιν . . . In this explanation wind is the main constituent, which forms itself into a rotating spiral. For περίσταςις cf. § 92. 3, § 102. 7.

ἀέρος τινὸς ἐπισυνωθουμένου ἄνωθεν: Usener, who analyses this clause 'vento in gyrum acto et desuper pulso', apparently takes ἐπισυνωθουμένου as a middle in an active sense, 'atmosphere thrusting it down simultaneously from above'. But (a) such a middle use is very improbable, (b) ἀήρ could not have this thrusting power. The participle is surely passive: wind in a spiral formation could not in itself account for the phenomenon of the spout: it needs also some 'body': this is supplied in a portion of misty atmosphere (ἀέρος τινός) which is thrust down from above into the wind-spiral.

10. ῥύσεως πολλῆς . . . : the third explanation, which also takes wind as the chief constituent, follows the lines of the explanations of the thunderbolt given above. The wind in the cloud, being impeded by the condensed mass of cloud in its endeavours to move sideways, is driven to find an exit in a downward direction: cf. § 103. 3-7.

§ 105. 1. καὶ ἔως μὲν . . . : the same distinction of the whirlwinds on land and the waterspouts at sea produced by the cyclones is implied by Lucretius, who, after his description of the phenomenon at sea, appends a picture of what occurs on land (vi. 443-447).

2. ὡς ἂν . . . γίνηται: Usener having emended ὡς ἂν to ὡς ἀναγκαίως, κίνησιν to δίνησιν, and γίνηται to γίνεται, then excludes the clause as a gloss on δῖνοι. This is exceedingly arbitrary, and Bignone points out

that the words will make good sense as they stand if ὡς ἂν be taken in the sense of 'in whatever way', 'in all the various ways in which the creation of such whirlwinds may occur owing to the movement of the wind'. He would however himself prefer to suppose a brief lacuna, γίνονται, ιδίως δὲ καὶ ὀνομάζονται, ὡς ἂν . . . This would, no doubt, give further point to the clause, but once again it seems to be unduly imaginative restoration, and I should prefer to keep the words as they stand as a reference to the various kinds of whirlwinds which may occur.

(b) *Earthquakes*. § 105. 5-§ 106. 2. The writer suggests two main causes for earthquakes. (1) The dislocation and shaking of the earth by wind, which either (a) penetrates from outside, or (b) is produced by the falling in of large masses of ground into subterranean caverns. Or (2) this falling may itself circulate a shock underground, which is ultimately arrested and returned by compact tracts of earth. We must remember that the earth is conceived of as flat and of no great depth. The explanations are for the most part like those suggested by Lucr. vi. 535-607, and may be traced to their authors among the early philosophers, from whom too comes the tradition of reckoning certain subterranean phenomena among τὰ μετέωρα.

5. κατὰ πνεύματος . . . The causing of the earthquake by subterranean winds is described by Lucr. vi. 577 ff.

6. παράθεσιν: presumably 'dislocation', lit. 'the putting aside' of the earth in small masses by the force of the wind, which ultimately by cumulative effect causes a great motion.

7. ὁ τὴν . . . παρασκευάζει: Usener for ὅταν . . . παρασκευάζῃ (sic). τὴν κράδανσιν, 'the swaying of the earth': so τὸ περιέχον κραδαίνοντος, Aet. iii. 15. 4, in his account of Anaxagoras' theory of earthquakes. The reading of the majority of the MSS. points to κραδασμόν, which Casaubon adopted, but the second hand in B supports Hermann's restoration κράδανσιν.

καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦτο . . . : the writer deals with the question of the origin of this wind. It may come from outside. This was apparently the theory of Anaxagoras: cf. Aet. loc. cit., and Arist. *Meteor.* ii. 7. 365 a: so Lucr. vi. 578:

ventus ubi atque animae subito vis maxima quaedam
. . . extrinsecus . . . coorta.

8. (ῥ): a necessary addition of Meibom: he must proceed now to the alternative cause of the wind.

ἐκ τοῦ πίπτειν . . . : the second cause: the earth is cavernous beneath, and from time to time masses of earth fall in which stir the air and so create a wind. This idea is explained in Lucr. vi. 535-556 and was the notion of Anaximenes: Arist. *Meteor.* ii. 7. 365 b βρεχόμενῃ τὴν γῆν καὶ ξηραίνουμένην ῥήγνυσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ἀπορρηγνύμενων κολωνῶν ἐμπιπτόντων σείεσθαι. So too Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* vi. 20, in explaining Epicurus' theories of earthquake says: 'fortasse

enim aere extrinsecus alio intrante agitur, fortasse aliqua parte subito cadente percutitur et inde motum capit'.

There can be no doubt as to the meaning, but the text is uncertain. The MSS. have ἐκ τοῦ πίπτειν εἰς ἐδάφη εἰς ἀντροεῖς τόπους. Usener obelizes the first εἰς and suggests in his notes that it may represent something like εἰκοντα or ἐκκελυμένα, but Hermann's simple emendation εἴσω, mentioned by Usener in the preface, seems to set the passage right.

9. ἐκπνευματοῦντα is again a correction of Usener's for ἐκ πνευμάτων. A participle is badly wanted, and this gives just the sense required: we may compare πεπνευματομένον, § 100. 7, and πνευματοθέντος, § 103. 9.

10. ἐπιληγμένον of Q is probably right: πεπιλημένον of the majority of the MSS. is certainly wrong: there is no question here of the condensation of air.

(καὶ) κατ' αὐτὴν δέ . . . : the second main cause: the communication of a shock owing to the fall of ἐδάφη. There seems to be nothing quite like this notion elsewhere. Lucr. vi. 557-576 has the idea of the fall, but regards it as due to wind and causing wind, as above, 1 b, and Democritus too (Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* vi. 20) connects it with the motion of a subterranean stream. The MSS. have κατὰ ταύτην: the sense demands Usener's restoration: cf. § 103. 7.

διάδοσιν, 'the distribution' of the shock.

12. ἀναπόδοσιν, 'the return' of the shock: the movement reaches a firm, rocky piece of earth and is repelled: so, with his general notion of wind, Lucr. vi. 568 ff.

ἀπαντήσῃ: sc. ἡ κίνησις.

§ 106. 2. γίνεσθαι: Usener, who puts a full stop at ἀποτελεῖσθαι, suggests in his notes that δυνατόν is missing: it is probably another instance in which ἐνδέχεται or the like must be supplied: cf. § 92. 3, § 101. 4.

(c) (p) *Volcanoes.* § 106. 3-7. There follows a short passage dealing with the genesis of wind, which is palpably fragmentary. It does not seem to be part of a general theory of wind, though Bignone appears to take it as such, but rather of its origin in connexion with some other phenomenon. Usener is inclined to attach it to the section dealing with cyclones (§ 104 above), but it does not seem to fit well. Comparing it with Lucretius' description (vi. 680-702 and especially 694-700), I am inclined to believe that it formed part of a section on the cause of volcanoes. Lucretius explains that there are subterranean tunnels from the sea underneath Aetna, and the water which thus enters causes the wind which drives out the flames, &c. The passage in Lucretius has also been unfortunately mutilated, but we may notice the lines:

et penetrare mari penitus res cogit aperto
atque efflare foras ideoque extollere flammam
saxaque subiectare et harenæ tollere nimbos,

which correspond well enough to the second half of the first sentence of this section. If this theory be right, a considerable passage must have fallen out.

3. τὰ δὲ πνεύματα: Usener suggests that we should read τὰ δὲ πνεύματα (ταῦτα), and whether the reference be to the cyclones or to volcanoes, or any other phenomena, it is a very probable addition: something is wanted to distinguish τὰ πνεύματα here from τὰ λοιπὰ πνεύματα below.

ἄλλοφυλίας τινός: probably the alien matter of wind as opposed to the earth of the volcanoes. I do not understand how Usener takes it on his theory of the context.

4. καθ' ὕδατος ἀφθόου συλλογὴν will, on my view, be a second cause, namely, that described by Lucretius—the entrance of the seawater, which forces the air in the caverns up as wind.

5. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πνεύματα, 'other winds' concerned in the eruption apart from the special ones with which he has been dealing: these are produced when a few wind-particles or currents fall into the hollows beneath the mountain, and setting the interior air in motion cause a spreading of wind. Bignone would read τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν.

6. ὀλίγων: sc. πνευμάτων, as opposed to the πολλὰ κοιλώματα into which they enter. The word does not seem to me, as Usener thinks, to require emendation. Bignone would translate 'few bodies of matter', holding that the writer is arguing against Democritus, who said that when many bodies were in an empty space, wind followed: this seems very far-fetched.

διαδόσεις, 'spreading': as the currents set in motion the air which they meet and that in its turn stirs more distant air: cf. κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διάδοσιν τῆς κινήσεως, § 105. 10.

(d) Hail. § 106. 6-§ 107. 4. The writer now returns from terrestrial phenomena to more strictly meteorological occurrences, and deals with the formation and shape of hail. The text is uncertain and the meaning obscure: unfortunately Lucretius passes by the subject of this and the next few sections with the general statement that it will be easy to account for the formation of such things when we have once grasped the nature and powers of the atoms (vi. 527-534), nor can we derive much assistance from the accounts of the theories of early philosophers. The general idea, however, seems clear. Hail is formed either (1) by the powerful congelation of particles of wind, or (2) by the milder congelation of particles of water: in either case together with the process of congelation there is a (? simultaneous) process of division which causes the formation of small masses of ice instead of the freezing of the whole cloud. With regard to details both of text and interpretation I am inclined to differ considerably from Usener.

8. κατὰ πῆξιν ἰσχυροτέραν: because it requires a stronger congelation to solidify the subtler and more elusive particles of wind than the already more compact particles of water.

9. πνευματωδῶν: the emphatic word in this first explanation as opposed to the ὑδατοειδῶν of the second.

περίστασις, 'conformation', the coming together from different quarters to form a whole: cf. περίστασιν . . . πνεύματος εἰς κύκλον, § 104. 9 above, for the word; also § 92. 3, § 102. 7.

καὶ καταμέρισιν: so the MSS., except that κατὰ μέρισιν is written as two words. Simultaneous with the process of conformation is one of division, which causes the formation of separate nodules of hail instead of one solid mass. Usener reads κατὰ μέρισιν, 'and a subsequent division': but (a) it is extremely improbable that any one held the notion that the whole congealed in a mass, 'and then' was divided: surely τὰ φαινόμενα ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ, (b) the lengthier explanation of the process in the second theory shows that this was not the case. Bignone tacitly follows Usener.

καὶ (κατὰ) πῆξιν μετρωτέραν . . .: the second theory: it is watery particles which congeal, and for this purpose a less severe freezing is required. (κατὰ) is a necessary insertion made by Meibom.

10. (καὶ) ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν, 'and at the same time a breaking': i.e. just as in the case of the πνευματωδῆ particles, there must be a concurrent process of division: the idea is then doubly explained: this causes a simultaneous 'thrusting together' (σύνωσις) of the particles, and a splitting up (διάρρηξιν) into separate nodules; the former process makes the individual parts of the hailstones cling together (κατὰ μέρος), the latter makes them cling together as separate wholes (κατὰ ἀθροότητα). I believe then that with the single insertion of καὶ the MS. text gives a perfectly intelligible and consistent account of this double process and that no further emendation is required. Usener, however, adopts the correction ὁμοῦρησιν (cf. Ep. ad Hdt. § 64. 9) for ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν, and to account for it inserts before it (πνευματωδῶν δέ τινων). But (a) the alteration is very considerable; (b) the 'neighbourhood of certain windy particles' is not required to account for the double process; (c) it destroys the triple parallelism of the whole clause (πῆξιν . . . ῥῆξιν, σύνωσιν . . . διάρρηξιν, κατὰ μέρος . . . κατὰ ἀθροότητα); (d) it introduces a confusion between the two explanations: all that is required in the second is ὑδατοειδῆ particles (this is made clear again by § 107. 3 εἴτε ὑδατοειδῶν εἴτε πνευματωδῶν). The correction is very ingenious, but to my mind quite wrong. Bignone's translation again follows Usener's text without comment.

11. σύνωσιν: the process of union of the parts in a whole as opposed to διάρρηξιν the breaking up into separate nodules: the particles congeal, but in single nuclei.

ποιουμένην agrees grammatically with ῥῆξιν, but in sense, of course, also with πῆξιν.

12. κατὰ μέρος, as far as regards the parts of the nodules as opposed to κατὰ ἀθροότητα, as far as regards the individual nodules as separate wholes. With the general idea of the second theory we may compare the notions of Anaximenes, χάλαζαν δὲ (ἐκθλίβεσθαι), ἐπειδὴν τὸ καταφερό-

μενον ὕδωρ παγῇ (Aet. iii. 4. 1) and Anaxagoras χάλαζαν δ' ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν παγόντων νεφῶν προωσθῇ τινα πρὸς τὴν γῆν, ἃ δὴ ταῖς καταφοραῖς ἀποψυχρούμενα στρογγυλοῦται (Aet. iii. 4. 2).

§ 107. 1. ἡ δὲ περιφέρεια . . . : the writer proceeds to consider the cause of the round shape of the hailstones and suggests (1) that the corners are rounded off as they fall; (2) that as all the composing particles come together in exactly even quantities and at even rate from all sides, the round shape is naturally formed: this is true whether the particles are of wind or water.

2. τῶν ἄκρων ἀποτηκομένων: this is stated as Epicurus' theory by Aet. iii. 4. 5 στρογγυλαίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν χάλαζαν καὶ τὸν ὑετὸν ἀπὸ τῆς μακρᾶς καταφορᾶς ὑποπεπλασμένον.

καὶ ἐν τῇ συστάσει . . . : this most ingenious idea is again implied in Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* iv. 12.

πάντοθεν . . . κατὰ μέρη ὁμαλῶς περιϋσταμένων: notice the extreme carefulness of the description: it seems to be taken direct from some philosopher's theory.

ὡς λέγεται: but unfortunately we cannot attribute it to its author.

3. ὕδατοιδῶν: Usener for some reason adopts the reading of F, ὕδατοποιῶν, against that of all the other MSS., which preserves the parallelism and is strongly supported by ὕδατοιδῶν in § 106. 10.

(e) *Snou.* § 107. 5-§ 108. 4. A section naturally follows on snow. The text is again corrupt, but the general sense is clear, and a series of brilliant emendations have greatly improved the MS. reading. There are three theories: (1) that water is driven out of the clouds, which subsequently congeals in cold regions below; (2) that the pressure of clouds on one another congeals the water into snow inside, so that it falls out in that form; (3) that the friction of congealed clouds causes bits of snow to break off along the edges. The last is perhaps the most typically Epicurean explanation. Lucretius again passes over the question without comment (vi. 529).

5. ὕδατος λεπτοῦ . . . : the first theory: fine particles of water exude from clouds of the right atomic formation provided with pores to fit them, and entering cold regions below become congealed into snow flakes. This was the theory of Anaximenes and Anaxagoras.

6. διὰ πόρων: a striking correction of Kühn's for διαφορῶν (variously accented) of the MSS.

θλίψεις, Usener. θλίψεως MSS.: the writer uses διὰ with acc. rather than gen. in this sense, e.g. διὰ τινα ἰσχυρὰν . . . ψυχρασίαν just below, and the accumulation of genitives would be almost intolerable.

7. νεφῶν ἀεὶ ὑπὸ πνευμάτων σφοδρᾶς: a series of corrections for the MSS. νεφῶν καὶ ὑπομνήματος σπορᾶς, which is clearly nonsense. Usener excludes καί, but I have accepted Bignone's correction ἀεὶ (cf. § 102. 5).

8. ἐν τῇ φορᾷ: i.e. in its descent.

9. κατωτέρω, Cobet, for κατώτερον.

περίστασιν: see §§ 92. 3, 102. 7, 104. 9, 106. 9.

καὶ κατὰ πῆξιν δ' . . . : the second explanation : the congelation of the snowflakes may take place inside clouds of sufficiently fine texture, and their exudation caused by the pressure of clouds in juxtaposition.

10. *δμαλή δραιότητα* : the clouds must be fine in texture to produce such fine particles as those which compose snow : they must be of the same texture all over (*δμαλή*) to cause the evenness of the formation of the snowflakes : cf. of the formation of hailstones, § 107. 2, *πάντοθεν . . . κατὰ μέρος δμαλῶς περιϋσταμένον*.

ἔχουσιν, Meibom, for *ἔχουσιν* or *ἔχουσα*.

τοιαύτη, Froben, for *τοιαύτην*.

12. Before *ὕδατοιδῶν* Usener inserts (*τῶν*) unnecessarily, *ὕδατοιδῶν καὶ συμπαρακειμένων* are conditions which must be fulfilled by the clouds. Bignone translates 'when the watery elements are pressed by those near them' : I do not see how this can be got out of the Greek.

σύνωσιν in the technical sense : the driving together of particles to form the flake : see § 106. 11.

13. *δ μάλιστα γίνεται ἐν τῷ ἀέρι* : i.e. this process of *σύνωσις*, the driving together of particles by an external agency to form things is especially frequent in the atmosphere, where there is greater freedom of movement. We have seen it in the case of hail in § 106. 11. The clause is curious, but not, I think, unnatural. There seems no necessity for Usener's *ἐν τῷ ἔαρι*, though Arist. *Meteor.* 1. 12. 347 b says *αἱ δὲ χάλασαι γίνονται ἔαρος μὲν καὶ ὁπωρίνου μάλιστα*.

§ 108. 1. *καὶ κατὰ τρίψιν δὲ νεφῶν* : a third possibility : the clouds themselves may be congealed, and by their friction cause the flakes of snow to spring off by a kind of trituration : a specially Epicurean idea.

2. *ἀπόπαλσιν* : a technical word : the particles which form the congealed clouds are always in a state of vibratory movement, and the friction enables them to 'leap away' from the cloud.

ἀν λαμβάνοι τὸ, Schneider, for *ἀναλαμβάνοιτο* or *ἀναλαμβάνοι τὸ*.

3. *ἄθροισμα* : again technical, the right conformation of atoms to make snowflakes : cf. 100. 3.

(f) *Dew and Frost*. § 108. 5-§ 109. 8. Dew is next dealt with in a section which presents no great difficulty. There are two theories of its formation : (1) that particles which form it unite in the atmosphere and fall ; (2) that particles rise from damp places, unite and form moist drops, which fall again as dew. To this account is appended a brief statement that frost is formed in the same ways, when the moist particles are congealed by cold air. Lucretius does not even mention dew in his list of phenomena passed over : vi. 527-534.

5. *ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος* is emphatic : in the first theory the origin of the moisture is in the air : moist particles gather together there till they form a drop big enough to fall as dew.

7. *καὶ κατὰ φθόρην δὲ* . . . : the second theory differs in that the

origin of the moisture is the earth: moist particles are exhaled from damp places which then gather together and fall once more as dew-drops. Bignone would read κατ' ἀναφοράν, unnecessarily: cf. φεράν for the fall in l. 7.

ἀπὸ νοτερῶν τόπων: sc. marshes; ἢ ὕδατα κεκτημένων, sc. places with ponds or streams.

8. οἷσις: Usener's correction for τοῖς, better than Kühn's οἷς, which is too abrupt.

9. εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ: with σύνοδον only: cf. σύνοδον πρὸς ἄλληλα, l. 5 above.

10. ὑγρασίας: Bignone would insert παχυτέρας: if anything is to be added I would rather insert τοιαύτης.

καθάπερ ὁμοίως . . . : the appeal to familiar phenomena is not so obvious as usual: perhaps the writer is thinking of such things as the formation of steam into water on an intervening solid.

11. τοιαῦτά τινα: there is obviously a lacuna after these words which must have contained (a) the conclusion of the sentence, (b) the beginning of a sentence about hoar-frost, as Gassendi long ago inferred from the context. I should differ slightly from Usener's tentative filling up, (a) because I think συντελούμενα is unnecessary and not quite in accordance with the writer's usual phraseology (cf. § 95. 9, &c.), (b) because οὐ διαφερόντως συντελεῖται τῶν δρόσων seems an unnatural expression: I suspect a participle, μεταβαλλομένων or ἀλλοιουμένων is lost.

§ 109. 2. τοιούτων τινῶν, Usener, for the τούτων of the MSS.: the correction is not absolutely necessary, but makes the construction less abrupt, and is hinted at by B's τούτων τινά.

(g) Ice. § 109. 4-8. A short section on the formation of ice follows. Two theories are advanced: both hold that ice is produced by the elimination of particles of round formation and the gathering together of those of angular shape, but they differ in that the first, which is probably that of Democritus, describes the process as taking place entirely in the water, the second holds that it is an external formation which then comes and causes congelation in the water. The ideas seem rather grotesque to us, but we may remember (1) that to Epicurus the alteration of the σχηματισμός of component particles is always the cause of change; (2) that round smooth particles are always characteristic of water (cf. Lucr. ii. 451-452), and that consequently their elimination would be the natural preliminary to the change of water into a solid; (3) that the observation of the formation of ice-crystals might well lead to some such idea. Lucretius (vi. 530) again passes over the problem with a mention.

4. ἐκθλιψιν, 'the squeezing out', a technical word of the atomists for the process by which a particle (or an atom) between two others gets driven out usually in an upward direction (cf. probably Ep. i, § 53. 6).

5. σχηματισμοῦ: the formation of atoms into a nucleus of matter: Lucretius *glomeramen*: cf. §§ 101, 102.

σύνωσιν, as in § 107. 12.

σκαληνῶν καὶ ὀξυγωνίων: it is a little difficult to realize the difference, but probably by σκαληνῶν he means particles of triangular shape, by ὀξυγωνίων other angular formations.

6. τῶν . . . ὑπαρχόντων: this is emphatic as it is the point in which the first theory differs from the second.

καὶ κατὰ ἔξωθεν: again the emphatic point: the nuclei are formed outside, and attaching themselves to the water cause the change in shape and texture. We ought perhaps, with Schneider, to read κατὰ (τὴν).

7. πρόσκρισιν: the use of this word leads one naturally to suspect that this was the theory of Anaxagoras, though I can find no trace of it elsewhere: cf. § 90. 8.

8. ποσά, 'a certain number': the use is odd, but seems vouched for by the MSS.

(h) *The rainbow.* § 109. 9-§ 110. 6. The writer proceeds to deal with the rainbow. Two theories again are advanced: (1) that it is due to the shining of the sun's rays on a watery atmosphere; (2) that it is caused by a mixture of light and air which produces these colours, which are then reflected by the surrounding air. The former theory alone is mentioned by Lucr. vi. 524-526, and seems to have been the notion of Anaximenes (Aet. iii. 5. 10).

9. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου: the MSS. have ὑπό, which can hardly be right. Usener, following F, omits the preposition: I think it is more likely that it is a mistake for ἀπό.

10. κατὰ πρόσκρισιν: the MSS. have κατ' αἰέρος φύσιν, a palpable error. Usener reads κατὰ κράσιν, which is excellent in sense, but hardly accounts for the MS. text. I suggest κατὰ πρόσκρισιν (κατ' αἰέρος = κατὰ πρόσ.); cf. § 109. 7 above. If the suggestion be right, one would expect this to be the theory of Anaxagoras, though Aetius (iii. 5. 11) states that he supported the reflection theory: it may be that the writer adopted Anaxagoras' technical term without intending to imply his authorship of the theory. Bignone, feeling the same objection to Usener's emendation, reads κατὰ σύμφυσιν.

11. ἰδιώματα, 'the special characteristics': cf. πρόσκρισιν ἰδίαν above.

εἴτε . . . μονοειδῶς: i.e. the peculiar combination of light and air may produce all the colours at once, or separate combinations may cause the separate colours.

13. τοιαύτην, Usener, for ταύτην: cf. § 109. 2.

14. κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν πρὸς τὰ μέρη: i.e. the shining of the same light on different parts of the surrounding atmosphere may cause the production of different colours: a suggestion to explain μονοειδῶς above.

§ 110. 1-6. As a secondary point the writer discusses the shape of the rainbow. Here we have two quite different theories corresponding, though not at first obviously, to the two theories of the formation of

the rainbow above: (1) if the rainbow is merely the reflection of the sun's light, then it is round because all points of the reflection are equidistant from our sight; (2) if it is caused by the mixture of elements of light from the sun and air in the atmosphere, then its roundness is due to the fact that one or other of these two component elements is actually arranged in round form and impresses its shape on the combination.

2. διὰ τὸ . . . θεωρεῖσθαι: the conformation of our κόσμος being spherical, the junction of points equidistant from the earth will assume a round appearance.

3. ἡ σύνωσιν . . . : this explanation clearly goes with the second of the two theories as to the general nature of the rainbow.

4. τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι . . . ἀποφερομένων: corresponding exactly, though with a more careful statement, to τοῦ τε φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, § 109. 10.

ἀτόμων: all the MSS. have τομῶν, a palpable mistake, which, as Usener has seen, was corrected by the insertion of ἀτομῶν after the participle ἀποφερομένων.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀέρος: after these words the MSS. have προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην. Usener insists, following C. F. Hermann, that the words from ἀέρος to σελήνην are only a meaningless repetition of a phrase from the following section. Usener also excludes αὐτοῦ, which I am inclined to keep as emphasizing the contrast between the light atoms derived from the sun and the air atoms already in the atmosphere: all that need be excluded is προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην.

5. περιφέρειαν . . . ταύτην. This combination (*sc.* of light and air atoms) stretches downwards, a kind of round shape: i.e. spreads out in the round shape which it assumes from one of its elements. But the expression is odd and the text rather uncertain, all the MSS. having καθέσθαι instead of καθίεσθαι, which is Meibom's correction.

(1) *The moon's halo.* § 110. 7-111. 2. Three easily distinguishable theories are propounded: (1) that the halo is formed by air advancing from outside towards the moon; (2) that it is formed by effluences from the moon itself, which are checked equally all round by the air; (3) that it is formed by the surrounding air, which is piled up in a thick circle either by an external current, or by heat which blocks up the channels for its movement. The text is rather corrupt, though it has been greatly improved by Meibom and Usener. Lucretius does not deal with this problem, nor does it seem possible to obtain any light from the accounts of the earlier philosophers, from whom no doubt these theories are derived.

7. καί: the MSS. have καὶ κατὰ, their most frequent mistake, due to dittography.

9. ἀναστέλλοντος, 'blocking', 'banking up': Meibom's correction for ἀναστέλλοντα, a mere mistake due to the neighbourhood of ρεύματα and ἀποφερόμενα.

10. περιστήσαι εἰς: Usener's most ingenious correction of *περὶ τῆς εἰς*, based on Meibom's previous suggestion *περιστήσῃ*.

καὶ μὴ τὸ παράπαν διακρίναι, 'without any distinction all along', i.e. the process of the banking up of the cloudy circle takes place equally at all parts, an elaboration of *ὁμαλῶς* in l. 9.

11. ἀναστέλλοντος: sc. τοῦ ἀέρος, as before: the expression is loose, 'the air checks the air round the moon'. Possibly it was the consciousness of this carelessness which led the writer to add the clause *ὃ γίνεται . . . ἀπεργάσασθαι*, which explains the real causes of the check.

12. περιφερές, like *παχυμερές*, is predicative.

παχυμερές, 'thick in parts', i.e. with its parts closely compressed, so dense.

§ 111. ἰ. ὃ γίνεται . . . ἀπεργάσασθαι. I take this sentence to refer only to the last explanation: the 'banking' of the air may be due either to an external effluence or to the effect of heat. Bignone would refer it to the whole paragraph, taking *ἦτοι . . . ῥεύματος* as the cause of the advance of air from outside (first explanation) and *ἡ . . . ἀπεργάσασθαι* as the cause of the 'banking' of the air (third explanation). The singular *ὃ* seems to me against this.

κατὰ μέρος τινά, sc. in different parts of the sky during the moon's course one or other of these causes is at work.

2. ἡ τῆς θερμασίας . . . ἀπεργάσασθαι is not very explicit. Bignone takes this to mean that heat seizes on the pores through which the air would naturally move and blocks them up, so as to produce the phenomenon of the halo. I feel sure that this is the meaning, but do not see how it can be extracted from the MS. text, with which it must be that the *πόροι* are *ἐπιτήδευοι εἰς τὸ τοῦτο ἀπεργάσασθαι*. I therefore propose the small change to *ἐπιτηδείως*.

V. FURTHER CELESTIAL PHENOMENA.

The writer now, with a certain irregularity of procedure, returns to celestial phenomena, and deals with certain problems which he had hitherto left untouched. It would not be right to transfer this and the following sections to their logical position at the beginning of § 99, because the whole letter is so obviously a patchwork compilation without systematic treatment. Usener suggests that this paragraph on comets ought to come after the two sections on the planets and fixed stars and immediately before that on falling stars. Again we may agree that this would be more logical, but there seems little reason for supposing that the writer was careful enough to put his subjects in the rational order.

(a) *Comets.* § 111. 4-11. For the occurrence of comets the writer suggests two possible causes, the latter being subdivided. (1) It may be that they are casual collocations of fire in the sky due to a special atomic conformation; (2) it may be that they are real permanent stars,

and that either (*a*) some special movement of the sky reveals them to us when they were previously hidden, or (*b*) they move independently so that they come into our vision. I cannot at all agree with Usener that (*2 b*) is a mere repetition of (*1*) and should therefore be excluded: see notes. Bignone agrees with me both in keeping the text and in the explanation of it.

5. περιστάσεως, 'a gathering of matter all round' to form some new object: one of the writer's favourite technical terms: cf. §§ 92, 102, 104, &c.

6. ἡ ἰδίαν . . . ὑπὲρ ἡμῶς: the second cause: the whole heaven moves so as to bring the comets into view: compare the account given of the motion of sun and moon, § 92. 9.

7. τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄστροα is emphatic: the comets are actual ἄστροα, permanent heavenly bodies, which through the movement of the whole sky now become visible.

ἡ αὐτὰ . . . ἐκφανῇ γενέσθαι: the third cause: the comets may be permanent celestial bodies, which though the whole heaven remains stationary, come into view from time to time by their own movement. The construction of the clause, as Bignone points out, is again infinitive depending on a suppressed δυνάτον or ἐνδέχεται: cf. § 92. 3, § 101. 11, § 106. 2. Usener excludes the whole clause on the ground that it is a mere repetition of (*1*), but it differs from it in that (*1*) regards the comets as occasional temporary aggregations of fire, and (*2 a* and *b*) as permanent bodies. It is essential to the passage to retain the clause, which is then parallel to the second possibility with regard to sun and moon given in § 92. 9.

8. διὰ τινὰ περιστάσιν: i.e. some conformation of the atmosphere which presses on these normally stationary bodies and stirs them into action. Bignone again translates 'for some reason': see § 102. 7.

9. τὴν τε ἀφάνισιν . . . αἰτίας. There can surely be no reason why Usener should exclude this clause: the explanation of the disappearance of the comets is not only natural but almost necessary.

(*b*) *Fixed stars.* § 112. 1-8. The writer now proceeds to consider the problems of the various kinds of motions of the stars, and deals first with the fixed stars. His explanations correspond exactly to the theories of the motions of the stars given in § 92, with which passage this is closely connected. (*1*) If the whole heaven moves round and the stars with it, then the fixed stars are at the points which do not revolve (i.e. the poles); (*2*) if the heaven is stationary and the stars move independently then, (*a*) if the stars are driven by their own whirl (δίνη), the fixed stars are prevented from moving by a circular current all round them which keeps them in their place, (*b*) if the stars advance to the regions where they can successively find fuel for their flame, then the fixed stars are kept in one place as it is the only source of their proper fuel. We may therefore fairly attribute the first theory to Anaximenes, the second to Democritus, and the third to Heraclitus. The reference is to the polar stars, i.e. as Bignone

explains, those whose distance from the pole is less than the height of the pole above the horizon, so that they are visible all the year round.

§ 112. 1. τινὰ ἄστρα στρέφεται αὐτοῦ ὁ συμβαίνει: the MSS. have τινὰ ἀναστρέφεται αὐτοῦ ὁ συμβαίνει. Usener's restoration ἄστρα for ἀνα- is certain, and he rightly sees that the expression is a reminiscence of the Homeric ἄρκτον . . . ἣ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται (Il. 18. 487). That being so, it seems more likely that the writer should have made the quotation exact and followed it with ὁ συμβαίνει, as the MSS. have it, than that he should have brought the phrase into line with his usual form of expression by writing, as Usener emends, στρέφεσθαι αὐτοῦ συμβαίνει.

στρέφεται αὐτοῦ: not merely *versatur ibidem*, but literally 'revolve in their place'.

οὐ μόνον . . . στρέφεται: the first cause: these stars are in a stationary part of the heaven.

2. τὸ λοιπόν: sc. 'the rest of the heaven': there is no reason to adopt Schneider's τὰ λοιπά, 'the remaining stars'.

3. τινές we may then take to be Anaximenes and his followers. Usener thinks the reference is not to the polar stars, but to the theory of the Pythagoreans that the 'middle and end' of the world were fixed. But the parallel of § 92 seems to demand the polar theory.

ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . καὶ τὰ ἄλλα: the second theory: the other stars perform an orbit, but these are kept in their place by a revolving ring of air around them.

4. περιεστάναι: with the full technical force of περίστασις: the encircling whirl is formed all round the star.

5. ἣ καὶ διὰ . . . : the third theory, which is really so different in general idea from the other two, is carefully marked off from them.

6. κείμενα: emphatic, 'fixed'.

καὶ κατ' ἄλλους . . . : the usual caution: the parallel of earthly phenomena may suggest several other ways in which the occurrence may take place.

(c) *Planets and regular stars.* § 112. 9-§ 113. 12. From the fixed stars the writer passes to the moving stars, and first suggests explanations for the difference between the (apparently) erratic course of the planets and the regular orbits of the other stars. The two explanations given again correspond, but not so completely, to the theories of § 92. The notion of the movement of the whole sky now drops out, and the two theories of the independent motion of the individual stars are considered: (1) if they move according to orbits determined by necessity from the beginning, then some of these were regular circles and some are interrupted by aberrations; (2) if the stars move towards the regions which supply their fuel, then some pass always through regions equally open and prolific in fuel, others through irregular tracts with an unequal supply, so that their movements are erratic. For the latter notion we may compare, in a slightly different context, Lucr. v. 696-700. The wording of the passage is a little obscure and

the text in places uncertain, though I incline, as usual, to think Usener's corrections rash.

9. εἰ οὕτω . . . συμβαίνει: a parenthesis: 'if indeed it is the case that their movements are erratic', suggesting the possibility that in such distant phenomena even our observations may be doubtful.

§ 113. 1. τινὰ δὲ μὴ (οὕτω) κινεῖσθαι. The MSS. have τινὰ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, which cannot be right, as the question of the fixed stars has already been disposed of in the previous paragraph, and the contrast now is between the aberrations of the planets and the regularity of the stars. Usener boldly emends, on the analogy of the terminology elsewhere in this paragraph, to τινὰ δ' ὁμαλῶς κινεῖσθαι. But this seems too violent, and I am inclined to think that δὲ μὴ is right and some word has dropped out: possibly ἀνωμαλῶς, but more probably simply οὕτω, referring back to οὕτω . . . συμβαίνει. Bignone would exclude κινεῖσθαι as a gloss—not a very probable one.

2. παρὰ τὸ κύκλῳ . . . : the first explanation: in this idea of the whirl and ἀνάγκη we seem again to recognize the theory of Democritus.

3. ὁμαλὴν . . . 6. ὁμαλὰς . . . 7. ἀνωμαλεῖς. There is considerable doubt as to the form of the adjectives. Elsewhere the forms ὁμαλός and ἀνώματος alone are known: the MSS. here are doubtful; they are unanimous for ὁμαλὴν in l. 3, divided between ὁμαλὰς and ὁμαλεῖς in l. 6, and distinctly in favour of ἀνωμαλεῖς in l. 7. Usener prefers the 3rd declension forms throughout: I incline to think that MS. evidence combined with the invariable practice elsewhere is against it. Possibly the right solution is, as the MSS. suggest, that the writer used ὁμαλός but ἀνωμαλῆς, a slightly more probable form than ὁμαλῆς.

4. κατὰ τὴν (sc. δίνην) ἅμα τοῖς ἀνωμαλίαις χρωμένῃ is the MS. text and seems to me quite reasonable: the course of the planets is an orbit, but at the same time (ἅμα) it has some irregularities. Usener emends quite unnecessarily to κατὰ τινὰ δίνην, Bignone less violently but, I think, gratuitously to κατὰ τιν' ἄλλην.

ἑνδέχεται δὲ . . . : the second theory, that the fuel track of the planets is irregular, seems to bear the mark of Heraclitus.

5. παρεκτάσεις, 'tracts' of air: surely not 'currents', as Bignone renders.

6. ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνωθούσας κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς, 'urging them on (by the attraction of appropriate fuel) continuously in the same direction', i.e. in the direction of a regular orbit.

7. παραλλαγὰς, 'alternations', so 'aberrations': for the word cf. § 95. 8.

8. τὸ δὲ μίαν αἰτίαν . . . : the usual attack on the 'theological' view, which adopts one certain theory: cf. § 87.

10. ἀστρολογίαν: here clearly 'theological astronomy', the view which wishes to see in the movements of the stars an indication of the divine will: cf. ἀστρολόγων τεχνικίας, § 93. 12.

11. αἰτίας τινῶν is the MS. text, and again there seems no reason

to follow Usener in altering to αἰτίας ἄστρον—if indeed that is a possible expression. Bignone's πάντων is more probable, but possibly the writer's expression here was more mild.

ὅταν . . . ἀπολύωσι: again a familiar point. The primary object of Epicurean astronomy is to show that the divine nature πράγματα οὐκ ἔχει, K. Δ. i.

(d) *Difference of speed in the stars' orbits.* § 114. 1-7. The writer next deals with the apparent variety of pace in the orbits of the stars. His explanations here cannot be attached closely to preceding theories, nor are they exactly parallel to Lucretius' treatment of the same subject (v. 614-649), but they are within the same range of general ideas. Either (1) all stars are going on the same orbit, but some faster than others, or (2) some are really moving in the opposite direction, but are caught back by the whirl of the others and so seem to follow them more slowly, or (3) all move in the same direction, but some being at a greater distance from the centre have a larger distance to travel. The only difficulty of the passage lies in the text and interpretation of the second explanation.

3. περιόντα: of course nom. plur., τὸν αὐτὸν κύκλον being an internal acc. περιόντα is the correction in Froben's text for the MS. περιόντα.

καὶ παρὰ τὸ . . . ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δίνης: with this, the MS. text, the idea seems to be that the 'slower' stars are actually moving in an orbit in the opposite direction to that of the 'faster' stars, but they are, as it were, caught up by the whirl of the others and dragged back, so that they seem to move in the same direction as the others, but less fast. The idea is not quite clearly thought out, but sufficiently clear to be maintained in the text. Usener alters τῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης, and in his analysis renders *causam posse esse vertiginem illa ex orbita detrahentem*, the idea being apparently that of a whirl 'of the requisite nature' (τοιαύτης) dragging the stars out of their course. But (a) this entirely neglects τὴν ἐναντίαν κινεῖσθαι; (b) ἀντισπώμενα could only mean 'dragged in the opposite direction' and not 'dragged out of the course'; (c) the facts of the case are against such an idea, which is more appropriate to a planet. Bignone apparently accepts τοιαύτης, but agrees with me in the general idea of the passage.

4. τῆς αὐτῆς δίνης then is the whirl which moves the other stars as opposed to τὴν ἐναντίαν: cf. τὸν αὐτὸν κύκλον above. To me the expression seems quite clear and natural.

καὶ παρὰ τὸ περιφέρεσθαι . . .: this idea approaches nearly to the theory of Democritus as explained by Lucr. v. 621-636, but is without the elaborate notion of optical delusion which was a cardinal point in Democritus' explanation. We may compare the expressive phrase in the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda, *fr.* viii. 1. 11 οἱ μὲν ὑψηλὴν ζώνην φέρονται, οἱ δ' αὖ ταπεινὴν.

6. τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς . . .: the same caution as above, § 113. 8. To insist on the single explanation is to lay claim to miraculous knowledge

(ταρατεύεσθαι). Compare again Diog. Oen. fr. viii. 3. 7 μάντεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ.

(e) *Falling stars.* § 114. 8-§ 115. 8. The letter proceeds to deal with falling or shooting stars, a sequence which would be quite natural if we were to follow Usener's suggestion and transfer the section on comets to a place immediately before it. Three explanations are offered, as to the first of which there is great divergence of opinion. As I understand the passage they are: (1) the falling stars may actually be fragments of stars, rubbed off in collision of star with star and driven down towards earth by an outburst of wind; (2) they may be formed by a gathering of fire-producing atoms, caused to fall in the direction of the impulse started by their meeting; (3) they may be formed by a gathering of wind in dense clouds, which is ignited when it cannot find an outlet, and then bursts out and falls in the direction of its original impulse. Usener interprets the first theory quite differently and alters the text, but in any case the paragraph must be carefully compared with that dealing with comets (§ 111) and those which treat of lightning (§§ 101-102) and thunderbolts (§ 103).

8. παρὰ μέρος, 'in part', almost 'in individual cases', as Bignone translates it. It may possibly be used in a more strictly local sense, 'in places': cf. κατὰ μέρη, § 111. 1.

κατὰ παράτριψιν: Usener's correction for καὶ παρὰ τρίψιν. The repetition of παρὰ is not, I think, impossible, and the uncompounded τρίψις might be used here (see, however, § 101. 2), but καὶ is unintelligible after καὶ παρὰ μέρος, and the confusion of καί and κατὰ is the commonest mistake in the MSS.

8-11. κατὰ παράτριψιν . . . ἐλέγομεν: I take this whole clause together as constituting the first cause and, with some hesitation, retain the MS. ἐαντῶν. The idea is that stars rub together and fragments break off, which fall through the atmosphere: compare, as the writer tells us, the description of the first cause of the creation of lightning (§ 101. 2 ff.). The explanation will then be parallel to the second and third explanations of comets, namely, that shooting stars are in point of fact stars, or in this case, fragments of stars, whereas the other two explanations regard them as occasional formations.

If this view be correct, (1) παράτριψιν ἐαντῶν is a loose expression, for it is of course the collision of stars which causes the fragments to be rubbed off, and not the collision of the 'falling stars' themselves. Bignone, agreeing with me in the general view of the phrase, would read ἀστρων for ἐαντῶν, which would certainly make the expression much clearer, but this I do not consider necessary, as ἀστρων can so easily be derived as the equivalent of ἐαντῶν from οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀστέρες ἡμῖν in l. 8; (2) καὶ παρὰ ἔκπτωσιν will denote a further step in the same cause: the fragments of stars are first rubbed off and then caused to fall by the action of wind. Bignone takes the words as introducing the second cause: but (a) the introductory phrase for a new cause in this section is καὶ κατὰ, not καὶ παρὰ, and (b) in the

parallel account of lightning in § 101 the 'falling out' of the fragments rubbed off is denoted by ἐξολισθαίνων; (3) the parallel to the explanation of the lightning flashes will not be exact, for they are created by the friction of clouds: but I take it that the reference is intended to suggest the kind of παράρριψις and ἔκπτωσις which the writer has in mind and not to insist on an exact parallelism of occurrence. Usener however, desiring an exact parallel, reads νεφῶν for ἐαυτῶν and πυρὸς ἔκπτωσιν for παρὰ ἔκπτωσιν. But the changes seem to me (as to Bignone) unjustifiably violent; they are not really required by the reference to the section on lightning, and they destroy the parallel to the section on comets which we should certainly expect to find. Bignone notices further that they would make the first cause very little different from the third. I prefer, therefore, to retain the MS. text and explain it as above, though admitting that it is a rather careless piece of writing.

9. καὶ παρὰ ἔκπτωσιν, 'and then by the falling out of the fragments': Bignone, as already noted, takes this of an alternative cause.

10. ἡ ἔκπνευμάτως, 'the blowing of them out by wind'. Bignone renders 'the combination of fire and air, of which we have spoken in treating of lightning'. But (1) it is surely impossible that ἔκπνευμάτως could imply as much as this; (2) καθάπερ ought to refer to the whole clause and not to one word only.

§ 115. 1. καὶ κατὰ σύνοδον δὲ . . . γένηται. The second cause, the casual gathering of fire-particles, which then fall in the direction originally given them by their meeting. Compare the first explanation of comets in § 111. 4.

2. συμφυλίας, 'a kinship', i.e. a gathering of kindred matter, the περίστασις of § 111. 8: an unusual but quite natural term for the writer, which seems to be corroborated by the MS. variations.

καὶ κίνησιν: the MSS. have καὶ κατὰ κίνησιν, which might perhaps be kept to express a subordinate cause like καὶ παρὰ ἔκπτωσιν in § 114. 9: but the writer's usual practice is only to insert the preposition again when he is introducing a new cause, and the confusion and dittography of καί and κατὰ is so common that we should probably follow Usener in excluding κατὰ here.

οὐ ἂν . . . 'wherever' is a little awkward in expression, and we should perhaps adopt the suggestion made by Usener in his notes of ἂν . . ., 'in whatever direction'.

3. καὶ κατὰ πνεύματος . . . : the third suggestion is that the falling stars are really ignited wind: cf. the sections on lightning and the thunderbolt.

5. τούτου, Usener: the τούτων of the MSS. is a mere mistake; von der Muehl prefers the plural all through, πνευμάτων . . . τούτων φερομένων.

κατείλησιν, 'the whirl' of a pent up body: cf. § 101. 14, &c.

ἐπέκρηξιν seems to be what is intended by the MS. variants (three MSS. have it), though the force of ἐπ- is not easy to see, and Usener

suggests that we ought to read the simple *ἐκρηξίν*. Von der Muehl's *ἐκρηξίν* (*ἐκ*) is attractive.

6. *τῶν περιεχόντων*, 'from the surrounding matter', i.e. the *πυκνώματα ὀμυχλοειδῆ*. Bignone translates 'the bursting asunder of the parts on the outside', but this seems to miss the force of *ἐπέκρηξιν*.

7. *φερομένου*, Usener rightly, with *πνεύματος*, l. 4: *φερομένης* (MSS.) is again a mistake due to the neighbourhood of *φορᾶς*.

8. *ἀμύθητοι*, MSS.: the word, when it occurs (e.g. Dem. 520. 20), usually means 'unspeakably large, or many', a sense which is obviously out of place here, though Crönert would retain it in that sense. I do not think, seeing the writer's many references to *μῦθος*, that it is impossible that he should use the word meaning 'uncontaminated by myth': cf. especially the conclusion of the parallel section on thunderbolts (§ 104. 2) *μόνον ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω*. Usener, presumably regarding this as impossible, reads *ἀνύσιμοι*, 'effective', another very violent and, I think, unnecessary change. Bignone retains *ἀμύθητοι*, noting that Lortzing proposed *ἄμυθοι*, which is the more usual word in this sense.

(✓) *Weather-signs from animals*. § 115. 9-§ 116. 3. A concluding ironical paragraph follows on the supposed signs of the weather given by the appearance of certain animals—e.g. the swallow as the herald of spring. Such 'signs' are, the writer says, merely due to coincidence: the animals cannot exert any influence on the course of the seasons, and no animal of any sort, let alone a divine being, could be so enamoured of trifles as to play the game of watching for the animals and thus bringing the prediction to pass. The irony of the passage is in rather marked distinction to the general matter-of-fact style of the letter, and reminds us of passages in Lucretius. In his amused scorn the writer seems to have forgotten the explanation that it is the approach of a new season which causes the animals to appear.

9. *ἐπισημασῖαι*, 'signs of the weather': cf. § 98, where in dealing with the signs given by the stars, the writer says that some of them are due to chance coincidence, *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμφανέσι παρ' ἡμῶν ξύοις*.

κατὰ συγκύρημα . . . τοῦ καιροῦ: cf. § 98. 9 *κατὰ συγκυρήσεις καιρῶν*.

§ 116. 2. *κἂν* (*εἰ*): the addition of Usener seems necessary, as in Cobet's *ἀν* just before.

μικρὸν χαριέστερον εἶη: obviously an allusion to a proverb, 'the smaller the trifle, the greater the joy'.

3. *ἐμπέσοι*: another certain correction for the MS. *ἐκπέσῃ*.

Conclusion. § 116. 4-12. The letter ends with a conclusion based more or less closely on the corresponding conclusion of the first letter. These main principles, and especially the doctrine of the origin of things and the infinity of the atoms and space, must be thoroughly grasped, together with the fundamental reason for their knowledge, the true pleasure of life: from them an understanding of the details will naturally follow.

5. τοῦ μύθου ἐκβήση, the avowed object all through this second letter, and one of the chief sources of ἀταραξία.

6. τῶν ἀρχῶν, 'the origins' of things, i.e. the atoms and space.

7. ἀπειρίας : i.e. the infinity of the two ἀρχαί and of the κόσμοι.

8. κριτηρίων here must be the criteria of truth on the intellectual side, i.e. αἰσθησις and πρόληψις.

παθῶν : the criteria of rightness on the moral side : they are usually included with the other two under the general head of κριτήρια (e.g. *D. L.* x. 31), but the separation here is quite natural, and there is no reason, with Kochalsky, to suspect the text.

οὐ ἔνεκεν : i.e. the ἀταραξία, freedom for the disturbance of theological beliefs, which is the greater part of the true philosopher's ἡδονή.

9. τῶν κατὰ μέρος : the detailed phenomena of nature and their explanation.

10. καταγαπήσαντες : not merely understood but accepted them as a creed : Bignone renders 'studied with the utmost care', which is hardly strong enough.

11. ῥ̃ : Kühn's necessary correction for ῥ̃.

(ἄν) an inevitable addition of Usener's.

12. περιεποιήσαντο, 'made it their own' : they have not otherwise attained ἀταραξία.

LETTER TO MENOECEUS

THE third letter, written to Epicurus' disciple Menoeceus, is a brief exposition of the philosopher's moral theory. It starts with a reiteration of the two fundamental conditions of the moral life, the right understanding of the nature of the gods and the freedom from the fear of death, after which the rest of the letter is devoted to a clear and logical statement of Epicurus' view that pleasure is the end of life and of the sense in which this is to be understood.

The letter is not intended, like that to Herodotus, for the use of advanced students, but is a simple and straightforward exposition for the general reader. It is in fact an 'exoteric' work, as Aristotle might have called it, and as such, contains far more references than the other letters to rival theories and popular views. The common ideas as to the nature and activities of the gods are passed in review (§ 123) and their weakness is exposed, popular notions as to the terrible nature of death are condemned (§§ 125, 126), and vulgar conceptions of the character of true pleasure are refuted (§ 131). References are made, implicitly or explicitly, to ideas of Plato (§ 132), of the Cyrenaics (§ 127), of the Stoics (§ 130), of Theognis (§ 126), and possibly of Epicharmus (§ 125) and Mimnermus (§ 126). It is clear that however devoted a disciple Menoeceus may have been, the letter was intended to reach a wider public who might still be under the influence of an erroneous philosophy or of the unsupported maxims and opinions of popular thought.

For this reason the letter is written in a very different style from that of the letter to Herodotus. The expression is almost invariably smooth and artistic, free from the crabbed obscurities of the first letter and the hasty carelessness of the second. It is in the Attic mood, in a mellow and straightforward Greek, with far fewer idiosyncracies of vocabulary and idiom, and less technical diction than either of the other two letters or the *Κύρια Δόξα*. Epicurus employs such deliberate artifices as antithesis and assonance, one can almost trace an intentional rhythm, and certainly (though Usener has probably pressed the point too far) there is in general a deliberate avoidance of hiatus. As a consequence no doubt of its greater ease and fluency, the text of the letter has been far better preserved in the MSS. of Diogenes and, except in the last three sections, presents few serious difficulties.

The genuineness of the third letter has not been disputed, and in it we see Epicurus at his best. He is still the dogmatic teacher, certain

of the truth of his own position and contemptuous of all who differ from him, he preserves his characteristic gravity and seriousness, and has, for instance, no trace of the playfulness and irony of Plato or of the humour of Aristotle, but the reader cannot fail to find a certain attractiveness in this cold, severe style, which seems to bring before us a vivid picture of the aged philosopher discoursing to his young friends in the Garden.

INTRODUCTION (§ 122).

The introductory paragraph presents no serious difficulties. Philosophy is for all alike: no one is too young or too old for it, and to refuse to study it is at any age to throw away one's chance of happiness. This is an emphatic declaration of Epicurus' essentially democratic view: he had no desire to form a new esoteric sect, but wished to place his philosophy at the service of any who would hear it.

§ 122. 3. *πάρωρος*, 'past the age': the word is not quoted elsewhere in this sense, but the neighbouring *ἄωρος* makes its meaning clear.

4. *ἢ μήπω* is the reading of the MSS. (*ei B*), and there seems no reason for excluding *ἢ* which anticipates *ἢ* before *παρεληλυθέναι*: indeed it makes it easier to take *τὴν ὥραν* with *ὑπάρχειν*.

ὑπάρχειν ἢ: the MSS. have *ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ*, which must be emended either by the insertion of the article before *ὥραν*, as Cobet proposed, or by omitting *ὥραν* as a gloss. The latter seems the better course, as the repetition of *τὴν ὥραν* would be both unnecessary and harsh, and Epicurus in this letter shows much greater attention to such points of style.

5. *πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν* is of course emphatic: a man might just as well say that he is too young as too old to be happy.

μήπω is a necessary correction for the MSS. *μὴ*: F makes a similar mistake immediately afterwards in reading *μὴ* for *μηκέτι*.

7. *νεάζει τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*, 'may be young in blessings', a rather unusual expression: *νεάζειν τῷ τρόπῳ* is quoted from a fragment of Menander, but is not quite so harsh.

διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, 'by the grateful recollection of the past', i.e. of the philosophic truths which he learnt in earlier life. The phrase has almost a New Testament ring: there are other indications of an approximation of Epicurus' language to the Hellenistic, e.g. the use of *σάρξ*, K. Δ. iv. There is no need to follow Ritter in altering to *χαρὰν*. For this idea of the value of recollection Bignone refers to K. Δ. ix and *Sent. Vat.* xvii.

9. *διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων*: because he will know the truth about the government of the world and the dissolution of the soul at death.

μελετᾶν: probably 'meditate on', not 'practise': so at the end of the letter, § 135. 5. Note its combination with *πρᾶττε* in § 123. 1.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD LIFE (§§ 123-127).

§ 123. In a brief sentence Epicurus recommends his disciple to keep in mind the first principles, which are the guarantee of a happy and good life.

1. *παρήγγελον*: the imperfect seems to refer to verbal instructions given while Epicurus and Menoeceus were together. Oral teaching was always the basis of Epicurus' instruction: cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.*, § 83. 12 note.

2. *στοιχεῖα*, 'first principles': cf. *κατεστοιχειωμένον*, *Ep. ad Hdt.*, § 35. 9. There he was dealing with physical and metaphysical principles; here he is speaking of the moral principles, the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν*.

διαλαμβάνων: more than 'receiving' or 'accepting': 'distinguishing' these moral principles from other *στοιχεῖα* as the ground of the good life. So frequently in *Ep. ad Hdt.*, e.g. § 58. 6.

The two great principles, which Epicurus now enunciates, that the gods need not be feared, and that death is nothing to us, were part of the Epicurean *τετραφάρμακος*, and form the subject of K. Δ. i and ii.

1. *The nature of the gods* (§§ 123-124).

The Epicurean theology is here viewed in its moral aspect, as it affects human beings. That the gods exist is certain, for the knowledge of them is due to immediate (mental) perceptions, which are common to all men. They are also, as is commonly supposed, blessed and immortal, but popular religion errs in attributing to them the government of the world, and feelings of anger and love towards men, which are inconsistent with their blessedness. They live apart from the world and are not concerned with its changes and chances. Yet by the visitation of their images man can be brought to have a share in their *ἀταραξία*, so that a place is still left for religion. The removal of fear and the communication of tranquillity thus both contribute to the good life.

3. *Ἰϕον*: God is a living being, though the peculiar formation of his person distinguishes him from all other creatures.

ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον, 'imperishable and blessed in happiness': cf. K. Δ. i *τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον*.

4. *ἡ κοινὴ . . . νόσις*, 'the universal conception': the idea which is in the mind of every man. This idea was created, as we learn from *Lucr. v. 1161 ff.*, by the constant influx into the mind of subtle images (*εἰδῶλα*) passing from the persons of the divine beings and thus creating in the mind a 'concept' (*πρόληψις*): the process is exactly described by the verb *ὑπεγράφη*.

μηθὲν . . . προσάπτε, i.e. we must not attribute to the gods any care or anxiety, such as would be implied in the government of the world, or any feelings of anger or favour towards men, which would

disturb or diminish their complete happiness: this is where popular religion makes its mistake. Note how the non-interference of the gods in the world is presented as a deduction not from the workings of phenomena, but from the nature of the gods themselves: cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.*, § 77.

7. θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν: an emphatic declaration of Epicurus' position: he was not an atheist. As he explains in the next sentence, the conception of the gods is universal in the minds of men and cannot therefore be denied.

8. ἐναργής . . . γνώσις: the knowledge of the gods is a matter of immediate perception, not in this case by the senses, but directly by the mind. It was the result of an ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (see Appendix, pp. 259 ff.). ἐναργής is a technical term used of the immediate perception of a near object.

9. (οἱ) πολλοί. Gassendi's insertion of the article is essential for the meaning and is amply justified by τῶν πολλῶν below, ll. 10 and 11.

οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἷους νομίζουσιν, 'for they do not preserve them as they think them to be', i.e. they do not consistently keep up the idea of their blessedness and tranquillity, but attribute disturbing passions, &c., to them. But νομίζουσιν in this sense is certainly very awkward coming immediately after its use in reference to the erroneous opinions of men, and there is a strong temptation to adopt Usener's conjecture νοοῦσιν, which would refer back to ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόσις in l. 4: 'they do not represent them consistently as they originally conceive them' (so too Bignone). There is, however, no warrant for the conjecture, and it is perhaps safer to retain νομίζουσιν.

10. ἀσεβής δὲ . . . προσάπτων: for the general thought cf. *Lucr.* v. 1198 ff. and vi. 68 ff.

§ 124. 1. οὐ γὰρ . . . ἀποφάσεις: a very technical clause: the popular representations of the gods (as taking a part in the affairs of the world) are not 'concepts' formed in the mind by the constant repetition of the ἐναργής vision of the image, but 'suppositions' or additions of the mind (προσδοξαζόμενα), inferences, as *Lucretius* tells us in v. 1183 ff., from their observation of the regular sequence of phenomena on the earth and in the sky. For πρόληψις see note on νόσις, § 123. 4 above: ὑπόληψις is defined in *Vita Epicuri*, § 34, as the equivalent of δόξα, an inference from phenomena, which may or may not be true.

2. ἐνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι . . . 5. ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες: a difficult and obscure piece of writing. I take ἐνθεν to refer to the ἀποφάσεις, and to be used in the slightly forced sense 'according to which': the subject of οἰκειούμενοι in the next sentence then is 'men', or rather οἱ πολλοί. The majority of men judge others according to their own accepted standard of ethics: they are in the habit of welcoming those they see to be like themselves and rejecting those whom they find alien. They therefore falsely attach to the gods a similar habit, and suppose that they do harm to the wicked and benefits to the good.

In spite of the slight difficulty attaching to the meaning of *ἐνθεν*, this seems to me the natural interpretation.

Bignone takes *ἐνθεν* to mean 'from the gods' and believes the subject of *οἰκείουμενοι* to be *οἱ ἀγαθοί*. He translates 'Yet from the gods the foolish and wicked obtain the greatest evils and the good and wise the greatest benefits; for they, accustomed to their own virtues, embrace and make dear to themselves those who are like them, and consider alien what is discordant with them'. He thus believes the *ἐνθεν* clause not to be a statement of false popular belief, but of the actual facts: the good do derive benefit from the visitation of the images of the gods, because they can appropriate what is like themselves. This is good Epicureanism, but I doubt if it can be derived from the Greek: (1) *ἐνθεν* and *ἐκ θεῶν* will be an awkward tautology, which Bignone glosses over in his translation; (2) his argument largely depends on the words 'foolish' and 'wise' which he introduces without any warrant into the translation; (3) this Epicurean subtlety is alien to the rest of the section; (4) his objection that popular opinion does not represent the gods as doing kindness to the good and injury to the evil is not sound: in a certain stage of religious opinion (e.g. the Psalms) this opinion is very commonly found; (5) is there any evidence in Epicureanism for the idea that the images of the gods do harm to the evil?

3. *βλάβαι τε*: the MSS. have *βλάβαι αἰτιαί*, for which Usener's correction *βλάβαι τε* is not altogether satisfactory. Is it possible that Epicurus wrote *βλάβαι τοῖς αἰτίοις* on which *κακοῖς* was a gloss? Von der Muehl would write *αἱ μέγισται βλαβῶν αἰτιαί τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . καὶ ὠφελειῶν*.

3. (*τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*) seems a necessary addition: the antithesis can hardly have been left understood.

5. *ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες*: Usener parallels the construction from Plat. *Legg.* ix. 879 c *νομίζων ὡς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα*, but adds 'exspectes verbum spernendi'. A more direct opposition to *ἀποδέχονται* would indeed be natural, but is not essential.

2. *Death* (§§ 124-127).

The second great principle, that death is nothing to us, is also viewed in its moral aspect. As the true understanding of the nature of the gods relieves us from fear in this life, so the knowledge that consciousness ceases at death relieves us from fear with regard to a subsequent life. Moreover, since death will not be terrible when it comes, there is no reason why its anticipation should disturb us. The whole thought is worked out clearly, and as in the previous section the Epicurean view is set in contrast with popular notions.

7. *μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον*: the simple and emphatic expression which recurs frequently in Epicurean documents: cf. § 125, K. Δ. ii, and Lucr. iii. 830.

8. πᾶν ἀγαθὸν . . . ἐν αἰσθήσει : as in the physical world, so too in the moral world, αἰσθησις is the final criterion, but here it takes the form of πάθος, the internal feeling of pleasure or pain, which is the measure of good and bad. πάθος then, like αἰσθησις, has its place among the κριτήρια.

10. τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, 'the mortality of life', sc. the life which is bounded by a mortal period.

11. ἀπειρον : the MSS. have ἄπορον, but the correction of Aldobrandinus and Menagius is inevitable: the false notion about death, which is popularly current, adds 'an infinite period' of conscious existence after death. Bignone accepting ἀπειρον here, but wishing to account for the MS. text and noticing Epicurus' conscious habit of parallelism in this letter, would insert ἄπορον after ἀλλὰ τὸν.

§ 125. 1. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινόν : a rather startling deduction at first sight, but we must remember that to Epicurus the fear of death was not only the greatest of all fears in life, but was also the cause of other evils (cf. Lucr. iii. 59 ff.).

2. γνησίως, 'genuinely', 'whole-heartedly', a rather odd use which recurs in § 130. 7.

3. ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λόγος : Bignone thinks the reference may be to Epicharmus (fr. 11 Diels), but it seems more likely to be an attempt to get over what is in reality the popular feeling about death, not that it will be painful when it comes, but that the present thought of it is painful. Epicurus argues that the two are identical : we do not dread the coming of what will not be unpleasant when it comes. We might reply that death is painful in thought because it will mean the cessation of many present pleasures ; to which Epicurus would answer that 'we' shall not be there to feel the loss (cf. Lucr. iii. 900).

5. παρὸν : the reading of some MSS. παρών is due to the neighbourhood of παρών in l. 4.

6. ἐπειδήπερ : a fuller explanation of the way in which 'death is nothing to us' : so long as we live, death is not there, and when death comes, 'we' shall be no more, for consciousness will be gone.

10. οὐκέτ' εἰσίν : the hiatus (οὐκέτι εἰσίν MSS.) should be avoided as in μηκέτ' εἶναι, § 122. 6.

11. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ . . . § 127. 4. οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις. Having stated his own position Epicurus turns to the popular views of death. In the first place men are inconsistent : they sometimes dread death as the worst of evils, at other times they long for it as a respite from suffering. The wise man neither wishes to escape from life nor fears death : he does not ask for the longest but for the most pleasant life.

12. ἐν τῷ ζῆν . . . : a line has clearly been lost here, and Usener's suggestion (in which however I prefer Casaubon's ποθοῦσιν to his own αἰροῦνται) successfully gives the sense. The loss may have been due to the repetition τῷ ζῆν . . . τὸ ζῆν (note that B originally had τὸ for τῷ).

§ 126. 2. προσίσταται, 'comes across his path', 'offends' him. For the general sense of this sentence cf. K. Δ. xx, xl.

4. ἡδιστον is the reading of the MSS. and there seems no sufficient cause to follow Usener in his change to ἡδιον: Epicurus writes τὸ πλεῖον because τὸ πλείστον would be a palpable exaggeration, but τὸ ἡδιστον is not.

οὕτω καὶ . . . καρπίζεται, cf. K. Δ. xix.

6. The second error; to advise the young to live well and the old to die well is foolish: the art of both is the same, and life may be just as pleasant for the old, while it lasts.

ὁ δὲ παραγγέλλων: Epicurus may, as Bignone suggests, have Mimermus in mind.

7. καταστρέφειν, 'to end his life': so K. Δ. xx. ιι κατέστρεφεν.

τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν, 'the desirability of life', the pleasure which it really has for all.

9. The third error, which is much worse, that it is best not to be born, or if born to die as soon as possible. If a man really believes this, why does he not end his life? otherwise, he is talking idly to a world that will not believe him. χείρων has better authority than χείρον, which Usener adopts, and should be kept: the direct masculine is natural after εὐήθης.

10. ὁ λέγων: sc. Theognis.

§ 127. 1. ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν: the MS. text is a quite natural construction, and there is no need to drop ἐκ with Usener: it adds emphasis and force.

4. ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις: i.e. among the majority of men, to whom such a paradox seems absurd.

5. μνημονεύειν δὲ . . . οὐκ ἐσόμενον. The section ends with a short aphorism as to the right view of the future: we must not either reckon it as certainly ours, or certainly not ours. The true Epicurean has it in his hands to obtain the true pleasures of life, and can be almost independent of what fortune brings him or when it will terminate his life. Bignone notes well that Epicurus is arguing against the Cyrenaics, whose motto was μόνον ἡμέτερον τὸ παρόν.

THE MORAL THEORY.

Having considered the two conditions of a good life, a right knowledge of the nature of the gods and a true understanding of death, Epicurus devotes the rest of the letter to the exposition of his moral theory. He states that the end of action is pleasure, and then develops the implications of this view. The argument may conveniently be divided into subsections as the various points arise.

1. *Pleasure as the motive and end of action* (§§ 127-129).

In considering the purpose of life and the standard of good action Epicurus does not pursue the line of thought which he has already suggested in § 124. 8 (ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει) of deducing pleasure as the end from its fundamental nature as the only feeling in the field of morals. This is a popular treatise, and he prefers therefore

to reach his conclusion on more traditional and less strictly Epicurean lines. The motive of all action is desire: the classification of desires leaves as the 'necessary' residue, the health of the body and the repose of the mind: this means the absence of pain, bodily and spiritual, and the absence of pain is pleasure. Pleasure then is at once the mainspring and the purpose of life. We must note however how from the outset pleasure to Epicurus is not the positive enjoyment, which it was, for instance, to the Cyrenaics, but the negative release from pain, which some philosophers regarded not as pleasure, but as a neutral or indifferent state. This distinction is of vital importance for the whole ethical theory: the right life for Epicurus depends essentially on a due comprehension of limits.

§ 127. 8. τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν . . . φυσικαὶ μόνον: the main division of pleasures here follows traditional lines (cf. Plat. *Rep.* ii. 357 and Ar. *Eth.* 1118 b), and the general idea is clearly brought out with examples by the scholiast on Ar. *Eth.* loc. cit. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τῆς ἐσθλήτους ἀναγκαία· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων φυσικὴ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ· ἡ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε σιτίων ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσθλήτους ἢ τοιῶνδε ἀφροδισίων οὔτε φυσικὴ οὔτε ἀναγκαία.

9. κεναί, 'vain', 'idle', οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι.

10. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων . . . πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν: in the subdivision of the necessary desires Epicurus follows his own line of thought and leads up directly to his main point. Some desires are necessary for the preservation of life, e.g. those of food and shelter, some to the repose of the body (freedom from pain), some to happiness of mind (freedom from fear). From these he passes at once to health of the body and peace of mind—the two foundations of the true Epicurean conceptions of pleasure.

11. ἀοχλησίαν: a typical Epicurean formation: cf. K. Δ. xi εἰ μὴθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν, and viii πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις.

§ 128. 1. ἀπλανὴς θεωρία, 'the unerring contemplation': to form a right choice and avoidance, we must always have our eye on the true end.

3. (τῆς ψυχῆς): a necessary addition made by the second hand in B.

4. τούτου γὰρ χάριν . . . : for the idea of true pleasure or the absence of pain cf. K. Δ. xxvi, xxx, and especially iii.

7. τοῦ ζώου: Epicurus characteristically implies that animals as well as men feel the desire for pleasure.

8. καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθόν: Usener following BF omits the article, which is however surely required: the good of the body is not identical with the good of the soul.

συμπληρώσεται: the testimony of the MSS. is uncertain, but seems to point to συμπληρώσεται, which must be taken as a fut. middle with τὸ ζῶον as the subject. The parallel of K. Δ. xxvi. 2 (ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρωθῶσιν) however suggests that the συμπληρωθήσεται of F may be right. For the idea cf. Lucr. ii. 16 ff.

nonne videre
nil aliud sibi naturam latrare nisi utqui
corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mente fruatur
iucundo sensu cura semota metuque?

10. (ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν) was the original insertion of Gassendi, and there seems no need to 'improve' it with Usener by the substitution of μηδέν for μὴ: the addition is of course demanded by the sense. The limit of pleasure is in Epicurus' idea the removal of pain, and beyond that point pleasure can only be varied: see especially K. Δ. xviii.

11. τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος: pleasure is the beginning because it is the motive which leads to action, it is the end because its attainment is the completion of action.

§ 129. 2. συγγενικόν: the desire to reach pleasure is innate in us: a strengthening from the Epicurean point of view of its adoption as the end: cf. *D. L.* x, § 137, which Bignone incorporates with the *Life*.

4. ὡς κανόνι . . . κρίνοντες: we are thus brought back to the most simple and fundamental Epicurean point of view: the feeling of pleasure, the immediate sensation, 'is in the moral sphere the standard of good and bad, just as in the physical sphere, sense-perception is the standard of true and false: πάθος takes its place with αἰσθησις among the κριτήρια: see on § 124. 8.

2. *Pleasures and pains: choice and avoidance* (§§ 129, 130).

Having established pleasure as the end of action, it is necessary next to inquire what precisely this means in effect. It will mean, Epicurus argues, that though all pleasure is in itself good, because it is natural to us, yet there are some pleasures which we shall have to avoid because of their concomitant pain, and similarly some pains which we shall choose, because of the pleasure arising out of release from them. It is ultimately a matter of calculation; we must balance pleasures and pains against one another, and then choose the course which in the end brings the maximum of pleasure and the least pain. Two points are of interest in this section: (1) that we have arrived at something very like the Utilitarian calculus of pleasure; (2) that although Epicurus here amply refutes the calumnies attaching to the popular idea of Epicureanism and implicitly rejects all the pleasures of excess, yet he does not at all abandon the main position that in itself pleasure is always good: indeed, it is just for that reason that we must avoid pleasures which entail pain.

5. σύμφυτον, 'natural to us', like συγγενικόν above and οἰκείαν below.

6. οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἰρούμεθα: for this and the following clause compare the striking fragment (62) preserved by Aristocles apud Fusc., *Praep. Evang.* xiv. 21 (442) ἀμεινόν ἐστιν ὑπομένειν τοῦσδε τινὰς τοὺς πόνοὺς, ὅπως ἡσθῶμεν ἡδονὰς μείζους. συμφέροι τῶνδ' ἐτινων

ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῶμεν ἀλγηδόνας χαλεπωτέρας, where the idea of the calculus is clearly brought out.

7. τὸ δυσχερές, 'discomfort', another typical Epicurean word: cf. the fragment (37) in Ioannes Stob. *Flor.* xvii. 34 (Usener 181) προσπύτω ταῖς ἐκ πολυτελείας ἡδοναῖς οὐ δι' αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξακολουθοῦντα αὐταῖς δυσχερῆ.

10. διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν, 'because it has a nature akin to ours', i.e. because it is that towards which we naturally move: an elaboration of the idea expressed in συγγενικόν and σύμφυτον above. Cf. K. Δ. vii. 4 οὐ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκείον ὠρέχθησαν. Bignone translates 'because of their own proper nature', but this cannot be right.

11. After μέντοι Usener inserts γ' to avoid the hiatus. But μέντοι γε would be an unusual combination, and though this letter is undoubtedly written with care, we are hardly justified in correcting the MSS. on purely euphonic grounds, unless as in § 122. 6 and § 125. 10 the correction involves no change.

§ 130. 1. τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει: quite literally 'the measuring of one against the other'—just the word for a calculus of pleasures.

2. βλέψει: the simple substantive reads oddly, and Usener may be right in suggesting ἐπιβλέψει.

3. τοῦμπαλιν or τὸ ἔμπαλιν is the reading of all MSS. except B, and we are hardly justified in believing with Usener that B's eccentric ὅτ' ἂν πάλιν indicates an original τᾶμπαλιν.

3. Independence of desires (§§ 130, 131).

Epicurus proceeds to a practical application of his principle of choosing only the pleasures that involve no pain. αὐτάρκεια, 'self-sufficiency', is a virtue praised by all (remember that it was the moral aim of the Stoics), and in its application with regard to pleasures it means 'independence of desires' (Bignone). It leads us to be content with simple pleasures which involve no reaction. Indeed, since pleasure is but the removal of pain, simple food and drink can give us as complete pleasure as the most elaborate banquet. Finally, as Epicurus adds, almost cynically, if we accustom ourselves to simple fare, we are put into a better frame to enjoy luxury, if ever we meet it. The thought all through is typically Epicurean and may be paralleled from many other Epicurean sources.

5. οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα: it was not necessarily the Epicurean's ideal to have but a little to enjoy all his life, but rather that he should be content with what he has. So in a letter to a friend (*fr.* 39, Usener 182) we find him asking for a gift of cheese, so that he may make merry.

7. χρώμεθα is given by all the MSS., and though it may possibly be a dittography of χρώμεθα in l. 6, and ἀρκώμεθα, suggested by Cobet and adopted by Usener, gives more the sense which we should expect, we are hardly justified in introducing it into the text.

7. γνησίως: see § 125. 2 note.

8. ἡδιστα... ἥκιστα: Bignone notes that this assonance is employed by Epicurus again in a quotation given by Plutarch, *de Tranquillitate Animi* 16 ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δέμενος ἡδιστα πρόσκεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον (*fr.* 78, Usener 490), and had already been used in Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 5. It is another sign of conscious style in this letter.

9. τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστον: all that is required for the satisfaction of the natural desires is easy to obtain: cf. K. Δ. xv and xxi, and Lucr. v. 1119 'neque enim est unquam penuria parvi'.

τὸ δὲ κενὸν: what is required to satisfy the *κενὰ ἐπιθυμία*, § 127. 9.

10. οἷ τε λιτοὶ χυλοὶ . . . : an amplification of the satisfactory results of αὐτάρκεια: plain tastes can fully satisfy the pangs of hunger, and when once the 'pain due to want' has been removed, pleasure cannot be increased but only varied: cf. K. Δ. xviii. Usener alters τε to γὰρ in order to get a better logical sequence, but the transition is again from class to species, as in καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ in l. 5.

ἴσην . . . ἡδονήν: after the *πέρας* has been reached and the pain removed, pleasure cannot be quantitatively increased, but only qualitatively changed: therefore the pleasure to be obtained from plain and luxurious food is equal in amount (*ἴσην*). Usener most unjustifiably changes ἡδονήν to ἀηδίαν, believing presumably that the reference is to the cloying of the appetite after satiety. But not only is this inconsistent with Epicurean doctrine, but, as Bignone has shown, the MS. text is made certain by Cicero's translation of the passage, *de Fin.* ii. 28. 90 'negat enim tenuissimo victu . . . minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum'.

11. τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν, 'that which is painful by way of defect', i.e. the pain arising from an unsatisfied want, as in the case of hunger. Another characteristic phrase repeated in K. Δ. xxi.

§ 131. 1. καὶ μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ . . . : a still further limitation of the general principles to a particular instance.

τὴν ἀκροτάτην . . . ἡδονήν: i.e. the pleasure of ἀπονία, freedom from the pain of hunger.

2. τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν . . . : a summing up, referring the conclusions just reached to the general principles of the earlier part of the paragraph: simple living is the best for the health of the body and the purposes of life.

4. συμπληρωτικὸν: one more characteristic word: cf. *εὐσυνπλήρωτον*, § 133. 4.

5. καὶ τοῖς πολυτελείσιν . . . : a new and almost ironical consideration: plain living puts us into better condition (both physically and mentally) for the enjoyment of luxury, if we do at long intervals come across it.

6. προσερχομένους: though it has inferior MS. authority is better than *προσερχομένοις* with *τοῖς πολυτελείσιν*.

καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην . . . : a more serious reason: if we are accustomed to simple living, the attacks of fortune cannot hurt us, for we are used to being content with a little.

4. *The character of true pleasure* (§§ 131, 132).

Having now explained clearly what in effect is meant by making pleasure the end of life, Epicurus is able to refute false conceptions. He is not encouraging gluttony or sensuality, which bring with them greater pains, but the higher pleasure of a simple life, which satisfies the needs of the body and keeps the mind free from trouble and therefore able to devote itself to the study of philosophy. It is interesting to see that even apparently among contemporaries there were calumnies abroad concerning the nature of 'Epicureanism'.

9. καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας. The MSS. have καὶ τὰς τῶν : τῶν is rightly excluded by Usener and must have come from τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων just before.

ὥς τινες . . . νομίζουσιν : notice the three classes of persons who make misrepresentations (1) those who do not know the true doctrine; (2) those who know it, but do not agree with it, philosophical opponents; (3) those who cannot comprehend it—another piece of careful writing. Bignone points out that under (2) Epicurus is thinking primarily of the Cyrenaics who regarded ἀπονία as a purely neutral state ('the condition of the dead') and only the starting-point of true pleasure. The doctrine of the 'limit of pleasure' is the really essential feature of Epicurus' own theory.

§ 132. 1. ἀπολαύσεις : there seems no reason for Usener's change to the singular ἀπόλαυσις : it means individual acts of ἀπόλαυσις.

4. νήφων λογισμὸς, 'sober reasoning', a rather strong metaphorical use: cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 984 b 17 οἷον νήφων παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας. Notice that Epicurus is here surreptitiously introducing a new point. The characteristic pleasure of the mind, freed from fear, is philosophical study.

5. τὰς δόξας, 'opinions', are in particular of course mistaken opinions about the gods and about death: Epicurus is here working back to the two fundamental principles laid down at the outset of the letter.

ἐξ ὧν : preserved only by B: its omission in the other MSS. has led to the filling out of the construction by ἀφ' οὗ or ἀφ' ὧν in the earlier printed texts.

5. *Prudence* (§§ 132-135).

After establishing the general character of his ideal, Epicurus proceeds to consider the method of attaining it. It is clear that the right course of action will not be discovered by instinct, as it might be supposing all pleasures were not merely ἀγαθὰ but αἰρετά. It is necessary in order to live the truly pleasant life to have 'a right judgement in all things', based upon a calculation of the less and more of pleasure and pain. This right judgement Epicurus characterizes by the old word φρόνησις, always with philosophers the practical as opposed to the speculative wisdom: it is at once the ἀρχή, the beginning of any step in the right direction, and the μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, the best thing

a man can attain. It is indeed more valuable than purely speculative wisdom, σοφία, which cannot issue in any action, but can only lay the foundation of action in a true knowledge of circumstances. And what will be the instruction given by φρόνησις? It will be the recommendation of the accepted virtues, for it will show that the pleasant life is really that in which honour and justice are practised. Thus by a strict train of reasoning Epicurus, starting from his first principle of the pursuit of pleasure as the ideal, reaches the acceptance of the recognized standards of morality: the answer to his detractors is now complete. He concludes with a panegyric of the prudent man, the details of which must be considered as we come to them.

9. διδάσκουσα is Usener's necessary correction of the MS. reading διδάσκουσαι which must merely be due to the neighbourhood of the plural ἀρεταί.

10. καὶ δικαίως: notice how Epicurus includes the central word of Platonic ethics and ordinary morality—not without intention.

(οὐδὲ . . . καὶ δικαίως): Stephanus made this essential addition: cf. K. Δ. v. The omission must be due to homoeoteleuton.

§ 133. 1. ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις . . . : a panegyric of the φρόνιμος, in which he incidentally returns on much that he has said before: it is the φρόνιμος who knows the conditions of life, namely the true understanding of the nature of the gods and of death (§§ 123-127), who realizes the government of the world and the responsibility of free-willed man, who sees in chance not a determinant of action but an opportunity, and prefers to suffer with wisdom, rather than to prosper through folly. The section, largely through the corruption of the MSS., is undoubtedly the most difficult in this letter.

2. θεία, 'holy' or 'reverent' opinions, such as a truly religious man may hold—a singularly bold word seeing his direct opposition to ordinary religious beliefs. But, as has been seen already (§§ 123, 124), religion had a very real place in Epicurus' system.

3. τὸ τῆς φύσεως . . . τέλος: sc. pleasure: cf. § 129, where pleasure is described as συγγενικόν and σύμφυτον and is said φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν.

4. τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας: sc. ἀπονία, the freedom from pain, which can easily be secured by simple means: cf. § 130.

εὐσυνπλήρωτον: cf. § 131. 3 ὑγείας . . . συμπληρωτικόν, and for εὐπόριστον, § 130. 9 τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι.

5. τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν, 'the limit of evils' in a slightly different sense, 'the possible extent' of evils. For this idea that all pain is either slight or of short duration compare K. Δ. iv. The sentence so far has resumed the ideas of the Epicurean τετραφάρμακος: cf. K. Δ. i-iv notes.

6. τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τινων δεσπότην εἰσαγομένην πάντων: sc. εἰμαρμένην, 'destiny', or 'necessity' as viewed in the moral sphere. The earlier thinkers, and especially Democritus, having insisted in their physical theories on an all-controlling ἀνάγκη, were compelled to admit determinism in human actions. From this necessity Epicurus only escaped

(as we know from *Lucr.* ii. 216 ff.) by the device of the *παρέγκλις*, the original spontaneous swerve of the atoms in their downward fall, which in the conscious aggregate of the *ψυχή* was the cause of free will.

7. *ἐγγελώντος*: with some hesitation I propose this correction for the varieties of reading found in the MSS., *ἀγγέλωντος*, *ἀγγελώντος*, *ἀγγέλλοντος*. Usener had already suggested this sense in his reading *διαγγελώντος*, but the correction is more violent. It is true that *ἐγγελών* is elsewhere only found with the dat., but *καταγγελᾶν* similarly takes acc. in *Eur. Bacch.* 286. Bignone prefers to 'keep the MS. text' *ἀγγέλοντος*, and to follow on in the lacuna with *εἰμαρμένην κενὸν ὄνομα εἶναι*. But (a) *ἀγγέλοντος* is not the universal reading in the MSS., and the variation strongly points to a compound of *γγελᾶν*; (b) the verb *ἀγγέλλειν* in the context seems to me very unnatural. Kühn's *ἀνελόντος* is too far from the MS. text, and does not give the right sense: the 'prudent' Epicurean does not entirely annihilate destiny, as is seen by what follows.

After *ἐγγελώντος* there must be a lacuna of some considerable extent. All are agreed on *εἰμαρμένην*: Epicurus could not have left *τὴν . . . δεσπότην* alone without explanation, and that *εἰμαρμένην* must be the word is shown by *τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη*, § 134. 2. It is also clear that towards the end of the lacuna there must have been the words *ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην*, corresponding to *ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης*. So far there is agreement, but as to what the lacuna exactly contained and its relation to the rest of the sentence opinions differ.

(1) Usener, who believes that the whole section down to § 135. 4 *ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην* is one monstrous sentence, would write the lacuna (*εἰμαρμένην καὶ μᾶλλον ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι λέγοντος*). But (a) in a letter so carefully written as this, so clumsy a sentence is highly improbable, and moreover the supposition involves the alteration of *ὑπολαμβάνων*, § 134. 5, and *νομίζων*, § 135. 2, to *ὑπολαμβάνοντος* and *νομίζοντος*; it is far more probable that the sentence *τίνα νομίζει εἶναι κρείττονα* ended in the lacuna; (b) as Bignone shows, the resulting argument is most illogical: Epicurus could not have written that the *φρόνιμος* says that 'some things happen by necessity, others by chance, &c., . . . because necessity cannot be called to account, &c.' On the other hand the clause *διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην κτλ.* would give a good reason for the belief that most things are within our control.

(2) Bignone himself would therefore place a mark of interrogation after *κενὸν ὄνομα εἶναι*, which he supplies after *εἰμαρμένην*, and would then proceed *σόφος γὰρ ὁ τὴν μὲν τῶν γινομένων κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν παρ' ἡμᾶς τιθέμενος, ὃν ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνονται* (presumably a slip for *γίνεται*), *ἃ δὲ κτλ. &c.* 'For the wise man is he who places in our hands the chief control for the things that happen, of which some occur by necessity, others by chance, &c.' This is much more likely to have been the sense of the passage, and

(3) I should only differ from it in putting the mark of interrogation immediately after *εἰμαρμένην* (reading *ἐγγελώντος*) and supposing that

the rest was a little simpler, e.g. οὗτος γὰρ τὴν τῶν γινομένων κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν παρ' ἡμᾶς τίθεται, ὃν ἂ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεται ἃ δὲ κτλ.

In any case note that the emphasis falls on τὴν . . . δεσπότιν . . . πάντων: Epicurus does not deny that ἀνάγκη causes many things, but not all, and the greater part of our lives is under our own control.

8. ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης: Epicurus' conception of 'chance' seems to be of a force co-ordinate with necessity. Natural law causes the inevitable sequence of events, but it is chance that rules the production of particular causes: e.g. ἀνάγκη causes the motions and meetings of atoms, but chance causes them to fall into the positions which create our world. Such a notion is of course unscientific, but is very prominent in the Epicurean philosophy, e.g. Lucr. vi. 30 'quod fieret naturali . . . seu casu seu vi'. Guyau (*La Morale d'Épicure*) has seen in this idea the working of the παρέγκλισις in inanimate nature, just as in the soul it produces free will, but there is no evidence for this, and most probably Epicurus had not fully thought out the relation of his notion of chance to the rest of the system.

παρ' ἡμᾶς, 'in our control'.

9. ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, 'cannot be called to account'; i.e. if ἀνάγκη were universal, as the determinists hold, neither could there be responsibility in the moral sphere, nor the occasional 'lapse' in the physical sphere, which we call chance. It means more than 'destroys responsibility' (Wallace) for it is opposed not only to the ἀδέσποτον of our actions, but also to the ἄστατον character of τύχη.

10. ἀδέσποτον, 'not subject to the tyranny' of determinism: we are morally our own masters.

§ 134. 1. ἐπεὶ κρείττον ἦν . . . : the most emphatic and famous declamation of Epicurus' greater hatred of physical determinism than even of popular religion.

τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ: i.e. the popular story of the gods' interference in the affairs of men, and of their assignment of rewards and punishments.

3. παραιτήσεως: by worship of the gods we may, according to popular religion, hope to escape from the destiny which is our due.

ὑπογράφει, 'lightly sketches', 'hints at'.

4. τὴν δὲ τύχην . . . : finally the prudent man understands the nature of chance: it is not a divine force, nor a direct cause of good or evil, but it does afford occasions for good and evil. There is considerable doubt as to the punctuation and text of this section.

(1) Usener continues the construction of the main sentence, placing a comma after the parenthesis and reading ὑπολαμβάνοντος 5 . . . νομίζοντος § 135. 2. But apart from the improbability of the immense unbroken question, there is no authority for the genitives and the MSS. have ὑπολαμβάνων (ὑπολάμβανον H) . . . νομίζων (νομίζειν F).

(2) The variants just quoted might suggest ὑπολαμβάνοντ' . . . νομίζειν constructed after διὰ τό in § 133. 9, but, as Usener points out, the sense makes this impossible.

(3) With Bignone's view of the lacuna in § 133. 7, it is possible to retain the two nominative participles *ὑπολαμβάνων*, *νομίζων*, placing a comma after the parenthesis and referring them right back to the subject of the main sentence which begins in the parenthesis.

(4) But this too makes a very clumsy piece of writing, and I prefer, while retaining *ὑπολαμβάνων*, to read *νομίζει* (to which F's *νομίζειν* seems to point) in § 135. 2. A fresh sentence will then start at *τὴν δὲ τύχην* of which *νομίζει* is the main verb.

6. *οὔτε ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν* (MSS.), 'nor an uncertain cause', but (a) this is exactly what Epicurus did think chance to be (cf. *τὴν δὲ τύχην ἀστατον*, § 133. 9), and (b) as Bignone points out, the statement would not be at all borne out by the explanatory parenthesis. Bignone comparing Democritus' aphorism *τύχη μεγαλόδωρος, ἀλλ' ἀβέβαιος* would read *οὔτε ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν (μεγαλόδωρον)*, or to put it more in Epicurus' phraseology *οὔτε ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν (μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν)*; chance, that is, is not to be regarded as the cause, however uncertain, of the greatest blessings or ends—it can only confer the opportunities for good and evil and not the lasting blessings or evils themselves, which are *παρ' ἡμᾶς*. I think his suggestion is on the right lines, but too obscure in phraseology, and prefer to think that *πάντων* has dropped out before *ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν* (cf. *τὴν . . . δεσπότην πάντων . . . εἰμαρμένην* in § 133. 6 above): chance is not the cause, even the uncertain cause of *everything*, for it cannot give the vital good or evil, but only the opportunities for them.

7. *(οὐκ) οἶεται μὲν γὰρ . . . διδοσθαι*: it is clear that a negative must have dropped out somewhere, and Usener's *οὐκ* at the beginning seems a better correction than Gassendi's *μή* (why not *οὐ*?) before *δίδοσθαι*. The position of *μὲν* is strongly in favour of a preceding negative.

8. *ἀρχὰς μέντοι . . . ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι*: i.e. chance may start good or evil, but it still rests with us to use the occasions furnished by chance rightly.

§ 135. 2. *νομίζει*: see note on l. 4 above.

βέλτιον γὰρ . . . ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην: as the sentence stands in the MSS. it does not make sense. Usener reads *βέλτιστον*: 'for it is best of all that a well-judged action should succeed through chance', but (a) there is no authority for *βέλτιστον*; (b) *γὰρ*, as Bignone points out, is unsuitable; the parenthesis would not then give a reason for the previous opinion; (c) it is doubtful whether Epicurus would have said that this is best; (d) the idea is at any rate alien to the context. Bignone retains *βέλτιον* but would substitute *δ' αὖ* for *γὰρ*, 'but it is still better that . . .' I believe that once again homoeoteleuton has caused a loss of some words and that Epicurus wrote something like *βέλτιον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ καλῶς κριθέν σφαλῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κακῶς κριθέν ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην*, a restatement of the previous idea from a new point of view. Madvig's insertion (*μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι ἢ τὸ μὴ καλῶς κριθέν*) adopted by von der Muehl would give the same sense.

5. ταῦτα οὖν . . . ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς. The peroration of the letter. The disciple must meditate on (cf. § 123. 1) these precepts alone and with his fellow-disciples, and such practice will enable him to attain so complete an ἀραπαξία that he will be a god on earth.

σεαυτόν: Gassendi's correction for ἐαυτόν: perhaps not quite necessary as ἐαυτόν is not infrequently used for other persons besides the third. In the neighbourhood of τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ it would however be very improbable.

6. (τε) after πρὸς is a necessary insertion.

7. ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις is not a mere rhetorical exaggeration. The gods in their perfectly untroubled life are the ideal of what human life might become, and the man who has come near to this ideal might justly be said to have become a god on earth (cf. Lucr. iii. 322 'dignam dis degere vitam'). This explains how, again not metaphorically or in mere adulation, his later disciples could speak of Epicurus himself as a god, e.g. Lucr. v. 8 'deus ille fuit, deus'.

ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ

THE *Κύριαι Δόξαι* are a series of brief aphorisms dealing with Epicurus' ethical theory, and in particular with the conditions requisite for the tranquil life of the Epicurean philosopher. They are introduced by Diogenes Laertius¹ as 'the crown (*κολοφῶνα*) of all Epicurus' writings and of the philosophic life', and are quoted by name and with unmistakable references by Philodemus² and the Epicurean writers³ in the Herculanæan rolls, who speak of 'those who write against the *Κύριαι Δόξαι*'. Plutarch,⁴ Diodorus,⁵ and Lucian⁶ refer to them under the same title. Cicero in one passage⁷ appears to translate the title as 'Authoritative Sayings', in another⁸ as 'Selected Sayings', but undoubtedly regards them as the work of Epicurus.

There can then be no doubt that in antiquity the *Κύριαι Δόξαι* were looked upon as an authentic work of the Master deserving very special esteem and consideration. Modern critics have, however, been inclined to treat them with less respect. Gassendi,⁹ although he gave them the title of *Ratae Sententiae*, yet stated dogmatically that they were 'a Florilegium culled from various writings of Epicurus', and Usener,¹⁰ fastening upon Cicero's alternative title *Sententiae Selectae*, is at pains to prove that they are a compilation from various sources put together by some faithful but not very intelligent Epicurean disciple. His contentions were resisted by Giussani¹¹ and have recently been fully dealt with by E. Bignone,¹² but, as the question is one on which every reader is bound to form his own judgement, it is worth while to give a brief summary of the position.

Usener's chief lines of attack are: (1) important points in the Epicurean doctrine are omitted and points of secondary importance included. There is no mention of the cardinal principles of the physical theory or of the *Canonica*, nor is even the nature of the soul explained: on the other hand the points included about politics (e.g. in

¹ D. L. x. 138.

² Phil. *de Ira*, col. xliii.

³ Vol. Herc. col. xv: *ibid.*, col. xxvii.

⁴ Plut. *adv. Coloten*, 31, p. 1125.

⁵ Diod. I. xxv, fr. 1, Dind.

⁶ Luc. *Alexandri*, c. 47.

⁷ Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 7. 20 'Epicuri *Kypias Δόξας*, id est quasi maxime ratas'.

⁸ Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 30. 85 'in illis selectis eius brevibusque sententiis, quas appellatis *Kypias Δόξας*'.

⁹ *Animadversiones*, p. 1693.

¹⁰ Usener, *Epicurea*, xliii ff.

¹¹ Giussani, *Stud. Lucr.*, p. xxxi, note 1.

¹² *Rendiconti del R. Istit. Lombardo di sc. e lettere*, 1908, pp. 792 ff., and in an abridged form in *Epicuro*, *Introd.*, pp. 8-26.

XXXII and XXXVII) are not the basis of Epicurus' position, which was that politics should be altogether excluded. (2) Some of the maxims read like extracts from personal letters and are quite inappropriate in a summary of doctrines (e.g. X, XX, XXIV): some are even left in the second person, as they were in their original context. (3) Many of the maxims are mere duplicates of one another (e.g. III and XVIII, XI, XII, and XIII, XXXVII and XXXVIII). (4) There is the greatest possible disorder: all kinds of subjects are jumbled together and there is no sign of any fundamental scheme.

Of these points the second is easily dealt with: the use of the second person singular¹ in such maxims is common not only in Epicurus and is no necessary indication of an extract from a more colloquial work. The other three are more serious and can only be properly appreciated after a careful study of the aphorisms as a whole and in detail, and an attempt to gather the purpose and character of the work. As regards the supposed omissions Usener has certainly mistaken the character of the whole work, if he imagines that it was intended as a complete summary of the whole Epicurean system. Its purpose is essentially ethical, and there is therefore no attempt to explain the physical doctrine or the principles of the *Canonica* (XXIII and XXIV come in incidentally as an elaboration of the idea in XXII of the necessity for a well-ordered life of the understanding of the external world): such knowledge was contained in other Epicurean summaries (e.g. Ep. i) and is assumed in the *Κύριαι Δόξαι*. Nor indeed are the maxims meant to cover the whole range even of the moral theory: their content might, as Giussani has suggested, be described as 'Man in his own consciousness and the external world', and they constitute in fact a kind of practical handbook for the professed Epicurean, by which he may attain the life of *ἀταραξία*. This will explain not only the omissions, but the insertion of certain precepts which Usener regards as of secondary importance, e.g. the stress laid on the Epicurean view of justice (XXXII, XXXVII, &c.) is necessary because the Epicurean, essentially an individualist, must be instructed as to the attitude which he should take up to the society in which he lives and to its laws and customs. Bignone² has also pointed out that some of these apparently unimportant points are in reality replies to rival schools of thought, but the main guiding principle of their choice is the scope of the work itself.

As regards Usener's 'doublets', Bignone has dealt in detail with each individual case. It may be said in general that whereas no doubt the same ideas do recur from time to time in the aphorisms, they are put from a different point of view and gain a new significance in their context. If the framework of the *Δόξαι* is understood,³ it is seen that the repetition is always valuable and significant. Thus, for instance,

¹ Giussani, loc. cit.: Bignone, p. 10.

² p. 11.

³ See p. 346.

in III the idea of the quantitative limit of pleasure is stated as one of the four fundamental principles of the ethical system, in XVIII it is introduced and amplified by the notion of the 'variation' of pleasures as the foundation of a discussion of the 'pleasures of the flesh'. - In XI the value of physical science is maintained as conducive to mental *ἀραπαξία*, in XII it is asserted as saving man from the falsehoods of myth, in XIII it is regarded as a necessary supplement to 'protection from men'. The one instance in which we may with some probability assume a 'doublet' is XXXVII and XXXVIII, though even there the former seems to lay stress on the universality of the fundamental character of the 'just' action, the latter on the variability of the particular actions which in different circumstances may be just or unjust.

The accusation of 'disorder' may also, I think, be met. It may be that some transpositions should be made. Gassendi had proposed a rearrangement of XXVI-XXX, and Giussani, with his usual passion for transposition, would apparently be prepared to carry this further, though he does not specify the changes which he would propose. The charge is, however, very considerably minimized, if the true character of the 'Maxims' is realized. They are clearly not intended to be a consecutive logical whole, and any attempt to twist them into such will necessarily fail. Rather they are to be regarded as a series of groups of aphorisms, each group being internally consistent, but often only loosely connected with that which precedes or follows. The various points on which the faithful Epicurean may need instruction or guidance are dealt with as they occur, and he is left at the end with a whole which is complete but not continuously consecutive. To establish this point, it is necessary to suggest a brief analysis of these groups.¹ (1) I-IV. The *τετραφάρμακος*—the four fundamental principles necessary for the tranquil life; (2) V. The relation of pleasure and virtue; (3) VI, VII. Protection from external disturbance; (4) VIII-X. The selection of pleasures; (5) XI-XIII. The ethical value of physical science; (6) XIV-XXI. The wise man's life in relation to nature, his fellow-men, and to true pleasure (this group can be subdivided); (7) XXII-XXVI. The tests and standards of moral (i.e. truly pleasant) action; (8) XXVII, XXVIII. Friendship; (9) XXIX-XXX. The classification of desires; (10) XXXI-XXXVIII. Justice and Injustice; (11) XXXIX, XL. The wise man's life in the Epicurean community. This analysis might no doubt be varied, and there is often an interrelation between group and group, so that some aphorisms might be more justly regarded as links between groups rather than as belonging exclusively to one rather than the other. The question of the amount of disorder in the aphorisms must be judged by every reader for himself, but the criterion must not be a general framework, such as Usener would postulate, but a satisfactory distribution in groups.

We may take it then that the *Κύριαι Δόξαι* is a practical manual of

¹ The individual links of connexion between aphorism and aphorism will be dealt with more fully in the notes.

guidance for life intended for the professed Epicurean, that it does not claim to be a consecutive treatise on ethics, but deals successively with the various topics of importance for its own practical end. With all the ancient testimony which we have in its favour, there seems no sound reason for doubting that it is the work of Epicurus himself, nor, if its character be rightly understood, does its working out seem unworthy of him or more appropriate to an unintelligent compiler. The picture of the 'true Epicurean' which it represents is consistent with what we learn from other sources, and in particular from the third letter, to Menoeceus. It is based on a relentless working out of the idea of pleasure as the end of life (which is characteristically never stated in the aphorisms), and though in some details, such as the conceptions of justice and friendship, its individualism strikes the reader as almost incredibly cynical, yet the image of the tranquil life has its strong attractions, and the vision of the Epicurean community with which the series concludes has a considerable beauty of its own. We may safely regard the 'Principal Doctrines' as *Rafae*, the authentic dicta of their Master, and also as *Selectae* in the sense that they do not attempt to cover the whole field of ethics, but only to lay down the conditions for the true Epicurean life.

The first four aphorisms hang closely together and form the basis of the Epicurean moral system. The principles which they enunciate were known to the school as the 'quadruple remedy' (τετραφάρμακος), and are found summed up under this title in the Herculanean Rolls 1005, col. 4 καὶ πανταχῇ παρεπόμενον (Crönert: παρέστω μόνον Us.) ἢ τετραφάρμακος· ἄφθονον ὁ θεός, ἀνύποπτον (Crönert: ἀναισθητόν Us.) ὁ θάνατος, καὶ τὰ γαθὸν μὲν εὐκτῆτον, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκαρτέρητον. The four principles are again summed up as the full equipment for the moral life in Ep. iii, § 133, and are dealt with fully and in order in the earlier part of that letter. The right belief about the gods and about death, and the true understanding of pleasure and pain, secure ἀταραξία for the mind and enable us to aim at ἀπονία for the body.

§ 139. I. Sums up the teaching with regard to the nature of the gods and corresponds to Ep. iii, §§ 123, 124.

1. μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον: so ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον, Ep. iii, § 123. 3. ἄφθαρτον, 'indestructible', is a typically Epicurean word, based of course on the purely material conception of atomic structure.

οὔτε αὐτὸ . . . παρέχει. The divine beings themselves enjoy perfect ἀταραξία and do not disturb that of others: cf. Ep. i, § 77. 1 οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὄργαι καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι.

3. ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ exist only 'in a weak nature', almost 'are a sign of weakness': so Ep. i, § 77. 2 ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεῖσσι τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται, which brings out the meaning here. Anger and favour are characteristics of a weak nature dependent on others, and not of the perfect strength and independence of the divine.

Sent. Val. i has ἐν ἀσθeneίᾳ, which would correspond with the passage in Ep. i, but it seems unnecessary to alter the neuter.

After the first aphorism there is a very important scholium; see app. crit. This obviously bears very closely on the Epicurean conception of the nature of the gods. We may notice certain points in the scholium here. (1) λόγῳ θεωρητοῦς is not likely to be Epicurus' own expression, but its meaning will be that the εἰδῶλα of the gods are not perceptible by αἴσθησις but only by the mind (cf. Lucr. v. 1170 *egregias animo facies vigilante videbant et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu*).

(2) The following clause obviously corresponds very nearly to the passage in Cic. *N. D.* i. 49 'nec . . . ad numerum, . . . sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis, cum infinita simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis existat'. It may therefore be taken as certain that οὗς μὲν . . . οὗς δέ cannot be right: there is no trace elsewhere that Epicurus conceived of two categories of gods, and it is inconsistent with such evidence as we have: Gassendi's conjecture οὗ μὲν for οὗς μὲν, accepted by Giussani (*Stud. Lucr.*, p. 234) and Bignone, may be taken as fairly certain, and for οὗς δέ we should read either ὡς δέ with Gassendi, or more probably οἷους δέ suggested by Bignone. On the other hand, I regard Kuhn's change of ἀποτελεσμένων to ἀποτελεσμένους (followed by Usener and Giussani) as unnecessary. ὑφ' ἐστῶτας can be continued into the second clause, and ἀποτελεσμένων refers to the formation of the εἰδῶλα by the atoms. The gods 'do not exist as numerable material bodies, like other atomic compounds, but by identity of form, owing to the constant afflux of similar images which are completed at the same spot'. The expression is very condensed, but is, I think, intelligible. The form of the divine body remains always the same: its material constitution is a succession of atomic formations, the individual atoms coming together within the limits of the form to constitute the divine body for a moment and then coming off together in the combination of an 'image' to pass into the mind of man. The use of εἰδῶλων is therefore proleptic, and there is some confusion, as in the passage of Cicero, between the formation of the divine body and its cognition by men through the medium of the εἰδῶλον. (3) ἀνθρωποειδής: the divine body was always conceived by Epicurus as anthropomorphic in form (cf. Cic. *N. D.* i. 46 'a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum').

II. The second aphorism states the second condition of ἀπαράξια, the true knowledge with regard to death, and corresponds therefore to Ep. iii, § 124. 7.

4. ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The regular Epicurean formula, as in Ep. iii, § 124. 7, and Lucr. iii. 830 'nil igitur mors est ad nos'. It is here enforced by a brief and interesting syllogistic argument.

τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ: death means the atomic dissolution of the living being and atomic dissolution means the loss of sensation, for

sensation is due to the juxtaposition and movement of the soul and body atoms. So more briefly Ep. iii, § 124, 8 *στέρησις δέ ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος*: Lucr. iii. 558-614 explains the theory carefully and at length.

5. τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς: for we are sentient beings, and a non-sentient existence, whatever it might be, is not us. Lucr. iii. 847-869 again gives a useful commentary.

III. The first two principles concerned external things, the gods and death, with regard to which a right understanding is necessary to avoid fear. The third and fourth concern the internal feelings of pleasure and pain and the attitude to be taken up towards them. Bignone (p. 56. note 1) has pointed out that the third aphorism consists of two parts and must be considered in relation to the doctrines which Epicurus is combating. In the first he states that the quantitative limit of pleasure is the complete removal of pain: if all pain is eliminated, then perfect pleasure has been secured. Here he is attacking the doctrine of the Cyrenaics, who regarded the removal of pain as a merely negative state of calm, while pleasure was the addition beyond that of a *κίνησις*. In the second part he is attacking the Platonic idea of the *μικταὶ ἡδοναί*, pleasures in which there is an element of pain: where you find something in a state of pleasure (τὸ ἡδόμενον), there is no element of pain either bodily or mental. In other words, pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive, and Plato's *μικταὶ ἡδοναί* are not genuine pleasures. The practical inference was of great importance for the Epicurean ethic: pain can be removed by simple means, but it requires elaboration to produce the Cyrenaic pleasure: hunger is satisfied by bread, but the Cyrenaic needs an elaborate banquet. Moreover, these elaborate pleasures involve pains and are therefore to Epicurus' mind not true pleasures. We come then to the 'simple life' as the foundation of Epicurean morality—Epicurus was no 'epicure'—and this third aphorism does in fact correspond, though at first sight it seems remote, to the third article of the *τετραφάρμακος*, τὰ γὰθὸν εὐκτητόν. The point is brought out in the more elaborate treatment in Ep. iii, §§ 129-130, and is the underlying notion of Lucr. ii. 20 ff.

6. ὄρος, 'limit', beyond which greater pleasure cannot be produced, but as he points out in XVIII, pleasure can only be varied. Here he is in direct and immediate contrast to the Cyrenaic view.

παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος. Usener quotes an interesting note from Voll. Herc. Coll. II. t. vii, f. 14, which shows that even in antiquity there was a division of authorities as to whether παντὸς should or should not be read here. Its exclusion would not weaken the main position, but rather limit it to a particular case, the removal of what on each occasion causes pain. τὸ ἀλγοῦν is strictly 'bodily pain', as it is used just below, as opposed to τὸ λυπούμενον, 'mental pain', but it appears here to be used in a comprehensive sense, covering both.

7. ὑπεξαίρεσις. Voll. Herc., *ibid.* assures us that 'all the good copies' have *ἐξαίρεσις*, but the compound seems more probable and

the meaning is not affected. We may compare the parallel passage in Ep. iii, § 130. 11, *ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἐνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ* (so again in K. Δ. XVIII).

ὅπου δ' ἂν . . . : the second point, which really follows from the first; if pleasure is the complete absence of pain, then if pleasure is present there can be no pain. We cannot then have the *μικταὶ ἡδοναί*, and all pleasures which involve pain must be eschewed.

8. *ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρων*. Logically the addition is superfluous; if there is neither bodily nor mental pain there cannot be the combination. But the idea of the close connexion of the two and their interaction is constantly present to Epicurus.

§ 140. IV. The fourth aphorism deals with bodily pain, and is an expansion of the last clause of the *τετραφάρμακος*, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκατέρητον. Acute pain does not last long and chronic pain permits of an excess of pleasure. So that there is nothing in our physical constitution to make a life of pleasure as described in III impossible. The general idea is repeated epigrammatically in Ep. iii, § 133. 5 τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν (πέρας) ὡς ἡ χρόνους ἢ πόνοὺς ἔχει βραχεῖς, and is echoed by Diogenes of Oenoanda, *fr.* lviii. We may also compare another saying of Epicurus', quoted by Plutarch, *de Poetis Audiendis*, 14, p. 36⁶ οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν, with which he compares a line of Aeschylus *Θάρσει πόνου γὰρ ἄκρον οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον*. It seems doubtful whether sufferers from pain would accept Epicurus' position, but Cicero (*de Offic.* iii. 33. 117) acutely observes, 'non id spectandum est quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere, qui bona voluptate terminaverit, mala dolore': it was essential for Epicurus to maintain that there is open to every one at least a preponderance of bodily pleasure over pain. Two points in the aphorism may be noted: (1) Epicurus apparently speaks here of a coexistence of pleasure and pain, which at first sight seems inconsistent with III. But he is now considering pain in the body as a whole: some part may be in pain while other parts are free, but there cannot be pleasure and pain in the same part at the same time—*ὅπου δ' ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ' ὃν ἂν χρόνον ῆ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν*. (2) He is speaking here solely of bodily pain: he held of course that even the severest bodily pain might be exceeded and overcome by mental pleasure, and it was the function of the philosopher to secure this.

1. *συνεχῶς* goes of course with *χρονίζει*. R. D. Hicks takes τὸ ἀλγοῦν *συνεχῶς* together, 'continuous pain does not last long': this seems a paradox which even in this paradoxical aphorism Epicurus did not contemplate.

ἐν τῇ σαρκί, 'in the flesh', a favourite use of Epicurus' where most writers would have said *ἐν τῷ σώματι*: so again in XVIII and XX. Remember that *σῶμα* in Epicurus' vocabulary includes the corporeal *ψυχή*, so that he was forced to look for another word to express the body without the soul. It is also one of the signs of the approach of Epicurus' diction to Hellenistic Greek: cf. the use of *αἰών* in XX.

2. τὸ μὲν ἄκρον, 'the crisis' of acute pain. The use of ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονάς in XII makes it tempting to conjecture ἀκέραιον here, but the point of the aphorism is that bodily pain is never absolutely without alleviation, and the line of Aeschylus strongly supports ἄκρον: Epicurus may possibly have had it in mind. So in Diog. Oen. *fr.* lviii τῶν ἀλγυδόνων αἱ ἄκραι χρονίζουσιν οὐ δύναται.

3. Bywater's συμμένει for συμβαίνει would improve the sense, but it has no authority.

V. After the exposition of the τετραφάρμακος Epicurus proceeds to the conditions required for the pleasant life, and maintains that it must have the three qualities of prudence, honourable action, and justice: a life which is based on these three will of necessity be pleasant. The first half of the aphorism is repeated verbally in Ep. iii, § 132, 9 and in Diog. Oen. *fr.* liv, who confirms Gassendi's addition. As regards the second sentence there are divergent views, but with the text adopted Epicurus enforces his statement with a reiteration from another point of view.

7. (οὐδὲ . . . δικάως). Gassendi's addition must be accepted as in the corresponding place in Ep. iii, § 132, 10. It is now confirmed by Diog. Oen. *fr.* liv.

8. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο . . . τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν. As this sentence stands in the MSS. (see critical notes) it cannot construe, and some correction is necessary. Usener emends ὅτῳ δ' ἐν τούτων μὴ ὑπάρχει οἷον ζῆν φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικάως ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν, 'but if a man lacks any one of these, as for instance prudence in life, even though he has honour and justice, it is not possible for him to live pleasantly'. The sense is at first sight good, not only cannot a man live pleasantly who lacks all these qualities, but the want of one of them is fatal. But there are several objections to the restoration: (a) the alterations δ' ἐν τούτων for δὲ τοῦτο and οἷον ζῆν for οὐ ζῆν are too violent; (b) the grammar of καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικάως ὑπάρχει in the sense of 'and yet possesses an honourable and just life' is surely impossible; (c) the most important objection lies in the resulting sense. The language of Ep. iii, § 132 shows that Epicurus thought that φρόνησις was the controlling force in life, and itself produced the subordinate virtues: it is, therefore, surely impossible to suppose that he could have imagined that a man could live καλῶς καὶ δικάως, if he did not live φρονίμως. Bignone takes this point strongly.

Bignone himself reads (ἐξ) οὐ ζῆν . . ., 'but the man who is without that from which a prudent, honourable, and just life is derived, cannot possibly live happily'; he explains that τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ is φρόνησις, and refers to the emphasis laid on it in Ep. iii, § 132. Palaeographically the correction is simple, but the expression is surely too vague to be probable and the explanation is unnatural, as it would of course be impossible to live φρονίμως without φρόνησις.

Von der Muehl follows *Sent. Vat.* v. in omitting the words from οὐ ζῆν to ὑπάρχει.

I suggest that the MS. text is right as far as it goes (with the obvious correction ζῆ for ζῆ), but that here again there has been a loss owing to parallelism of expression. τοῦτο then refers to ἡδέως ζῆν, the nearest subject in the previous sentence, and ἐκείνο to φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν. The sentence then becomes a reinforcement of the maxim by the appeal to experience: 'if in fact we see a man's life is not pleasant, then we may be sure that he is not living virtuously: if we see that he is not living virtuously, we may know that he cannot be living pleasantly'. It does not greatly add to the previous maxim, but Epicurus is fond of such repetitions to enforce important points (he uses one in the corresponding place in Ep. iii, § 132), and the correction involves very little textual change.

VI and VII go closely together. If, as is stated in V, the pleasant life involves prudence, honourable living, and justice, how is this to be secured? The first necessity is ἀταραξία from without: for a man to live his own life well, he must be protected from molestation by others. It is therefore necessary to seek for such protection, and any means which can provide it is a 'natural good' (VI). In VII he goes on to consider certain false attempts to secure protection. The general idea of these two aphorisms is referred to in XIV, XXVIII, XXXI, and XXXIX, and is implicit in much of Lucretius' description of early civilization in v. 1011 ff. and 1105 ff.

11. θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, 'to have immunity from the attacks of men', a condensed form of expression which Epicurus affects: cf. VII τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν and XIV τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενης, and the corresponding use of θαρρεῖν in XXVIII and XXXIX. ἦν: the inferential imperfect used often in the Κύρια Δόξαι: cf. XII οὐκ ἦν.

κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν, 'a good in accordance with nature': cf. VII τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν. ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ὧν is certainly an odd construction, though not impossible for Epicurus. Usener suggests ἀγαθά, which would be easier, but possibly something like ταῦτα ζητεῖν has dropped out.

After κατὰ φύσιν the MSS. have ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας, which Usener excludes as a gloss on ἐξ ὧν. I had at one time thought the words might be retained and (ὀρέγεσθαι) added after them (cf. VII *ad fin.* ὀρέχθησαν). The aphorism would then become an anticipation of the first part of VII: 'in order to obtain ἀσφάλεια men sought rule and kingship as the means by which they might attain their end'. The sense would be quite in accordance with Epicurus' thought, but I do not think he could speak of this mistaken idea as κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν, and it is better to regard the words as an anticipatory gloss: VI is the general statement and VII gives the detail. Von der Muehl retains ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας, translating presumably 'the advantage of rule and kingship is a natural blessing', but apart from the grammatical difficulty, this is open to the same objection that Epicurus could not have spoken of such things as a κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν.

12. After *τοῦτο* Meibom inserted *τις*, which would again make the construction easier, but in Epicurus it is hardly necessary.

§ 141. VII deals with a false attempt to obtain this necessary protection from other men: persons have thought that they could do it by winning fame and high position which would place them above molestation. But in fact the struggle to obtain and maintain high position is itself a serious obstacle to *ἀταραξία*, nor, as Epicurus points out here, is the result attained one of real security. Lucretius has a remarkably close parallel v. 1120-1126:

at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentis,
ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret
et placidam possent opulenti degere vitam,
nequiquam, quoniam ad summum succedere honorem
certantes iter infestum fecere viai,
et tamen e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos
invidia interdum contemptim in Tartara laetra.

3. ἀπέλαβον, 'they obtained to the full': cf. ἀπολαμβάνειν in XII. τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν, 'the good according to nature' as in VI.

5. κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκείον, 'in accordance with that which is akin to nature', i.e. the instinct for pleasure. Cf. Ep. iii, § 129. 10 *πάντα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθόν*.

VIII passes to a slightly different topic, yet not unconnected with the last two aphorisms. If men can be so deceived about 'natural goods', what criterion can we have in the choice of pleasures? This aphorism lays down the general principle: all pleasures are good in themselves, but in some the concomitant pain outweighs the pleasure, and these must be avoided. The idea is elaborated in IX and X and is dealt with fully in Ep. iii, § 129.

6. καθ' ἑαυτὸ κακόν: the neuter is quite natural, and the reading καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακή of FP³ looks like the emendation of a grammatical purist. But possibly von der Muehl's καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν is the most natural construction.

7. ἀχλήσεις, 'disturbances': cf. XI ἡνώχλουν and Ep. iii, § 127. 11 *ἀοχλησίαν*.

§ 142. IX is a unique statement in Epicurus but very important, as it gives the ground for the differentiation of pleasures. Gassendi observed that it was directed against the Cyrenaics, who held (D. L. ii. 87) that 'no pleasure differs from any other nor is it more pleasant': they believed also that pleasure was merely momentary and could not be prolonged, so that the object of life was to accumulate as many pleasurable moments as possible, and it did not matter from what source they were derived: life for them was simply and solely apolaustic. Epicurus' view, on the other hand, was that although pleasure could not be increased quantitatively beyond the limit of the complete absence of pain (III), yet pleasures could be

varied, and had qualitative differences. Here he also implies that they can differ in 'density' in three ways, either by lasting longer or by affecting the whole organism or by affecting its more important parts (in particular, the mind). If all pleasures were alike in these respects, then there would be no difference at all between them, but as it is, a 'calculus of pleasures' becomes possible: we can select our pleasures, either according as they are more pure, i.e. more completely exclude pain (VIII and XI), or as they are more lasting or affect the whole organism or its more important parts. The theory is an integral part of the ethical scheme and is needed to complete the argument of Ep. iii, § 129.

1. *κατεπυκνῶτο*, 'could be intensified' or 'condensed'.

After *ἡδονή* Bignone would insert *καὶ μνήμη*. There is no doubt that memory played a part in Epicurus' conception of pleasure (compare the general idea of Ep. iii, § 122, and XVII of the Vatican aphorisms) and would be a means of *καταπύκνωσις*, but it seems hardly justifiable to introduce it into the text here. Similarly Crönert's insertion (*καὶ τόνω*) is superfluous.

2. *ἄθροισμα* is used quite literally of the 'aggregate' of atoms of soul and body which composes the man. 'Organism' seems the nearest word in English, though it includes ideas foreign to the Greek word: cf. Ep. i, § 63. 3 *ἡ ψυχὴ σώμα ἐστὶ λεπτομερές παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον*.

τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη, 'the most important parts', i.e. especially the mind rather than the body: cf. Ep. i, §§ 35: 6, 36: 6.

X-XIII may be regarded as going together and are naturally approached from IX. Epicurus is applying the test of the *κυριώτατα μέρη*, and in particular of the mind. For its pleasure the necessary conditions are, as has been learnt from the *τετραφάρμακος*, a true knowledge of the nature of the gods and of death, and an understanding of the bounds to be set to desire and of the limits of pain. Now the pleasures of sensuality cannot help us here; if they could, we might (apart from their accompanying pain) regard them as perfect pleasures. But for this purpose we must turn rather to philosophy, which gives us the sure knowledge of the nature of the world and the principles of our own conduct.

X is a straightforward statement: if the pleasures of the body could give us what we need, we could find nothing to censure in them.

4. *τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν*: the regular Greek periphrasis with *περὶ* to avoid one genitive dependent on another. *ἀσωμάτων* F is a strange variant, but does not point to any real alternative.

5. *μετέωρων*: the movements of the heavenly bodies and the other phenomena of the sky, the subject in fact of the second letter. The fear about the *μετέωρα* is of course the idea that they are arbitrary acts on the part of divine beings, which, according to the Epicureans, was one of the causes of the origin of religion: cf. XI and Lucr. v. 1183-1240.

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6. καὶ ἀλγῆδόνων, 'and its pains', not 'pain' simply (as Hicks), for 'the fear of pain' would be an idea not found elsewhere in Epicurus.

τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, 'the limits set to our desires', i.e. that we cannot desire greater pleasure than the complete absence of pain (III).

It is clear that we require here the mention also of the limit set to pain (IV), and the insertion of (καὶ τῶν ἀλγῆδόνων) would be sufficiently justified by XI. But, as Bignone has pointed out, it is now guaranteed by the text of Diogenes of Oenoanda, *fr.* xlv, where this aphorism is quoted.

7. μεμφαίμεθα. The reading of B μεμφάμεθα is hardly enough authority for altering the otherwise universal μεμφαίμεθα to the more grammatically correct ἐμεμφάμεθα.

8. ἐκπληρουμένοις: a necessary correction of the εἰσπληρουμένοις of the MSS.: a common error (K = ις).

9. ὅπερ: sc. τὸ ἀλγοῦν καὶ τὸ λυπούμενον.

XI. If we had no need of such knowledge, we could well lead a pleasant life without physiology, but as this knowledge is the essential condition of pleasure, we cannot dispense with our understanding of nature. The general idea of this direct value of scientific knowledge is dealt with in Ep. i, § 78.

11. ἡνώχλουν: cf. VIII ὀχλήσεις.

12. μή ποτε . . . ἦ τι: the form of the expression strongly recalls ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς in II and elsewhere.

τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν is a brilliant restoration for the MSS. τετόλμηκα νοεῖν. B accentuates τετολμηκά and P has τ. τό. μηκα, which point to a corruption, and a marginal note in B describes the reading of the text as σφά(λμα).

§ 143. XII makes one step farther in advance. There are two possible sources of information about the heavenly phenomena and death, religion and science. The ordinary man derives his conceptions from the myths of religion, but they are peculiarly calculated to inspire fear and so to destroy pleasure: if pleasure is to be based on complete ἀταραξία, and so to be absolutely pure, we must learn the truth about the universe from physical science. Again Ep. i, § 78, puts the point fully.

1. οὐκ ἦν, 'it is not possible': the inferential imperfect again: cf. VI ἦν κατὰ φύσιν.

ὅπερ τῶν κυριωτάτων, 'about the most important matters', i.e. the μετέωρα and death: cf. Ep. i, § 78. 1 τὸ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν: also §§ 35, 36.

2. τοῦ σύμπαντος: nothing short of a knowledge of the universe will really suffice, or at least of the general principles of its working.

ὀπποτεούμενον: the fear of the arbitrary action of the gods in phenomena gives us a 'suspicion': cf. ὑποψία in XI. Normal Attic uses the verb only in the active, and Usener proposes to read ὑποψιεύοντα, but this may be accepted as a later usage.

4. ἀκεραίους, 'unalloyed', entirely free from pain, and in this case from the mental pain of fear. Lucretius puts the point well in iii. 37 ff.:

et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus,
funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo
omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam
esse *voluptatem liquidam puratque* relinquit.

ἀπολαμβάνειν: cf. VII ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν.

XIII is a connecting link between the immediately preceding topic and that of VI and VII, to which Epicurus returns in XIV. It is no good to secure freedom from molestation by other men, unless we combine that with the greater freedom of mind, which is due to the true knowledge of the universe. Our ἀταραξία must be complete both on the physical and mental sides, if we are to have true pleasure: cf. Lucr. iii. 37 ff. and ii. 16 ff.

5. τὴν κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν: cf. VI θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, VII τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν. κατ' ἀνθρώπους is here a natural variation.

6. ὑπόπτων: cf. XI ὑποψία, XII ὑποπτεύμενον, the word which links these three aphorisms together: the root idea is fear arising from uncertainty.

τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς always coupled by the physiologists with τὰ μετέωρα, as Ep. ii and Lucr. vi.

7. τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ: things outside our κόσμος, sc. other worlds and the gods. So Lucr. i. 74 of Epicurus, 'omne immensum peragravit mente animoque'.

XIV. A most difficult and obscure aphorism in which both text and meaning are uncertain. It returns to the topic of the ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, which had been broached in VI and VII and referred to again in XIII. VI showed its necessity for the ideal life, and VII that the effort to gain it by fame and position is mistaken. Epicurus now considers the question how it is to be attained: the aphorism must be considered in close connexion with XXXIX where he recurs again to this question. Our view as to his answer must be determined by the text adopted both here and in XXXIX. According to the text here given Epicurus holds that there must as a preliminary be some force (δύναμις)—even though it were only personal influence—which can banish from one's life the elements which are likely to cause disturbance (ἐξοριστική, cf. ἐξωρίσατο in XXXIX). But besides this force, by far the purest source (εὐπορία εὐλκρινεστάτη) of ἀσφάλεια is that which arises from one's own quiet life and retirement from the world. Here then we have the answer to the question raised in VII. The men who aim at political power think to secure their ἀσφάλειαν wholly by force. They are wrong: it is true that some force is necessary to banish certain molestations, but the true solution is to eschew politics altogether and live one's own life in peace. This was, of

course, the regular Epicurean view, characteristic of its general individualistic attitude: compare *Lucr. v. 1127-1128*:

ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum

quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.

For other views of the aphorism see notes below.

8. *γενομένης μέχρι τινός*: the start towards *ασφάλεια* must be made by an exercise of force or power which can secure it to a certain degree.

9. *δυνάμει τινί ἐξοριστικῇ*, 'by a certain force of expulsion', i.e. of getting rid of certain elements of interference and placing them beyond the borders of one's life. The text is very uncertain. I accept with some hesitation Usener's correction *τινί* for *τε*: among the many MS. variations of the next word, the almost universal perispomenon accent points to a dative rather than a nominative. *ἐξοριστικῇ* would be strongly supported by *ἐξωρίσατο* in XXXIX, which in my view is based on the same general idea. 'The man who secures *ασφάλεια* makes all things he can akin to him (*ὁμόφυλα*) or at least not alien (*ἀλλόφυλα*): for the rest, he either does not mix with them (*ἀνεπίμικτος ἐγένετο*), or else banishes them from his life (*ἐξωρίσατο*).' There is, however, an exactly similar doubt as to the text there.

Usener takes *δυνάμει τινί* by itself and reads *ἐξερειστικῇ*: 'the *ασφάλεια* arising from *ἡσυχία* and *ἐκχώρησις* is a support to and the purest source of the *ασφάλεια* from men which has been obtained to a certain extent by a certain force'. But (1) *δυνάμει τινί* is very weak and does little but repeat *μέχρι τινός*; (2) *ἐξερειστικῇ* is feeble in sense and grammatically awkward in combination with the substantive *εὐπορία*: this Usener feels himself and suggests in his notes *ἐξέρεσις ἢ*; (3) the general sense is unsatisfactory: the life of retirement cannot well be described as 'a support' to *ασφάλεια*.

R. D. Hicks, accepting Usener's text, translates 'then on a basis of power arises most genuine bliss': this is surely an impossible sense for *ἐξερειστικῇ*, which cannot be passive in meaning, and *εὐπορία* must go with the genitive *τῆς . . . ασφαλείας*.

Bignone retains the *τε* of the MSS. and reads *δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εὐκρινεσ(τάτῃ ἐπεξεργαστικῇ)τάτῃ γίνεται*, 'both by its power of offering support and by its unalloyed gifts of goods is most productive of' the *ασφάλεια ἐξ ἀνθρώπων*. But *δυνάμει ἐξερειστικῇ* is an odd expression, and the addition to the text is very considerable.

εὐκρινεστάτῃ, 'most pure', because it is not tainted by the element of *ὄχλησις*, which is involved in the use of force to banish molestations.

10. *ἐκχωρήσεως*: the bulk of the MS. authority is for *ἐγχωρήσεως*, but that must be a mere mistake.

§ 144. XV deals with the topic of Ep. iii, § 130: to satisfy the desires of nature (the *ἀναγκαῖαι ἥδοναί*) very little is wanted, and that can easily be obtained. But to satisfy the empty cravings of those who are not philosophers is an almost endless task. The idea is familiar and the expression straightforward. Besides Ep. iii, § 130. 9 *τὸ μὲν φυσι-*

κὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον, we may compare an aphorism preserved by Stobaeus, *Floril.* xvii. 23 (*fr.* 67, Usener 469) χάρις τῇ μακαρίᾳ Φύσει, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἐποίησεν εὐπόριστα, τὰ δὲ δυσπόριστα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα, and Lucr. v. 1117-1119:

quod si quis vera vitam ratione gubernet,
divitiae grandes homini sunt vivere parce
aequo animo; neque enim est umquam penuria parvi.

1. ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος: cf. the epigram in Athenaeus (Usener *fr.* 471):

τὰς φύσιος δ' ὁ πλοῦτος ὅρον τινὰ βαιὼν ἐπίσχει,
αἱ δὲ κεναὶ κρίσεις τὰν ἀπέραντον ὁδόν.

2. τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν, 'the wealth demanded by idle imaginings', i.e. suggested by the baseless mental images of persons who have not learned the true wisdom. So Epicurus, as quoted by Porphyrius, *ad Marcellam*, 27, p. 208. 2 (*fr.* 68, Usener 471) οὐ σπάνιον γε εὐρεῖν ἄνθρωπον (πένητα) πρὸς τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος καὶ πλούσιον πρὸς τὰς κενὰς δόξας. Cf. also XXXIX παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.

XVI. A new topic, the comparative importance of chance and reason in life. Chance can at times hinder the wise man, but only to a small extent: it must be reason that throughout his life decides his action and therefore his fate. The idea is reproduced in several Epicurean passages and is foreshadowed in Ep. iii, § 134.

3. βραχεά: the neuter plural (internal acc.) has the better MS. authority as against βραχεῖα, and, as Usener points out, is supported by Cicero's rendering (*de Fin.* i. 19. 63) 'exiguam (not exiguum) fortunam intervenire sapienti'. Epicurus, too, is almost certainly adapting Democritus' aphorism βαιὰ γὰρ φρονήσι τύχη μάχεται, τὰ δὲ πλείστα ἐν βίῳ εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκῇ κατιθύνει, where we have the same neuter plural. τὰ δὲ μέγιστα just afterwards confirms it.

The same parallels are conclusive against Cobet's τύχη for τύχη.

4. διώκηκε is clearly intended by the MS. διώκηκε and is read by Stobaeus, when he quotes this passage. Usener, who quite arbitrarily excises διοικεῖ καὶ διοικῆσει at the end of the sentence as a gloss, reads διώκησε as a gnomic aorist and cuts out the καί which follows it in the MSS. Epicurus wishes to emphasize the continuance of the process by the use of all three tenses. Bignone also takes this view of the text.

XVII gives us the direct connexion between justice and the Epicurean ideal. Justice, as we shall see (XXXIII), has in itself no immediate value, but indirectly it is useful because it most contributes to the inward and outward peace (ἀταραξία) of the life of ideal pleasure: injustice, on the other hand, is the source of the greatest possible disturbance. The idea is strictly Epicurean, and besides we may compare the fragment δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία (*fr.* 80, Usener 519), and particularly K. Δ. XXXV, which explains the cause of the παραχή.

6. ὁ δίκαιος βίος is the form in which the aphorism appears in Diodorus and *Sent. Vat.* xii: the meaning is of course not different.

In XVIII Epicurus passes back to the limitation of pleasures, originally laid down in III, and speaks now more fully as regards both the body and the mind. The amount (μέγεθος) of pleasure is limited in both cases: both for body and for mind there is a point beyond which pleasure cannot be increased in quantity (τὸ πέρασ), but only varied in kind. For the body this point is reached when there is ἀπονία, when all pain due to want is removed by the satisfaction of the want (e.g. in hunger). For the mind the limit is the establishment of ἀταραξία by the reasoned comprehension of the limits of pleasure and the right understanding of emotions like them, i.e. the desires and fears connected with the conceptions of immortality and death. Beyond these limiting points we can only get variation in our pleasures, and though for the mind such variation is good, for the body it means the introduction of means of pleasure which involve pain. The ideal of 'plain living and high thinking' is thus shown to be the life of the fullest and purest pleasure: cf. X and Ep. iii, §§ 130-132.

9. τὸ κατ' ἐνδειαν ἀλγοῦν, 'the pain due to want': cf. III and Ep. iii, § 130.

ποικίλλεται, 'is varied', in the means by which it is satisfied. This is a new point in addition to the πέρασ doctrine of III. The luxurious life, which as was seen in X does not produce ἀταραξία, cannot increase the quantity of pleasure, but only vary its means of satisfaction.

10. ἀπεγένησεν: a curious word, meant perhaps to suggest the reaching of the limit in the process.

11. ἡ . . . τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις, 'the thinking out of these very pleasures', i.e. the comprehension by reason of their limits. The understanding of the limits of pleasure of body and mind will not only give a rule of conduct but will itself be one of the means of securing ἀταραξία.

τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις is probably rightly explained by Bignone to mean 'the emotions like them', i.e. the desires associated with immortality and the fears connected with death which (before the Epicurean philosophy) used to be the greatest cause of mental fear.

Hicks translates the clause, 'The limit of pleasure in the mind is obtained by calculating the pleasures themselves and the contrary pains'. But (a) this is not at all an Epicurean idea: he does not weigh pleasures against pains, but only admits 'pure pleasure'; (b) it is a possible, but not the natural sense of ἐκλόγισις; (c) τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις cannot be strained to mean 'the contrary pains'.

12. παρεσκεύαζε: a real imperfect 'used to cause' before the Epicurean philosophy was grasped.

§ 145. XIX. A point of great importance is introduced as a deduction from the previous aphorism. If there is a limit of greatness to the

pleasure both of body and mind, and no pleasure can be greater than the complete absence of bodily pain and mental trouble, then complete pleasure can be attained in a limited time, and infinite time could not produce greater pleasure. The conception is of great importance for Epicurus because it enables him to maintain that there is no reason why men should long for immortality, which could not give them greater pleasure than they can know in this life. It is elaborated in XX.

1. ἴσην: sc. not greater.

2. τὰ πέρατα: as in XVIII, the limits of bodily and mental pleasure, i.e. the complete absence of pain and anxiety.

XX. A difficult aphorism in which the editors have been inclined to tamper with the text, but it can, I think, be maintained as it stands. It is a contrast in the attitudes of 'the flesh' and 'the mind' towards pleasure, and is clearly intended to bring out further the point of XIX that infinite time is not required to obtain the greatest pleasure. Epicurus has also in mind, as usual, the view of the Cyrenaics. 'The flesh' is the body apart from the mind (IV): it can perceive individual sensations owing to the admixture of soul and body atoms, but cannot correlate sensations or reason about them. Any individual sensation of pleasure is perceived by it as something which might be indefinitely increased or prolonged: if this were really the case the longer the time, the greater would be the pleasure, and infinite time would produce infinite pleasure. It is on this purely sensational basis that the sensual man (ἄσωτος, X) acts, and it is also the root of the Cyrenaic theory which advocated the accumulation of the individual moments of pleasure (μονόχρονος ἡδονή). But the mind, Epicurus holds, knows well that this is not so, but that there is a quantitative limit to pleasure both of body and mind: complete pleasure is therefore attainable in this life and there is no need of immortality. The man who holds this conviction will be content to cease to exist, when his time comes, without feeling that he has missed anything. The difficulties lie chiefly in the first sentence.

4. ἀπέλαβε, 'perceives', as in VII and XII, with no added implication of reflection on the sensation.

5. καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν, 'and infinite time is (in that case) required to supply pleasure'. I think the sentence may be so translated without unduly straining the Greek. παρεσκεύασεν is the reading of all the MSS. and is exactly paralleled by τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν below. If the text is altered at all, it should be to παρεσκεύασ' αὐν, or with Diels to καὶ . . . παρεσκεύασεν. Usener reads ἀρέσκοι αὐν, αὐτὴν being then τὴν σάρκα, 'infinite time would satisfy it'. But not only is this a violent alteration of a word which is almost certainly authentic, but, as Bignone points out in his admirable discussion of this aphorism (Introd., pp. 26-32), it implies in the σὰρξ something more than mere perception, and is therefore contrary to Epicurus' doctrine. Bignone himself would read καὶ ἄπειρον οὕτω

ἄπειρος, 'and limited time can produce unlimited pleasure'. But (1) the phrase below οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθημεν shows that there must have been a contrast between the σὰρξ which does require infinite time and the διάνοια which does not; (2) though Epicurus says that the flesh perceives pleasures as ἄπειρα, he surely would not go so far as to say that limited time gives it pleasure which is ἄπειρον, for his whole doctrine is that there is always a πέρας. The expression is very obscure, but can, I think, stand as we have it.

τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους, 'its ultimate purpose', or as Bignone translates it, 'its summum bonum', i.e. to get rid of all pain and so secure ἀπονία: the τέλος is also the πέρας of pleasure.

6. τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν, 'the reasoned understanding': cf. XVIII ἡ . . . τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις.

7. τοῦ αἰῶνος, 'the age to come', the eternal life after death which religion assumes. The word is another of the signs of the approximation of Epicurus' language to the Hellenistic: cf. αἰώνιον XXVIII.

τὸν παντελῆ βίον, 'the complete life', which has attained its τέλος of ἀπονία and ἀταραξία. The analogy of XXI τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν suggests the transposition παντελῆ τὸν βίον. But the present order perhaps accords better with Epicurus' use of παρασκευάζειν, to 'afford' rather than 'to make'.

8. προσεδεήθημεν is the reading of F and H and is clearly indicated by the reading of P and Q. The change of subject is quite natural and Usener's προσεδεήθη (οὐ) μὴν is unnecessary.

9. οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, an interesting point. Epicureanism is not ascetic: it does not avoid pleasure, but only realizes its true limits.

11. κατέστρεφεν, 'draws to its close': cf. Ep. iii, § 126. 6 τὸν δὲ γέροντα καλῶς καταστρέφειν and XL προκαταστροφὴν. The aorist κατέστρεψεν, gnomic as all through the aphorism, would be more natural and was suggested by Bywater, and the imperfect may be due to the neighbouring παρεσκεύαζεν, which is a genuine imperfect in relation to the other aorists.

§ 146. XXI. An ingenious connexion between the argument of the last aphorisms and the earlier practical considerations of VII and XV. If we are really convinced of the limits of pleasure, we shall know that but little is needed to secure ἀπονία and ἀταραξία, and shall avoid, as unnecessary, the struggles for political power and position. We may compare Lucr. ii. 16-53 and v. 1105-1135.

1. ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι: cf. XV.

2. (τὸ): the addition of the second article is necessary.

τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν: cf. XVIII.

4. ἀγῶνας: a metaphor from the games: the struggles for success and the prizes which they bring. We may perhaps translate 'competition'.

XXII. An interesting and important link of connexion between the ethical theory and the general theory of knowledge. If we are to be

sure that our actions are right, we must, as has been seen from the preceding aphorisms, always refer them to the 'real end' of life, namely *ἀπονία* and *ἀταραξία* (cf. XXV). But it is equally important to refer them also to the direct evidence of the senses, which is the ultimate basis of all knowledge (see Ep. i, § 82). It is a cardinal rule in the field of *φυσιολογία* that all conclusions of opinion (*δοξαζόμενα*) must be tested by such reference to immediate sensation. In the ethical field there is a double reason for doing this: firstly, in order to act rightly, we must have a right understanding of the world around us and must therefore refer to our external perceptions (*αἰσθήσεις*); and secondly, we must refer to our internal sensations (*πάθη*), the immediate perceptions of pleasure and pain, to be sure that any action we choose is really productive of pleasure and not of pain. Unless we keep these rules, we are liable in the moral sphere, as in the physical, to be misled by *προσδοξαζόμενα*, unauthorized additions of the mind.

5. τὸ ὑφέστηκός . . . τέλος, 'the real end' of life, *sc.* *ἀπονία* and *ἀταραξία*. For this meaning of *ὑφέστηκός* Bignone refers to the Life of Epicurus, § 32, 6 *ὑφέστηκε δὲ τὸ ὄραν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀκούειν*, 'our sight and hearing are realities'. Schneider's proposal to expunge *τέλος* would make the aphorism refer solely to the theory of knowledge without any connexion with the ethical theory—a very abrupt jump. Hicks translates 'We must take into account as the end all that really exists'; this seems unmeaning, and is certainly not Epicurean.

πάσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν, 'all the immediate evidence of sensation', i.e. both of the *πάθη* and the *αἰσθήσεις*. For the meaning of *ἐνάργεια* see Ep. i, § 52. 3. Merbach (*de Epic. Canon.*, p. 19) notes that *ἐπιλογίζεσθαι* is definitely associated in Epicurus with *ἐνάργεια*.

6. ἐφ' ἣν: a general statement, applicable both in the physical and the moral fields.

7. ἀκρισίας: because, unless we bear in mind the fundamental criterion of *πάθος*, we shall lose the power of discriminating between really pleasurable actions and the reverse.

ταραχῆς: because, unless we attend to the evidence of the senses, *αἰσθήσεις*, in the physical world, we shall admit the fears which are primarily destructive of the pleasures of life. Ep. i, § 82, provides a close parallel.

XXIII. The last aphorism took us back to the fundamental acceptance of *αἰσθησις* as the final test, and the next two deal with this subject. Objection to the Epicurean principle might be taken on two grounds: either that some of our sensations were trustworthy, but others not, or that they are all untrustworthy. Epicurus deals with these two positions separately, and in this aphorism with the extreme sceptic position. If, he says, you reject all sensations you are left without any standard of judgement at all, by which even to condemn the senses: for, as Lucretius explains in an interesting parallel

passage, reason, the only other possible standard, is itself founded on the senses and owes to them its validity :

quid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi
debet? an ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibus orta est?
qui nisi sunt veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis.

(Lucr. iv. 482-485.)

There is no difficulty in text or expression.

9. ἀναγωγή, 'reference': cf. ἀνάγομεν in XXII.

§ 147. XXIV. Epicurus now proceeds to consider the more modified scepticism which does not reject all sensation as untrue, but maintains that this or that sensation is false. He answers in effect, 'If you reject any single sensation, you will produce confusion in them all, and so destroy the possibility of a standard of judgement'. The expression of the aphorism is, however, obscure because it is highly technical: it should be read in conjunction with Ep. i, § 50. Both Giussani (who has a valuable comment on this aphorism in *Stud. Lucr.*, pp. 181-182) and Bignone in his note explain the passage with reference to the familiar Epicurean instance of the man who sees a tower at a distance. He has a sensation of a round tower. If he is a good Epicurean he will say to himself, 'this sensation is true: it represents the image which has come to me'. But he will not go on to affirm that the tower itself is round; this he will regard as a problem awaiting (προσμένον) confirmation (ἐπιμαρτύρησιν) or contradiction (ἀντιμαρτύρησιν) on a nearer view (ἐνάρρημα). But the man who is not an Epicurean, when he comes up to the tower and finds it square, will say, 'my sense-perception was false', not realizing that the judgement that the tower was round was something added by his mind (προσδοξαζόμενον) to the actual sensation: he ought to distinguish the two. If, says Epicurus, we reject any single sense-perception in this way we are really undermining them all by our groundless opinion, because the next time that we have a similar sensation, we shall at once be inclined to doubt its truth and so on till we shake our belief in sensation altogether—for we may take up a similar attitude to immediate feelings (πάθη) or images perceived by the mind (ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας).

If, on the other hand, he continues, we blindly accept these opinions based on sensation—including both the actual sensation and the addition of thought—then, so far from escaping error, we shall introduce doubt into every judgement that we make: if, for instance, we decide in the example given above that the tower *is* round, we are simply wrong.

Many difficulties are involved in this Epicurean principle, some of which were more clearly perceived by his successors than by himself.

1. ἐκβαλεῖς: the MSS. both here and in l. 5 support ἐκβάλλεις: the

parallel of XXIII εἰ μάχῃ . . . οὐχ ἔξεις might support its retention, but διαμρήσεις following immediately in the protasis, makes the future necessary.

ἀπλῶς, 'singly', 'by itself', as opposed to πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν in XXIII. Hicks' translation 'absolutely' does not make sense.

2. κατὰ τὸ προσμῆνον. κατὰ has better MS. authority than καί, which Usener adopts, and very greatly improves the sense: the 'opinion based on the idea awaiting confirmation' (that the tower is round) is contrasted with 'that which is actually present in sensation' (the image of a round tower), and we thus get a natural division of the two things to be 'distinguished', whereas with καί the point at which the second part of the contrast begins is not grammatically obvious. κατὰ and καί are frequently confused in the MSS. of Diog. Laert. Bignone also reads κατὰ, and Merbach (*de Epic. Canon.*, p. 39).

3. καὶ τὰ πάθη: a similar error may be made in the region of feeling. Giussani (l.c.) suggests as an example, that we may have a sensation of pricking: opinion at once assumes an external body pricking us, and when we find there is none, we may be similarly led to conclude that the sensation itself was false, whereas, it was, in fact, due to some internal cause.

καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας. For a discussion of the very difficult expression ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας see note on Ep. i, § 38, and Appendix, pp. 259 f. I do not believe that the epithet φανταστικὴν here is intended to modify its sense, seeing that for Epicurus all thought was conducted by means of images. It seems likely, however, that he is thinking primarily of those mental images which are caused by the attention of the mind to εἶδωλα, not perceptible to the senses, but visiting the mind directly. The kind of mistake then would be, as Giussani again suggests, if seeing in sleep the vision of a dead friend, and realizing on waking that he was dead, we therefore assumed that the dream-vision was false, whereas as a dream-vision it was true, and Epicurus on his theory of the persistence of the εἶδωλα, can explain its occurrence.

4. τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ: by the same kind of 'groundless opinion' as caused confusion in the case of the single sensation, e.g. of the tower. The MSS. point to ματαίῳ rather than ματαία.

5. ὥστε . . . ἐκβαλεῖς: because, when you are similarly led to reject other perceptions, you will then be in the position of the objector of aphorism XXIII.

εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις . . . The exactly opposite process, the acceptance of all appearances (i.e. sense-perception plus the inference of opinion), will lead to exactly the same confusion. The only sure ground of procedure is the distinction of the two.

6. τὸ προσμῆνον . . . τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν: together. The addition of the accusative here is a valuable explanation of the real sense of τὸ προσμῆνον in passages where it is used absolutely as above, e.g. Ep. i, § 50. 10. Here τὸ προσμῆνον . . . τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν is of course, in our

example, the idea that the tower is round, τὸ μὴ is the simple sense-perception of a round tower.

7. οὐκ ἐκλείψεις is the MS. reading. Bonnet's ἐκλείψει, adopted by Usener, would make the construction more normal, 'the error will not disappear', but it is probably possible to retain ἐκλείψεις in a transitive sense, either 'you will not escape' (so Bignone) or possibly 'you will not leave out', 'eliminate' the falsehood.

8. ὥς τετηρηκώς . . . ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς, 'since you will have preserved the whole ground of doubt in every judgement of right or wrong': the 'ground of doubt' is always the προσδοξαζόμενον, and if we accept that in all cases, we make all our conclusions dubious. I have followed Bignone in reading κατὰ for the MSS. καὶ: cf. the similar confusion in l. 2.

Usener boldly alters to ὥστ' ἀνηρηκώς, 'so that you will have annulled all distinction and every judgement of right and wrong'. But apart from the very violent character of the change, it involves, as Giussani points out, the very unnatural sense of 'distinction' for ἀμφισβήτησις, which should certainly mean 'doubt', 'uncertainty'. (Hicks with Usener's text translates 'you will be taking sides in every question involving truth or error'. I can make nothing of this.)

Giussani himself reads ὥστε τετηρηκώς and καὶ ἀνηρωκώς, 'so that you will have preserved every cause of doubt and destroyed every judgement of right or wrong'. This gives good sense, but Bignone's correction is far simpler.

§ 148. XXV. After this excursion into metaphysics in the two previous aphorisms, Epicurus now returns to ethics. Every action must be tested by direct reference to the ultimate end of nature, i.e. perfect pleasure, consisting of ἀπονία and ἀταραξία. If we stop short of that and try to test our actions by any intermediate standard, such as that of prudence or honour or justice, we shall find that our actions are deviating from the true ideal of pleasure and we shall no longer be practising as we preach.

2. τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, 'the end which our nature seeks': cf. XX τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλος and XV ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος.

προκαταστρέψεις . . . εἰς ἄλλό τι, 'you stop short before reaching the τέλος and turn to some other standard': the picture is of proceeding upwards through a series of correlated ideals, all dependent on the ultimate end of pleasure and stopping before we reach the end of the series. For this intransitive sense cf. XL προκαταστροφήν from the derivative sense of καταστρέφειν, 'to depart from life', XX.

4. τοῖς λόγοις: not merely 'your words' but 'the principles you profess'.

XXVI-XXX. Considerable doubt has been raised as to the correct order of these aphorisms. It would appear at first sight that XXVI, which deals with the classification of desires, must have a close connexion with XXIX and XXX, while XXVII and XXVIII, which deal with friendship, appear to interrupt that connexion. Gassendi

accordingly arranged them in the order XXIX, XXX, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, and Meibom following him inserted XXVI between XXIX and XXX. Bignone (Intro., pp. 21 ff.) who is concerned to defend the sequence of the aphorisms against the attacks of Usener, expresses some doubt at this point, and thinks it possible that a sentence has been lost linking up XXVI and XXVII. He has, however, made a good case for preserving the order of the MSS., and it seems better to retain it, bearing in mind, however, the possibility of a slight dislocation.

XXVI. Bignone (Intro., p. 21) has pointed out that there is an essential link of connexion between this aphorism and XXV. We must always refer our desires to the ultimate test of *ἀπνοία* and *ἀταραξία*, and the practical application of that test is that physical pain or mental disturbance results if the desires are not satisfied. If then we find that no such result would follow, we may be sure that the desire in question is unnecessary. This is confirmed when we find that the craving passes away, if it is found that the object of desire is unattainable or likely to cause harm.

5. ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγούν ἐπανάγουσιν. Pleasure being the removal of τὸ ἀλγούν κατ' ἐνδειαν (III, XXI), if no such pain results, when desires are unfulfilled, they cannot be necessary.

6. εὐδιάχυτον, 'dissolvable': cf. XXX οὐ διαχέονται.

7. ἦ (ῆ): the variation in the MSS. points to the duplication which is required by the sense. Possibly *δυσπόριστοι ῆ*, adopted by von der Muehl, is a simpler correction.

XXVII. The connexion of thought is here much less obvious, and as Bignone suggests (Intro., p. 22), it is possible that an aphorism has dropped out, of which we may obtain the sense from Ep. iii, § 127. 10 τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων (ἐπιθυμιῶν) αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσχησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. On the other hand, a good Epicurean could supply the links. Some pleasures are unnecessary, some are necessary: of the necessary some are requisite for happiness, and of all those friendship is easily the most important. Friendship always played a large part both in the teaching and the practice of Epicurus. Just as love was condemned by Epicurean ethics as being an 'unnecessary' pleasure involving pain, so friendship is always extolled as helping to fill a want, but not causing excessive feeling. We may notice that there is no altruistic element in it at all: it is only to complete one's own pleasure that one acquires a friend. So Cicero (*de Fin.* ii. 26. 82) quotes Epicurus as saying that 'friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure and is to be cultivated for pleasure's sake'.

9. ὧν. As Cicero in translating this aphorism (*de Fin.* i. 20. 65) says *omnium rerum quas* . . . Usener suggests that we should read ὅρων: but the rendering is natural in Latin as in English.

παρσκευάζεται probably in a real middle sense: 'provides for itself', 'acquires'.

δλου, 'the whole course of life', or possibly in the technical sense of παντελής in XX and XXI.

XXVIII continues the subject of friendship but is obscure, as it introduces an unexpected connexion of thought. It takes us right back to the ideas of the τετραφάρμακος. The thought that 'death is nothing to us' (II) assures us that there is no everlasting pain in a future life, and the knowledge that acute pain is of short duration (IV) gives us confidence as regards the pains of this life. Now this conviction has an importance for our view of friendship. Friendship is both a requisite for happiness and also one of the best means of securing ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, for our friends will protect us against attack. Now if they had a fear of death or of the long duration of pains which they might suffer as the result of their efforts on our behalf, they might be unwilling to risk danger on our behalf—as it is, having nothing to fear, they will not refuse. The thought is a little far-fetched and almost cynical in its selfishness, but not inconsistent with the general Epicurean position about friendship, and is an interesting instance of the way in which Epicurus endeavours to link together different parts of his theory. The aphorism must be compared with the free translation of it in Cic. *de Fin.* i. 20. 68 'eadem sententia confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum'.

12. αἰώνιον, 'everlasting', in the Hellenistic sense: cf. τοῦ αἰῶνος (XX).

ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀρισμένοις: probably, as Bignone takes it, 'in the limited evils of this life', as opposed to αἰώνιον δεινόν. It may perhaps be more general 'in the present limited existence'.

13. ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας: cf. Cic. (loc. cit.) *praesidium amicitiae*, 'the protection which is secured by friendship'. The expression is a little odd, but not impossible for Epicurus, and it is clear that Cicero read φιλίας. Usener would emend to φιλίας, which might make the construction easier, 'sees the protection . . . perfected by means of friendship', but the plural is strange. So Madvig's 'vir doctus' read φιλία, which is adopted by von der Muehll, but the alteration is unnecessary.

κατεῖδε: the MSS. agree on κατεῖναι, but it is impossible to construe it, and Cicero's *perspexit* seems to make Madvig's correction certain.

§ 149. XXIX. After the digression on friendship Epicurus returns to the classification of desires which was started in XXVI. There he had taken the broad division of necessary and unnecessary desires. Here he makes a more elaborate division into three classes. The division is closely supported in Ep. iii, § 127, and by *Sent. Val.* xx (from which Bignone corrects the text) and Diog. Oen. *fr.* li. Compare also Cic. *de Fin.* i. 13. 45.

The meaning is best illustrated by the scholium on this aphorism (see app. crit.): 'Epicurus regards as natural and necessary desires those which put an end to pain, as for instance drink in the case of thirst: natural and not necessary are those which merely vary the pleasure but do not remove pain, as for instance expensive foods:

neither natural nor necessary are for instance crowns and the setting up of statues'.

1. It is obvious that there is a lacuna in the MSS. caused by the repetition of *φυσικάί*, and the correction of Stephanus, adopted by Usener, would give the required sense satisfactorily. But the quotations of the aphorism in *Sent. Vat.* xx and *Diog. Oen. fr.* li, have enabled Bignone to make a slightly more elaborate correction, which may now however be regarded as certain.

3. *παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν*: cf. XV ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν (πλοῦτος) εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκπίπτει. He means not merely 'false opinion' but, having as usual the image-notion of thought, 'idle fancies'. A mental picture of some object, which does not really contribute to pleasure, causes us to desire it.

XXX. This aphorism seems at first sight to be almost a duplicate of XXVI, but there are two points which distinguish it. In the first place, as Bignone has pointed out (*Introd.*, p. 23), whereas XXVI dealt with all unnecessary desires, this deals only with those that are physical and unnecessary, the second class in XXIX. Secondly, Epicurus is here dealing with a special class of desires. In XXVI he pointed out that all unnecessary desires are due to idle imaginings, which fade away when the object is found to be unobtainable or harmful. But here he has in mind the case where the effect is violent and prolonged: there is little doubt, I think, that he is thinking of the passion of love. Nevertheless, even here the same explanation is true: the desire arises from a baseless mental image, and it is prolonged owing to the maintenance of that image in the man's mind and not owing to anything in the nature of the desire.

4. *τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*. Usener suggests the insertion of *μέν*: it would be an improvement but is not essential.

6. *σύντονος*, 'intense', used of *ἐπιθυμία* also in *Plat. Legg.* 734 a.

7. *οὐ διαχέονται*, 'are not dissolved': cf. XXVI *εὐδιάχυτον*. This clause adds to the notion of intensity that of prolongation.

§ 150. From XXXI-XXXVIII follow a series of aphorisms on the subject of justice, and of the Epicurean philosopher's relation to the laws of the community.

XXXI lays down clearly Epicurus' position. There is a kind of justice, which is in accordance with nature, that is, contributes directly to pleasure. To obtain pleasure we need 'protection from men': and this we may partly attain by making a compact between ourselves and other men that if they will refrain from hurting us, we will not hurt them. Justice then is 'a pledge of mutual advantage'. The idea is developed in the following aphorisms and is reproduced in *Lucr.* v. 1019-1020:

tunc et amicitiam coeperunt iungere aventes
finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari.

Critics have always seen in this theory of Epicurus an anticipation of Hobbes' idea of the 'social contract'.

1. *τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον*, 'the justice which arises from nature', i.e. contributes to the natural end of pleasure. For the form of the

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phrase cf. XXV τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως and more particularly XV ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος. Epicurus implies of course that any kind of justice which does not contribute to ἀσφάλεια and so to ἀταραξία and so to pleasure is not natural and may be rejected.

σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος, 'a pledge of mutual advantage': the compact to act justly guarantees the advantage of both parties. Cf. συνθήκας in XXXII and in XXXVI again συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν. Bignone following Philippson (*Arch. f. Gesch. der Philosophie*, 1910, pp. 291 ff.) would translate 'symbol', 'expression (*Ausdruck*)', pointing out that Epicurus held that there was actually such a thing as natural justice, and that it was the 'outward sign' of mutual advantage. But συνθήκας in XXXII and Lucretius' phraseology seem to be against this, and the passages which Bignone adduces are not decisive for either version.

XXXII is a deduction from the general idea of justice expounded in XXXI. Apart from the compact to refrain from mutual molestation, justice does not exist at all: no action, save in this sense, is 'naturally' just or unjust. Justice and injustice therefore do not exist for the animals, who from the nature of the case cannot make such a compact, nor (as against the Pythagorean view, as Bignone points out) between men and animals, nor for such nations as either from their weakness are unable or from their savagery are unwilling to make it.

3. ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἐδύνατο . . . : that is, all animals except men.

4. ἀλλήλα. With some hesitation I accept Gassendi's emendation. The majority of the MSS. have ἀλλὰ, which Usener emends to ἄλλα, but the variation of the other MSS. and especially the indication of some letters lost in P point to some other word, and ἀλλήλα is strongly demanded by the parallel of ἀλλήλους in XXXI.

5. ἦν: the imperfect as Philippson suggests (*Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* xvi, p. 298) looks to the time of the formation of primitive communities.

6. ἡ μὴ ἐβούλετο in the case of nations is of course a necessary addition.

XXXIII at first sight seems to add little to what has already been said, except that its statement that justice does not exist in itself might be taken on a superficial view to be a contradiction of the statement in XXXI as to 'natural' justice. Its importance lies, as Bignone points out, in its polemical significance: it is directed against those who regarded justice as a 'metaphysical entity' (καθ' αὐτό) independent of the social relations of men, such as the Pythagoreans, Plato with his conception of the 'idea' of justice, and the Stoics who regarded the moral qualities as having a corporeal existence. For Epicurus justice like the other virtues was a συμβεβηκός, 'an accident', relative to the actions of men: see Ep. i, §§ 40, 68-73 and Lucr. i. 455 ff. Therefore, although it is a 'natural' good, it can only be realized in social relations and has no existence 'in itself'. There is no difficulty in text or expression.

9. καθ' ὁπληλικούς δὴ ποτε ἀεὶ τόπους is important. There is no universal justice, but it arises naturally as a *συμφέρον* in different places, and may thus vary in its content.

§ 151. XXXIV is the complement of the preceding proposition, and one of Epicurus' most relentless logical deductions from his premises. If justice has no meaning apart from the contract for ἀσφάλεια, neither has injustice. Each man is concerned only with his own pleasure, and that may often be promoted by an act of injustice: but for the preservation of the contract society has appointed certain officials to punish acts of encroachment, and the fear that he may be caught and punished by them may be so disquieting to the offender as to make his action—purely from the point of view of his own pleasure—a bad thing for him. The theory is completely cynical and perfectly consistent with the whole Epicurean theory, but it must not be understood to mean that fear is the *only* motive for just action in Epicurus' eyes: he is here stressing one side.

2. εἰ μὴ λήσει after ὑποψίαν, almost dependent in sense.

XXXV is an amplification of the latter part of XXXIV. The fear of detection must always be disquieting even to the most ingenious wrongdoer, for no man can have perfect confidence that he will not be detected. A thousand escapes give a man no security that he will not be taken before his death. The general idea is vouched for in many Epicurean references, e.g. XVII δ' ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων, Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iv. 22 (Usener *fr.* 582) πίστιν γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν οὐ δύνασθαι, Lucr. iii. 1014 ff.

4. ποιούντα: the reading of the MSS. can well be kept, ὧν being constructed directly after λάθρα, lit. 'doing anything in secret from what they contracted'. Usener's alteration to κινούντα is gratuitous.

5. πιστεύειν has of course the emphasis of the sentence: 'he may escape detection, but he can't trust to doing so'. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 97. 13 'latendi etiamsi felicitatem habent, fiduciam non habent'.

6. ἐπί seems a necessary correction of the MSS. ἀπό or ὑπό, and the divergence points to some uncertainty.

7. καταστροφῆς, 'death': cf. κατέστρεφεν, XX, &c. μέχρι . . . καταστροφῆς goes with ἀδελον and not, as Bignone apparently takes it, with λήσει. You cannot tell until the moment of death whether he will finally escape. It is like Solon's 'Call no man happy, until he is dead'.

XXXVI introduces a new point. Though justice in its definition and general character is universally the same, the advantage gained by this mutual compact, yet if we consider individual actions, we see that the same action may be just in one country, or at one time or under certain circumstances, and not in others: no particular action is universally and always just.

The varieties of the codes of justice and its variability in character according to circumstance was of course a commonplace of Greek philosophers, and a fruitful cause of moral scepticism. Epicurus here states it from his own point of view.

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8. (τὸ): a necessary addition made by Gassendi.

9. κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας: a strange expression; 'in reference to the individuality of country'.

10. ὅσων δὴ ποτε αἰτίων: e.g. at different times, in relation to different persons, &c.

§ 152. XXXVII is a considerable amplification of the idea of the variability of justice expressed in the last aphorism. The first clause insists emphatically that the supreme test of a just action is that it should contribute to 'advantage' in the sense in which Epicurus understands it of the Social Contract: that it should be just in some circumstances and not in others is of no moment. In the second clause he explains that mere ordinance by law does not make actions just: indeed, an enactment is unjust, if it does not contribute to 'advantage'. Lastly, he asserts that the justice or injustice of a particular action may change, but the action is just so long as it is sincerely held to contribute to 'advantage', even though subsequently it becomes unjust. The sense is clear, but the text in several places is uncertain.

1. τὸ . . . ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον, 'that which on examination is proved to be . . .', the regular Epicurean notion: cf. XXIV, and for a fuller exposition Ep. i, § 50. We must not be content with a first impression that an action is just, for our belief may be due to false opinion, but must try it by the test of 'advantage', and if it stands that, we can know that it is just.

2. τῶν νομοσθέντων εἶναι δικαίων is excised by Usener as a title for the aphorism which has by mistake crept into the text. But there is no parallel case of a title, the words will make good sense as a partitive genitive, they are strongly supported by XXXVIII τὰ νομοσθέντα δίκαια, and greatly help the general idea. There are many actions 'customarily regarded as just' or 'sanctioned as just by law' (νόμος), but to each of these must be applied the test of 'advantage'. The order is unusual, but it is difficult to see at what other point the genitive could be inserted. Bignone retains the words and Hicks implies their retention in his translation.

3. τὸ τοῦ δικαίου ἐνέχυρον. The text here is very uncertain: the MSS. vary between τὸ and τὸν and between εἶναι alone and χώραν εἶναι. Usener conjectured τὸν . . . χαρακτηῖρα, 'it bears the stamp of justice', which would give good sense, but is palaeographically very remote. If we can suppose that the two words χώραν εἶναι have been transposed, then εἶναι χώραν is not far from ἐνέχυρον and τὸ is vouched for by F. The sense will then be 'it has the guarantee of a just action', and for the expression we may compare XL βεβαιώτατον πίστωμα.

4. νόμον: a certain correction of the MSS. μόνον.

6. κὰν μεταπίπτῃ . . ., 'even if the "advantage" in the matter of justice shifts', i.e. it is at one time advantageous and so 'just' to do a certain action, at another not.

8. πρόληψιν, 'general concept' of justice: i.e. the idea which has

been formed in our minds by a series of apprehensions of acts which are just: cf. Ep. i, § 37, and notes there. We may remark the materialistic form of the phrase εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττη, as a coin might 'fit in' to the mould from which it was impressed.

9. φωναῖς κεναῖς, 'sounds without content', i.e. words which have no real meaning, as would the word 'just' if applied by mere association to an action which had seemed to lead to 'advantage': cf. Ep. i, § 37. 10 κενούς φθόγγους.

ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ is Usener's correction for the MSS. ἀλλὰ πλείστα, à πλ being regarded as a dittography of ἀλλ': it may be however that the letters really represent ἀπλῶς as Kochalsky has conjectured.

§ 153. XXXVIII is an elaboration of the idea of the two last clauses of the preceding aphorism and adds little that is new. Actions regarded as just are not just, if in practice they turn out not to be of advantage: actions which are really just may, by a change of circumstance, become unjust. Even Bignone, who is concerned to maintain the genuineness of all the aphorisms and the correctness of their order, is ready to agree with Usener that this is a 'duplicate' of XXXVII, and suggests that it was either written as an alternative by Epicurus or inserted here from some other work as an illustration, which subsequently became incorporated in the text.

1. καιῶν, both here and in l. 4, is a certain restoration for the MSS. κενῶν: f's κοινῶν here, and still more B's καὶ τῶν in l. 4, strongly support the change.

2. ἐναρμόττοντα: the MSS. have only ἀρμόττοντα, but ἐναρμόττη in XXXVII makes Usener's correction almost necessary.

3. ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, 'in actual practice', as opposed to the theoretic assumptions of the makers of laws or originators of customs.

5. ἐνταῦθα δέ: a rather curious case of 'δέ in apodosis': it has, however, considerably better MS. authority than δῆ.

τότε μὲν ἦν . . . ὕστερον δ' οὐκ ἦν. In the first clause the imperfects seem to be real past tenses, in the second inferential as usual in the aphorisms.

§ 154. XXXIX. An obscure aphorism with a very uncertain text. It returns from the special topic of justice to the wider subjects of immunity from external interference and friendship (cf. VI, VII, XXVII, XXVIII, XXXI, and in particular XIV). The general idea is not very difficult: the wise man must first grapple with the element in external things which militates against ἀταραξία, then he must win over to his side (ὁμόφυλα) things which are akin to him (cf. Ep. iii, § 124. 4 ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοῦ ὁμοίου ἀποδέχονται): others, if he cannot have with him, he must at any rate not allow to be alien to him (οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε). But supposing it is impossible with some things to secure even this, then he must keep clear of them altogether either by refusing to have dealings with them himself (ἀνεπίμικτος), or by driving them beyond the borders of his life (ἐξωρίσατο). All through the neuter really implies persons: cf. I τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον.

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For the general idea which is implied of a sort of league of Epicurean wise men against the world we may compare XL and Cic. *de Fin.* i. 20. 70 'sunt autem qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, ut ne minus amicos quam se ipsos diligant'.

1. τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν . . . συστησόμενος is the reading of the MSS. Usener despairs of it, and suggests in his notes that we must either read συστελάμενος (presumably 'the man who best contracts (or 'narrows') the element of disquiet'), or τὸ μὲν θαρροῦν . . . συστησόμενος ('the man who has best organized immunity'), supposing that a corresponding δέ clause has dropped out. But it is, I think, possible to retain the MS. text not, as Bignone takes it, 'the man who is best able to confront' (*affrontare*), but rather 'the man who is best able to order (or control) the element of disquiet'. For this use of συνίστασθαι we may compare its military use with such words as πόλεμον, κίνδυνον, ἐπιβολήν, &c., while the participial τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν will be like τὸ ἀλγοῦν in IV and τὸ φοβούμενον in XII.

2. ὁμόφυλα κατεσκεύασατο, 'made akin to himself', lit. 'made members of his own tribe': the metaphor is political, though the reference of the aphorism is not political, but quite general. Hicks translates 'made into one nation all the folk capable of uniting together', an incredible action on the part of an Epicurean philosopher!

4. ἀνεπίμικτος, 'without intercourse with': so βίος ἀνεπίμικτος ὁμιλίας, Plut. 2. 438 c.

καὶ ἐξωρίσατο . . . πράττειν: a very doubtful and difficult clause. All MSS. except one give ἐξηρίσατο, and the majority ὅσα τοῦτ' ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν. Usener, basing his text on ἐξηρίσατο, B's τοῦτω and F's λυσιτελῇ, reads ἐξηρέσατο ὅσα τούτων λυσιτελῇ πράττειν, 'he wins over all of them which it is profitable to treat thus (for ἐξηρέσατο with acc. in this sense cf. Dem. 1396. 26 ἂν τοὺς κυρίους ἢ δώροις ἢ δι' ἄλλης ἡστυνοοσὺν ὁμιλίας ἐξαρέσῃται). But (1) πράττειν by itself will not construe; (2) the sense is not what is wanted: this idea has already been expressed in ὁμόφυλα κατεσκεύασατο, and it is absurd to say that he 'wins over' those whom he cannot even persuade to remain neutral! The only possible meaning for this last clause is 'when he cannot even make them neutral, he either withdraws himself from them or expels them from his life'. This sense can be obtained if we follow Stephanus in reading ἐξωρίσατο, which is practically the reading of H. The exact parallel to the meaning will then be found in XIV if we read there δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξοριστικῇ, and the idea is also implied in ἐκ τῶν ὁμορουντῶν in XL. Bignone agrees in reading ἐξωρίσατο.

ὅσα τοῦτ' ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν is the text best supported by the MSS., 'all whom it was an advantage to treat thus', τοῦτο πράττειν governing the acc. like εὖ ποιεῖν, &c. Bignone reads ὅσα τοῦτο λυσιτελὲς πράττειν, and translates 'in so far as it is profitable', but this appears to me to be an impossible sense for ὅσα.

XL. A summing up of the best kind of life in a community of true Epicureans. Men must first procure immunity from their neighbours:

then, as it were in a protected sphere, they may live in perfect security and close intimacy with their friends; and if a friend dies first, they may mourn their own loss, but not pity him, as they know that death is nothing to him. This is a fitting conclusion to the *Κύριαί Δόξαι*, as it puts together many ideas which have previously occurred singly and leaves a very attractive picture of an Epicurean society such as must have lived in Epicurus' own 'garden'.

The text is uncertain in some details.

6. *τὴν δύνάμιν ἔσχον*: because a certain power is requisite to establish this security from neighbours: cf. XIV *δυνάμει τινὲ ἐξοριστικῇ*.

τοῦ τό is a simple and inevitable correction.

7. *τῶν ὁμορούντων*, 'those on the borders of their life': this is the same idea of a circumscribed field of life as is implied in *ἐξωρίσαστο* in XXXIX.

οὔτοι only F, but the *οὔτω* of the other MSS., which Usener keeps, can hardly be anything but a mistake. *οὔτοι* is implied in *οἷοι*.

8. *ἡδιστα τὸ*: Usener's correction for *ἡδιστον τὸν* B and other variations; it is again required by the sense.

9. *ὡς πρὸς ἑλεον*: the Epicurean may lament his own loss of a friend, but must not pity him: cf. Lucr. iii. 894-911, a famous passage which brings out the idea very clearly.

10. *προκαταστροφὴν*: cf. *καταστροφῆς* XXXV and *κατέστρεφεν* XX. It means surely 'the decease of a friend before oneself', and not, as Hicks and Bignone take it, 'before his time', 'premature'.

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FRAGMENTS

THE fragments here given are derived from two sources. The first is a collection of eighty aphorisms discovered in 1888 by C. Wotke in a Vatican MS. (Cod. Vat. gr. 1950) and published by him in *Wiener Studien*, 1888, pp. 191 ff., with a critical apparatus containing emendations by Usener and Hartel, and supplemented by observations by Usener himself and by Gomperz. The MS., which is of the fourteenth century, is a miscellany containing works of Xenophon, the *Thoughts* of Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus' *Manual*, and other works. The present collection is headed Ἐπικούρου Προσφώνησις (? Προσφωνήσεις, as suggested by Weil). Some of the sayings, denoted in the text by square brackets, came not from Epicurus but from his disciples, in several instances from Metrodorus. About twenty of them were already known, several being quotations from the *Κύρια Δόξαι*. The rest were probably selected from various works of Epicurus, not a few of them seeming to be quotations from private letters. Usener conjectured that the collection was derived from a florilegium made from the letters of Epicurus and his disciples which was used by Seneca, the sentences from the *Κύρια Δόξαι* being added by the compiler, but Bignone is probably right in thinking that there is not sufficient ground for any such definite statement.

The collection deals almost wholly with the moral theory of Epicurus and adds on many points to our knowledge of the system. The sentences containing new matter have been marked, as they were in Wotke's publication, by an asterisk. The text is fairly sound and in most places can easily be corrected, but there remain certain doubtful passages.

The fragments which follow are almost all derived from the great collection of *Epicurea* made by Usener, who gathered from writers both Greek and Latin all quotations from Epicurus' words and references to his doctrines. Here will only be found passages in Greek, which there is good reason to believe are actual quotations of the philosopher's words, though possibly in some cases (notably the extracts from Porphyrius, *ad Marcellam*) slightly paraphrased. I have not included fragments in Latin (mainly quotations in Cicero and Seneca), even though they are probably often literal translations. These fragments have naturally not even so much coherence as those in the Vatican collection: they deal with all kinds of subjects, and were preserved for all kinds of reasons. Nearly half are extracts from personal letters of Epicurus to his disciples, which do not as a rule throw much light on his philosophy, but add greatly to the

picture of the man: we understand more clearly what the 'Life' means by his 'unsurpassed kindness to all' (§ 9). But from the rest we can glean much confirmation of his doctrines, mainly on the ethical side, and often interesting additions to our knowledge.

To Usener's collection have been added a few further fragments from the Herculean rolls and the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, incorporated in his translation by Bignone.

IV. This sentence is a brief epitome of K. Δ. iv, which is quoted in Sentence III. It is couched in epigrammatic form and probably intended to be committed to memory.

1. *σύντομον*: Usener's emendation is certain, *σύντομον* of the MS. being an anticipation of *σύντομον* immediately following.

3. *ἀβληχρόν*: cf. Hom. *Il.* v. 337. A good instance of Epicurus' use of a poetic word in a short maxim: perhaps it was easier to bear in mind.

VII. This sentence again is an epigrammatic *résumé* of K. Δ. xxxv, which has just preceded it. It occurs again in part in Plut. *Contr. Epic. Beat.* 6. 1090 c (*fr.* 82) and is quoted in a pregnant Latin form by Seneca, *Ep.* 97. 13 'potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi fides non potest'.

IX. Quoted by Seneca, *Ep.* 12. 10 (Usener *fr.* 487) 'malum est in necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est'. Hartel on the ground of Seneca's form of the maxim would read *κακὸν ζῆν ἐν ἀνάγκῃ*, but this is unnecessary, and Usener points out that Epicurus' model was probably the famous lines *κακὸν γυναῖκες, ἀλλ' ὅμως, ὧ δημόται, οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκὲν οἰκίαν ἀνευ κακοῦ*. The epigrammatic form is again prominent. For the idea compare K. Δ. xvi: the wise man can so regulate his life that he is little affected by circumstance, and at the worst he can put an end to his life. Bignone notes that this sentence by implication contradicts the popular notion that Epicurus forbade suicide.

X. This sentence is quoted with some variations as from Metrodorus by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* v. 138), and is included in the collections of Metrodorus' fragments (3, p. 43, Duen.: 37 Körte). Bignone notes that the most interesting variation is the inclusion of the vocative *Μενέστρατε*, which shows that the quotation comes from a private letter. For the general idea we may compare Lucretius' description (i. 62 ff.) of the life and work of Epicurus. The quotation is from Hom. *Il.* i. 70.

XI. There is no close parallel to this sentence, but it is obviously a striking contrast with the life of the Epicurean philosopher, for whom both rest and activity are a part of his *ἀταραξία*.

XIV. This aphorism occurs also in the collection of Stobaeus (*Floril.* xvi. 28) and is quoted by Plutarch (*Contr. Epic. Beat.* 27, p. 1104 a). It would appear to come from a private letter addressed to some one

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who was delaying to make a full study of Epicureanism. The idea, as Bignone notes, occurs in Hor. *Od.* i. 11.8 'carpe diem quam minimum credula postero'.

2. κύριος may be supplied with certainty from Stobaeus.

3. τὸ χαῖρον: Stobaeus has τὸν καιρόν. The variation is suspicious, but our text here may well be right, as Epicurus is particularly fond of these participial substantives and the sense is good. Epicurus' correspondent is postponing the true pleasure of philosophy.

XV. Both the text and the exact meaning of the aphorism are doubtful. Wotke on Usener's suggestion read it thus: ἡθὴ ὥσπερ τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἴδια τιμώμενα· ἂν τε χρηστὰ ἔχωμεν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλούμεθα· ἂν τε μὴ, οὕτω χρήσις καὶ τῶν πέλας, ἂν ἐπιεικεῖς ᾖσιν, which he would presumably render, 'Our characters are esteemed as our own possessions: if they are good, then we are envied by men; if not, we shall find our neighbours ill-disposed as well, if they are just', i.e. men will judge us and behave to us, as they find us. This was objected to by subsequent critics: the expression is jerky and the sentiment not particularly Epicurean: moreover, the participle τιμώμενα is awkward, and still more so Usener's χρήσις for the MS. χρή.

I have followed the restoration of Bignone, based on conjectures of Wilamowitz and Weil. He notes that the idea is then closely parallel to the argument in Hor. *Sat.* i. 3: 'among friends allowances must be made for idiosyncrasies of character', and points out that it bears clear marks of Epicurean origin. The notion that certain characteristics remain particular to individuals in spite of philosophic teaching is brought out in Lucr. iii. 310 ff., and the general conception of mutual indulgence among friends frequently recurs.

1. τιμῶμεν of the MS. should certainly be retained: indeed τιμώμενα can hardly be construed unless the fragment is regarded as part of a longer sentence.

ἂν τε χρηστὰ . . . ἂν τε μὴ go more naturally together with Bignone's punctuation than as Wotke arranged them with ἂν τε μὴ introducing a new clause.

2. ζηλώμεθα is a slight change for ζηλούμεθα, a second subjunctive frequently becoming corrupted in a dependent clause. Weil's ζηλούμενα is a less satisfactory correction.

3. (τὰ) is an easy addition.

ἐπιεικεῖς must be taken in the sense of 'indulgent', 'well-disposed', which it has not infrequently, e.g. Thuc. iii. 40. 3 καὶ ἡ ἐπιεικεία πρὸς τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπιτηδείους . . . ἔσεσθαι . . . δίδονται.

If our friends are indulgent to us, we must behave similarly to them.

XVI. Another rather doubtful aphorism in which I have again followed the reading of Bignone, which involves only two slight changes, βλέπων (Wotke) for βλέπτων (an obvious error) and ἀγαθῷ for ἀγαθῶ. The reference then is to the ordinary man, and the idea is a commonplace of Greek philosophy after Socrates: no man deliberately chooses evil, but only when he is allured to it as good

compared with what seems a greater evil. It is not easy to find an exact parallel to the idea in Epicurus, though Bignone compares K. Δ. xxv and *fr.* 38, but the commonplace may well have been introduced in a letter and selected rather injudiciously by the compiler.

Usener quite unnecessarily altered the second part of the clause, ἀλλὰ δελεασθεῖς ὡς ἀγαθὸν προσὸν μείζον ἀν τοῦ κακοῦ ἐθηρεύθη, and took it to refer to the deliberate choice by the Epicurean philosopher of a good which involves evil but surpasses it. This is good Epicureanism, but as Bignone points out, both δελεασθεῖς and ἐθηρεύθη are against it: to this may be added that οὐδεὶς makes the general reference clear.

Crönert's πρὸς τι μείζον for πρὸς τὸ μείζον is unnecessary: it is *the* evil which seems greater on each occasion.

XVII. A characteristic aphorism on the blessings of old age, for which Bignone well compares the exordium of the letter to Menoeceus (§ 122). The young man is still tossed about by uncertainty and constantly changes his course, but the old man has reached harbour and, if he has lived well, can look back in thankful memory on the blessings he has received.

2. νέος (ἐν) ἀκμῇ: the MS. has νέος ἀκμῇ which Usener altered to ἔντος ἀκμῆς, but there is an elaborate parallelism between the two clauses and ὁ δὲ γέρων demands ὁ νέος. Similarly ἐν λιμένι τῷ γήρῳ suggests ἐν ἀκμῇ which gives a natural construction. Bignone, seeing the parallelism, wrote νέος ἀκμῇ, but the dative alone is unnatural, as is Crönert's νέος ἀκμῆν.

πολύς: Hartel unnecessarily altered to πολλά. Not only the construction, but the metaphors are parallel: the young man is a wandering stream, the old man has reached harbour. πολὺς πλάζεται is therefore like the familiar πολὺς ῥεῖ. For πλάζεται, used in this sense of a stream, cf. Hom. *Il.* xvii. 750 ῥόον πεδίονδε τίθησι | πλάζων.

5. χάριτι of the MS. is certainly right and is used in Epicurus' sense of 'grateful recollection': cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 122. γ ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων and LV τῇ τῶν ἀπολυμένων χάριτι. Hartel's χάρακι is a clumsy completion of the metaphor which really loses the point of the aphorism. Memory plays a considerable part in the Epicurean conception of pleasure: cf. K. Δ. ix.

XVIII. This is probably not a general maxim, but, as Usener thought, an extract from a personal letter to a friend, who had fallen in love. For the general attitude of Epicurus towards love, which he regarded as a violent disturbance of ἀταραξία, see *Lucr.* iv. 1058 ff.

XIX. Bignone has rightly seen that this aphorism refers again to the importance of memory in the Epicurean conception of happiness. The philosopher, remembering the joys of the past, can renew his youth daily (cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 122), or rather remains continually young: but the man who is ever seeking new pleasures and is disappointed is plunged at once into the gloom of old age.

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1. *τῆμερον* may thereforesm probably be retained in an emphatic and picturesque sense, though Usener's *αὐθημερόν* would be the more conventional way of expressing the meaning. Gomperz's *τὴν (τῆμ) φρόνησιν* misses the point.

XX is important as it restores the right text of K. Δ. xxix: see notes there.

XXI. For the idea see *Ep. ad Men.* §§ 127 ff. and K. Δ. xxvi, xxix.

1. *πεισόμεθα*: the MS. has *πείσομεν*, which Wotke accepts and Bignone translates 'we shall obey'. But this meaning is impossible except in the middle, and we cannot render 'we shall persuade'. It therefore seems necessary to read *πεισόμεθα*.

2. *τάς (τῶν)*, Wotke's addition, seems inevitable.

XXIII. The notion is exactly that of *Vit. Ep.* § 120 *καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας . . . συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν τοῖς ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἐκτεπληρωμένοις*. Compare also K. Δ. xxvii. Friendship starts from need, but it becomes a good in itself.

1. *αἰρετή*, Usener, is a necessary correction of *ἀρετή*.

XXIV. This aphorism is interesting as being the only one in the collection which is not strictly ethical. For the doctrine of the *εἶδωλα* see *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 46, 49, and for the simulacra as the origin of dreams *Lucr.* iv. 962 ff. For Epicurus' opposition to divination see *Vit. Ep.* § 135.

XXV. This aphorism appears in Seneca, *Ep.* 4. 10 (Usener 477) 'magnae divitiae sunt lege naturae composita paupertas', and is echoed in *Lucr.* v. 1117-1119:

quod si quis vera vitam ratione gubernet,
divitiae grandes homini sunt vivere parce
aequo animo; neque enim est umquam penuria parvi.

Compare also K. Δ. xv and *fr.* 45 (Usener 202).

XXVI. This is probably an extract from a private letter and refers to the philosopher's own works.

XXVII. An ingenious claim for the superiority of philosophy over other pursuits, which brings out its close connexion with the Epicurean ideal of pleasure. Bignone compares *Diog. Oen. fr.* xxvi for the general idea of pleasures, in which the action and enjoyment are simultaneous.

3. *ἅμα: μετά* (V) must be a mere mistake, a repetition of *μετά* above.

XXVIII. Friendship is not always acquired in the same way: it is sometimes fast sometimes slow in the making, but we must risk much for it. A characteristic saying, to which we have no close parallel. At the end the MS. has *παρακινδυνεύσαι χάριν χάριν φιλίας*, which von der Muehl retains: 'We must risk acts of kindness for the sake of friendship': but the repetition is probably a mistake.

XXIX. Epicurus' claim to originality and his scorn for popular acclamation.

1. *φυσιολογῶν χρησµωδεῖν* is an ingenious correction of Usener's for an obvious corruption and may be taken as certain. For the idea of the philosopher as an oracle compare *Lucr. v. 110 ff.*:

qua prius aggrediar quam de re fundere fata
sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripode a Phoebi lauroque profatur.

Bignone also refers to Cicero's ironical allusion in *N. D. i. 66* 'haec ego nunc physicorum oracula fundo'. Von der Muehll adopts Crönert's correction *φυσιολόγῳ*, which I do not understand: is it to be taken with *παρησία*?

XXX. This fragment is attributed to Metrodorus by Stobaeus, *Flor. xvi. 20*. As quoted by him in a fuller form, with the words *ὡς βιωσόμενοι μετὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ζῆν* after *τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον*, it clearly refers to the preparations for a continued life after death, and Bignone therefore believes that it is directed against the Orphics. In that case *τὸ τῆς γενέσεως φάρμακον* will be an ironic reference to the draught of the waters of Lethe taken by souls before they enter this life. As the fragment stands here it might equally well be taken to mean that men act as though this life would continue for ever.

XXXI. This aphorism is attributed to Epicurus by the Paris *Gnomologium* (Usener, *fr. 339*), but to Metrodorus by Stobaeus, *Floril. cxviii. 33*. Usener in his notes on the Vatican collection is inclined to give it to Metrodorus, as does Bignone on the ground of its metaphorical expression. For the Epicurean idea of *ἀσφάλεια* see *K. Δ. vii, xiii, xiv*.

XXXII. The text of this sentence is corrupted in the MS. Usener's *ἀγαθὸν μέγα* for *ἀγαθὼν μετὰ* may be accepted, and similarly in all probability his correction *σεβασμός* for *σεβαστός*. Bignone, comparing *fr. 31*, where Epicurus, addressing Colotes who had fallen down and worshipped him, says *ὡς σεβομένῳ γάρ σοι τὰ τότε ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα*, would read *σεβαστὸς λόγος*, but the parallel is not very close, and the present quotation is clearly more of a general aphorism. Usener would also change *τῶν σεβομένων* to *τῷ σεβομένῳ*, but though the dative would be more usual, the alteration is not imperative. The idea is interesting, that the veneration of a sage is really a blessing to his worshippers rather than to himself.

XXXIII. Protection from hunger, thirst, and cold are the necessary physical desires, and a man who satisfies these may have perfect happiness equal to that of the gods. The first part of the aphorism is quoted again by Porphyrius (*fr. 44*) and may be compared with *Lucr. ii. 16 ff.* The second part reappears in several forms, the closest of which is that in Aelian, *Var. Hist. iv. 13* (Usener, *fr. 602*) *ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν ἐτοίμως ἔχειν καὶ τῷ Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας διαγωνίζεσθαι μάχην ἔχων καὶ ὕδωρ*. From this quotation we may with certainty restore *Δι* to the text. We may also compare the conclusion of the letter to Menoeceus (§ 135).

XXXIV. A subtle observation on friendship to which there is no exact parallel, though the idea in K. Δ. xxvii, that friendship provides ἀσφάλεια comes near to it. I cannot think of any very satisfactory way of retaining in English the double meaning of *χρεία* . . . *χρείας*; Usener ingeniously translates 'Nicht, dass wir sie brauchen, brauchen wir von den Freunden'.

XXXV. An ingenious argument for Epicurean contentment. We may compare *Ep. ad Men.* § 127. 5 *μνημονεύειν δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως οὐχ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐχ ἐσόμενον*. Seneca, *Ep.* 15. 10 also suggests it, and Bignone traces the same idea in Hor. *Sat.* ii. 6, *ini.* Compare also Lucretius' phrase of the discontented man (iii. 957) 'semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis'.

2. τῶν εὐκταίων, 'among the things to be prayed for', not of course that Epicurus believed in prayer for blessings: the word is conventional, and to Epicurus would mean 'to be hoped for'.

XXXVI. This fragment clearly cannot be attributed to Epicurus himself. Usener would assign it to Hermarchus, his successor as head of the school.

2. αὐταρκείας: Bignone notices the two sides of this word 'internal contentment' arising from self-sufficiency, and also 'self-control', 'independence of desires'. It is perhaps significant that it is the word chosen by the Stoics to express their moral ideal: Epicurus fully satisfied the Stoic standard.

XXXVII. An Epicurean paradox. If pleasure is the end of life, then the natural inclination to it is a source of strength.

XXXVIII. Though Epicurus did not forbid suicide (cf. *fr.* IX), he had some contempt for it: cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 24. 23 (Usener 498) and *Vit. Ep.* § 119: also Lucr. iii. 79 ff.

1. μικρός is probably right, and Usener's emendation to οἰκτρός really weakens the sense. Bignone suggests that if any correction is needed, we should read *μικρόψυχος*.

XXXIX. Another subtle observation on friendship which we may compare with XXIII, XXVIII, and XXXIV. The expression is a little obscure.

2. συνάπτων: sc. τὴν χρείαν τῇ φιλίᾳ. To Epicurus (cf. XXIV) *χρεία* is an essential element in friendship.

καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν, 'takes the return of favours in the place of kindly feeling'.

3. τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν: what is described in XXXIV as ἡ πίστις ἢ περὶ τῆς χρείας.

XL. A clever argument of Epicurus, who stoutly maintained free will, against Democritus, who held that necessity was supreme. Bignone compares a fragment of the *περὶ φύσεως* published by Gomperz in *Wiener Studien*, 1879, where it is argued that you cannot persuade any one else of error, unless free will is admitted: for if necessity is supreme, you cannot be sure that you have always the necessity of

reasoning right and your opponent of reasoning wrongly. We may compare the parallel argument as to scepticism in Lucr. iv. 469 f.:

denique nil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit
an sciri possit, quoniam nil scire fatetur.

2. Usener quite arbitrarily added the word γέλων to the end of this aphorism, deriving it from γελᾶν at the beginning of the next sentence (XLI). It completely destroys the argument and is required where it stands.

XLI. An interesting injunction: philosophy is not to be divorced from ordinary life but associated with it at all times.

1. γελᾶν was arbitrarily excluded by Usener and attached (as γέλων) to the previous aphorism. But it is clearly in place here and Bignone finds a parallel for it in the fragments of Philodemus (περὶ Ἐπικούρου ix), ἐν μέρει δὲ θέλειν εὐχαρίσθαι αὐτοὺς γελανῶς (cf. *Riv. di Fil.* 1915, pp. 538 ff.).

So too Plut. *de Defectu Oraculorum*, 19 (Usener, *fr.* 394) εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. Crönert's μελετᾶν is therefore unnecessary.

3. φωνάς: cf. *Ep. ad Hdl.* § 36. 11 διὰ βραχεῶν φωνῶν and XXXIII σαρκὸς φωνή.

XLII. A rather obscure fragment, which it is impossible to interpret with certainty without its context. τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν must be 'pleasure', and the general sense will then be that pleasure is enjoyed at the moment when it is brought into being: the two processes are simultaneous. Bignone believes it to be an argument against the Platonic doctrine that pleasure is a γένεσις not an οὐσία, and compares it with K. Δ. iii, where Epicurus denies that pleasure and pain can coexist. But it seems difficult to take the present fragment as a representation of the Epicurean point of view, as it can hardly be reconciled with the importance attached to the pleasures of memory, and it looks more like a statement of the Cyrenaic view of the μονόχρονος ἡδονή. But compare XXVII, which suggests that the reference here may be to the pleasure of philosophic study.

2. ἀπολαύσεως, Usener, seems a certain correction of ἀπολύσεως.

XLIII. An interesting aphorism on avarice, which Greek thought ranked among sensual vices.

2. μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου: Bignone translates 'even in a just man', but it must surely be neuter.

XLIV. A continuation of the same subject. The text has got corrupted: Usener's ἐπίσταται is certain and συγκαθεῖς may be right in the sense of 'having accommodated himself to', but possibly we should prefer Gomperz's correction συγκλεισθεῖς. For the meaning of αὐτάρκεια see note on XXXVI. Usener is inclined to refer this maxim to the period when Athens was besieged by Demetrius in 294 B.C.

XLV. An interesting description of what Epicurus takes to be the physical effect of the study of natural philosophy. Note that the contrast is not between pride and humility, but between an outward boastfulness and an inner confidence.

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1. φωνῆς can, I think, stand by itself without Usener's addition of κενῆς.

3. σοβαροῦς: I agree with Bignone that this can be retained: the philosopher has a pride and disdain, but it is not expressed in idle vaunting.

XLVI. A rather commonplace sentence which Usener thinks comes from a private letter: von der Muehl reads ἐκδιώκομεν but without critical comment: the subjunctive is more natural.

XLVII. The first part of this fragment was already known as Metrodorus' (Duen. 26: Körte 49); for the second Bignone compares Diog. Oen. fr. ii, col. 2.

2. σῆν: it is hardly necessary to insert the article, as Usener suggested.

3. περιστάσει: a favourite Epicurean word for 'surroundings', 'environment', used sometimes in a concrete, sometimes in an abstract sense.

4. προσπύσαντες: a violent expression, which Usener notes was often used by Metrodorus, but not often by Epicurus himself (see however frs. 37 and 79).

τοῖς . . . περιπλαττομένοις: Bignone has, I think, shown that the MS. text may be kept, περιπλάττεσθαι being used of shell-fish holding on to rocks; Usener emended it unnecessarily to περιπλεκομένοις.

6. παιῶνος: a brilliant emendation of Usener's for the MS. πλείονος. The metaphor here may be, as Usener suggests, from the comic chorus leaving the stage with a τήνελλα καλλίνικος at the end of the play: cf. Aristoph. *Acē*, 1232.

XLVIII. Another rather commonplace aphorism, which in the topic of life and death has a connexion with that which precedes.

1. πειρᾶσθαι: the regular infinitive in such aphorisms, δεῖ or χρεῖ being 'supplied'.

τὴν ὑστέραν τῆς προτέρας may well be retained, as Bignone has shown, if ὁδόν be understood. Usener preferred to change to τὴν ὑστεραίαν (sc. ἡμέραν) τῆς προτεράας.

2. ἐν ὁδῷ: the MS. has ἐν ὃ ὁδῷ, which is probably a mere dittography: Bignone corrects to ἐν προόδῳ, which is more likely to be right than Crönert's ἐν εὐόδῳ.

3. ὁμαλῶς, 'equably', 'contentedly'.

LI is clearly an extract from a private letter to a disciple who had asked for advice. The form of the answer, stating the conditions of permission and then denying the possibility of their fulfilment, shows a certain touch of humour uncommon in Epicurus. There is a certain number of small corruptions in the MS. text which the editors have put right: ἔθει for ἔθη might possibly be retained with von der Muehl. The general aphorism at the end recurs in *Vit. Epic.* § 118. 10.

LII. A more than usually picturesque and metaphorical aphorism: the chain of Epicurean friends is imagined as extending round the

world, every man exhorting his acquaintances to embrace the true life of happiness.

1. ἡ φίλια: Bignone defends the MS. text, and for the personification compares the address to Venus in Lucr. i *ini.* The expression is certainly unusual, but not extravagant. Of the corrections Hartel's ἡ φιλοσοφία might possibly be right, but Usener's 'ἡλίου σφαῖρα' is palaeographically improbable and gives a picture which seems strangely unlike Epicurus.

περιχορεύει: with an idea of joyful motion, not merely 'runs round', as Bignone translates it.

2. ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν, 'to the felicitations given to one who enjoys true happiness': the Epicurean sage is felicitated both by Epicureans and by others who see his happiness. Bignone notes the frequency with which Epicurus and his disciples congratulated one another on their lives, and quotes in support a saying about Epicurus from Dionys. Episc. Περὶ φύσεως in Eus. *Præp. Ev.* xiv. 27. 8 οὕτω πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ μακαρισμοῦ τούτου μετουσίαν ἐξομωιωθησομένους ἐκείνους τοῖς θεοῖς παρακαλεῖ. The expression is again strange, and Weil may be right in conjecturing ἐπὶ τὸν μακάριον βίον which is simpler.

LIII. A straightforward argument against envy.

LIV. This aphorism was already contained in various *florilegia* (*fr.* 53).

LV. 2. χάριτι, 'grateful recollection': cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 122 and *Val. Sent.* xvii above.

LVI-LVII are given in the MS. as one sentence, though imperfect. Wotke separates the two parts, supposing ὁ βίος . . . ἔσται to refer to some different subject, and adopting Usener's completion of the first half στρεβλούμενος (αὐτὸς ἢ ὁρῶν στρεβλούμενον) τὸν φίλον. Bignone however, following Thomas, thinks that the two parts ought to be related: he notes that after the publication of the *Vatican Sentences*, the first part of the maxim was found in a gnomologium in a MS. at Heidelberg, the last words running ἡ στρεβλουμένη τοῦ φίλου. Adopting this he would then proceed (καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνήσκει· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται) τὸν φίλον, ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς κτλ. But there are, I think, two objections to this restoration: (a) it neglects μὲν at the beginning of the sentence, which should be followed by a contrasted δὲ clause; (b) it neglects the technical Epicurean sense of ἀπιστία: friendship gives a πίστις (cf. *Sent. Val.* xxxiv, xxxix), a trust that your friend will serve you if need comes, and what destroys this πίστις is an injury done to you by your friend, which shows that you can no longer trust him. I should therefore accept Usener's restoration of the first half (the text of the Heidelberg anthology is probably a mere variation), and if one is to conjecture the words lost in the second half, would propose εἰ δὲ ἀδικήσει αὐτὸν ὁ φίλος: 'The wise man will be as distressed for his friend's suffering, as for his own, but if his friend proves unfaithful, then his whole life will be confounded.'

1. στρεβλούμενος: for the idea cf. *Vit. Ep.* § 118, 3.

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LVIII. For ἐγκύκλια in the sense of 'affairs', 'routine', cf. *Ep. ad Pyth.* § 85, 4 τοῖς εἰς ἀσχολίας βαθυτέρας τῶν ἐγκυκλίων τινὸς ἐμπελεγμένοις, and for the Epicurean notion of the importance of the withdrawal from politics compare also K. Δ. vii and *Vit. Ep.* § 119.

LIX. A straightforward attack on greed. Usener's insertion of the article before γαστρὸς is hardly necessary.

LX. This fragment is quoted by Seneca, *Ep.* 22. 13 'nemo non ita exit e vita, tamquam modo intraverit'. There is considerable doubt about its interpretation and reference. Seneca interprets it in a moral sense, 'a man leaves life no better than he entered it', and comments 'falsum est, peiores morimur quam nascimur'. Usener compares *Lucr.* iii. 972, 973:

respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas
temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante,

and takes it to mean that our condition after death will be as it was before birth, i.e. we shall feel and know nothing—but it is very difficult to extract this from the Greek. Bignone takes it to refer to the accompaniments of this life, 'We brought nothing into this world and it is certain that we shall take nothing out'. If one looks simply at the Greek text it surely refers to the brevity of life and the little that any man accomplishes in it: 'every man at his death is like a new-born child'; his life is gone as it were in a few hours.

LXI. Another fragment where both text and interpretation are difficult. Bignone has rightly seen that it must be an extract (as is shown by καὶ) from a longer passage on friendship: Epicurus has probably been speaking of the advantages of friendship in mutual service and protection, and has instanced first the friendship of true Epicureans, which he regards as the highest. Then he passes to the friendship of members of a family, where kinship forms a natural basis for such mutual confidence.

1. ὁψις is the actual bodily presence of those who live together: Usener's σύναψις is quite unnecessary.

2. ἡ . . . ποιουμένη: I would retain the nominative of the MS., regarding εἰς which follows ἡ as a ditlography of εἰς before πολλήν: it is the actual ὁψις which is a spur to mutual confidence, just as in XVIII he said that πρόσοψις was the great incitement to love. The editors wish to refer this clause to συγγενείας and agree in changing ποιουμένη to ποιουμένης: Wotke accepted Hartel's καὶ for ἡ εἰς, and Bignone would read κεῖς ἀεί—a strange exaggeration. But I think the nominative is right and makes better sense.

εἰς τοῦτο is then the general purpose of mutual confidence, which is the subject of the whole section from which this sentence is taken. The saying is interesting as showing Epicurus' belief in family life.

LXII. Again the text is difficult and uncertain, but the general meaning is clear. It is never of any use for children to be angry with parents who are angry with them: if the parents' anger is justified, then retaliation is futile, if it is irrational, resentment only increases their passion, but 'a soft answer turneth away wrath'.

4. γελοῖον πάνυ τὸ προσεκαίειν τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμοκατοχοῦντα: I have with hesitation adopted the text put together by Bignone from suggestions by Weil and Crönert. I feel considerable doubt about προσεκαίειν in the sense of 'increasing' the irrational passion, but θυμοκατοχοῦντα appears to be supported by the usage of θυμοκάτοχον of a magic medicine in passages quoted by Crönert (*Rhein. Mus.* lxi, p. 421), *Dict. Abrax.* 118. 17 θυμοκάτοχον πρὸς βασιλεῖς καὶ μεγιστάνας, *Par. Lond.* 1. 114. 941 θυμοκάτοχον καὶ ὑποτακτικόν. The MS. has πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἐκκλησιν τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμοκατοχοῦντα, for which Usener read σιγᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἐκκλησιν τὴν ἀλογίαν (ἄγον) θυμῷ κατασχόντα, a large correction, which does not give satisfactory sense.

6. εὐγνωμονοῦντας V: it is unnatural to take this with τρόπους, and it is probably better to read the singular εὐγνωμονοῦντα to correspond with θυμοκατοχοῦντα.

LXIII is interesting as showing that Epicurus did not wish to push his idea of the simple life to excess: the ascetic will suffer bodily distress like the glutton and so fail to attain ἀπονία. The text of the first few words is corrupt but has been set right by Usener. Bignone compares Hor. *Sat.* I. i. 102 ff. Von der Muehl reads ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης, but I do not understand the meaning of λεπτότης here.

LXIV. The true Epicurean is glad to receive praise (cf. LII) but he must not seek for it: his care is for his own bodily and spiritual welfare.

LXV is clearly part of an argument against the current practice of prayer. The gods cannot ever answer it, and often a man could get for himself what he prays for.

LXVI. Usener is probably right in holding that this fragment cannot refer to sympathy with living friends (θρηνοῦντες is against that), but to feeling for friends who are dead. The true Epicurean will not idly lament their death, but meditate on their lives. Compare K. Δ. xl οὐκ ᾠδύραντο ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφὴν.

LXVII. Great possessions cannot be obtained by the true Epicurean, and if he has them by chance he can distribute them, and so win the good-feeling of friends which is the true wealth.

1. ἐλεύθερος: Usener suggests ἐλευθέριος but ἐλεύθερος is better. The philosopher's life is 'free' because it is not encumbered by the necessity of courting others.

2. (μή) must be added.

3. συνεχεῖ δαψιλεία can hardly stand alone and σὺν is a more probable insertion than ἐν. πάντα κέκτηται can well stand by itself in the sense of Bignone's amplification πάντα τὰ συμφέροντα κέκτηται.

LXVIII. In the form in which it stands here, the aphorism appears to mean that a fastidious man is never satisfied. But the sense is a little feeble, and as it is quoted by Aelian, *Var. Hist.* iv. 13 (*fr.* 69) φῶ δλίγον οὐχ ἱκανόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτῳ γε οὐδὲν ἱκανόν, 'the man who is not satisfied with little, is satisfied with nothing', it is far more pointed. We should however perhaps hardly be justified in reading here φῶ δλίγον οὐχ ἱκανόν.

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LXIX. The point is truly Epicurean: it is not bodily hunger which makes one desire dainty foods, but a greed of the mind which imagines and then desires new varieties. After the satisfaction of the need there can be only variety in pleasure. *λίχνος* with the gen. is quoted from the fragments of Menander (*Incert. i. 10 λίχνος τοῦ κεκρυμμένου*).

LXX. A common Epicurean theme which recurs in K. Δ. xxxiv, xxxv and *Sent. Val. vii*.

LXXI. Another straightforward aphorism, which suggests the Epicurean 'hedonistic calculus'. In the presence of every desire we must ask what amount of pleasure and what amount of pain does it involve and decide accordingly. Compare *Ep. ad Men.* § 129. 5 ff.

LXXIII. A rather interesting statement of the value of experience in the case of physical health.

LXXIV. A paradox of dialectic.

LXXV. This is of course a reference to the story of Solon's saying to Croesus (Hdt. i. 30 ff.). The quotation is the end of an iambic line and is attributed to Solon in Scholion on Dio Chrys. *Or.* 72. 13 and on Lucian, iv, p. 137. To the Epicurean on the other hand the memory of past pleasures was one of the chief sources of present happiness: cf. XVII, XIX.

LXXVI. There is some doubt as to the authorship of this fragment, which evidently comes from a personal letter. Usener attributes it to Epicurus and thinks that it is addressed to one of the earlier disciples, who was older than Epicurus himself: possibly to Leonteus of Lampsacus. Bignone comparing it with a fragment of Metrodorus (Körte 41, Plut. *adv. Col.* 31), which is somewhat similar in tone, prefers to attribute it to him.

Bignone in his translation does not sufficiently bring out *διέγνωκας . . . ὁποίῳ ἐστι . . . καὶ οἶον*: this must imply a distinction between two methods of philosophizing, exoteric and esoteric. Epicurus' philosophy was to be proclaimed to the world (cf. XXIX, LII), and the contrast here must be with some other sect who kept their philosophy to themselves.

LXXVII may be compared with XLIV and LXVII. *αὐτάρκεια* must be taken in the same wide sense as in XLIV which cannot be fully translated in English.

LXXVIII is perhaps the most remarkable of all the exaltations of friendship in Epicurus. It is called immortal because it gives a man happiness equivalent to that of the gods: compare *Ep. ad Men.* § 135. 7 *ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ εἰκοι θνητῷ ζῆψι ζῶν ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς*.

LXXIX. With this saying we may compare what is said of the nature of the gods in K. Δ. i *τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει*.

LXXX. A well-spent youth will have put a man on the safe path for the rest of his life.

The opening of the sentence is blurred in the MS.: von der Muehl conjectures *γενναίω*.

3. οἰστροειδής: lit. 'gad-fly like', a typically picturesque word.
LXXXI. The first part of the sentence is alluded to in Porph.
de Abstin. i. 51 (Usener, *fr.* 470).

1. οὐδὲ τὴν need not be altered with Usener to οὐδέ τιν'.

3. περίβλεψις: cf. K. Δ. vii ἐνδοξοὶ καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γένεσθαι.

4. τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας: lit. 'things connected with unlimited causes', i.e. causes of unlimited desire, such as there is for wealth, honour, power, &c. Bignone takes it to mean 'causes not proportional to the natural end', but this seems less natural.

OTHER FRAGMENTS

1 (Usener 2). This sentence is quoted in the *Life of Epicurus* by Diog. Laert. (x. 136) in a passage where he is contrasting the Epicurean idea of pleasure as the absence of pain with that of the Cyrenaics. See notes there.

2 (Usener 18). The fragment is quoted by Plutarch in a work (*adv. Coloten*), which is a violent attack on Epicureanism. He interprets the reply to mean, 'Yes, I will act so, but I do not wish to admit it', and Cicero, in a passage (*de Fin.* ii. 9. 28) which seems to allude to this book, says that Epicurus 'sometimes gets into great difficulties, and when the general conscience of mankind is removed, seems ready to do anything, however disgraceful, for pleasure's sake'. But it is obvious from its occurrence in a book of 'Problems' (or we might say 'Casuistry') that Epicurus regarded this as an open question, and the reply given here is therefore to be taken quite seriously. *Sent. Vat.* li suggests that conflict with the laws is likely to mean ultimately conflict with Epicurean principles. At the same time K. Δ. xxxvii and fragments 81, 83 suggest that the laws were made for man and not man for the laws, and there might have been cases in which Epicurus would have answered this question affirmatively.

3 (Usener 27). This sentence is again quoted in the *Life of Epicurus* (§ 135) in a passage where he is summing up various characteristics of the Epicurean philosophy. The expression is not very easy: see notes there.

4 (Usener 29). Epicurus held that the atoms had no colour, but that colours were produced in things by the arrangements and movements of the component atoms (cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 54, 55, *Lucr.* ii. 730 ff.). One of his arguments is here recorded, that even in our experience things have no colour in the dark (cf. *Lucr.* ii. 746, 747).

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5, 6, 7 (Usener 58, 59, 60). These three passages, all cited from Plutarch's attack on Colotes, must be extracts from a discussion in the *Symposium* on the results of differences of atomic arrangement in compounds, illustrated by the effects of wine on the human body. Sometimes it is felt to be cool, sometimes it produces heat. How can this be? Not according to Epicurus, because wine is absolutely either hot or cold, but because it contains in itself particles which may be productive of heat and others which may be productive of cold. If then the 'heat-particles' come together, the effect is warming, if the cold, then cooling. But the atomic conformation of the body which it enters is also of importance: for heat or cold particles in it may come and join those in the wine and so increase the one effect or the other. The whole explanation is, in fact, closely parallel to that of the differences of taste which the same thing will have for different persons given by Lucretius in iv. 633 ff.

The general sense is clear, but there are difficulties of text and of the detailed interpretation of the passages.

5. This is part of a dialogue between Polyaeus, Epicurus, and others, and it is quoted piecemeal by Plutarch. The first question is definitely assigned to Polyaeus, the second remark it seems most natural to take as an interruption by one of the other characters, and the third (quoted as occurring 'a little later') will be part of Epicurus' reply.

2. *ὑπέλαβέ τις οὐ . . . ἀποφαίνεσθαι*: we may with Bignone retain the MS. text and interpret 'some one interrupted saying that it did not appear': the 'some one' will be a supporter of Epicurus. Usener, wishing to assign this remark to Epicurus himself, would read *ὑπέλαβε τις οὐ . . . ἀποφαίνεται*, but this is not only unnecessary but does not really give good sense.

4. *τοῦδε δέ τινος*: I take this genitive, like *τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως κτλ.* in *fr. 6*, to be objective after *θερμαντικός*, 'capable of warming a body of a certain kind', i.e. that you must not only have the right amount of wine, but the right atomic structure in the body of the drinker to assist the warming process as described in *fr. 6*. Bignone in all these places takes the genitive apparently as descriptive, 'a certain quantity of wine at a certain temperature'. This seems to me very doubtful Greek, and moreover it neglects the essential point of the conformation of the body of the recipient.

6. 2. *τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης . . . θερμαντικόν*, 'capable of warming a certain body which is in a certain disposition', i.e. a body containing the right kind of particles in the right arrangement: see note on *fr. 5*. Bignone again takes it as descriptive, 'a certain quantity of wine at a certain temperature and arranged in a specific manner'.

4. *φύσεις*, here, 'atoms': it was Democritus' technical term, and Epicurus himself spoke of *αἱ ἄτομοι φύσεις*.

5. *εἰ, δέον γε*: this is the MS. text, and I think it may just be retained: 'in the compound there are certain particles out of which

cold might be produced, if, when occasion requires, united with other particles they could form a structure which would cause cold'. The particles are always there, and it requires only the combination with other particles in the body to form the right atomic structure to produce the effect of cold. But the sense of *δέον γε* is rather strained, and we should perhaps accept Bignone's suggestion *εἰ (eis) δέον γε ἐρέσθαι παραλυνγίσθαι*, 'if appropriately united with other particles'. The same sense would be obtained by Wyttenbach's *εἰς δέον τε*, but Usener's alteration *ἢ αἰ γε* is both violent and unsatisfactory.

7 is more straightforward and reinforces the general argument with the statement that wine is frequently drunk without any perceptible effect of heat or cold, which shows that it is neither hot nor cold absolutely.

8 (Usener 62) occurs in *Vit. Ep.* § 118, and recurs at the end of *Sent. Vat.* li with the substitution of *ἀφροδίσια* for *συνουσίη*. In *Vit. Ep.* it is quoted as a common saying of the Epicureans, but *Plut. Quaest. Conviv.* iii. 6. 1 makes the attribution to the *Symposium* certain.

9 is not included in Usener's collection, but was included by Bignone from the Herculanean Rolls on rhetoric. The text is corrupt in the papyrus and was first put in order by Gomperz: I have noted the points in which Sudhaus, from whom I here take the text (*Philodem. Voll. Rhet. Suppl.*, p. 50), differs from him. The fragment is clearly a double version of a saying and may, though not with certainty, be attributed to Epicurus himself. It is of course very ironical in tone and is fully in accordance with Epicurus' usual contempt for rhetoric.

10 (Usener 67). This fragment is quoted as from the *περὶ τέλους* by Athenaeus, and also, with abbreviations at the end, in *Vit. Ep.* § 6 (see notes there). It was maliciously used against Epicurus by his detractors, but is in fact an extremely emphatic statement that bodily pleasure must be regarded as just as essential for complete happiness as mental pleasure. It should, however, be read in conjunction with such passages as *Ep. ad Men.* § 129, where Epicurus says that all pleasures are good, but not all *αἰσθητά*.

11 (Usener 68). An interesting fragment for Epicurus' idea of bodily pleasure. *ἀσυνία* becomes a permanent stable condition of body and this produces *χαρά*, which is a strong and positive feeling of pleasure.

12 (Usener 70). A clear statement of the doctrine that pleasure is the supreme test: beauty and virtue have no validity in themselves. Compare *fr.* 79.

13 (Usener 75). This of course is the fundamental doctrine of Epicurean physics and may be compared with *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 39 and *Lucr. Bk. I.*

14 (Usener 76). A slight variation of the preceding statement, but there is no reason to doubt that they both occurred in the first book of

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the *περὶ φύσεως*. *τόπος* was one of Epicurus' regular terms for 'empty space': cf. *Lucr.* i. 426 'locus ac spatium quod inane vocamus'.

15 (Usener 81). This fragment is quoted as from the eleventh book of the *περὶ φύσεως* by the scholiast on *Ep. ad Pyth.* § 91 (see note there). It is clearly an argument for the Epicurean view that the size of the sun is as we see it. It must be compared with *Lucr.* v. 564 ff., where it is argued that terrestrial lights become confused in outline before they appear to diminish in size. Much more so would this happen with the sun whose great distance from the earth would be very likely to cause such blurring. But the outline of the sun is not blurred: therefore we must suppose that his size is not diminished. Bignone in his note on *Ep. ad Pyth.* § 91, has, I think, shown clearly that this is the meaning and that there is no reason for any alteration in the text.

Other fragments of the *περὶ φύσεως* have been found in the Herculanean Rolls (see *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature*, Powell and Barber, 1921, p. 40, note by J. L. Stocks). Some of these have been published with conjectural restorations, but the text is so fragmentary and uncertain and the restorations at present so far from satisfactory that I have not included any in the present collection. It may, however, be well to give some account of the extent of these fragments and their contents with references to the sources where they may be found.

A. Fragments definitely assigned to certain Books:

1. *Book II*. Eleven fragments from *VH*¹ vol. ii, edited by Rosini and Orelli (*Epicuri Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1818). These deal with the theory of sense-perception by means of effluences, and in particular with the *εἰδῶλα* which are the cause of vision. Col. iii gives an indication of Epicurus' theory of the atomic construction of the *εἰδῶλα*, and col. vii appears to point out that the *εἰδῶλον* preserves the same shape and the same space intervals as the original, but that its content (*βάθος*) is not solid (*σῶμα*) but void (*κενόν*). Further references to these fragments will be found in an article by Gomperz ('Neue Bruchstücke Epikurs', *Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, lxxxii, 1876, p. 87), which contains a summary of the *περὶ φύσεως* fragments then known.

2. *Book XI*. Thirteen fragments from *VH*¹ vol. ii, edited by Rosini and Orelli (op. cit.); corrections and additions from the Oxford copies of cols. ix to xii, published by Gomperz (*Zeitschrift für die Oesterreichischen Gymnasien*, xviii, 1867, pp. 207 ff.): see also *Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akad.* lxxxii, p. 87). This book deals with cosmogony and is largely occupied with a discussion of the earth's position at rest in the middle of the *κόσμος*. The idea expounded by Lucretius (v. 534 ff.) is elaborated, and the earth is said to owe its freedom from motion to its position in the centre, so that there is equal pressure of air on it from all sides. There is incidentally a

discussion of the means by which we can obtain information as to τὰ μετέωρα. [An alternative version of these fragments (except 2, 3, and 4) was published by Mancini (*Atti del Congresso Internazionale di scienze storiche*, vol. II, 1905, pp. 249 ff.) based on a MS. in the University Library of Messina (Fondo Monastico 37). This MS. is a transcript made by one Foti, who assisted Rosini in the deciphering of the Herculanean Rolls, and was apparently taken from an earlier facsimile than that from which *VH* was published: its readings may therefore have occasional value, though Foti's own restorations are for the most part very poor.]

3. *Book XIV.* Ten fragments published by Gomperz (*Zeitschr. für Oest. Gymn.*, loc. cit., pp. 211-213), which are part of a polemic on the question of the original φύσις, and are directed, as Gomperz thinks, against the theory of Plato in the *Timaeus*.

4. *Book XV.* A fragment of the title of the book giving an indication of the date of its writing. Discussed by Gomperz (*ibid.*, pp. 669-670).

5. *Book XXVIII.* Thirteen fragments from the *Apographa Oxoniensis*, each composed of two halves taken from different parts of the reproduction, the pages of the roll having been torn in half and copied separately: published by Cosattini (*Hermes*, xxix, 1894, pp. 1-15). These represent the latter portion of the book and look like the records of a conversation, Metrodorus being frequently addressed by name. They deal with the principles of the *Canonice*, and in particular with the truth of αἰσθησις and the importance of the use of words in their primary sense (see *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 37). Cosattini thinks that they show a greater interest in questions of logic than is usually attributed to Epicurus.

B. Unassigned Fragments:

1. *On the Will.* Six fragments and one fairly continuous passage of some length published by Gomperz (*Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akad. für Wiss.* lxxxii, 1876, pp. 92 to 95, and *Wiener Studien*, i. 1879-1880, pp. 27-31). The fragments appear to discuss from an atomic point of view the reaction of the mind to the εἶδωλα coming from without, and tend in Gomperz's view, to show that Epicurus, though the opponent of fatalism, was not opposed to determinism. These fragments, if they could be satisfactorily restored, would throw a great deal of light on Epicurus' psychology, and so illuminate his moral theory.

2. *On generation.* Seven fragments published by Cosattini (*Rivista di Filologia*, xx, 1892, pp. 510-515) and attributed by him to Epicurus himself on the ground that no other Epicurean work περὶ φύσεως is known in the Herculanean collection and the writing resembles that of the fragments of Book II. The passage appears to deal with the process of generation from the atomic point of view.

3. *On error.* A short fragment from the conclusion of a book published by Gomperz (*Sitzungsb. kais. Akad.*, *ibid.*, p. 96) dealing with the origin of erroneous ideas in the mind.

4. *On the 'myth' of a future life.* A few scraps published by

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Gomperz (ibid., pp. 96, 97), which appear to be part of a polemic against the popular religious ideas of punishment after death (cf. *Ep. ad Men.* §§ 124 ff.).

16 (Usener 92). These definitions may well be included among the genuine fragments, though Usener does not admit them. They are entirely in agreement with Epicurean doctrine and are expressed in the language of Epicurus.

17 (Usener 93). This quotation occurs in the *Vit. Ep.* § 7, 11, and is directed against Nausiphanes, a pupil of Democritus, from whom Epicurus undoubtedly learned much, though he heaped scorn and abuse on him. For the text and interpretation see notes there.

18 (Usener 97). This and the following two fragments (19) come from the Herculanean Rolls. Their restoration is naturally very tentative.

1. δ: sc. that pleasure has a limit: cf. K. Δ. iii.

19 (Usener 99). These two much corrupted fragments from Philodemus' *περὶ εὐσεβείας* must have been quoted by him for the sake of the pious expression *θεῶν ἐλλείων ὄντων*. This is strictly inconsistent with Epicurus' view of the gods, but it is notable that both he and his disciples occasionally used such conventional phrases: cf. *Lucr.* ii. 434, v. 1156.

20 (Usener 105). The fragment is quoted by Theo as an example of a bad order of words, and is placed by Usener among 'Spurious Letters'. But there seems no particular reason to doubt it. It is almost impossible to guess the context.

1. οἷσθ' ἄπερ ἡμῖν is a brilliant restoration of Crönert's (*Rhein. Mus.*, 1906, p. 422) for the manifest corruption of the MSS.: Usener's *ἔστιν ἂ πρὶν μὲν* is much less probable.

2. γεγένηται: Crönert's obvious correction for *γένηται*.

21 (Usener 113). This fragment, which is about Nausiphanes, is quoted in *Vit. Ep.* § 8, 2.: see notes there. Bignone has, I think, clearly shown that the MS. text *διδάσκαλον* may be retained without alteration or addition.

22 (Usener 114). These quotations are again about Nausiphanes and are given by Sextus Empiricus. There is little doubt that Epicurus did derive some of his knowledge of atomism from Nausiphanes, but he is always very violent in proclaiming his independence.

1. βαρυστόνους is given by Plutarch (*contr. Ep. Beat.* 2, p. 1086 e) among a list of abusive epithets which Epicurus liked to hurl at other philosophers.

2. τοῦ πλεύμονος, 'the Mollusc': Sextus explains that Epicurus gave him this nickname, *ὡς ἀναίσθητον*.

23 (Usener 116). Epicurus is here clearly contrasting the motive of his moral philosophy with that of others. They invite men to a laborious round of virtues, which may or may not profit them, he invites them to continuous pleasure.

24 (Usener 117). The fragment is preserved in Athenaeus, but the name Apelles is restored from a reference in Plutarch. Athenaeus quotes it in connexion with Epicurus' claim to have been free himself from all traditional education, and notes his congratulations to disciples in the same condition: cf. *fr.* 33.

1. αἰκίας is an ingenious emendation of Bignone for the meaningless αἰτίας of the MSS. It would be quite in Epicurus' manner to refer to education on traditional lines as 'contamination'. It is therefore better in sense, as well as palaeographically, than Wachsmuth's παιδείας which is accepted by Usener.

25 (Usener 125). Another fragment from *Vit. Ep.* § 5. 6, addressed to Themista, Leonteus' wife. It shows Epicurus in a playful mood.

26 (Usener 130). A considerable number of fragments survive addressed to Idomeneus, who was one of the leading disciples. This fragment refers to the voluntary contributions (cf. *frs.* 40, 41) made by the disciples for the support of their master. The phraseology used is religious and playful in tone, but the Epicureans began quite early to give the founder a form of religious veneration.

27 (Usener 131). This invocation, like *fr.* 20, was quoted by Theophrastus as an example of bad prose rhythm, the fault here being that the rhythm is too close to that of verse. Rohde in his copy of Usener, now in my possession, has noted that if the word κινήματα be removed, the remainder is a rough iambic verse.

28 (Usener 135) is rightly referred to by Seneca (*Ep.* 21. 7) as a *nobilis sententia*.

1. χρημάτων is the reading of the MSS. and should be retained as a partitive genitive. One MS. corrects to χρήματα: Seneca translates *non pecuniae adiciendum*, from which Meineke restored χρήμασι, but there seems no authority for the construction.

2. τῆς . . . ἐπιθυμίας: probably specifically 'the desire for money', and not 'desires' in general, as Bignone takes it. Seneca has *cupiditati detrahendum est*.

29 (Usener 135 a, p. 345). This is quoted by Stobaeus with the heading Ἀπολλώνιος Εἰδομένη. It is certainly Epicurean in expression and Usener is probably right in recognizing Ἰδομενεὶ in Εἰδομένη. Ἀπολλώνιος may, as he suggests, come from the next heading in Stobaeus, Ἀπολλώνιος τοῖς γνωρίμοις, or, as Hense thinks, it may be that Stobaeus took the saying from Apollonius quoting Epicurus.

1. τὴν αὐτάρκειαν must be taken here in its narrower sense of the control of desires.

2. θαρρῶμεν, 'may be content', and so free from any disturbing desires for luxurious food.

30 (Usener 138). A dying letter to Idomeneus quoted in *Vit. Ep.* § 22. 2 (see notes there). An almost identical letter to Hermarchus is translated by Cicero, *de Fin.* ii. 30. 96. It is probable that Epicurus sent slight variations of the letter to different disciples.

31 (Usener 140). The tone of this fragment is probably ironical.

Epicurus wished to discourage Colotes' extravagant signs of devotion and so paid them back to him and addressed him in the excessive reverence of the second sentence.

2. ἀφυσιολόγητον, 'not to be accounted for by scientific method', 'unaccountable', obviously a semi-ironical expression: cf. the use of the word in *fr.* 44.

3. πάσης . . . ἐπιλήψεως, after ἐπιθύμημα, γίνεσθαι after εἰθισμένης.

4. τινῶν: the MSS. have τιμῶν, for which Wytttenbach conjectured θεῶν, but the nearer correction τινῶν, though a little feeble, is probably safer.

32 (Usener 143). Another playful extract quoted in the *Vil. Ep.* § 5. 3.

33 (Usener 163). For the text see note on *Vil. Ep.* § 6. 6.

34 (Usener 165). Quoted in *Vil. Ep.* § 5. 8 as a phrase which brought censure on Epicurus for his excessive flattery of a young man.

35 (Usener 176). A charming letter to a child written on one of Epicurus' visits to see his disciples in Asia Minor, where he had lived and taught before coming to Athens: see *Vil. Ep.* § 10.

36 (Usener 177). Another portion of a letter obtained from the works of Philodemus in the Herculean Rolls. It may be compared with *fr.* 30.

37 (Usener 181). A clear statement of the argument for the 'simple life': it satisfies bodily needs and does not involve consequent pains, as luxury does.

2. προσπτύω: a violent word, for which see its use by Metrodorus in *Sent. Vat.* xlvii, and by Epicurus again in *fr.* 79.

38. This fragment, which is not in Usener's collection, was recovered from the Herculean papyri by Crönert (*Rhein. Mus.* lxi, p. 426). It is like in character to 30 and 36.

39 (Usener 182). Another fragment on the simple life from *Vil. Ep.* § 11. 6: see note there on κυβηρίδιον.

40 (Usener 183). A reference to the contributions made by the disciples for the support of Epicurus: see *fr.* 26.

1. δαιμονίως seems a safer correction of the MS. δαίως than Cobet's δαψίλως: it is also more in accord with the phraseology of the fragment.

2. οὐρανομηκῇ: an intentionally poetic word.

41 (Usener 184). Another reference to the σύνταξις, which shows that it was a well-organized subscription of a substantial amount levied on all disciples. It would presumably be required for the upkeep of the house and gardens in Athens and for the sustenance of Epicurus and the disciples, who lived there. The opening of the fragment looks as though some official of the community was authorized to assess the amount.

42 (Usener 185). Another fragment from Philodemus said to be in reference to a boy who had brought the philosopher a present of a sheep (the preceding words in the papyrus should surely be read καὶ

δόντος πρόβατον παιδίου τινὸς ἐν] πλε[κ]τῶι ἐρκ[ι]ω[ι], and not as they were edited, παιδίῳ τινί): Epicurus paid him by teaching. Bignone for some reason omits this fragment.

1. ἀντίδοσιν: the papyrus has αἰνοῦσαν, out of which Usener admits that it is practically impossible to extract any sense. ἀντίδοσιν would give what is required and is not palaeographically a very large alteration.

43 (Usener 187). Epicurus was always contemptuous of the 'man in the street', and did not wish or expect to be understood by him. Compare *Sent. Vat.* xxix.

44 (Usener 200). The quotation is not assigned by Porphyrius to any author, but apart from its language the coincidence of part of it with *Sent. Vat.* xxxiii makes it certain that this is Epicurus. Bignone enters a caution about Porphyrius' quotations, and in particular points out that it is not easy to determine where the quotation stops and Porphyrius' comment begins. But the whole of this extract may safely be assigned to Epicurus.

1. ἀφυσιολόγητον: cf. *fr.* 31.

45 (Usener 202). We may compare *Sent. Vat.* xxv, and for the general idea *K. Δ.* xviii.

4. ἐστιν (οὐ πλοῦτος ἀλλὰ πενία). In the MS. of Porphyrius the fragment ends with ἐστιν, the next sentence (*fr.* 68) beginning with the words οὐ σπάνιον. Usener wrote ἐστι πενία, thinking presumably that οὐ should be excluded and that πενία had dropped out owing to confusion with σπάνιον. Bignone, who retains οὐ, suspects the larger omission due to the reputed οὐ.

46 (Usener 203). Fears arise because we forget the laws of nature, desires because we forget the natural limits of pleasure.

48 (Usener 207) is very close in expression to *Lucr.* ii. 34-36:

nec calidae citius decedunt corpore febres,
textilibus si in picturis ostroque rubenti
iacteris, quam si in plebeia veste cubandum est.

1. κατακειμένη and ἐχούση are changed by Usener to the masculine, presumably on the ground that Porphyrius, citing the quotation in his address to Marcella, would have adapted the participles to the feminine. But Epicurus' correspondent may also have been a woman and nothing is gained by the change.

49 (Usener 212). A more than usually fragmentary extract from a letter to a disciple who had written to the master on the relation of phenomena to the unseen (atoms and space). See *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 51 and elsewhere. The text given is that of Crönert (*Rhein. Mus.* lxi, p. 425), who re-examined the papyrus.

1. Before φέρων, ἐν μνήμῃ or the like must have preceded.

50 (Usener 213). Bignone quotes interesting passages from Plutarch (*contr. Ep. Beat.* 1097 e) and from Metrodorus showing that Epicurus and his disciples recognized a peculiar joy in the tears of

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grief shed for a dead friend. Memory is here, as always, an important factor in Epicurean happiness.

51 (Usener 214) sounds a little cynical in expression, but Epicurus was probably thinking of the formation of habit.

52 (Usener 215) is a half-hearted precept to do good to an enemy, but remarkable even as it stands.

54 (Usener 221) is another unassigned quotation in Porphyrius. Stobaeus refers it to Pythagoras, but its likeness to *Sent. Val.* liv and other Epicurean sentiments seems to justify Usener's attribution to Epicurus.

55 (Usener 266). It is not certain that these are the actual words of Epicurus, but the idea of revolving cycles or periods of time is certainly his: cf. *Lucr.* iii. 856 ff.

56 (Usener 356). This fragment deals with the gods to whom Epicurus himself attributed speech and supposed them to converse with one another, like Epicurean sages, the nearest approach on earth to the gods. Philodemus goes on to argue that the gods speak in Greek, or in some language like it, for in no other language is philosophy discussed.

57 (Usener 387). An unusually interesting fragment preserved by Philodemus about religious observances. Though Epicurus denied the interference of the gods in the direction of the world, he was yet scrupulous in the performance of religious functions (cf. *Vit. Ep.* § 10. 5) and here recommends such piety to his disciples. He held no doubt that such performance of ceremonial did not involve any belief in the action of the gods in the world, but it is also clear from *Lucr.* vi. 68 ff. that he conceived that the *simulacra* of the gods entering the mind of the worshipper could communicate something of the divine ἀταραξία: prayer for the Epicurean becomes communion.

1. καὶ καλῶς is perhaps a closer emendation of the defective κα . . . αλω than Gomperz's καὶ τᾶλλα.

3. περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ σεμνοτάτων: sc. τῶν θεῶν.

4. ἐπὶ δὲ . . . δόξης: the meaning is here obscure. It may be that Epicureans should be careful not to incur any charge of impiety.

5. φυσικῶς ζῆν: a few words after this can be made out, but sense can hardly be made of them.

58 (Usener 388). A rather cynical argument for the general Epicurean view that the gods do not listen to prayer.

59 (Usener 409). A relentless and startling exposition of the doctrine of pleasure which caused great scandal in antiquity. Compare the saying attributed to Metrodorus (*fr.* vi, p. 47, Duen.: *fr.* 39, Körte) περὶ γαστέρα γάρ, ὃ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. If the mind is to have ἀταραξία in order to pursue philosophy, the first condition is ἀπονία of the body, and for that the first need is ἀπονία = ἡδονή of the stomach. It is a fearless piece of logic which was falsely interpreted as though Epicurus had made the pleasure of the stomach the first object of life.

2. τὰ περιττά, 'the things over and above', mere ἀταξία, those 'variations' of mental pleasure which may be summed up as 'culture'.

60 (Usener 422). An emphatic statement of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure: the removal of pain constitutes pleasure, and if it has been accomplished no further pleasure is needed. The satisfaction of the natural desire for the removal of pain does not incite to evil-doing, but only the striving for the fulfilment of unnatural desires.

2. ἐν αἰσθήσει καθεστῶτες: sc. as long as we are alive and awake.

3. ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡδονή is the MS. text and may be kept. Bignone objects that the contrast between ἡδονή and ὄρεξις is inappropriate, but the contrast is between the natural pleasure fulfilled and the unnatural desires unfulfilled. Bignone himself would read ῥοπή in the sense of 'impulse': this seems to me unnecessary, but is better than Crönert's φωνή or Usener's ἐνδεια.

4. ἔξωθεν, presumably 'outside' the person who conceives it: 'puts ἀδικία into action'.

61 (Usener 423). As pleasure is the removal of pain, so the height of pleasure is the removal of a great pain. If we grasp and hold to this, we need not engage in Peripatetic subtleties.

1. παρ' αὐτὸ it seems impossible to retain, but none of the suggestions are satisfactory. Reiske's παρ' αὐτοῦ, 'from the person himself', is odd Greek and poor sense, Usener's πάντα = παρανίκα is not very good sense and introduces an odd word. Bignone would read κατ' αὐτὸ, 'in itself', and translates 'the simple liberation from great pain', supporting it by Plutarch's words in the context τὴν τὰγαθὸν φύσιν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύγῃς τοῦ κακοῦ, but the expression is still strange.

3. ἐπιβάλλη, 'grasps it in mind', a reference to the Epicurean conception of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας. The aorist seems essential as against the MS. ἐπιβάλλη.

περιπατή: Bignone is undoubtedly right in seeing an ironical allusion to the 'Peripatetics', whose Aristotelian doctrine of pleasure involved subtle analysis.

62 (Usener 442). This is good Epicurean doctrine (see *Ep. ad Men.* §§ 129, 130), but, as Usener admits, we cannot be certain that these are actually Epicurus' words.

63 (Usener 445). As usual with these citations from Porphyrius we cannot feel certain of the actual words. Porphyrius goes on to explain that it is the mind which is to blame because of its vain desires and hopes: compare Diog. Oen. fr. i.

64 (Usener 447). For this Epicurean commonplace see K. Δ. iv and *Sent. Vat.* iv.

65 (Usener 448). An echo of the first part of the preceding fragment.

66 (Usener 457). For the idea see Seneca, *Ep.* 8. 7 'philosophiae servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas': the expression here is, as Usener points out, not quite like that of Epicurus himself.

67 (Usener 469). So in a less picturesque manner, *Ep. ad Men.* § 130. 9 τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πάντων εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστόν.

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68 (Usener 471). An elaboration of a commonplace dictum of Epicurus. The fool is poor in respect of ἀταραξία, the true end of life, and rich in fancies which lead to extravagant desires.

1. οὐ σπάνιον: Usener in connexion with his emendation of the previous sentence (see *fr.* 45) omitted οὐ, but it is not easy to see how he then interpreted the remark.

πένητα seems a necessary addition, as is νόσου in l. 5.

69 (Usener 473). A strange variant of this aphorism occurs in *Sent. Vat.* lxviii.

70 (Usener 476). αὐτάρκεια is here used in the narrower sense of self-control, 'control of desires': almost, as Bignone translates it, 'frugality'.

71 (Usener 478). This looks more like a long-winded paraphrase of some brief saying of Epicurus than an exact quotation of his words: cf. *Sent. Vat.* lxiii.

72 (Usener 479). Riches involve a greater complication of life and therefore greater παραχῆ.

1. τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν, 'the escape' which they desire: Usener's change to τιν' is unnecessary.

73 (Usener 480). A strange aphorism which again may be a little distorted in Porphyrius' quotation.

1. θηριώδους is Nauck's emendation for the MS. θρηνώδους: one might hesitate to accept it but for a close parallel in Philod. *VH*² vii. 179, *fr.* xxiv ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀνημ[έρον καὶ] θηριώδους ἐρ[γασίας] κτλ. Epicurus is probably comparing the rapacious acquisition of riches with the ravaging of a wild beast.

74 (Usener 485). Fear and desire are the two great obstacles to ἀταραξία, which is the necessary prelude to philosophical study.

75 (Usener 486). On the same theme again. It is not the poor man who is without luxuries who suffers, but the rich man tormented by his desires.

1. τούτων is explained by τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθόν, which has preceded.

πόνος is a little strange in view of φέρειν . . . πόνον, and Usener may be right in suggesting κακόν.

76 (Usener 488). Fluctuation between extremes of feeling is the reverse of ἀταραξία.

77 (Usener 489). For the Epicurean attitude to fortune see especially *Ep. ad Men.* § 134 and *K. Δ.* xvi. The text is uncertain in places, but in the latter half can be corrected from a quotation in the Byzantine gnomologion.

4. παρατετάχθαι: cf. *Vit. Ep.* § 120. 3 τύχη τε ἀντιτάξασθαι.

78 (Usener 490). Usener aptly quotes *Hor. Ep.* i. 4. 13:

omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum:
grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora.

For the play on ἡκιστα . . . ἥδιστα cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 130. 8.

79 (Usener 512). Epicurus had but little place in his system for aesthetic appreciation, as such: cf. *fr.* 12. τὸ καλὸν has probably also a moral sense in reference e.g. to Plato's use of it.

1. προσπίτω: cf. *Sent. Vat.* xlvii, *fr.* 37.

80 (Usener 519). Virtue was not in Epicurus' view of value in itself, but only in so far as it produced ἀταραξία. Compare K. Δ. xvii ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος.

81 (Usener 530). The wise man, as is explained in *fr.* 83, will act justly without the compulsion of law, but the law protects him against those who have not such wisdom.

82 (Usener 532). For the ideas compare K. Δ. xxxiv and xxxv; esp. xxxv *init.* οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάβρα τι ποιῶντα . . . πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσσει; also *Sent. Vat.* vii. Bignone omits this fragment, possibly because Plutarch introduces it with φασί, suggesting a general Epicurean source, but the words sound like Epicurus himself.

83 (Usener 533). The fragment is not specifically quoted as from Epicurus, but as it comes among a number of others definitely assigned to him, Usener is probably justified in his attribution. Epicurus may have in mind the story of Gyges and its use by Plato in *Rep.* ii. 359 d.

1. τὸ τοῦ γένους τέλος is certainly a rather strange expression for Epicurus, but Bignone supports it by τὸ συγγενικὸν τέλος, Philod. *Voll. Rhet.* ii. 17. 15. It is of course equivalent to the more usual τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος, i.e. ἡδονή.

84 (Usener 537). An interesting fragment, as it shows the basis on which, according to Epicurus, the 'social contract' was built. The man who causes fear in others may incite them to revenge, and so is full of fear himself. Compare K. Δ. vi, xxxi, *Lucr.* v. 1019, 1020. Usener notes that the saying appears in a positive form in Maximus Abb. *gnomol* 9, p. 174 ὁ πολλοῖς φοβερὸς ὢν πολλοὺς φοβεῖται.

85 (Usener 548). For the general idea see K. Δ. vii.

86 (Usener 551). This is the famous Epicurean motto against which Plutarch wrote the treatise from which it is quoted. The idea is that of the preceding fragment, that it is in the life which abstains from public affairs that ἀταραξία can most easily be attained. Usener notes echoes of the idea in *Hor. Ep.* i. 17. 10 'nec vixit male qui natus moriensque fefellit' and in *Ovid, Trist.* iii. 4. 25 'crede mihi, bene qui latuit, bene vixit'.

87 (Usener 554). A curious fragment which may not contain Epicurus' own words. The general sense of the passage is familiar.

2. ἐξ ἀρχῆς: because, as is seen from K. Δ. vii, men originally seek for high position as a means of securing ἀσφάλεια and only later come to regard it as an end in itself.

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LIFE OF EPICURUS

THE 'Life of Epicurus' is in fact the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius' *History of the Philosophers*, in which are embodied the three *Letters* and the *Main Principles*. It is, as we possess it, a curious medley of statements concerning Epicurus' life and his disciples, of attacks made upon him and the replies which might be given to them, of summaries of his doctrines, and of discussions of his differences with other schools, and especially with the Cyrenaics. And not only are these sections thrown together anyhow, but within the individual sections there is confusion, facts and opinions being foisted in at inappropriate places and consequently dislocating the sequence. The most conspicuous example occurs in §§ 120, 121, but there are others in §§ 6, 10, 22 (see notes on these passages), and the exceedingly disjointed style which pervades the whole work can only be accounted for by the supposition of constant additions and interruptions.

The recent work of scholars, and in particular of Diels, on the Greek Doxographers, has made us familiar with the way in which works of this kind were constructed. They were in fact 'traditional books': round the text would grow a collection of marginal notes, and each successive editor, incorporating almost at haphazard what he found, and adding perhaps further material of his own, would then publish his own 'edition'. Into this succession came Diogenes Laertius, who proceeded on the usual plan, or rather, engaged copyists to do it for him, for, as Usener warns us (p. xxii), *ne scripsit quidem sed scribenda librariis commisit*. Round the *velustius illud opus, quod Laertii librariis exemplar fuit* (p. xxxv), itself a conglomeration, there had gathered marginal incrustations: sometimes, as in §§ 120, 121, we can peel these off: more often we are left with an inextricable confusion. The book is in fact not an intelligent compilation, but a growth.

It might reasonably be asked, What in that case is its value? When it has grown from so many sources, unknown to us, whose validity cannot now be estimated, what importance can be attached to its statements? The answer seems to be that it is of value, if used with discretion. In the first place there is no reason to doubt the main statements about Epicurus' life: with the exception of one or two minor discrepancies as to dates, they tally well. In the second, the 'Life' embodies a very considerable number of quotations from Epicurus' writings, which, couched as they are in language very similar

to that of the *Letters*, we may fairly accept: they are in many instances confirmed from other sources. Thirdly, the disjointed expositions of his doctrines, which again agree well on the whole with the *Letters*, may be regarded as giving us an occasional addition to our knowledge. Lastly, though this is less important, the long section on the abuse hurled at Epicurus and the replies (§§ 3-12), together with his sporadic criticisms on other philosophers, give us an interesting, though unpleasant picture, of the methods of philosophic controversy in antiquity. In short, though the process of its construction has made the book almost intolerable as literature, it has not impaired the value of its contents, if duly sifted and compared with what is otherwise known.

The text of the book, as might be expected from its origin, is seriously corrupted, but the acumen of Usener did much to restore it, and it has been in my opinion greatly improved, often in the direction of a return to the MS. tradition, by the work of Bignone.

§ 1. 1. The date of Epicurus' birth is placed in 341 or the end of 342 B.C.

2. Γαργήτιος: Gargettus was one of the Attic demes.

3. Μητρόδωρος: one of the principal personal disciples of Epicurus, for the celebration of whose memory Epicurus provides in his will. Certain fragments of his works remain (ed. Körte).

4. Ἡρακλείδης: sc. Heraclides Lembos, who wrote an epitome of the *διαδοχή τῶν φιλοσόφων* of Sotion of Alexandria.

κληρουχισάντων . . . Σάμον: the colonization of Samos by Athens took place in 352 or 351 B.C. Epicurus' father had therefore probably been settled there about ten years before Epicurus was born.

5. ὀκτωκαιδεκῆτη: sc. in 323 B.C.

6. Ξενοκράτους: Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396-314 B.C.) was a personal friend of Plato and head of the Academy for twenty-five years.

8. ἐκπεσόντων: sc. from Samos, whence the Athenians were driven out by Perdiccas in 322 B.C.

§ 2. 2. μαθητὰς ἀθροίσαντα: both in Colophon and also, as we learn from § 15, in Lampsacus and Mitylene.

ἐπανελθεῖν: in 307-306 B.C.

3. κατ' ἐπιμίξιν τοῖς ἄλλοις: this is interesting, as Epicurus always professed his complete independence of all other philosophers.

4. ἀποφαίνεσθαι, 'expounded his doctrines', 'taught': the MSS. are obviously corrupt here, but Usener's emendation is highly probable: Kochalsky ingeniously reads ἀποστατεῖν, 'separated from them' αἵρεσιν, 'sect', 'school'.

10. τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ' Ἡσιόδω χάους: the notion is that Epicurus came on Hesiod's description of the original Chaos in the course of his school reading, and finding that the schoolmasters could not explain it to him, determined to go to the philosophers.

11. γραμματοδιδάσκαλον: the natural interpretation of the words is

that Epicurus himself was at some time or other a schoolmaster, possibly during the period at Colophon. Usener, however, on the ground of γραμμαδιδασκαλίδης in Timon's verses below, believes that the reference is to Neocles, Epicurus' father: if so, the statement has got misplaced.

12. Δημοκρίτου: there can be no doubt, in spite of Epicurus' denials, that he obtained his physical philosophy from the Atomists, and in particular from Democritus.

§ 3. 3. γραμμαδιδασκαλίδης: probably the word is not to be taken as a patronymic, but, as Bignone points out, in the generally contemptuous sense in which these terminations are employed by the comedians: 'teacher of infants'.

ἀναγωγότατος, 'stubborn', 'unmanageable', a word frequently applied to ill-trained domestic animals.

6. Φιλόδημος: the Epicurean teacher of the last century of the Roman Republic, contemporary of Cicero and instructor of L. Piso, whose writings have been partly recovered from Herculaneum. Cicero draws a most unfavourable and probably unfair picture of him in the *In Pisonem*, c. 28.

8. ἐν ὁμοίοις: a very probable restoration for ἐν νόμοις. The work would have been a collection of historical parallels and coincidences.

9. Διότιμος: Athenaeus xiii. 611 b speaks of a Theotimus who wrote a slanderous treatise against Epicurus, who may be the same person as this Diotimus.

§ 4. 1. Ποσειδώνιος: the philosopher who succeeded Panaetius as the popular exponent of Stoicism at Rome and was Cicero's chief authority for the Stoic position. Bignone points out that οἱ περὶ in philosophic phraseology often denotes the original authority for a statement and the intermediate sources of information: so here it may mean 'Posidonius and his successors'.

2. ἐν τοῖς δώδεκα . . . τῆς εἰκάδος: a very vexed clause. The MSS. have ἐν τοῖς δώδεκα . . . ἃ ἐστὶ περὶ τοῖς κδ. Usener, whom I follow, keeps the MS. text at the beginning and adopts at the end Hübner's emendation περὶ τῆς εἰκάδος: 'in the twelve books of the work entitled "The Arguments of Diocles"', which are about the Twentieth, i.e. the Epicurean festival held on the twentieth of each month in commemoration of the Founder. This is a rather bold conjecture, but not improbable. Bignone objects that it is improbable that any author would devote twelve books to the Epicurean festival, and accepting Gassendi's emendation ἐν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ (B reads δωδεκάτῳ), proposes at the end ἃ ἐστὶ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς κ, 'which runs to twenty-four books'. But (1) περὶ τῆς εἰκάδος might well be taken as the title given to the portion of Sotion's work dealing with Epicureanism, which would be not unlikely to occupy twelve books; (2) the comment which Bignone restores, that the Arguments of Diocles consisted of twenty-four books is wholly irrelevant and surely a most improbable parenthesis.

4. καὶ γὰρ σὺν τῇ μητρὶ . . . ἀναγινώσκειν: seeing that this is the

precise charge made by Demosthenes (*de Cor.* 258) against Aeschines, it may well be discounted as a commonplace of abuse.

7. *Λεοντίω*: one of the most prominent of Epicurus' disciples, the recognized companion of Metrodorus (see § 23). She appears to have been a woman of ability and learning.

8. *τὰ δὲ Δημοκρίτου*: though no doubt Democritus' work was the basis of Epicurus' physics, he made many great changes in the theory of the atomists, in particular in his insistence on the truth of *αἰσθησις* as the basis of all inquiry.

καὶ Ἀριστίππου: still less is it true that Epicurus adopted the pleasure-theory of Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaics. Epicurus regarded the absence of pain as complete pleasure, while the Cyrenaic theory took absence of pain to be itself indifferent, and regarded as the end the accumulation of moments of intense pleasure (*μονόχρονος ἡδονή*), such as Epicurus strongly deprecated as involving *ταραχή*.

10. *Τιμοκράτης*, brother of Metrodorus, was a disciple who subsequently deserted the school (see § 23); *Ἡρόδοτος*, the disciple to whom the first letter is addressed.

12. *Παιᾶνα*, the title of Apollo, the Healer: see below § 5. 3.

§ 5. 1. *Ἰδομένα*: fragments of several letters to him from Epicurus are preserved (*frs.* 26-30).

ἔκπυστα . . . *ποιήσαντας*: it is not known what secrets they divulged, but it would be in accordance with Epicurus' views of the value of friendship to forgive them.

2. *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* can hardly mean here 'for this very reason', but more likely idiomatically 'all the same'.

3. *Παῖν ἄναξ* (*fr.* 32): here an exclamation, not a vocative. One wonders whether the use of the same exclamation gave rise to the idea of Epicurus' flattery of Mithres mentioned above § 4. 12.

4. *κροτοθούρου*: a facetious and playful word.

ἐνέπλησας is quoted by Suidas in his note on *κροτοθούρου* and is probably right as against the *ἐνέπλησεν* of the MSS.

5. *Θέμιστα* (*fr.* 25) was the wife of Leonteus of Lampsacus, to whom Epicurus dedicated one of his works: see § 28.

7. *τρικύλιστος*: again colloquial, 'with a hop, skip, and a jump', or 'in my seven-leagued boots'.

8. *Πυθοκλέα* (*fr.* 34), to whom the second letter is addressed.

10. *νομίζει αὐτῇ παραινεῖν* is the reading of the MSS., 'he thinks that he is giving her advice'. This cannot be right, but no emendation yet proposed seems satisfactory. Usener's suggestions *δομᾷ αὐτὴν ἑταῖραν* or *Ἀριάγνην* are too far from the text, as is Kochalsky's *νομίζει αὐτὴν παρενεῖναι*. Bignone following the suggestion of the *editio princeps* would read *νομίζει αὐτὴν περαίνειν* in an obscene sense, and explains that Epicurus' expressions of tender affection were so exaggerated that they might be so described by a malicious critic. But this does not seem convincing. What is required is some exaggerated expression of flattery like those in the other quotations.

ὀνομάζει αὐτήν is likely to be right, and the missing word should be a proper name implying a flattering comparison.

§ 6. 3. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε . . . (*fr.* 10). There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the quotation, but its citation without context and the interpretation put on it are malicious and quite misleading. Epicurus must not be supposed to have recommended all these pleasures; the sentence should be read in connexion with such passages as *Ep. ad Men.* § 129, where he says that all pleasures are good, but not all to be chosen (αἰρεταί), or expressly goes on in § 130 to exclude the pleasures of the table because they are not pure, but bring pain with them.

4. ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς . . . Possibly Meibom's insertion of καὶ before τὰς would make it a little clearer and more in Epicurus' manner, but it is not necessary.

5. τὰς διὰ μορφῆς, 'the pleasures arising from shape', that is to say, all the pleasures of sight: it need not be confined, as Kochalsky supposes, to the appreciation of artistic work any more than τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων refers only to the pleasures of music. μορφῆς is rightly restored from Athenaeus, the gen. sing. being corrupted in the MSS. to other cases.

6. Παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν . . . (*fr.* 33). Again the meaning of the quotation is slightly distorted. Epicurus always claimed independence of all the other philosophical schools, but is probably thinking here rather of the normal Athenian education in literature and music, 'culture'.

τὰκάτιον ἀράμενος is a brilliant restoration of Gassendi of hopeless corruptions in the MSS.

7. Ἐπίκτητος, who would naturally attack Epicurus as part of the Stoic polemic.

10. δις αὐτὸν . . . ἀπὸ τρυφῆς: this is probably pure slander, and if it has any foundation, may be explained by Epicurus' weak health.

12. τὴν μυστικὴν ἐκείνην συνδιαγωγὴν: this is interesting as probably indicating that there was an element of an initiate community in Epicurus' school.

§ 7. 1. πολλὰ . . . ἡγνοηκέναι: once again, Epicurus' detachment from other schools of thought. His ignorance was probably less than he would have liked it to be thought.

2. τό τε σῶμα ἔλασιν ὡς διακείσθαι: Bignone quotes evidence from the Herculean writings of Epicurus' bodily infirmities, which is also supported by Plutarch, *contr. Epic. Beat.* 16.

4. μὲν . . . ἡμερησίαν: possibly this was for the support of the whole community.

6. ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους. Crönert thinks that this is the ἐπιστολὴ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματων (*Usener* 171, 172): if so, we ought perhaps to accept the correction of Menagius ἐν τῇ.

7. Μαμμάριον: the name has been restored from Philodemus in the Herculean Rolls: *VH²* i. 149.

9. ταῦτὰ λέγειν, 'he repeats himself': Kühn's ταῦτά for the ταῦτα of

the MSS. may certainly be accepted, but it is hardly necessary with Usener to insert *τε* after *ταῦτα* and cut out *τὰ πλείστα* after *Ναυσίφάνει*. The inelegant repetition of *τὰ πλείστα* is not inconsistent with Diogenes' usual style.

10. *Ναυσίφάνει*: Nausiphanes of Teos was a pupil of Democritus, who continued the tradition of the atomic school. It is tolerably certain that Epicurus learnt much from him, but he always professes his independence and treats Nausiphanes with scorn.

11. *ἀλλ' ἔτως* (*fr.* 17) is a brilliant restoration of Usener's for *ἀλλ' εἶτως ἀλλ'* (B) and other hopeless corruptions in the MSS. It is certainly better than Stephanus' correction *ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἄλλος εἶχε κάκεῖνος*. Kochalsky, believing the MSS. *εἶτως* to be composed of the two final syllables of *λέξει* and *οὕτως*, accidentally omitted and written in the margin, would read the whole passage *καὶ αὐτῇ λέξει φάσκαι οὕτως, Ἀλλ' εἶχε κάκεῖνος . . .*

εἶχε . . . ὠδίνων τὴν . . . καύχῃσιν: Usener compares Iulian. *Ep.* 59 *νυνὶ δ' ὥσπερ ὠδίνων τὴν καθ' ἡμῶν λοιδορᾷ ἀθρόαν ἐξέχεας*.

§ 8. 3. *διδάσκαλον* (*fr.* 21) is the reading in all the MSS., and Bignone has shown, I think, that it may be kept: 'he called me sarcastically, "The Master".' There would be considerable point in such a sarcasm from a master to a very obstinate and independent pupil, and there is the same kind of irony in Epicurus' use of the epithet *χρυσοῦς* below for Plato. Kochalsky would read *ἀποκαλεῖν διδάσκαλόν (μου ἑαυτόν)*, but this would be feeble, and further *ἀποκαλεῖν* which always has an abusive sense would be inappropriate. Usener's conjecture is also unnecessary.

πλεύμονα, 'mollusc', the *pulmo marinus*. Bignone compares Plat. *Phileb.* 21 c *ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσων θαλάττια μετ' ὁστρέων ἐμψυχὰ ἐστί σωμάτων*.

Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* i. 3, quotes Epicurus' application of the epithet to Nausiphanes and adds *ὡς ἀναίσθητον*, which gives the point, and makes impossible the interpretation 'lung', i.e. 'braggart'.

5. *Διονυσόκολακας*, because of Plato's relations to Dionysius of Syracuse.

χρυσοῦν, obviously a sarcastic epithet, like *διδάσκαλον* above. Bignone believes that there is a reference to the golden age and would take it to mean 'simpleton': he adds that it applies to Plato's use of myths and belief in immortality. Is it not more probable that it refers to the division of the classes in *Rep.* 415 a? Epicurus speaks of Plato ironically as the 'golden philosopher', who himself of course belonged to the highest class.

6. (δν), a necessary insertion by Hermann.

7. *στρατεύεσθαι*: contemptuously. There seems no need to accept Usener's suggestion *τεραπεύεσθαι*, 'he dealt in magic', though no doubt it would go better with *φαρμακοπωλεῖν*.

8. *γράμματα διδάσκειν*: just as in § 3 Epicurus is called *γραμματικὸς δασκαλίδης*.

9. *κυκητήν*, 'the muddler' in reference to Heraclitus' well-known obscurity, which an opponent might regard as confusion of thought. Compare his nickname *δ σκοτεινός* and Lucr. i. 639 'clarus ob obscuram linguam'.

Ληρόκριτον: of course a feeble pun. Bignone notes however that elsewhere Epicurus speaks with respect of Democritus, from whom he certainly learnt his atomic theories.

10. *Ξαννίδωρον*: cf. *σάννας*, 'zany', in Cratinus, *Incert.* 33 and *σαννίων* in a similar sense in Arr. Epictet. iii. 22. 83.

Κυνικούς is probably the right restoration of the *Κυζηνικούς* of the MSS. Gassendi suggested *Κυρηναίικούς*, but the epithet would be very inapplicable to them.

11. *τοὺς διαλεκτικούς*, 'the logicians', those who believed, as Epicurus did not, in the value of logic and dialectic. Possibly more definitely 'the Academics' as the inheritors of Plato's *διαλεκτική*.

πολυφθόρους seems a safe correction of *πολυφθονερούς*, of which it is difficult to make any satisfactory sense.

Πύρρων: Pyrrhus of Elis (c. 365-275 B.C.), who after some acquaintance with atomism, took up the attitude of a sceptic and was the founder of the sceptic tradition. His moral ideal of *ἀπαθία* was closely akin to Epicurus' *ἀταραξία* and may have influenced him.

§ 9. 1. *τῷ γὰρ ἀνδρί*: Gassendi's correction of the MSS. reading *τῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν* seems necessary, and is supported by the note in the margin of B γρ. *τοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρός*.

2. *ἡ . . . πατρίς*: sc. Athens, where he was born.

5. *ταῖς δογματικαῖς αὐτοῦ σειρῇσι προσκατασχεθέντες*: a strong phrase. The faithfulness of the Epicurean school to the exact doctrines of the master was notorious and comes out strongly in Lucretius.

6. *Μητροδώρου τοῦ Στρατονικέως*. This Metrodorus was of course not Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Epicurus' most faithful disciple, but apparently a pupil of Apollodorus who is mentioned in § 25.

πρὸς Καρνεάδην ἀποχωρήσαντος: i.e. the famous Carneades of a century later, who was head of the New Academy.

8. *ἡ τε διαδοχὴ . . . ἐς αἰὲ διαμένουσα*. The continuity of the Epicurean school right through the classical period is notorious, though an even greater claim might be made in the Roman era for the Stoics.

9. *νηρίθμους*: the authority of the MSS. seems to be in favour of this spelling as against the more normal *ἀνηρίθμους*.

ἀπολούουσα, 'producing', a rather unexpected word, which is however used in medical writings of child-birth.

§ 10. 1. *πρὸς τοὺς γονέας*, and especially towards his mother Chaerestrata. The letter in the fragment (ixiii) of Diogenes of Oenoanda, which was originally supposed to be one of Epicurus to his mother, is more probably, as William thinks, a letter of Diogenes' own.

5. τῆς . . . πρὸς θεοὺς οσιότητος. For Epicurus' piety see *Ep. ad Men.* § 124 and *fr.* 57. It was probably a quite genuine religious feeling that the ἀταραξία of the gods could communicate itself to men in their devotions.

7. ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ ἐπικεικίας . . . ᾗψατο. The true reason for Epicurus' abstention from political life was probably not his own 'excessive modesty', but his strong conviction that politics were destructive of ἀταραξία and therefore to be avoided: cf. K. Δ. vii.

χαλεπωτάτων . . . τὴν Ἑλλάδα: this refers no doubt to the state of Athens during the blockade by Demetrius of Phalerum in 295 B.C., when Athens was reduced almost to starvation. Plutarch, *Vit. Demetr.* 34, says that Epicurus rationed his disciples on a few beans daily.

9. εἰς τοὺς: there seems no reason to follow Usener in omitting εἰς which is read by all the MSS. Part of a letter to a child written apparently on one of these visits is preserved (*fr.* 35).

12. [ὅν . . . φησιν]. Usener was probably right in excluding these words as a note by a Scholiast: it is impossible to fit them into the text satisfactorily.

§ 11. 6. ὕδατι μόνον . . . : cf. *fr.* 37.

Πέμψον μοι . . . : *fr.* 39.

7. κυθριδίου is the Ionic form of χυθρίδιον. In the genitive it must be adjectival 'potted cheese', but there is much to be said for the reading κυθρίδιον, 'a small pot of cheese'.

§ 12. 2. ἀπληστοί seems a necessary correction of Usener's; ἀπληστον is hardly possible, either with κέρδος or adverbially with ἀρχετέ.

3, 4. This is Epicurus' doctrine that pleasure has a πέρασ, namely the removal of pain: cf. K. Δ. iii and *Ep. ad Men.* § 131.

8. ῥητῶν has the better MS. authority, but possibly ῥημάτων is the more natural word to use.

10. Ἀναξαγόραν: Epicurus would be in agreement with Anaxagoras in holding that the original φύσις was not one continuous substance, but innumerable 'seeds', but violently opposed to his supposition that there were heterogeneous 'seeds' corresponding to every individual thing.

Ἀρχελαόν: Archelaus is said to have been a pupil of Anaxagoras and the teacher of Socrates, and may have had a special attraction for Epicurus in that he combined the study of ethics with that of physics.

11. ἐγύμναζε δέ . . . : compare, for instance, his instruction to Herodotus to learn the doctrines by heart, *Ep.* i, § 36.

§ 13. 3. Πραξιφάνους, a Peripatetic and pupil of Theophrastus.

4. Λεύκιππον, the undoubted founder of the atomic school, and teacher of Democritus, who took over and greatly elaborated the theory. Epicurus' denial of his existence was probably a playful form of his assertion of independence.

7. Ξενοκράτους: see § 1 note.

9. λέξει κυρία must surely mean 'ordinary, current speech', and not, as Bignone interprets it 'proprietà di vocaboli'. It was one of the

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points of the Canon that the 'first word', i.e. the most obvious term should always be used (*Ep. ad Hdt.* § 38), but in carrying out his principle Epicurus, though he avoided the technical phraseology of other philosophers, certainly created a terminology which may well be described as *ιδιωτάτη* and was not always *σαφής*.

10. *ιδιωτάτη*, 'most special or peculiar' to himself. It seems unnecessary to emend to *ιδιωτική* or *ιδιωτικωτάτη*.

11. *ἀξιοῖ . . . ἀπαιτεῖν*, 'he claims to demand', i.e. requires of orators. He urged that the orator should aim at the same *σαφήνεια* which he practised himself. This seems quite good sense and would not be improved by Usener's suggestion *ἀπαιτῶν*, 'he claims for himself when he demands of others', or by Cobet's *δοκεῖν*, 'he claims to practise'. It is far more probable that the *περὶ Ῥητορικῆς* contained a demand for clearness from orators than any claim to clearness in his own writings.

§ 14. 1. *ἀντὶ τοῦ Χαίρειν*: this may have been a mere idiosyncrasy, but more likely that Epicurus on his own view of pleasure regarded 'rejoicing' as excessive and inconsistent with true pleasure, and therefore substituted expressions more consistent with his own ideal. It is hardly necessary to insert *γράφει* after *χαίρειν* with Usener or *γράφειν* after *πράττειν* with Kochalsky, constructing it with the previous sentence.

3. *Ἀρίστων*: the MSS. have *ἄριστον οἱ*, for which Cobet, seeing that this must stand for the name of some writer proposed *Ἀρίστων*; Bignone wishing further to account for *οἱ* in the MSS. would read *Ἀρίστων ὁ περιπατητικός*. In vii. 164 Diog. Laert. speaks of *ἕτερος Ἀρίστων Ἀλεξανδρεὺς περιπατητικός* and it is very probable that a Peripatetic philosopher, who is otherwise known to have written philosophy and history, should have made this charge of plagiarism against Epicurus. There seems no reason to go so far from the MSS. as Usener's *Ἀντίγονος* or his other proposal *Καρύστιος*.

τὸν Κανόνα: see *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 35, 36.

5. *Παμφίλου*: Pamphilus is also mentioned by Suidas as one of the teachers of Epicurus.

7. *δύο πρὸς τοῖς τριάκοντα*: it would appear from other sources that Epicurus was thirty-five when he set up his school in Athens, but he had previously taught in Lampsacus and Mitylene. See the next paragraph.

8. *τὸ τρίτον . . . ὀλυμπιάδος*: i.e. the end of 342 or the beginning of 341 B.C.

§ 15. 2. *δύο καὶ τριάκοντα*, i.e. 310 B.C., but if he was five years teaching in Lampsacus and Mitylene, this would put his coming to Athens in 305, whereas on other grounds (see § 2) it seems best to date this in 307-306. Possibly he began his teaching in Asia earlier or did not continue it for so long, but the point is not of much importance.

3. *οὕτως*, 'after that'.

4. *τὸ δεύτερον . . . ὀλυμπιάδος*, i.e. 270 B.C.

7. Ἑρμαρχον: for his succession to the headship of the school see Epicurus' will (§ 17).

§ 18. 4. Χαίρετε . . . This poem has been included in the *Palatine Anthology*, vii. 106, though it seems hardly worthy of a place there: it is poor doggerel and may therefore be rendered by such.

5. τοῦπος: Usener's conjecture, is much better than οἶσιν found in f and the *Anthology*, a substantive is badly needed. It is not easy to account for the πρώτος or πρώτον of the MSS., of which no sense can be made.

6. ἐληλύθειν is the rather odd form preferred by Usener. The MSS. point to ἐσῆλυθε and the metre might then be put straight by καὶ τόν, as in f and the *Anthology*: but the article is not needed and would be strange.

8. (δέ), a necessary addition to answer μέν.

9. The will of Epicurus is an interesting document, showing his care for the preservation of the garden and for the continuance of the school, and his interest in his friends and disciples. It is said to be drawn up in better form than most of the philosophers' wills which have been preserved, but behind the legal phraseology one may detect the rather loose rambling style which we associate with Epicurus, and which may be taken as evidence of its genuineness.

12. ἐν τῷ Μητροῦ: the Metroum was the office of the state-archives.

§ 17. 2. Ἑρμάρχῳ: this provision practically appoints Hermarchus as head of the school.

3. Ἀγεμόρτου: the MS. reading ἀγεμάρχου is merely due to the neighbouring Ἑρμάρχῳ and the name may be restored with certainty from other places in the *Life*.

8. αὐτῶν: sc. of Amynomachus and Timocrates: the legal heirs are to act with the successors in the school.

ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποτε τρόπῳ is an almost certain restoration for the MS. text ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀποτρέπω: f has ἐν ᾧ ἂν τρόπῳ which points to it.

9. διατηρῶσιν: the subjunctive seems necessary in spite of the unanimous optative of the MSS.

10. παραδίδωσιν seems to be the word indicated by the MS. variations: Usener on the ground of the accent in most of the copies, prefers the aorist παραδῶσιν.

§ 18. 3. ἐναγίσματα: the customary offerings at the tomb of the dead: cf. the Roman festival of the Parentalia.

5. τῇ προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ: sc. δεκάτῃ ἱσταμένον as opposed to δεινῇ φθίνοντος. Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 31. 101 ff. makes a severe attack on Epicurus for these provisions for the celebration of his memory: *id testamentum cavebit is qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil ad nos pertinere post mortem?* The answer would probably be that Epicurus did not suppose that such celebrations would affect him, but thought it would be valuable to the coming generations of his disciples to keep his memory fresh. From the festival on the 20th Athenaeus says that the Epicureans were known as the εἰκαδισταί.

8. μνήμην was restored by Aldobrandinus from the corresponding words of Cic., loc. cit., *ut et sui et Metrodori memoria colatur*. I agree with Bignone that it is unnecessary to go farther with Usener and change *κατά τεταγμένην* to *κατὰ τὰ τεταγμένα*.

§ 19. 4. τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς Μητροδώρου: the daughter of Metrodorus and Leontion, whose name was apparently Danae.

§ 20. 2. μετὰ τοῦ: some of the MSS. read μετ' αὐτοῦ. Possibly μετ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ may be the origin of both readings.

τοῦ συγκαταγεγραμμένος ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ: this expression is very characteristic of Epicurus. Cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 122 μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιᾷ τῷ φιλοσοφῶν and farther on ὥστε φιλοσοφῆτιόν καὶ νέψ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάξῃ . . .

6. ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων: i.e. from the capital as opposed to the interest (πρόσοδοι).

8. χρεῖαν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις παρεσχημένοι: for an example of an appeal by Epicurus for such assistance see *fr.* 26 πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν ὑπὲρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκνων.

11. παρὰ, Usener, is a rather violent correction for the MS. ἐπὶ, but it seems necessary.

§ 21. 2. ἐὰν δέ τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων . . . γένηται, the regular Greek periphrasis to avoid the mention of death (cf. *fr.* 36). γένηται is only read by F, but is more natural than the pres. subj. which is given in the other MSS.

6. ὦν has more MS. support than ὡς, adopted by Usener, and as it will make good sense, should be preferred.

7. ὅπως ἂν is Usener's correction of the MS. ὅπως δῆ. ἂν seems necessary according to Epicurus' usage, but the change is violent.

9. ἐλευθέραν is the natural word and has considerable MS. authority, but there is strange variation. Usener reads ἐλευθερίᾳ, but the strangeness of the expression and its position immediately after the straightforward ἐλεύθερον make it improbable.

§ 22. 1. The extract from the letter to Idomeneus is a manifest insertion: in an earlier form of the 'Life' καὶ διέθετο μὲν ὧδε must have immediately followed the will.

πρὸς Ἰδομενέα (*fr.* 30): the letter is also quoted with some variations by Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 30. 96, but as addressed to Hermarchus.

2. καὶ ἅμα τελευτῶντες, 'even though dying at the same time', but the expression is a little strange, especially coming inside τὴν μακαρίαν ἀγοντες . . . ἡμέραν. Cicero has *cum ageremus vilae beatum et eundem supremum diem*, whence Davis has conjectured *τελευταίαν* for *τελευτῶντες*, which would certainly make the construction easier.

3. ἐγράφομεν: a normal epistolary imperfect.

παρηκολούθει, imperf. seems more probable than the MS. pluperf. *παρηκολούθηκει*.

8. διέθετο, a necessary correction of ἔθετο: see § 16. 9.

11. Μητροδῶρον . . . Λαμψακηρόν. The text is uncertain here: the MSS. seem to point to *Μητροδῶρον Ἀθηναῖον ἢ Τιμοκράτην καὶ Σάνδην*

Λαμψακηνόν. The researches of Duening (*de Metrodori Epicuri vita et scriptis*) seem to show that Metrodorus' father's name was either Athenaeus or Timocrates: we should then emend as in the text and take Sande to be the name of his mother. But (a) ἔσχε δὲ points to the mention of more than one person here; (δ) the sentence ἐσχε δὲ καὶ . . . Τιμοκράτην, § 23. 7, implies a previous mention of Timocrates; (c) there is some authority (f) for καὶ instead of ἤ. It is therefore possible that the sentence originally ran Μητροδώρον καὶ Τιμοκράτην Ἀθηναίων καὶ Σάνδης Λαμψακηνούς (καὶ Μητροδώρος ἀπ' οὗ . . .

Σάνδης seems a strange name and possibly we should accept Gomperz's conjecture Κασσάνδρας.

13. εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν: sc. to Lampsacus. Cobet's restoration of οἰκίαν of the MSS. may be taken to be certain.

§ 23. 1. ἀγαθὸς πάντα is a quite natural construction and the insertion of κατὰ with P²H is unnecessary.

2. ἐν προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς is rightly interpreted by Bignone to mean 'in prologues or prefaces to his writings', where he might well mention Metrodorus. It appears, for instance, that the 28th book of the περὶ φύσεως was dedicated to Metrodorus (*Vol. Herc. vi, fr. 45*).

γραφαῖς again a necessary correction by Usener of γράφει.

5. ἀκατάληκτος: the majority of the MSS. have the curious error ἀκατάληπτος, perhaps because it was a familiar technical word in the writings of Epicurus.

11. ἔσχε δὲ . . . Τιμοκράτην: if we adopt Usener's text in § 22. 11, we should also follow his suggestion (*Introd. xxvi*) that this sentence should be put in brackets as interrupting the account of Metrodorus. If on the other hand we suppose that Timocrates was mentioned in the first sentence of the paragraph, we must find room for this sentence somewhere, perhaps after the list of Metrodorus' writings.

§ 24. 6. Πολύαινος, whose memory Epicurus in his will (§ 10) enjoined on his disciples to preserve.

7. φιλικός, 'friendly, amiable': there seems no reason to adopt Cobet's φιληκός.

Φιλόδημον: see note on § 3.

§ 25. 1. ἐπιστολικά, probably 'treatises in the form of letters'.

2. μαθημάτων, 'science', is a brilliant and fairly certain emendation of Casaubon's for μαθητῶν.

6. Κωλώτης was a devoted disciple of Epicurus, to whom is addressed an extant fragment of a letter of the master (*fr. 31*). He wrote a treatise to show that it was impossible to live according to the precepts of any of the other philosophers, to which Plutarch wrote in reply the *adversus Coloten*, which is one of our sources for knowledge of the Epicurean morals.

7. Πολύστρατος: a work of his entitled περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονημάτων was discovered at Herculaneum.

9. Κηποιύρανος: probably a name given him by his opponent.

11. Ζήνων was the master of Philodemus.

§ 26. 1. Διογένης of Tarsus wrote an abridgement of Epicurus' ethics and also the ἐπιλεκτοὶ σχολαί here mentioned, probably a collection of philosophical dissertations.

5. τέταρτος is a little odd (it includes Epicurus himself), but it is unnecessary to change the text to τρίτος.

7. κύλινδροι are the rolls made by fastening the papyrus pages together, and, though there was some variation, the average length in Pliny's time was twenty sheets, but earlier the rolls were larger.

9. αὐτοῦ: a good emendation of Cobet's for the almost meaningless αὐται.

11. εἰ γάρ τι . . . Usener is of opinion that the following quotation comes from Clitomachus, not from Carneades.

12. φιλονεικεῖ: the present is unusual after εἰ and opt., and Casaubon's ἐφιλονεῖκει is attractive. But there are historic presents or perfects all round, so that it is best to retain the present here.

§ 27. 3. εἵακε: a very brilliant restoration of Cobet's for the meaningless εἶλακε.

10. φυγῶν is Gassendi's certain correction of the MS. φύτων.

§ 28. 3. περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ γωνίας: this work must have dealt with the doctrine of the 'least parts' or πέρατα in the atom: see *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 56 ff.; Lucr. i. 599.

5. περὶ εἰδῶλων: sc. the 'images' by which sight took place: cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 49 ff.; Lucr. Bk. IV.

9. νόσων is Gassendi's emendation for νότων which Usener retains. But 'maxims about south-winds' are very improbable, and one of the Herculanean papyri refers to an Epicurean work, περὶ νόσων καὶ θανάτου.

11. â must be right: the MSS. have the extraordinary reading μίαν, which it is hard to account for.

§ 29. 3. κἄν: Usener's restoration for κἄμέ, which cannot be right.

4. ἡ τις . . . Πυθοκλέα: there must be an omission owing to the clauses of similar form and the loss can be supplied with certainty.

§ 30. 2. ἐφόδους: probably not 'introduction', as Bignone translates it, but rather the 'method of approach' to the Epicurean philosophy. It is in the *Canonicon*, for example, that we should find the insistence on the supremacy of αἴσθησις.

5. κατὰ στοιχείον, 'in an abridged form'. The expression is not unnatural, and Usener's suggestion κατεστοιχειωμένον, though it would express it better, is unnecessary. The reference is surely to such letters as the three which Diogenes has given us, and not, as Crönert supposed, to any regular series of letters containing epitomes.

§ 31. 1. τὴν διαλεκτικὴν . . . ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν. The Epicureans rejected both the Platonic dialectic and the Aristotelian logic on the ground that they both implied argument based on words and led away from the true basis of αἴσθησις.

παρέλκουσαν, 'misleading'. Both Bignone and Kochalsky translate 'superfluous', a sense which the word has in later Greek. They

are no doubt influenced by the following ἀρκεῖν γάρ, but the more original meaning of the word is here stronger and better. Logic to the Epicurean is not only unnecessary: it is actively deceptive.

2. κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους, 'in accordance with the voices of things', i.e. with what things tell us themselves by immediate perception without the interpretation of δόξα. Bignone compares K. Δ. xxxvii τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ' ἐν τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν, and Lucr. iii. 931 'denique si vocem rerum natura repente mittat' (which is rather far from the notion here). The idea is akin to that in *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 37. 6 τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγους . . . δεῖ εἰληφέναι.

3. ἐν . . . τῷ Κανόνι: in the extant works of Epicurus the nearest passages are *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 38 (which comes closest to an exposition of the Canon), 51, 82, and K. Δ. xxiv: see notes there, and Appendix to the letter to Herodotus, p. 259. In the first and last of these passages Epicurus comes at any rate very near including the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας among the κριτήρια of truth.

4. καὶ προλήψεις, 'the general concepts' formed by a combination of αἰσθήσεις: cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 72, and note there. Gassendi would insert τὰς before προλήψεις, but it is possible that αἰσθήσεις and προλήψεις are grouped closely together as the κριτήρια of knowledge and τὰ πάθη added separately as the κριτήριον in the moral sphere.

5. καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας, 'the intuitive apprehensions of the mind', the apprehensions which consist in grasping an image. For fuller discussion see K. Δ. xxiv note and Appendix, p. 259.

6. (αὐτὸς): an addition suggested by Giussani in his notes, seems necessary to bring out the sense. Besides the Epicureans Epicurus himself gives some countenance for the inclusion of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας among the κριτήρια of truth. The reference is probably to *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 38 and K. Δ. xxiv. Possibly, as Bignone suggests, Epicurus did not include ἐπιβολή in the Canon, but later on put it in with the other κριτήρια.

8. ἄλογος: i.e. αἰσθήσεις carries its own conviction of truth without reasoning or calculation; it is immediate. Nor is it μνήμης δεκτικὴ: one sensation gains nothing in truth, though it may in interpretation, from the recollection of another. It cannot be started by itself, but only by an outside object, and when it is so started it cannot of itself add to or remove anything from the data of the sensation.

9. ὑφ' αὐτῆς is only read by F, but seems obviously right.

δύναται, Gassendi, is a necessary correction of ἀδυνατεῖ of the MSS.

10. οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι, κτλ. This idea recurs in K. Δ. xxiii and xxiv, and is elaborated by Lucretius in iv. 482 ff.

§ 32. 1. ὁμογενής: the MSS. have ὁμογένεια, which is improbable as an adjectival form, and may well have arisen from the neighbouring ἁνομογένεια. Seeing that just below they are divided between ὁμογενὲς and ὁμογένειαν, it seems safe to restore the natural adjectival form here. By ὁμογενὲς αἰσθήσεις he means e.g. two acts of sight, by ἁνομογενή

e.g. sight and hearing: cf. Lucr. iv. 486 'an poterunt oculos aures reprehendere, an auris tactus?'

4. ἤρηται is a considerable change from the MS. εἴρηται, but seems required to make sense.

5. τὰ ἐπαισθήματα, 'the apperceptions', e.g. the understanding in addition to the hearing of what is said by some one else. So ἐπαίσθησις is used in *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 52. 10, 53. 2 in the sense of 'comprehension'. The fact that we do so understand confirms the truth or necessity of what we hear.

6. ὁφέστηκε, 'is a fact', is part of our experience.

7. ὅθεν καὶ . . . σημειοῦσθαι: this is of course the regular Epicurean rule of procedure with regard to things of which we cannot have immediate perception.

9. ἐπίνοιαι, 'ideas', framed by the mind and based ultimately on sensation: e.g. the Epicurean conception of infinite space is formed by the combination of προλήψεις of space, themselves based on sensation.

κατὰ τε περίπτωσιν is not easy. I take it to mean 'by coincidence', by the fitting in of one experience with another. This is I take it what Bignone means by 'secondo l'incidenza'. Kochalsky appears to take it to mean 'by throwing themselves on such perceptions', but that does not suit well with the rest of the sentence.

10. ἀναλογίαν, the conscious 'comparison' of one experience with another. ὁμοιότητα, the 'resemblance' that is noticed between them, σύνθεσιν, the 'combination' of experiences into a new idea.

11. συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ: Epicurus would have to admit that here reasoning played some part.

τά τε . . . οὐ κινεῖ: a characteristic Epicurean doctrine. The vision seen in dreams or by madmen must be real, i.e. must be caused by actual εἶδωλα inasmuch as they do 'move' the mind, but they need not be evidence of an external reality, for they may be caused, e.g. by εἶδωλα from things which meet and combine in the air: cf. Lucr. iv. 732 ff.

§ 33. 1. τὴν . . . πρόληψιν: the 'general concept' formed in the mind by repeated sense-perceptions, and therefore acting as an 'anticipation' by which fresh perceptions are identified: see *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 72.

κατάληψιν, 'apprehension' by the mind. Kochalsky appears to take ὁρθὴν with this word as well as with δόξαν, but not rightly, ὁρθὴ δόξα being so well-recognized a philosophical term.

3. οἷον τὸ . . . ἄνθρωπος: the πρόληψις gives us the conception of 'man' as such and such in form and behaviour and enables us thus to recognize a man. Kochalsky wrongly writes: οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστιν Ἄνθρωπος, 'such for instance, as "Man"', a very unnatural form of expression.

5. προηγούμενων τῶν αἰσθήσεων: the αἰσθήσεις 'lead the way' inasmuch as they have formed the πρόληψις.

6. τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον, 'the first significance', that which the word immediately suggests apart from metaphorical and other extensions. The participle is Gassendi's necessary correction for ἐπιτεταγμένον of the MSS.

ἐναργές, 'clear evidence' of truth, a favourite word of Epicurus usually used of the 'clear vision' of an object close at hand: cf. ἐνάργημα, *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 72. 4, and ἐνάργεια, *ibid.* § 48. 10.

12. καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν . . . : for the Epicurean view of opinion see *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 50-52 and *K. Δ.* xxiv. Opinion is an inference made by the mind, but based, as is said here, on sense-perception. In the case of terrestrial phenomena, we can approach and get the 'clear vision' (ἐνάργημα) which will confirm or contradict it: in the case of the distant phenomena of the sky we cannot have confirmation, the utmost is non-contradiction.

13. οἷον Πόθεν . . . Here the ἐναργές on which our answer will depend is the πρόληψις of 'man'.

34. 4. (τὸ) προσμένον . . . , 'the problem awaiting solution': the distant view of any object should be so regarded until we can get near and reach a decision by means of the near view: cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.* §§ 38, 50 and *K. Δ.* xxiv. The article is a necessary addition.

5. ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι τῷ πύργῳ: the square tower which in the distance looks round was a favourite Epicurean example of the προσμένον: cf. *Lucr.* iv. 353 ff., 501 ff.

7. πάθη: the criterion of the moral field, the 'feelings' or 'internal sensations': cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 38, &c.; *Ep. ad Men.* § 129.

10. τὰς δὲ περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν: unless we keep to τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον τοῖς φθόγγοις our inquiries will be into mere words: cf. *Ep. ad Hdt.* § 37. ὁ ὅπως ἂν . . . μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν ᾗ . . . ᾗ κενὸς φθόγγος ἔχωμεν.

§ 83. Between the first and second letters there is only this brief sentence.

§ 116. Between the second and third letters there is a longer discussion, which has the appearance of being foisted in.

§ 117. 1. περὶ δὲ τῶν βιωτικῶν, 'concerning matters touching different kinds of lives', practically 'concerning morals' or 'ethics': cf. *βίοι*, as a title of a work of Epicurus, in § 119.

3. πρότερον δέ: it looks almost as if the third letter originally followed here, but the discussion of the 'wise man' was put in subsequently. The section is rather difficult and loose in its construction.

ἃ τε αὐτῷ: Usener justly observes that one would expect ἃ αὐτῷ τε: it is a very loose piece of writing as it stands.

4. περὶ τοῦ σοφίου: the Stoics spoke particularly of the σοφός or *sapiens*, and a good deal in the section has the appearance of polemic against the Stoics.

βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων . . . γίνεσθαι: the sentence has the appearance of a philosophic commonplace: hatred is between equals, envy for superiors, and contempt for inferiors: cf. *Quintilian* xii. 8 'nam pluri-

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on what

mum refert, invidia reus an odio an contemptu laboret, quorum fere pars prima superiores, proxima pares, tertia humiliores premit'.

8. *πάθει μάλλον* . . . *πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν*: a difficult passage, which has been very variously treated and understood. Usener would prefer to read *μὴν* for *μᾶλλον* (p. xxviii) and suggests (p. 334) that before *οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι* something like *τὰς τοῦ βίου περιστάσεις* has fallen out: 'It is true that he will be constrained by passions, but the circumstances of life would be no impediment to wisdom'. This is a little inconsequent. Kochalsky, following Usener's hint, reads *μ(ὴν ὥς) ἄλλον συσχεθῆσθαι*, (δ) *οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι* . . . , 'He will be subject to emotions, like any other man, but this would be no obstacle'. Bignone points out that the Epicurean sage will not let himself be carried away by intense passions, but that there are certain affections, such as friendship and the grief for departed friends, to which he is peculiarly liable, and would therefore read *πάθεισι (τισι) μᾶλλον*. It is difficult to be certain, but I am inclined to think *πάθεισι* is used here in the technical Epicurean sense: 'the wise man will feel pleasure and pain more acutely', because of his education and consequent susceptibility. In that case the MS. text may be kept, but Kochalsky's connecting (δ) seems necessary to give the passage some kind of coherence.

§ 118. 1. *κἂν στρεβλωθῇ* . . . *εὐδαίμονα*. Bignone notices that this paradox was common to the Stoics and Epicureans. Usener has collected evidence for it among the latter (p. 338).

3. *διατελεῖν εὐλογοῦντα*, the emendation of Kochalsky, seems to me to get nearest to the required sense. But it is not palaeographically a satisfactory correction of *διὰ τε δὲ οὐχ*, which with variations in the division of the words is the MS. text. Usener proposed *διὰ τε λόγου (καὶ διὰ πράξεως ἰέναι)*, apparently meaning 'he will act similarly both in word and deed towards friends present or absent': but it is a very strange expression, and is not, I think, improved by Bignone's suggestion *εἶναι* or *γίνεσθαι* for *ἰέναι*. The true solution has not yet been found and it looks as if the corruption were extensive.

ὅτε μέντοι . . . *οἰμώξει*: a return to the subject of the first sentence of the section: the arrangement all through this passage is very scrappy and incoherent.

4. *μύξει καὶ οἰμώξει*: as the MSS. are fairly evenly divided between *μύξει* and *οἰμώξει* but show a great preponderance for *οἰμώξει* over the present, it seems better to read the future in both cases. Present and future are used indifferently all through this section.

5. *Διογένης*: sc. of Tarsus: cf. § 26. 1.

7. *τῶν σπουδαίων* must be right as against *τὸν σπουδαῖον* of the majority of MSS., but the expression is not natural.

9. *οὐδὲ θεόπεμπτον εἶναι τὸν ἔρῳτα*: cf. Lucr. iv. 1278:

*nec divinitus interdum Venerisque sagittis
deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur.*

ἐν τῷ . . . Aldobrandinus supplies the number 'the twelfth book', but on what authority is not known.

10. οὐδὲ ῥητορεύσειν καλῶς: Epicurus had a strong dislike for rhetoric, which he no doubt thought tended to deal with φωναὶ κεναί.

συνουσίη . . . ὤνησε (*fr.* 8), with φασιν parenthetical, seems to be indicated by the MS. text. Usener having introduced συνουσίην then reports that the MSS. unanimously read ὤνησε, 'solita negligentia', for ὀνήσαι: this is surely uncritical.

§ 119. 4. διατραπήσεσθαι τινας, 'will feel shame in the presence of some', i.e. the respect due to distinguished persons.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐπηρεάσειν, 'and certainly will not insult them in his cups'. The MSS. have τηρήσειν, which Usener retains and Bignone translates 'will not continue in drunkenness', but he admits in his note that there is no evidence for such a meaning of τηρήσειν. Hermann suggested ληρήσειν, 'he will not talk nonsense in his cups', which is poor sense. Kochalsky's amplification is not convincing, τήρησιν κοσμίον being a most unnatural expression. I incline to connect the clause with the preceding and to read ἐπηρεάσειν, a rather unusual word which might be corrupted to τηρήσειν: the verb is constructed with acc. in Arist. *Pol.* v. 10. 15.

6. οὐδὲ πολιτεύεται: Epicurus both recommended and practised abstention from public life on the ground that it was destructive of ἀταραξία.

8. (οὐ) μεταλλάξει αὐτὸν τὸν βίον, 'he will not put an end to his life altogether'. This is perhaps a rather hazardous conjecture for μετάξει αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, but the corruption is deep-seated. For the expression cf. Isocr. 119 B, 192 A. Usener reads καταξιοῖ αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, 'he still thinks himself fit to live', Bignone prefers the text of f μετέξει αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, 'he will retain a part in life', which presumably carries with it the change of πηρωθεῖς to πηρωθέντα. Kochalsky has a characteristic amplification μετ' ἀταραξίας ἐξάξει αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, 'he will quietly remove himself from life', but this is surely the opposite of the sense required: the true Epicurean will endure, though blinded.

§ 120^a. 2. οὐ πανηγυριεῖν δέ: another instance of Epicurus' distrust of rhetoric: see § 118.

καὶ κτήσεως . . . τοῦ μέλλοντος: the Epicurean sage must be a practical man. Cf. *Sent. Vat.* xli ἅμα δεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι.

3. φιλαγρήσειν: a pleasant and rather modern touch in the sage.

4. φίλον τε οὐδένα προήσεσθαι is Bignone's correction for the MS. κτήσεσθαι: cf. § 118. 2. Usener made the violent change φίλην γὰρ οὐδένα κτήσεσθαι, 'for no one will find fortune a constant friend'. Kochalsky reads ἀποκτήσεσθαι in the same sense as Bignone's text, but the word is unnatural and apparently otherwise unknown except in ecclesiastical Greek.

εὐδοξίας . . . καταφρονήσεσθαι: for the Epicurean view of worldly reputation see K. Δ. vii.

6. ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις, 'at public festivals', and especially religious ceremonies. That this is the meaning Bignone has shown by reference

to Plut. *contr. Epic. Beat.* 13. 1095 c, where it is said that the sage will take special pleasure in recitations and the Dionysiac festivals: we may compare what is said of Epicurus' own 'devotion to the gods' in § 10. Kochalsky perversely translates, 'he will specially have friends in his philosophical speculations'.

§ 121^b. Bignone has, I think, quite conclusively shown that this passage and that which precedes it in the MSS. ἀμαρτήματα . . . ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν should be transposed. As the section stands in the MSS. a passage on the general moral tenets of the Epicureans is interposed without introduction between two passages descriptive of the 'wise men'. By the transposition the sequence is restored. This is strongly confirmed by the words which come at the end of the two passages respectively. (1) μετιτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν in the MSS. is out of place and is followed by the further description of the σοφός, εἰκόνας τε ἀναθῆσθαι κτλ.: with the transposition it is brought to its natural place just before the third letter. (2) τὸ ἐξῆς δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς is almost meaningless as it stands: with the transposition τὸ ἐξῆς is the direction to the scribe to include the passage about the moral tenets, which, as Bignone supposes, was written, probably by Laertius himself, as an adscript, δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς are the first words of the passage which give both meaning and construction to ἀμαρτήματα ἀνισα εἶναι.

Usener perceived that there was dislocation but wrongly referred the note τὸ ἐξῆς δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς to the third letter, which followed, and regarded the second passage on the σοφός, εἰκόνας τε ἀναθῆσθαι, as the adscript: he then had to suppose a lengthy lacuna before ἀμαρτήματα containing a summary of the whole Epicurean position.

1. εἰ ἔχοι, ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίη: the MSS. have σχοίης, of which Kühn's σχοίη is a certain correction. Bignone has shown that no further correction is necessary: 'he will set up statues (of others), but whether he has one himself, he will be indifferent'. This is confirmed by the scholium to K. Δ. xxix, when in giving examples of the division of pleasures it is said οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ' ἀναγκαίας, ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις. Usener taking the words to refer to some other trait of the σοφός, supposed something lost before εἰ ἔχοι and suggested πλοῦτον or τέκνα: Kochalsky would prefer οἰκῆσθαι. But no addition is necessary.

2. διαλέξασθαι: as the aorist infinitive is read by three of the MSS., there seems no need with Usener to accept the solecism ὁρθῶς ἂν . . . διαλέξεσθαι: Cobet bracketed ἂν, but it seems simpler to read the aorist.

3. ἐνεργεῖα is Usener's correction of the MS. ἐνεργεῖν: he will not 'in practice' make poems. We ought perhaps to accept Kochalsky's δὲ for τε, as a contrast with the previous clause is wanted.

οὐκ εἶναι τε ἕτερον ἑτέρου σοφώτερον. Bignone explains that, as the aim of Epicureanism was purely practical and the doctrine was laid down once for all by the founder, any idea of progress or superiority of one Epicurean thinker over another is impossible. οὐκ εἶναι was

accepted by the old editors from the οὐκ εἶναι τε of B. The majority of the MSS. have οὐ κινεῖται, whence Usener reads οὐ κινεῖσθαι, of which I cannot make any satisfactory sense.

9. καὶ καθ' ὅνους δὲ ὅμοιον ἔσεσθαι: cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 135. 5 τὰτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενή μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐθ' ὕπαρ οὐτ' ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ.

11. τὸ ἐξῆς, on Bignone's theory, which I follow is a direction to the scribe, to add in the text the section 120. 5-10 which was originally written in the margin, and was wrongly inserted above.

δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς are similarly the opening words of this short section on Epicurean tenets and are to be read continuously with ἀμαρτήματα κτλ.

§ 120^b. 1. ἀμαρτήματα ἄνισα εἶναι: if δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς be read in connexion with these words it is not necessary to suppose any loss, though the transition is a little abrupt. Editors before Bignone taking them in their place in the MSS. after ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις were compelled to think that something had dropped out. Cobet read <τὰ> ἀμαρτήματα and Usener would supply <τὰ κατορθώματα καὶ τὰ> ἀμαρτήματα which Kochalsky adopts in his translation. But Bignone has shown (1) that the article is not required, because the Epicureans did not maintain that *all* faults were unequal: some may be equal; (2) that the addition of τὰ κατορθώματα is unnecessary, as in other passages (e.g. D. L. vii. 120; Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 95) it is the equality or inequality of sins alone which is in question, and indeed Epicurus, holding that no sage could be wiser than another, would not mind recognizing equality in good deeds. The argument is of course directed against the Stoic doctrine of the equality of all ἀμαρτήματα.

5. συνίστασθαι . . . ἐκπεπληρωμένοις: the words in the MSS. are clearly corrupt, but it is unnecessary to do more than emend ἐκπεπληρων with Bignone to ἐκπεπληρωμένοις. Those who are 'complete in their pleasures' are the wise, and they alone, according to Epicurus (§ 118, cf. K. Δ. xl), are capable of having the fullest friendship. Usener unnecessarily read συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς ἐκπεπληρωμένην, 'in a community of interests which is made complete by the greatest pleasures'.

§ 121^a. 1. τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν . . . ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν: one would naturally take this contrast to be between the perfect happiness of the gods which knows no increase or diminution and human happiness, which is a balance between pleasures added and lost. This was the view of Meibom who emended καὶ τὴν (ἀνθρωπίνην), ἔχουσαν προσθήκην . . . But this is not good Epicureanism: for Epicurus the perfect human happiness, the complete removal of pain, was equal to that of the gods (cf. e.g. Lucr. iii. 322 'ut nil impediatur dignam dis degere vitam'). Bignone is therefore right in supposing the contrast to be between the Epicurean ideal of happiness and that commonly held by men.

4. μετέπειτα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολήν: these words now fall into their natural place.

§ 135. 7. ἐν τῇ μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ: the 'Lesser Summary' is usually taken to be the letter to Herodotus in which there is no reference to prophecy or divination. Gassendi therefore proposed to emend to μακρᾷ, but it is possible either that a passage on the subject has dropped out of the letter, or that the compilers have here given a wrong reference.

8. μαντική . . . γινόμενα (*fr.* 3): the phrase is difficult and in any case very compendious. The thought appears to be: since events are regulated by natural laws there can be no supernatural revelation; even if there were, the events which occur do not concern the true Epicurean, for he has the regulation of his life in his own hands: cf. *Ep. ad Men.* § 133 τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον.

9. οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς, 'nothing to us' appears to be the sense. But this is a very unusual meaning of παρὰ, which after οὐδὲν, &c., usually means 'in comparison with'. Meibom accordingly read πρὸς, which would be normal. Bignone, comparing τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, cited above, would read οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, 'nothing in comparison with that which is in our control', which is attractive, but probably unnecessary.

§ 136. 1. διαφέρεται δὲ . . . ἡδονῆς. The Cyrenaics, like Epicurus, selected pleasure as the 'end', but attached a quite different meaning. Epicurus held that there were two kinds of pleasures, the 'static' (καταστηματική), which consisted in the calm resulting from the complete removal of pain, and the 'kinetic', which could not increase pleasure but only give it variation. The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, regarded 'static' pleasure as purely indifferent, and 'kinetic' pleasure was their aim: thus they approached more nearly to the popular conception of Epicureanism.

3. ἀμφοτέρα cannot be right by itself: the older editors altered it so as to refer to the two ἡδοναί mentioned above, Meibom to ἀμφοτέραν and Gassendi to ἀμφοτέρας. Usener suggested more probably that a neuter word had been lost, and Bignone's supplement γένη is more likely than Kochalsky's σχήματα.

5. φίλους: there seems no reason to take Gassendi's correction φιλοσόφους.

8. δέ: again Usener's suggestion διχῶς is gratuitous.

11. εὐφροσύνη must here denote some violent form of pleasurable experience, and Bignone may be right in supposing a reference to its use of the feelings of banqueters in Hom. *Od.* ix. 5 ff.:

οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γέ τί φημι τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι
ἢ ὅτ' ἂν εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχῃ κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα,
δαιτυμόνες δ' ἂν δώματ' . . . κτλ.

§ 137. 4. τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν . . . τὸ μέλλον: for this idea that pleasures can be varied, though not increased, by duration, compare K. Δ. ix and the opening (§ 122) of the letter to Menoeceus. The Cyrenaics did not 'look before and after', but regarded only the intensity of the pleasure at the moment of its occurrence (μονόχρονος ἡδονή).

5. τῆς ψυχῆς : Casaubon's insertion of τὰς is not necessary in the very loose writing of these notes.

6. τῷ τὰ ζῶα . . . χωρὶς λόγου : an interesting appeal to experience to support the central moral doctrine of Epicureanism.

9. ἵνα καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς . . . : the reference is to Soph. *Trach.* 787, 788 :

βοῶν, ἰύζων ἀμφὶ δ' ἐκτύπουν πέτραι,
Λοκρῶν τ' ὄρειοι πρῶνες Εὐβοίας τ' ἄκρα.

10. χιτῶνος must be right; and the χεῖμωνος of P¹ a mere error. Diogenes is clearly making the quotation from memory, and having used βοᾷ as the introductory verb, substitutes something for the participle βοῶν at the beginning of the line. But the MS. δάκνων can hardly be right, nor are the older conjectures δεινῶς and λάσκων probable. Kochalsky would read δάκεων, going after ὑπό, 'when he is being devoured by the biting of the shirt', βοᾷ then being part of the quotation : but the arrangement of the words is very awkward, and δάκεων in this sense improbable. Casaubon's δακρύων seems an obvious and simple correction.

11. ἔστενον : again by memory for Sophocles' ἐκτύπουν.

§ 138. 1. οὐ δι' αὐτὰς must be the right reading, though it has been corrupted in some of the MSS.

3. διαγωγὴν . . . ἀγωγὴν, 'education is a way of life', a means διὰγειν τὸν βίον, a process that must be continued from age to youth. So Kochalsky, who translates 'education continues over the whole of life'. This is the natural meaning derived from the ordinary sense of διάγειν Bignone, connecting it apparently with a transitive sense of the verb, translates 'direction'.

4. ἀχώριστον . . . μόνην : cf. K. Δ. v and *Ep. ad Men.* § 132.

5. βρωτά, 'things to eat', is the reading of the majority of the MSS. and might well be taken as a typical example of χωριστὰ ἀγαθὰ : food is a necessity to life, but βρωτά, particular foods, may be done without. Usener suggests βρωτά τινα, but in the very rough style of Diogenes' notes this is hardly necessary. B¹F read βροτά, 'mortal things', which Bignone prefers, pointing out that these two MSS. are the chief representatives of the two classes. He translates 'mortal goods', and for the idea refers to K. Δ. v and *Ep. ad Men.* § 132 and § 135 : but the support is slight and, in spite of Bignone's argument that in his maxims Epicurus is apt to use words of poetic colouring, the expression would be very strange.

6-10 are an introduction to the Κύριαι Δόξαι, which Diogenes regards as the 'crown' of all Epicurus' work.

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